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authorJeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>2015-07-10 17:19:56 -0400
committerPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>2015-07-13 13:31:58 -0400
commitfa1aa143ac4a682c7f5fd52a3cf05f5a6fe44a0a (patch)
tree3f53aa6f35af83370aa7cd7bc25a2f6a2b6b8bbd /security/selinux/include/avc.h
parentsecurity: add ioctl specific auditing to lsm_audit (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-fa1aa143ac4a682c7f5fd52a3cf05f5a6fe44a0a.tar.xz
linux-dev-fa1aa143ac4a682c7f5fd52a3cf05f5a6fe44a0a.zip
selinux: extended permissions for ioctls
Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/include/avc.h')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/avc.h6
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index ddf8eec03f21..db12ff14277b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
}
#define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
+#define AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS 2 /* update extended permissions */
int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
unsigned flags,
@@ -151,6 +152,10 @@ int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
+int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ u8 driver, u8 perm, struct common_audit_data *ad);
+
+
u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
#define AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT 1
@@ -161,6 +166,7 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE 32
#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE 64
#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE 128
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS 256
int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events);