aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>2016-08-11 18:44:50 +0100
committerWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>2016-08-25 18:00:29 +0100
commitcab15ce604e550020bb7115b779013b91bcdbc21 (patch)
tree0ba025b8ad16505532aaa6e1b4cc665473f026fa /arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
parentarm64: kprobe: Always clear pstate.D in breakpoint exception handler (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-cab15ce604e550020bb7115b779013b91bcdbc21.tar.xz
linux-dev-cab15ce604e550020bb7115b779013b91bcdbc21.zip
arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions
The ARMv8 architecture allows execute-only user permissions by clearing the PTE_UXN and PTE_USER bits. However, the kernel running on a CPU implementation without User Access Override (ARMv8.2 onwards) can still access such page, so execute-only page permission does not protect against read(2)/write(2) etc. accesses. Systems requiring such protection must enable features like SECCOMP. This patch changes the arm64 __P100 and __S100 protection_map[] macros to the new __PAGE_EXECONLY attributes. A side effect is that pte_user() no longer triggers for __PAGE_EXECONLY since PTE_USER isn't set. To work around this, the check is done on the PTE_NG bit via the pte_ng() macro. VM_READ is also checked now for page faults. Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h10
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
index e20bd431184a..7ba1cebb64d9 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)];
#define pte_write(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_WRITE))
#define pte_exec(pte) (!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_UXN))
#define pte_cont(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_CONT))
-#define pte_user(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_USER))
+#define pte_ng(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_NG))
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_HW_AFDBM
#define pte_hw_dirty(pte) (pte_write(pte) && !(pte_val(pte) & PTE_RDONLY))
@@ -84,8 +84,8 @@ extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)];
#define pte_dirty(pte) (pte_sw_dirty(pte) || pte_hw_dirty(pte))
#define pte_valid(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_VALID))
-#define pte_valid_not_user(pte) \
- ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER)) == PTE_VALID)
+#define pte_valid_global(pte) \
+ ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_NG)) == PTE_VALID)
#define pte_valid_young(pte) \
((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_AF)) == (PTE_VALID | PTE_AF))
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static inline void set_pte(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte)
* Only if the new pte is valid and kernel, otherwise TLB maintenance
* or update_mmu_cache() have the necessary barriers.
*/
- if (pte_valid_not_user(pte)) {
+ if (pte_valid_global(pte)) {
dsb(ishst);
isb();
}
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static inline void set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
pte_val(pte) &= ~PTE_RDONLY;
else
pte_val(pte) |= PTE_RDONLY;
- if (pte_user(pte) && pte_exec(pte) && !pte_special(pte))
+ if (pte_ng(pte) && pte_exec(pte) && !pte_special(pte))
__sync_icache_dcache(pte, addr);
}