diff options
authorJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>2017-06-05 05:21:54 +0200
committerJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>2017-07-16 19:18:31 +0200
commitea2d23a76a3a0ba0a56bedbfa7aec18fe42c5422 (patch)
parentcrypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using (diff)
bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH usejd/rng-blocker
This protocol uses lots of complex cryptography that relies on securely generated random numbers. Thus, it's important that the RNG is actually seeded before use. Fortuantely, it appears we're always operating in process context (there are many GFP_KERNEL allocations and other sleeping operations), and so we can simply demand that the RNG is seeded before we use it. We take two strategies in this commit. The first is for the library code that's called from other modules like hci or mgmt: here we just change the call to get_random_bytes_wait, and return the result of the wait to the caller, along with the other error codes of those functions like usual. Then there's the SMP protocol handler itself, which makes many many many calls to get_random_bytes during different phases. For this, rather than have to change all the calls to get_random_bytes_wait and propagate the error result, it's actually enough to just put a single call to wait_for_random_bytes() at the beginning of the handler, to ensure that all the subsequent invocations are safe, without having to actually change them. Likewise, for the random address changing function, we'd rather know early on in the function whether the RNG initialization has been interrupted, rather than later, so we call wait_for_random_bytes() at the top, so that later on the call to get_random_bytes() is acceptable. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org> Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
2 files changed, 20 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_request.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_request.c
index b73ac149de34..6bd916cece6c 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_request.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_request.c
@@ -1406,6 +1406,12 @@ int hci_update_random_address(struct hci_request *req, bool require_privacy,
struct hci_dev *hdev = req->hdev;
int err;
+ if (require_privacy) {
+ err = wait_for_random_bytes();
+ if (unlikely(err))
+ return err;
+ }
/* If privacy is enabled use a resolvable private address. If
* current RPA has expired or there is something else than
* the current RPA in use, then generate a new one.
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index a0ef89772c36..75c1f30156d4 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -538,7 +538,9 @@ int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
smp = chan->data;
- get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
+ err = get_random_bytes_wait(&rpa->b[3], 3);
+ if (unlikely(err))
+ return err;
rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */
rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */
@@ -571,7 +573,9 @@ int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
} else {
while (true) {
/* Seed private key with random number */
- get_random_bytes(smp->local_sk, 32);
+ err = get_random_bytes_wait(smp->local_sk, 32);
+ if (unlikely(err))
+ return err;
/* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
if (!generate_ecdh_keys(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk))
@@ -590,7 +594,9 @@ int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
SMP_DBG("OOB Private Key: %32phN", smp->local_sk);
- get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16);
+ err = get_random_bytes_wait(smp->local_rand, 16);
+ if (unlikely(err))
+ return err;
err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->local_pk,
smp->local_rand, 0, hash);
@@ -2832,7 +2838,11 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
struct smp_chan *smp;
__u8 code, reason;
- int err = 0;
+ int err;
+ err = wait_for_random_bytes();
+ if (unlikely(err))
+ return err;
if (skb->len < 1)
return -EILSEQ;