linux-dev/drivers/virt, branch linus/master

Merge tag 'char-misc-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc

2022-06-03T18:36:34Z

Pull char / misc / other smaller driver subsystem updates from Greg KH: "Here is the large set of char, misc, and other driver subsystem updates for 5.19-rc1. The merge request for this has been delayed as I wanted to get lots of linux-next testing due to some late arrivals of changes for the habannalabs driver. Highlights of this merge are: - habanalabs driver updates for new hardware types and fixes and other updates - IIO driver tree merge which includes loads of new IIO drivers and cleanups and additions - PHY driver tree merge with new drivers and small updates to existing ones - interconnect driver tree merge with fixes and updates - soundwire driver tree merge with some small fixes - coresight driver tree merge with small fixes and updates - mhi bus driver tree merge with lots of updates and new device support - firmware driver updates - fpga driver updates - lkdtm driver updates (with a merge conflict, more on that below) - extcon driver tree merge with small updates - lots of other tiny driver updates and fixes and cleanups, full details in the shortlog. All of these have been in linux-next for almost 2 weeks with no reported problems" * tag 'char-misc-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (387 commits) habanalabs: use separate structure info for each error collect data habanalabs: fix missing handle shift during mmap habanalabs: remove hdev from hl_ctx_get args habanalabs: do MMU prefetch as deferred work habanalabs: order memory manager messages habanalabs: return -EFAULT on copy_to_user error habanalabs: use NULL for eventfd habanalabs: update firmware header habanalabs: add support for notification via eventfd habanalabs: add topic to memory manager buffer habanalabs: handle race in driver fini habanalabs: add device memory scrub ability through debugfs habanalabs: use unified memory manager for CB flow habanalabs: unified memory manager new code for CB flow habanalabs/gaudi: set arbitration timeout to a high value habanalabs: add put by handle method to memory manager habanalabs: hide memory manager page shift habanalabs: Add separate poll interval value for protocol habanalabs: use get_task_pid() to take PID habanalabs: add prefetch flag to the MAP operation ...

Merge tag 'size_t-saturating-helpers-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gustavoars/linux

2022-05-25T20:56:57Z

Pull misc hardening updates from Gustavo Silva: "Replace a few open-coded instances with size_t saturating arithmetic helpers" * tag 'size_t-saturating-helpers-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gustavoars/linux: virt: acrn: Prefer array_size and struct_size over open coded arithmetic afs: Prefer struct_size over open coded arithmetic

Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2022-05-24T00:38:01Z

Pull AMD SEV-SNP support from Borislav Petkov: "The third AMD confidential computing feature called Secure Nested Paging. Add to confidential guests the necessary memory integrity protection against malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data replay, memory remapping and others, thus achieving a stronger isolation from the hypervisor. At the core of the functionality is a new structure called a reverse map table (RMP) with which the guest has a say in which pages get assigned to it and gets notified when a page which it owns, gets accessed/modified under the covers so that the guest can take an appropriate action. In addition, add support for the whole machinery needed to launch a SNP guest, details of which is properly explained in each patch. And last but not least, the series refactors and improves parts of the previous SEV support so that the new code is accomodated properly and not just bolted on" * tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (60 commits) x86/entry: Fixup objtool/ibt validation x86/sev: Mark the code returning to user space as syscall gap x86/sev: Annotate stack change in the #VC handler x86/sev: Remove duplicated assignment to variable info x86/sev: Fix address space sparse warning x86/sev: Get the AP jump table address from secrets page x86/sev: Add missing __init annotations to SEV init routines virt: sevguest: Rename the sevguest dir and files to sev-guest virt: sevguest: Change driver name to reflect generic SEV support x86/boot: Put globals that are accessed early into the .data section x86/boot: Add an efi.h header for the decompressor virt: sevguest: Fix bool function returning negative value virt: sevguest: Fix return value check in alloc_shared_pages() x86/sev-es: Replace open-coded hlt-loop with sev_es_terminate() virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs ...

x86/sev: Get the AP jump table address from secrets page

2022-04-27T11:31:38Z

The GHCB specification section 2.7 states that when SEV-SNP is enabled, a guest should not rely on the hypervisor to provide the address of the AP jump table. Instead, if a guest BIOS wants to provide an AP jump table, it should record the address in the SNP secrets page so the guest operating system can obtain it directly from there. Fix this on the guest kernel side by having SNP guests use the AP jump table address published in the secrets page rather than issuing a GHCB request to get it. [ mroth: - Improve error handling when ioremap()/memremap() return NULL - Don't mix function calls with declarations - Add missing __init - Tweak commit message ] Fixes: 0afb6b660a6b ("x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs") Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh Signed-off-by: Michael Roth Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220422135624.114172-3-michael.roth@amd.com

virt: sevguest: Rename the sevguest dir and files to sev-guest

2022-04-27T11:29:56Z

Rename the drivers/virt/coco/sevguest directory and files to sev-guest so as to match the driver name. [ bp: Rename Documentation/virt/coco/sevguest.rst too, as reported by sfr: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427101059.3bf55262@canb.auug.org.au ] Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2f5c9cb16e3a67599c8e3170f6c72c8712c47d53.1650464054.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com

virt: acrn: Prefer array_size and struct_size over open coded arithmetic

2022-04-26T15:20:10Z

As noted in the "Deprecated Interfaces, Language Features, Attributes, and Conventions" documentation [1], size calculations (especially multiplication) should not be performed in memory allocator (or similar) function arguments due to the risk of them overflowing. This could lead to values wrapping around and a smaller allocation being made than the caller was expecting. Using those allocations could lead to linear overflows of heap memory and other misbehaviors. So, use the array_size() helper to do the arithmetic instead of the argument "count * size" in the vzalloc() function. Also, take the opportunity to add a flexible array member of struct vm_memory_region_op to the vm_memory_region_batch structure. And then, change the code accordingly and use the struct_size() helper to do the arithmetic instead of the argument "size + size * count" in the kzalloc function. This code was detected with the help of Coccinelle and audited and fixed manually. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#open-coded-arithmetic-in-allocator-arguments Acked-by: Fei Li Signed-off-by: Len Baker Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva

drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor: remove unneeded `ret` variable in `fsl_hv_open()`

2022-04-26T10:50:31Z

Fix the following coccicheck warning: drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c:662:5-8: Unneeded variable: "ret". Return "0" on line 679. Signed-off-by: Guo Zhengkui Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220426083315.9551-1-guozhengkui@vivo.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

virt: sevguest: Change driver name to reflect generic SEV support

2022-04-21T09:48:24Z

During patch review, it was decided the SNP guest driver name should not be SEV-SNP specific, but should be generic for use with anything SEV. However, this feedback was missed and the driver name, and many of the driver functions and structures, are SEV-SNP name specific. Rename the driver to "sev-guest" (to match the misc device that is created) and update some of the function and structure names, too. While in the file, adjust the one pr_err() message to be a dev_err() message so that the message, if issued, uses the driver name. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/307710bb5515c9088a19fd0b930268c7300479b2.1650464054.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com

virt: sevguest: Fix bool function returning negative value

2022-04-14T11:53:35Z

The function enc_payload() is wrongly declared bool but returns an integer value. Correct it. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: fce96cf04430 ("virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver") Signed-off-by: Haowen Bai Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1649930657-10837-1-git-send-email-baihaowen@meizu.com

virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets

2022-04-13T17:11:20Z

The new efi_secret module exposes the confidential computing (coco) EFI secret area via securityfs interface. When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under /sys/kernel/security), a "secrets/coco" directory is created in securityfs. In it, a file is created for each secret entry. The name of each such file is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is the secret data. This allows applications running in a confidential computing setting to read secrets provided by the guest owner via a secure secret injection mechanism (such as AMD SEV's LAUNCH_SECRET command). Removing (unlinking) files in the "secrets/coco" directory will zero out the secret in memory, and remove the filesystem entry. If the module is removed and loaded again, that secret will not appear in the filesystem. Signed-off-by: Dov Murik Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412212127.154182-3-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel