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authorHao Luo <haoluo@google.com>2021-12-16 16:31:50 -0800
committerAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>2021-12-18 13:27:41 -0800
commit34d3a78c681e8e7844b43d1a2f4671a04249c821 (patch)
treed0a60ddfc12cc916d80923b04d80f01ae69c1301 /kernel/bpf/verifier.c
parentbpf: Convert PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL to composable types. (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-34d3a78c681e8e7844b43d1a2f4671a04249c821.tar.xz
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bpf: Make per_cpu_ptr return rdonly PTR_TO_MEM.
Tag the return type of {per, this}_cpu_ptr with RDONLY_MEM. The returned value of this pair of helpers is kernel object, which can not be updated by bpf programs. Previously these two helpers return PTR_OT_MEM for kernel objects of scalar type, which allows one to directly modify the memory. Now with RDONLY_MEM tagging, the verifier will reject programs that write into RDONLY_MEM. Fixes: 63d9b80dcf2c ("bpf: Introducte bpf_this_cpu_ptr()") Fixes: eaa6bcb71ef6 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_per_cpu_ptr()") Fixes: 4976b718c355 ("bpf: Introduce pseudo_btf_id") Signed-off-by: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211217003152.48334-8-haoluo@google.com
Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c30
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 9073337ac66f..f49b3d334f4e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -4399,15 +4399,30 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
}
}
- } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MEM) {
+ } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM) {
+ bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type);
+
+ if (type_may_be_null(reg->type)) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno,
+ reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ if (t == BPF_WRITE && rdonly_mem) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n",
+ regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", value_regno);
return -EACCES;
}
+
err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size,
reg->mem_size, false);
- if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
+ if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (t == BPF_READ || rdonly_mem))
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) {
enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE;
@@ -6654,6 +6669,13 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag;
regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = tsize;
} else {
+ /* MEM_RDONLY may be carried from ret_flag, but it
+ * doesn't apply on PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Fold it, otherwise
+ * it will confuse the check of PTR_TO_BTF_ID in
+ * check_mem_access().
+ */
+ ret_flag &= ~MEM_RDONLY;
+
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag;
regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.ret_btf;
regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id;
@@ -9455,7 +9477,7 @@ static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
dst_reg->type = aux->btf_var.reg_type;
- switch (dst_reg->type) {
+ switch (base_type(dst_reg->type)) {
case PTR_TO_MEM:
dst_reg->mem_size = aux->btf_var.mem_size;
break;
@@ -11678,7 +11700,7 @@ static int check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
err = -EINVAL;
goto err_put;
}
- aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM;
+ aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY;
aux->btf_var.mem_size = tsize;
} else {
aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;