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authorJulien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>2015-09-11 17:25:59 +0100
committerRussell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>2015-09-11 18:50:03 +0100
commit0b61f2c0f37983c98ed4207f3f5e265938371b68 (patch)
tree3dd23439d981eb8e93da117a6a563c797d4fe08c /arch/arm/xen/hypercall.S
parentARM: domains: add memory dependencies to get_domain/set_domain (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-0b61f2c0f37983c98ed4207f3f5e265938371b68.tar.xz
linux-dev-0b61f2c0f37983c98ed4207f3f5e265938371b68.zip
arm/xen: Enable user access to the kernel before issuing a privcmd call
When Xen is copying data to/from the guest it will check if the kernel has the right to do the access. If not, the hypercall will return an error. After the commit a5e090acbf545c0a3b04080f8a488b17ec41fe02 "ARM: software-based privileged-no-access support", the kernel can't access any longer the user space by default. This will result to fail on every hypercall made by the userspace (i.e via privcmd). We have to enable the userspace access and then restore the correct permission every time the privcmd is used to made an hypercall. I didn't find generic helpers to do a these operations, so the change is only arm32 specific. Reported-by: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm/xen/hypercall.S')
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/xen/hypercall.S15
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm/xen/hypercall.S b/arch/arm/xen/hypercall.S
index f00e08075938..10fd99c568c6 100644
--- a/arch/arm/xen/hypercall.S
+++ b/arch/arm/xen/hypercall.S
@@ -98,8 +98,23 @@ ENTRY(privcmd_call)
mov r1, r2
mov r2, r3
ldr r3, [sp, #8]
+ /*
+ * Privcmd calls are issued by the userspace. We need to allow the
+ * kernel to access the userspace memory before issuing the hypercall.
+ */
+ uaccess_enable r4
+
+ /* r4 is loaded now as we use it as scratch register before */
ldr r4, [sp, #4]
__HVC(XEN_IMM)
+
+ /*
+ * Disable userspace access from kernel. This is fine to do it
+ * unconditionally as no set_fs(KERNEL_DS)/set_fs(get_ds()) is
+ * called before.
+ */
+ uaccess_disable r4
+
ldm sp!, {r4}
ret lr
ENDPROC(privcmd_call);