<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-dev/arch/x86/mm/Makefile, branch master</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel development work - see feature branches</subtitle>
<id>https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/atom/arch/x86/mm/Makefile?h=master</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/atom/arch/x86/mm/Makefile?h=master'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/'/>
<updated>2022-10-03T21:03:26Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>x86: kmsan: handle CPU entry area</title>
<updated>2022-10-03T21:03:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Potapenko</name>
<email>glider@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-28T12:32:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/commit/?id=ce732a7520b093091c345cba1b84542d1abd83ed'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ce732a7520b093091c345cba1b84542d1abd83ed</id>
<content type='text'>
Among other data, CPU entry area holds exception stacks, so addresses from
this area can be passed to kmsan_get_metadata().

This previously led to kmsan_get_metadata() returning NULL, which in turn
resulted in a warning that triggered further attempts to call
kmsan_get_metadata() in the exception context, which quickly exhausted the
exception stack.

This patch allocates shadow and origin for the CPU entry area on x86 and
introduces arch_kmsan_get_meta_or_null(), which performs arch-specific
metadata mapping.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220928123219.1101883-1-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Fixes: 21d723a7c1409 ("kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core")
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich &lt;iii@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: kmsan: disable instrumentation of unsupported code</title>
<updated>2022-10-03T21:03:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Potapenko</name>
<email>glider@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-15T15:04:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/commit/?id=93324e6842148cfdb44d1437fb586b957ace1f8c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:93324e6842148cfdb44d1437fb586b957ace1f8c</id>
<content type='text'>
Instrumenting some files with KMSAN will result in kernel being unable to
link, boot or crashing at runtime for various reasons (e.g.  infinite
recursion caused by instrumentation hooks calling instrumented code
again).

Completely omit KMSAN instrumentation in the following places:
 - arch/x86/boot and arch/x86/realmode/rm, as KMSAN doesn't work for i386;
 - arch/x86/entry/vdso, which isn't linked with KMSAN runtime;
 - three files in arch/x86/kernel - boot problems;
 - arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c - recursion.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-33-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich &lt;iii@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/mm: disable instrumentations of mm/pgprot.c</title>
<updated>2022-09-11T23:22:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Naohiro Aota</name>
<email>naohiro.aota@wdc.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-08-24T08:47:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/commit/?id=818c4fdaa98769ce2d0bf64bc50a6c9af89290ea'/>
<id>urn:sha1:818c4fdaa98769ce2d0bf64bc50a6c9af89290ea</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 4867fbbdd6b3 ("x86/mm: move protection_map[] inside the platform")
moved accesses to protection_map[] from mem_encrypt_amd.c to pgprot.c.  As
a result, the accesses are now targets of KASAN (and other
instrumentations), leading to the crash during the boot process.

Disable the instrumentations for pgprot.c like commit 67bb8e999e0a
("x86/mm: Disable various instrumentations of mm/mem_encrypt.c and
mm/tlb.c").

Before this patch, my AMD machine cannot boot since v6.0-rc1 with KASAN
enabled, without anything printed.  After the change, it successfully
boots up.

Fixes: 4867fbbdd6b3 ("x86/mm: move protection_map[] inside the platform")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220824084726.2174758-1-naohiro.aota@wdc.com
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota &lt;naohiro.aota@wdc.com&gt;
Cc: Anshuman Khandual &lt;anshuman.khandual@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'mm-stable-2022-05-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm</title>
<updated>2022-05-26T19:32:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-26T19:32:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/commit/?id=98931dd95fd489fcbfa97da563505a6f071d7c77'/>
<id>urn:sha1:98931dd95fd489fcbfa97da563505a6f071d7c77</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton:
 "Almost all of MM here. A few things are still getting finished off,
  reviewed, etc.

   - Yang Shi has improved the behaviour of khugepaged collapsing of
     readonly file-backed transparent hugepages.

   - Johannes Weiner has arranged for zswap memory use to be tracked and
     managed on a per-cgroup basis.

   - Munchun Song adds a /proc knob ("hugetlb_optimize_vmemmap") for
     runtime enablement of the recent huge page vmemmap optimization
     feature.

   - Baolin Wang contributes a series to fix some issues around hugetlb
     pagetable invalidation.

   - Zhenwei Pi has fixed some interactions between hwpoisoned pages and
     virtualization.

   - Tong Tiangen has enabled the use of the presently x86-only
     page_table_check debugging feature on arm64 and riscv.

   - David Vernet has done some fixup work on the memcg selftests.

   - Peter Xu has taught userfaultfd to handle write protection faults
     against shmem- and hugetlbfs-backed files.

   - More DAMON development from SeongJae Park - adding online tuning of
     the feature and support for monitoring of fixed virtual address
     ranges. Also easier discovery of which monitoring operations are
     available.

   - Nadav Amit has done some optimization of TLB flushing during
     mprotect().

   - Neil Brown continues to labor away at improving our swap-over-NFS
     support.

   - David Hildenbrand has some fixes to anon page COWing versus
     get_user_pages().

   - Peng Liu fixed some errors in the core hugetlb code.

   - Joao Martins has reduced the amount of memory consumed by
     device-dax's compound devmaps.

   - Some cleanups of the arch-specific pagemap code from Anshuman
     Khandual.

   - Muchun Song has found and fixed some errors in the TLB flushing of
     transparent hugepages.

   - Roman Gushchin has done more work on the memcg selftests.

  ... and, of course, many smaller fixes and cleanups. Notably, the
  customary million cleanup serieses from Miaohe Lin"

* tag 'mm-stable-2022-05-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (381 commits)
  mm: kfence: use PAGE_ALIGNED helper
  selftests: vm: add the "settings" file with timeout variable
  selftests: vm: add "test_hmm.sh" to TEST_FILES
  selftests: vm: check numa_available() before operating "merge_across_nodes" in ksm_tests
  selftests: vm: add migration to the .gitignore
  selftests/vm/pkeys: fix typo in comment
  ksm: fix typo in comment
  selftests: vm: add process_mrelease tests
  Revert "mm/vmscan: never demote for memcg reclaim"
  mm/kfence: print disabling or re-enabling message
  include/trace/events/percpu.h: cleanup for "percpu: improve percpu_alloc_percpu event trace"
  include/trace/events/mmflags.h: cleanup for "tracing: incorrect gfp_t conversion"
  mm: fix a potential infinite loop in start_isolate_page_range()
  MAINTAINERS: add Muchun as co-maintainer for HugeTLB
  zram: fix Kconfig dependency warning
  mm/shmem: fix shmem folio swapoff hang
  cgroup: fix an error handling path in alloc_pagecache_max_30M()
  mm: damon: use HPAGE_PMD_SIZE
  tracing: incorrect isolate_mote_t cast in mm_vmscan_lru_isolate
  nodemask.h: fix compilation error with GCC12
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/mm: enable ARCH_HAS_VM_GET_PAGE_PROT</title>
<updated>2022-04-29T06:16:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-29T06:16:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/commit/?id=e10cd4b00904db127b178859d81f6b5d05d16c67'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e10cd4b00904db127b178859d81f6b5d05d16c67</id>
<content type='text'>
This defines and exports a platform specific custom vm_get_page_prot() via
subscribing ARCH_HAS_VM_GET_PAGE_PROT.  This also unsubscribes from config
ARCH_HAS_FILTER_PGPROT, after dropping off arch_filter_pgprot() and
arch_vm_get_page_prot().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220414062125.609297-6-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual &lt;anshuman.khandual@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Khalid Aziz &lt;khalid.aziz@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu: Remove "noexec"</title>
<updated>2022-04-04T08:17:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov</name>
<email>bp@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-27T11:56:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/commit/?id=76ea0025a214cdf0d2c204f4c21cbffa9fb57c32'/>
<id>urn:sha1:76ea0025a214cdf0d2c204f4c21cbffa9fb57c32</id>
<content type='text'>
It doesn't make any sense to disable non-executable mappings -
security-wise or else.

So rip out that switch and move the remaining code into setup.c and
delete setup_nx.c

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan &lt;jiangshanlai@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220127115626.14179-6-bp@alien8.de
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sev: Move common memory encryption code to mem_encrypt.c</title>
<updated>2021-12-08T15:49:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kirill A. Shutemov</name>
<email>kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-06T13:55:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/commit/?id=20f07a044a76aebaaa0603038857229b5c460d69'/>
<id>urn:sha1:20f07a044a76aebaaa0603038857229b5c460d69</id>
<content type='text'>
SEV and TDX both protect guest memory from host accesses. They both use
guest physical address bits to communicate to the hardware which pages
receive protection or not. SEV and TDX both assume that all I/O (real
devices and virtio) must be performed to pages *without* protection.

To add this support, AMD SEV code forces force_dma_unencrypted() to
decrypt DMA pages when DMA pages were allocated for I/O. It also uses
swiotlb_update_mem_attributes() to update decryption bits in SWIOTLB DMA
buffers.

Since TDX also uses a similar memory sharing design, all the above
mentioned changes can be reused. So move force_dma_unencrypted(),
SWIOTLB update code and virtio changes out of mem_encrypt_amd.c to
mem_encrypt.c.

Introduce a new config option X86_MEM_ENCRYPT that can be selected by
platforms which use x86 memory encryption features (needed in both AMD
SEV and Intel TDX guest platforms).

Since the code is moved from mem_encrypt_amd.c, inherit the same make
flags.

This is preparation for enabling TDX memory encryption support and it
has no functional changes.

Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan &lt;sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan &lt;sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206135505.75045-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sev: Rename mem_encrypt.c to mem_encrypt_amd.c</title>
<updated>2021-12-08T15:49:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan</name>
<email>sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-06T13:55:04Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/commit/?id=dbca5e1a04f8b30aea4e2c91e5045ee6e7c3ef43'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dbca5e1a04f8b30aea4e2c91e5045ee6e7c3ef43</id>
<content type='text'>
Both Intel TDX and AMD SEV implement memory encryption features. But the
bulk of the code in mem_encrypt.c is AMD-specific. Rename the file to
mem_encrypt_amd.c. A subsequent patch will extract the parts that can be
shared by both TDX and AMD SEV/SME into a generic file.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan &lt;sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206135505.75045-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kbuild: remove cc-option test of -fno-stack-protector</title>
<updated>2020-07-07T02:13:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Masahiro Yamada</name>
<email>masahiroy@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-26T18:59:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/commit/?id=893ab00439a45513cae55781fc8e3b7108ee1cda'/>
<id>urn:sha1:893ab00439a45513cae55781fc8e3b7108ee1cda</id>
<content type='text'>
Some Makefiles already pass -fno-stack-protector unconditionally.
For example, arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile, arch/x86/xen/Makefile.

No problem report so far about hard-coding this option. So, we can
assume all supported compilers know -fno-stack-protector.

GCC 4.8 and Clang support this option (https://godbolt.org/z/_HDGzN)

Get rid of cc-option from -fno-stack-protector.

Remove CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE, which is always 'y'.

Note:
arch/mips/vdso/Makefile adds -fno-stack-protector twice, first
unconditionally, and second conditionally. I removed the second one.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;masahiroy@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'x86/kdump' into locking/kcsan, to resolve conflicts</title>
<updated>2020-03-21T08:24:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-21T08:23:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/commit/?id=a4654e9bde4ecedb4921e6c8fe2088114bdff1b3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a4654e9bde4ecedb4921e6c8fe2088114bdff1b3</id>
<content type='text'>
Conflicts:
	arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
