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authorHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>2006-06-27 13:22:38 -0700
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@sunset.davemloft.net>2006-06-29 16:57:53 -0700
commit576a30eb6453439b3c37ba24455ac7090c247b5a (patch)
treee0c427a61e3de5c93e797c09903d910f6f060e64 /security/commoncap.c
parent[NETFILTER]: statistic match: add missing Kconfig help text (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-576a30eb6453439b3c37ba24455ac7090c247b5a.tar.xz
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[NET]: Added GSO header verification
When GSO packets come from an untrusted source (e.g., a Xen guest domain), we need to verify the header integrity before passing it to the hardware. Since the first step in GSO is to verify the header, we can reuse that code by adding a new bit to gso_type: SKB_GSO_DODGY. Packets with this bit set can only be fed directly to devices with the corresponding bit NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST. If the device doesn't have that bit, then the skb is fed to the GSO engine which will allow the packet to be sent to the hardware if it passes the header check. This patch changes the sg flag to a full features flag. The same method can be used to implement TSO ECN support. We simply have to mark packets with CWR set with SKB_GSO_ECN so that only hardware with a corresponding NETIF_F_TSO_ECN can accept them. The GSO engine can either fully segment the packet, or segment the first MTU and pass the rest to the hardware for further segmentation. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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