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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-09-27 19:37:27 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-09-27 19:37:27 -0700
commitf1f2f614d535564992f32e720739cb53cf03489f (patch)
tree7c363b95df8d63954e822c98462fd3a9a98794ae /arch
parentMerge tag 'nfsd-5.4' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux (diff)
parentima: ima_api: Use struct_size() in kzalloc() (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-f1f2f614d535564992f32e720739cb53cf03489f.tar.xz
linux-dev-f1f2f614d535564992f32e720739cb53cf03489f.zip
Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar: "The major feature in this time is IMA support for measuring and appraising appended file signatures. In addition are a couple of bug fixes and code cleanup to use struct_size(). In addition to the PE/COFF and IMA xattr signatures, the kexec kernel image may be signed with an appended signature, using the same scripts/sign-file tool that is used to sign kernel modules. Similarly, the initramfs may contain an appended signature. This contained a lot of refactoring of the existing appended signature verification code, so that IMA could retain the existing framework of calculating the file hash once, storing it in the IMA measurement list and extending the TPM, verifying the file's integrity based on a file hash or signature (eg. xattrs), and adding an audit record containing the file hash, all based on policy. (The IMA support for appended signatures patch set was posted and reviewed 11 times.) The support for appended signature paves the way for adding other signature verification methods, such as fs-verity, based on a single system-wide policy. The file hash used for verifying the signature and the signature, itself, can be included in the IMA measurement list" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: ima_api: Use struct_size() in kzalloc() ima: use struct_size() in kzalloc() sefltest/ima: support appended signatures (modsig) ima: Fix use after free in ima_read_modsig() MODSIGN: make new include file self contained ima: fix freeing ongoing ahash_request ima: always return negative code for error ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig ima: Define ima-modsig template ima: Collect modsig ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement() ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest() PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature() MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions ima: initialize the "template" field with the default template
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/Kconfig2
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c24
2 files changed, 2 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index f933a473b128..68f7c2b16ff7 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
config KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
- depends on KEXEC_FILE && SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+ depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
help
This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
the kexec_file_load() syscall.
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index fbdd3ea73667..1ac9fbc6e01e 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
-#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <asm/boot_data.h>
#include <asm/ipl.h>
@@ -23,28 +23,6 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
};
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
-/*
- * Module signature information block.
- *
- * The constituents of the signature section are, in order:
- *
- * - Signer's name
- * - Key identifier
- * - Signature data
- * - Information block
- */
-struct module_signature {
- u8 algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */
- u8 hash; /* Digest algorithm [0] */
- u8 id_type; /* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */
- u8 signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0] */
- u8 key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0] */
- u8 __pad[3];
- __be32 sig_len; /* Length of signature data */
-};
-
-#define PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2
-
int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
{
const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;