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authorGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>2018-05-03 13:45:58 -0500
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2018-05-04 12:52:47 -0400
commitacf784bd0ce257fe43da7ca266f7a10b837479d2 (patch)
tree8dd84537bf4b37809868b378a7a819437db625ae /net/nsh/nsh.c
parentatm: zatm: Fix potential Spectre v1 (diff)
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net: atm: Fix potential Spectre v1
ioc_data.dev_num can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: net/atm/lec.c:702 lec_vcc_attach() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev_lec' Fix this by sanitizing ioc_data.dev_num before using it to index dev_lec. Also, notice that there is another instance in which array dev_lec is being indexed using ioc_data.dev_num at line 705: lec_vcc_added(netdev_priv(dev_lec[ioc_data.dev_num]), Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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