diff options
| author |   Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2009-07-31 12:54:11 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer |   James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2009-08-17 15:09:11 +1000 |
| commit | 788084aba2ab7348257597496befcbccabdc98a3 (patch) | |
| tree | 2da42d746d67b16ef705229a1b5a3528ec19c725 /security/commoncap.c | |
| parent | SELinux: call cap_file_mmap in selinux_file_mmap (diff) | |
| download | linux-dev-788084aba2ab7348257597496befcbccabdc98a3.tar.xz linux-dev-788084aba2ab7348257597496befcbccabdc98a3.zip | |
Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory
is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to
ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how
much space the LSM should protect.
The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux
permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by
CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.
This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason
being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux
controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to
map some area of low memory.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 6bcf6e81e547..e3097c0a1311 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, { int ret = 0; - if (addr < mmap_min_addr) { + if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_RAWIO, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */ |