linux-dev/crypto/asymmetric_keys, branch master

KEYS: asymmetric: enforce SM2 signature use pkey algo

2022-08-03T20:56:20Z

The signature verification of SM2 needs to add the Za value and recalculate sig->digest, which requires the detection of the pkey_algo in public_key_verify_signature(). As Eric Biggers said, the pkey_algo field in sig is attacker-controlled and should be use pkey->pkey_algo instead of sig->pkey_algo, and secondly, if sig->pkey_algo is NULL, it will also cause signature verification failure. The software_key_determine_akcipher() already forces the algorithms are matched, so the SM3 algorithm is enforced in the SM2 signature, although this has been checked, we still avoid using any algorithm information in the signature as input. Fixes: 215525639631 ("X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3 certificate verification") Reported-by: Eric Biggers Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

pkcs7: support EC-RDSA/streebog in SignerInfo

2022-08-03T20:56:20Z

Allow using EC-RDSA/streebog in pkcs7 certificates in a similar way to how it's done in the x509 parser. This is needed e.g. for loading kernel modules signed with EC-RDSA. Signed-off-by: Elvira Khabirova Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov Reviewed-by: Tianjia Zhang Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

pkcs7: parser support SM2 and SM3 algorithms combination

2022-08-03T20:56:20Z

Support parsing the message signature of the SM2 and SM3 algorithm combination. This group of algorithms has been well supported. One of the main users is module signature verification. Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

X.509: Support parsing certificate using SM2 algorithm

2022-08-03T20:56:20Z

The SM2-with-SM3 certificate generated by latest openssl no longer reuses the OID_id_ecPublicKey, but directly uses OID_sm2. This patch supports this type of x509 certificate parsing. Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

certs: Add FIPS selftests

2022-06-21T15:05:12Z

Add some selftests for signature checking when FIPS mode is enabled. These need to be done before we start actually using the signature checking for things and must panic the kernel upon failure. Note that the tests must not check the blacklist lest this provide a way to prevent a kernel from booting by installing a hash of a test key in the appropriate UEFI table. Reported-by: Simo Sorce Signed-off-by: David Howells Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce Reviewed-by: Herbert Xu cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165515742832.1554877.2073456606206090838.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/

certs: Move load_certificate_list() to be with the asymmetric keys code

2022-06-21T15:05:06Z

Move load_certificate_list(), which loads a series of binary X.509 certificates from a blob and inserts them as keys into a keyring, to be with the asymmetric keys code that it drives. This makes it easier to add FIPS selftest code in which we need to load up a private keyring for the tests to use. Signed-off-by: David Howells Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce Reviewed-by: Herbert Xu cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165515742145.1554877.13488098107542537203.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/

certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation

2022-05-23T15:47:49Z

Factor out the blacklist hash creation with the get_raw_hash() helper. This also centralize the "tbs" and "bin" prefixes and make them private, which help to manage them consistently. Cc: David Howells Cc: David S. Miller Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Eric Snowberg Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-5-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6

2022-03-21T23:02:36Z

Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu: "API: - hwrng core now credits for low-quality RNG devices. Algorithms: - Optimisations for neon aes on arm/arm64. - Add accelerated crc32_be on arm64. - Add ffdheXYZ(dh) templates. - Disallow hmac keys < 112 bits in FIPS mode. - Add AVX assembly implementation for sm3 on x86. Drivers: - Add missing local_bh_disable calls for crypto_engine callback. - Ensure BH is disabled in crypto_engine callback path. - Fix zero length DMA mappings in ccree. - Add synchronization between mailbox accesses in octeontx2. - Add Xilinx SHA3 driver. - Add support for the TDES IP available on sama7g5 SoC in atmel" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (137 commits) crypto: xilinx - Turn SHA into a tristate and allow COMPILE_TEST MAINTAINERS: update HPRE/SEC2/TRNG driver maintainers list crypto: dh - Remove the unused function dh_safe_prime_dh_alg() hwrng: nomadik - Change clk_disable to clk_disable_unprepare crypto: arm64 - cleanup comments crypto: qat - fix initialization of pfvf rts_map_msg structures crypto: qat - fix initialization of pfvf cap_msg structures crypto: qat - remove unneeded assignment crypto: qat - disable registration of algorithms crypto: hisilicon/qm - fix memset during queues clearing crypto: xilinx: prevent probing on non-xilinx hardware crypto: marvell/octeontx - Use swap() instead of open coding it crypto: ccree - Fix use after free in cc_cipher_exit() crypto: ccp - ccp_dmaengine_unregister release dma channels crypto: octeontx2 - fix missing unlock hwrng: cavium - fix NULL but dereferenced coccicheck error crypto: cavium/nitrox - don't cast parameter in bit operations crypto: vmx - add missing dependencies MAINTAINERS: Add maintainer for Xilinx ZynqMP SHA3 driver crypto: xilinx - Add Xilinx SHA3 driver ...

KEYS: asymmetric: properly validate hash_algo and encoding

2022-03-09T23:47:13Z

It is insecure to allow arbitrary hash algorithms and signature encodings to be used with arbitrary signature algorithms. Notably, ECDSA, ECRDSA, and SM2 all sign/verify raw hash values and don't disambiguate between different hash algorithms like RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padding does. Therefore, they need to be restricted to certain sets of hash algorithms (ideally just one, but in practice small sets are used). Additionally, the encoding is an integral part of modern signature algorithms, and is not supposed to vary. Therefore, tighten the checks of hash_algo and encoding done by software_key_determine_akcipher(). Also rearrange the parameters to software_key_determine_akcipher() to put the public_key first, as this is the most important parameter and it often determines everything else. Fixes: 299f561a6693 ("x509: Add support for parsing x509 certs with ECDSA keys") Fixes: 215525639631 ("X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3 certificate verification") Fixes: 0d7a78643f69 ("crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Stefan Berger Tested-by: Tianjia Zhang Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

KEYS: asymmetric: enforce that sig algo matches key algo

2022-03-09T23:46:59Z

Most callers of public_key_verify_signature(), including most indirect callers via verify_signature() as well as pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(), don't check that public_key_signature::pkey_algo matches public_key::pkey_algo. These should always match. However, a malicious signature could intentionally declare an unintended algorithm. It is essential that such signatures be rejected outright, or that the algorithm of the *key* be used -- not the algorithm of the signature as that would allow attackers to choose the algorithm used. Currently, public_key_verify_signature() correctly uses the key's algorithm when deciding which akcipher to allocate. That's good. However, it uses the signature's algorithm when deciding whether to do the first step of SM2, which is incorrect. Also, v4.19 and older kernels used the signature's algorithm for the entire process. Prevent such errors by making public_key_verify_signature() enforce that the signature's algorithm (if given) matches the key's algorithm. Also remove two checks of this done by callers, which are now redundant. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Stefan Berger Tested-by: Tianjia Zhang Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen