linux-dev/arch/arm64/tools/cpucaps, branch linus/master

Merge branch kvm-arm64/wfxt into kvmarm-master/next

2022-05-04T08:42:16Z

* kvm-arm64/wfxt: : . : Add support for the WFET/WFIT instructions that provide the same : service as WFE/WFI, only with a timeout. : . KVM: arm64: Expose the WFXT feature to guests KVM: arm64: Offer early resume for non-blocking WFxT instructions KVM: arm64: Handle blocking WFIT instruction KVM: arm64: Introduce kvm_counter_compute_delta() helper KVM: arm64: Simplify kvm_cpu_has_pending_timer() arm64: Use WFxT for __delay() when possible arm64: Add wfet()/wfit() helpers arm64: Add HWCAP advertising FEAT_WFXT arm64: Add RV and RN fields for ESR_ELx_WFx_ISS arm64: Expand ESR_ELx_WFx_ISS_TI to match its ARMv8.7 definition Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier

arm64/sme: Basic enumeration support

2022-04-22T17:50:49Z

This patch introduces basic cpufeature support for discovering the presence of the Scalable Matrix Extension. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220419112247.711548-9-broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas

arm64: Add HWCAP advertising FEAT_WFXT

2022-04-20T12:24:44Z

In order to allow userspace to enjoy WFET, add a new HWCAP that advertises it when available. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Acked-by: Catalin Marinas Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220419182755.601427-9-maz@kernel.org

Merge branch 'for-next/spectre-bhb' into for-next/core

2022-03-14T19:08:31Z

Merge in the latest Spectre mess to fix up conflicts with what was already queued for 5.18 when the embargo finally lifted. * for-next/spectre-bhb: (21 commits) arm64: Do not include __READ_ONCE() block in assembly files arm64: proton-pack: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting arm64: Use the clearbhb instruction in mitigations KVM: arm64: Allow SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 to be discovered and migrated arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels arm64: proton-pack: Report Spectre-BHB vulnerabilities as part of Spectre-v2 arm64: Add percpu vectors for EL1 arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline arm64: entry: Add vectors that have the bhb mitigation sequences arm64: entry: Add non-kpti __bp_harden_el1_vectors for mitigations arm64: entry: Allow the trampoline text to occupy multiple pages arm64: entry: Make the kpti trampoline's kpti sequence optional arm64: entry: Move trampoline macros out of ifdef'd section arm64: entry: Don't assume tramp_vectors is the start of the vectors arm64: entry: Allow tramp_alias to access symbols after the 4K boundary arm64: entry: Move the trampoline data page before the text page arm64: entry: Free up another register on kpti's tramp_exit path arm64: entry: Make the trampoline cleanup optional KVM: arm64: Allow indirect vectors to be used without SPECTRE_V3A arm64: spectre: Rename spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit ...

arm64: Add support of PAuth QARMA3 architected algorithm

2022-02-25T13:38:52Z

QARMA3 is relaxed version of the QARMA5 algorithm which expected to reduce the latency of calculation while still delivering a suitable level of security. Support for QARMA3 can be discovered via ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 APA3, bits [15:12] Indicates whether the QARMA3 algorithm is implemented in the PE for address authentication in AArch64 state. GPA3, bits [11:8] Indicates whether the QARMA3 algorithm is implemented in the PE for generic code authentication in AArch64 state. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin Acked-by: Marc Zyngier Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220224124952.119612-4-vladimir.murzin@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon

arm64: cpufeature: Mark existing PAuth architected algorithm as QARMA5

2022-02-25T13:38:51Z

In preparation of supporting PAuth QARMA3 architected algorithm mark existing one as QARMA5, so we can distingwish between two. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin Acked-by: Marc Zyngier Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220224124952.119612-3-vladimir.murzin@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon

arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels

2022-02-24T13:58:52Z

Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can make use of branch history to influence future speculation. When taking an exception from user-space, a sequence of branches or a firmware call overwrites or invalidates the branch history. The sequence of branches is added to the vectors, and should appear before the first indirect branch. For systems using KPTI the sequence is added to the kpti trampoline where it has a free register as the exit from the trampoline is via a 'ret'. For systems not using KPTI, the same register tricks are used to free up a register in the vectors. For the firmware call, arch-workaround-3 clobbers 4 registers, so there is no choice but to save them to the EL1 stack. This only happens for entry from EL0, so if we take an exception due to the stack access, it will not become re-entrant. For KVM, the existing branch-predictor-hardening vectors are used. When a spectre version of these vectors is in use, the firmware call is sufficient to mitigate against Spectre-BHB. For the non-spectre versions, the sequence of branches is added to the indirect vector. Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: James Morse

KVM: arm64: Workaround Cortex-A510's single-step and PAC trap errata

2022-02-03T09:22:30Z

Cortex-A510's erratum #2077057 causes SPSR_EL2 to be corrupted when single-stepping authenticated ERET instructions. A single step is expected, but a pointer authentication trap is taken instead. The erratum causes SPSR_EL1 to be copied to SPSR_EL2, which could allow EL1 to cause a return to EL2 with a guest controlled ELR_EL2. Because the conditions require an ERET into active-not-pending state, this is only a problem for the EL2 when EL2 is stepping EL1. In this case the previous SPSR_EL2 value is preserved in struct kvm_vcpu, and can be restored. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 53960faf2b73: arm64: Add Cortex-A510 CPU part definition Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morse [maz: fixup cpucaps ordering] Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220127122052.1584324-5-james.morse@arm.com

arm64: errata: Add detection for TRBE trace data corruption

2022-01-27T19:01:53Z

TRBE implementations affected by Arm erratum #1902691 might corrupt trace data or deadlock, when it's being written into the memory. So effectively TRBE is broken and hence cannot be used to capture trace data. This adds a new errata ARM64_ERRATUM_1902691 in arm64 errata framework. Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Will Deacon Cc: Mathieu Poirier Cc: Suzuki Poulose Cc: coresight@lists.linaro.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose Acked-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1643120437-14352-5-git-send-email-anshuman.khandual@arm.com Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier

arm64: errata: Add detection for TRBE invalid prohibited states

2022-01-27T19:01:53Z

TRBE implementations affected by Arm erratum #2038923 might get TRBE into an inconsistent view on whether trace is prohibited within the CPU. As a result, the trace buffer or trace buffer state might be corrupted. This happens after TRBE buffer has been enabled by setting TRBLIMITR_EL1.E, followed by just a single context synchronization event before execution changes from a context, in which trace is prohibited to one where it isn't, or vice versa. In these mentioned conditions, the view of whether trace is prohibited is inconsistent between parts of the CPU, and the trace buffer or the trace buffer state might be corrupted. This adds a new errata ARM64_ERRATUM_2038923 in arm64 errata framework. Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Will Deacon Cc: Mathieu Poirier Cc: Suzuki Poulose Cc: coresight@lists.linaro.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose Acked-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1643120437-14352-4-git-send-email-anshuman.khandual@arm.com Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier