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-rw-r--r--Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy1
-rw-r--r--drivers/base/firmware_class.c74
-rw-r--r--fs/exec.c92
-rw-r--r--include/linux/fs.h15
-rw-r--r--include/linux/ima.h10
-rw-r--r--include/linux/lsm_hooks.h35
-rw-r--r--include/linux/security.h16
-rw-r--r--kernel/kexec_file.c73
-rw-r--r--kernel/module.c68
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/iint.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h49
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c25
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c69
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c120
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c53
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c92
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c115
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c1
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/integrity.h15
-rw-r--r--security/security.c34
22 files changed, 601 insertions, 364 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 0a378a88217a..bb0f9a135e21 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ Description:
base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
[FIRMWARE_CHECK]
+ [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK]
mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
[[^]MAY_EXEC]
fsmagic:= hex value
diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
index b9250e564ebf..a414008ea64c 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/async.h>
#include <linux/pm.h>
#include <linux/suspend.h>
@@ -291,40 +292,19 @@ static const char * const fw_path[] = {
module_param_string(path, fw_path_para, sizeof(fw_path_para), 0644);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(path, "customized firmware image search path with a higher priority than default path");
-static int fw_read_file_contents(struct file *file, struct firmware_buf *fw_buf)
+static void fw_finish_direct_load(struct device *device,
+ struct firmware_buf *buf)
{
- int size;
- char *buf;
- int rc;
-
- if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
- return -EINVAL;
- size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
- if (size <= 0)
- return -EINVAL;
- buf = vmalloc(size);
- if (!buf)
- return -ENOMEM;
- rc = kernel_read(file, 0, buf, size);
- if (rc != size) {
- if (rc > 0)
- rc = -EIO;
- goto fail;
- }
- rc = security_kernel_fw_from_file(file, buf, size);
- if (rc)
- goto fail;
- fw_buf->data = buf;
- fw_buf->size = size;
- return 0;
-fail:
- vfree(buf);
- return rc;
+ mutex_lock(&fw_lock);
+ set_bit(FW_STATUS_DONE, &buf->status);
+ complete_all(&buf->completion);
+ mutex_unlock(&fw_lock);
}
static int fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device,
struct firmware_buf *buf)
{
+ loff_t size;
int i, len;
int rc = -ENOENT;
char *path;
@@ -334,8 +314,6 @@ static int fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device,
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fw_path); i++) {
- struct file *file;
-
/* skip the unset customized path */
if (!fw_path[i][0])
continue;
@@ -347,28 +325,21 @@ static int fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device,
break;
}
- file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(file))
+ buf->size = 0;
+ rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &buf->data, &size,
+ INT_MAX, READING_FIRMWARE);
+ if (rc) {
+ dev_warn(device, "loading %s failed with error %d\n",
+ path, rc);
continue;
- rc = fw_read_file_contents(file, buf);
- fput(file);
- if (rc)
- dev_warn(device, "firmware, attempted to load %s, but failed with error %d\n",
- path, rc);
- else
- break;
+ }
+ dev_dbg(device, "direct-loading %s\n", buf->fw_id);
+ buf->size = size;
+ fw_finish_direct_load(device, buf);
+ break;
}
__putname(path);
- if (!rc) {
- dev_dbg(device, "firmware: direct-loading firmware %s\n",
- buf->fw_id);
- mutex_lock(&fw_lock);
- set_bit(FW_STATUS_DONE, &buf->status);
- complete_all(&buf->completion);
- mutex_unlock(&fw_lock);
- }
-
return rc;
}
@@ -685,8 +656,9 @@ static ssize_t firmware_loading_store(struct device *dev,
dev_err(dev, "%s: map pages failed\n",
__func__);
else
- rc = security_kernel_fw_from_file(NULL,
- fw_buf->data, fw_buf->size);
+ rc = security_kernel_post_read_file(NULL,
+ fw_buf->data, fw_buf->size,
+ READING_FIRMWARE);
/*
* Same logic as fw_load_abort, only the DONE bit
@@ -1051,7 +1023,7 @@ _request_firmware_prepare(struct firmware **firmware_p, const char *name,
}
if (fw_get_builtin_firmware(firmware, name)) {
- dev_dbg(device, "firmware: using built-in firmware %s\n", name);
+ dev_dbg(device, "using built-in %s\n", name);
return 0; /* assigned */
}
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index dcd4ac7d3f1e..9bdf0edf570d 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
#include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
#include <linux/oom.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
@@ -831,6 +832,97 @@ int kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_read);
+int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
+ loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+ loff_t i_size, pos;
+ ssize_t bytes = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || max_size < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+ if (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)
+ return -EFBIG;
+ if (i_size <= 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *buf = vmalloc(i_size);
+ if (!*buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ pos = 0;
+ while (pos < i_size) {
+ bytes = kernel_read(file, pos, (char *)(*buf) + pos,
+ i_size - pos);
+ if (bytes < 0) {
+ ret = bytes;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (bytes == 0)
+ break;
+ pos += bytes;
+ }
+
+ if (pos != i_size) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, id);
+ if (!ret)
+ *size = pos;
+
+out:
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ vfree(*buf);
+ *buf = NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file);
+
+int kernel_read_file_from_path(char *path, void **buf, loff_t *size,
+ loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+ struct file *file;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!path || !*path)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(file))
+ return PTR_ERR(file);
+
+ ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, size, max_size, id);
+ fput(file);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path);
+
+int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+ struct fd f = fdget(fd);
+ int ret = -EBADF;
+
+ if (!f.file)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, size, max_size, id);
+out:
+ fdput(f);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_fd);
+
ssize_t read_code(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, loff_t pos, size_t len)
{
ssize_t res = vfs_read(file, (void __user *)addr, len, &pos);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index ae681002100a..e514f76db04f 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2576,7 +2576,22 @@ static inline void i_readcount_inc(struct inode *inode)
#endif
extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
+enum kernel_read_file_id {
+ READING_FIRMWARE = 1,
+ READING_MODULE,
+ READING_KEXEC_IMAGE,
+ READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,
+ READING_POLICY,
+ READING_MAX_ID
+};
+
extern int kernel_read(struct file *, loff_t, char *, unsigned long);
+extern int kernel_read_file(struct file *, void **, loff_t *, loff_t,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id);
+extern int kernel_read_file_from_path(char *, void **, loff_t *, loff_t,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id);
+extern int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int, void **, loff_t *, loff_t,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id);
extern ssize_t kernel_write(struct file *, const char *, size_t, loff_t);
extern ssize_t __kernel_write(struct file *, const char *, size_t, loff_t *);
extern struct file * open_exec(const char *);
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 120ccc53fcb7..e6516cbbe9bf 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -18,8 +18,9 @@ extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened);
extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
-extern int ima_module_check(struct file *file);
-extern int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
+extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id);
#else
static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -42,12 +43,13 @@ static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
return 0;
}
-static inline int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
+static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 71969de4058c..cdee11cbcdf1 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -541,25 +541,24 @@
* @inode points to the inode to use as a reference.
* The current task must be the one that nominated @inode.
* Return 0 if successful.
- * @kernel_fw_from_file:
- * Load firmware from userspace (not called for built-in firmware).
- * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing
- * the firmware to load. This argument will be NULL if the firmware
- * was loaded via the uevent-triggered blob-based interface exposed
- * by CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER.
- * @buf pointer to buffer containing firmware contents.
- * @size length of the firmware contents.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @kernel_module_request:
* Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for
* userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
* @kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel
* Return 0 if successful.
- * @kernel_module_from_file:
- * Load a kernel module from userspace.
- * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing
- * the kernel module to load. If the module is being loaded from a blob,
- * this argument will be NULL.
+ * @kernel_read_file:
+ * Read a file specified by userspace.
+ * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read
+ * by the kernel.
+ * @id kernel read file identifier
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @kernel_post_read_file:
+ * Read a file specified by userspace.
+ * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read
+ * by the kernel.
+ * @buf pointer to buffer containing the file contents.
+ * @size length of the file contents.
+ * @id kernel read file identifier
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @task_fix_setuid:
* Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user
@@ -1454,9 +1453,11 @@ union security_list_options {
void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
- int (*kernel_fw_from_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file);
+ int (*kernel_read_file)(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
+ int (*kernel_post_read_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id);
int (*task_fix_setuid)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int flags);
int (*task_setpgid)(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
@@ -1715,9 +1716,9 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct list_head cred_transfer;
struct list_head kernel_act_as;
struct list_head kernel_create_files_as;
- struct list_head kernel_fw_from_file;
+ struct list_head kernel_read_file;
+ struct list_head kernel_post_read_file;
struct list_head kernel_module_request;
- struct list_head kernel_module_from_file;
struct list_head task_fix_setuid;
struct list_head task_setpgid;
struct list_head task_getpgid;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 4824a4ccaf1c..157f0cb1e4d2 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -24,10 +24,12 @@
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
struct linux_binprm;
struct cred;
@@ -298,9 +300,11 @@ int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
-int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file);
+int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
+int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id);
int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int flags);
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
@@ -850,18 +854,20 @@ static inline int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *cred,
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file,
- char *buf, size_t size)
+static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+static inline int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
+static inline int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file,
+ char *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index 007b791f676d..b696c3f3708f 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
@@ -33,65 +34,6 @@ size_t __weak kexec_purgatory_size = 0;
static int kexec_calculate_store_digests(struct kimage *image);
-static int copy_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, unsigned long *buf_len)
-{
- struct fd f = fdget(fd);
- int ret;
- struct kstat stat;
- loff_t pos;
- ssize_t bytes = 0;
-
- if (!f.file)
- return -EBADF;
-
- ret = vfs_getattr(&f.file->f_path, &stat);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
-
- if (stat.size > INT_MAX) {
- ret = -EFBIG;
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* Don't hand 0 to vmalloc, it whines. */
- if (stat.size == 0) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
- *buf = vmalloc(stat.size);
- if (!*buf) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- pos = 0;
- while (pos < stat.size) {
- bytes = kernel_read(f.file, pos, (char *)(*buf) + pos,
- stat.size - pos);
- if (bytes < 0) {
- vfree(*buf);
- ret = bytes;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (bytes == 0)
- break;
- pos += bytes;
- }
-
- if (pos != stat.size) {
- ret = -EBADF;
- vfree(*buf);
- goto out;
- }
-
- *buf_len = pos;
-out:
- fdput(f);
- return ret;
-}
-
/* Architectures can provide this probe function */
int __weak arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
unsigned long buf_len)
@@ -182,16 +124,17 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
{
int ret = 0;
void *ldata;
+ loff_t size;
- ret = copy_file_from_fd(kernel_fd, &image->kernel_buf,
- &image->kernel_buf_len);
+ ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(kernel_fd, &image->kernel_buf,
+ &size, INT_MAX, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
if (ret)
return ret;
+ image->kernel_buf_len = size;
/* Call arch image probe handlers */
ret = arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(image, image->kernel_buf,
image->kernel_buf_len);
-
if (ret)
goto out;
@@ -206,10 +149,12 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
#endif
/* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */
if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) {
- ret = copy_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf,
- &image->initrd_buf_len);
+ ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf,
+ &size, INT_MAX,
+ READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS);
if (ret)
goto out;
+ image->initrd_buf_len = size;
}
if (cmdline_len) {
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 8358f4697c0c..955410928696 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2654,7 +2654,7 @@ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len,
if (info->len < sizeof(*(info->hdr)))
return -ENOEXEC;
- err = security_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
+ err = security_kernel_read_file(NULL, READING_MODULE);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -2672,63 +2672,6 @@ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len,
return 0;
}
-/* Sets info->hdr and info->len. */
-static int copy_module_from_fd(int fd, struct load_info *info)
-{
- struct fd f = fdget(fd);
- int err;
- struct kstat stat;
- loff_t pos;
- ssize_t bytes = 0;
-
- if (!f.file)
- return -ENOEXEC;
-
- err = security_kernel_module_from_file(f.file);
- if (err)
- goto out;
-
- err = vfs_getattr(&f.file->f_path, &stat);
- if (err)
- goto out;
-
- if (stat.size > INT_MAX) {
- err = -EFBIG;
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* Don't hand 0 to vmalloc, it whines. */
- if (stat.size == 0) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
- info->hdr = vmalloc(stat.size);
- if (!info->hdr) {
- err = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- pos = 0;
- while (pos < stat.size) {
- bytes = kernel_read(f.file, pos, (char *)(info->hdr) + pos,
- stat.size - pos);
- if (bytes < 0) {
- vfree(info->hdr);
- err = bytes;
- goto out;
- }
- if (bytes == 0)
- break;
- pos += bytes;
- }
- info->len = pos;
-
-out:
- fdput(f);
- return err;
-}
-
static void free_copy(struct load_info *info)
{
vfree(info->hdr);
@@ -3589,8 +3532,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(init_module, void __user *, umod,
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
{
- int err;
struct load_info info = { };
+ loff_t size;
+ void *hdr;
+ int err;
err = may_init_module();
if (err)
@@ -3602,9 +3547,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
|MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_VERMAGIC))
return -EINVAL;
- err = copy_module_from_fd(fd, &info);
+ err = kernel_read_file_from_fd(fd, &hdr, &size, INT_MAX,
+ READING_MODULE);
if (err)
return err;
+ info.hdr = hdr;
+ info.len = size;
return load_module(&info, uargs, flags);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index 8f1ab37f2897..345b75997e4c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
- iint->ima_module_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+ iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
}
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
- iint->ima_module_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+ iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 585af61ed399..5d0f61163d98 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -19,10 +19,12 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/hash.h>
#include <linux/tpm.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include "../integrity.h"
@@ -106,6 +108,8 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
const char *op, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *filename);
int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash);
+int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, loff_t len,
+ struct ima_digest_data *hash);
int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
struct ima_template_desc *desc, int num_fields,
struct ima_digest_data *hash);
@@ -136,13 +140,25 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
return hash_long(*digest, IMA_HASH_BITS);
}
+enum ima_hooks {
+ FILE_CHECK = 1,
+ MMAP_CHECK,
+ BPRM_CHECK,
+ POST_SETATTR,
+ MODULE_CHECK,
+ FIRMWARE_CHECK,
+ KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
+ KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
+ POLICY_CHECK,
+ MAX_CHECK
+};
+
/* LIM API function definitions */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
-int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
+int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- struct file *file,
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value,
- int *xattr_len);
+ struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum hash_algo algo);
void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
@@ -157,8 +173,6 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf);
/* IMA policy related functions */
-enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, MMAP_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK, FIRMWARE_CHECK, POST_SETATTR };
-
int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
int flags);
void ima_init_policy(void);
@@ -178,23 +192,25 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
#define IMA_APPRAISE_LOG 0x04
#define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES 0x08
#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE 0x10
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY 0x20
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
-int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, int opened);
int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- int func);
-void ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
- struct ima_digest_data *hash);
+ enum ima_hooks func);
+enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+ int xattr_len);
int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value);
#else
-static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(int func,
+static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file,
const unsigned char *filename,
@@ -216,15 +232,16 @@ static inline void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
}
static inline enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache
- *iint, int func)
+ *iint,
+ enum ima_hooks func)
{
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
}
-static inline void ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
- int xattr_len,
- struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+static inline enum hash_algo
+ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len)
{
+ return ima_hash_algo;
}
static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 1d950fbb2aec..370e42dfc5c5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
-#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+
#include "ima.h"
/*
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ err_out:
* ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
* @inode: pointer to inode to measure
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
- * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MMAP_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK)
+ * @func: caller identifier
*
* The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
@@ -168,13 +168,13 @@ err_out:
* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
*
*/
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE;
flags &= ima_policy_flag;
- return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, flags);
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, flags);
}
/*
@@ -188,9 +188,8 @@ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
* Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
*/
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- struct file *file,
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value,
- int *xattr_len)
+ struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum hash_algo algo)
{
const char *audit_cause = "failed";
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
@@ -201,9 +200,6 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
} hash;
- if (xattr_value)
- *xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file->f_path.dentry, xattr_value);
-
if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
@@ -213,13 +209,10 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
goto out;
}
- /* use default hash algorithm */
- hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
-
- if (xattr_value)
- ima_get_hash_algo(*xattr_value, *xattr_len, &hash.hdr);
+ hash.hdr.algo = algo;
- result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
+ result = (!buf) ? ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr) :
+ ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr);
if (!result) {
int length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length;
void *tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 1873b5536f80..6b4694aedae8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
-#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include "ima.h"
@@ -68,25 +67,25 @@ static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
/* Return specific func appraised cached result */
enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- int func)
+ enum ima_hooks func)
{
switch (func) {
case MMAP_CHECK:
return iint->ima_mmap_status;
case BPRM_CHECK:
return iint->ima_bprm_status;
- case MODULE_CHECK:
- return iint->ima_module_status;
- case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
- return iint->ima_firmware_status;
case FILE_CHECK:
- default:
+ case POST_SETATTR:
return iint->ima_file_status;
+ case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
+ default:
+ return iint->ima_read_status;
}
}
static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- int func, enum integrity_status status)
+ enum ima_hooks func,
+ enum integrity_status status)
{
switch (func) {
case MMAP_CHECK:
@@ -95,20 +94,19 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
case BPRM_CHECK:
iint->ima_bprm_status = status;
break;
- case MODULE_CHECK:
- iint->ima_module_status = status;
- break;
- case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
- iint->ima_firmware_status = status;
- break;
case FILE_CHECK:
- default:
+ case POST_SETATTR:
iint->ima_file_status = status;
break;
+ case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
+ default:
+ iint->ima_read_status = status;
+ break;
}
}
-static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int func)
+static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ enum ima_hooks func)
{
switch (func) {
case MMAP_CHECK:
@@ -117,49 +115,51 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int func)
case BPRM_CHECK:
iint->flags |= (IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
break;
- case MODULE_CHECK:
- iint->flags |= (IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
- break;
- case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
- iint->flags |= (IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
- break;
case FILE_CHECK:
- default:
+ case POST_SETATTR:
iint->flags |= (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
break;
+ case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
+ default:
+ iint->flags |= (IMA_READ_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
+ break;
}
}
-void ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
- struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+ int xattr_len)
{
struct signature_v2_hdr *sig;
if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 2)
- return;
+ /* return default hash algo */
+ return ima_hash_algo;
switch (xattr_value->type) {
case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig))
- return;
- hash->algo = sig->hash_algo;
+ return ima_hash_algo;
+ return sig->hash_algo;
break;
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
- hash->algo = xattr_value->digest[0];
+ return xattr_value->digest[0];
break;
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
/* this is for backward compatibility */
if (xattr_len == 21) {
unsigned int zero = 0;
if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[16], &zero, 4))
- hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+ return HASH_ALGO_MD5;
else
- hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+ return HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
} else if (xattr_len == 17)
- hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+ return HASH_ALGO_MD5;
break;
}
+
+ /* return default hash algo */
+ return ima_hash_algo;
}
int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -182,7 +182,8 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
*
* Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
*/
-int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, int opened)
@@ -296,7 +297,7 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG)
return;
- rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, NULL);
+ rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo);
if (rc < 0)
return;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 6eb62936c672..38f2ed830dd6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
-#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+
#include "ima.h"
struct ahash_completion {
@@ -519,6 +519,124 @@ int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
return rc;
}
+static int calc_buffer_ahash_atfm(const void *buf, loff_t len,
+ struct ima_digest_data *hash,
+ struct crypto_ahash *tfm)
+{
+ struct ahash_request *req;
+ struct scatterlist sg;
+ struct ahash_completion res;
+ int rc, ahash_rc = 0;
+
+ hash->length = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+ req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ init_completion(&res.completion);
+ ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+ ahash_complete, &res);
+
+ rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_init(req), &res);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ sg_init_one(&sg, buf, len);
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, NULL, len);
+
+ ahash_rc = crypto_ahash_update(req);
+
+ /* wait for the update request to complete */
+ rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res);
+ if (!rc) {
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, hash->digest, 0);
+ rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_final(req), &res);
+ }
+out:
+ ahash_request_free(req);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int calc_buffer_ahash(const void *buf, loff_t len,
+ struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+ struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
+ int rc;
+
+ tfm = ima_alloc_atfm(hash->algo);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+ rc = calc_buffer_ahash_atfm(buf, len, hash, tfm);
+
+ ima_free_atfm(tfm);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int calc_buffer_shash_tfm(const void *buf, loff_t size,
+ struct ima_digest_data *hash,
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm)
+{
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, tfm);
+ unsigned int len;
+ int rc;
+
+ shash->tfm = tfm;
+ shash->flags = 0;
+
+ hash->length = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_init(shash);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ while (size) {
+ len = size < PAGE_SIZE ? size : PAGE_SIZE;
+ rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, len);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ buf += len;
+ size -= len;
+ }
+
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = crypto_shash_final(shash, hash->digest);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int calc_buffer_shash(const void *buf, loff_t len,
+ struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ int rc;
+
+ tfm = ima_alloc_tfm(hash->algo);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+ rc = calc_buffer_shash_tfm(buf, len, hash, tfm);
+
+ ima_free_tfm(tfm);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, loff_t len,
+ struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (ima_ahash_minsize && len >= ima_ahash_minsize) {
+ rc = calc_buffer_ahash(buf, len, hash);
+ if (!rc)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return calc_buffer_shash(buf, len, hash);
+}
+
static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
{
if (!ima_used_chip)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index f355231997b4..60d011aaec38 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/rculist.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include "ima.h"
@@ -258,6 +259,43 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = {
.release = seq_release,
};
+static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
+{
+ void *data;
+ char *datap;
+ loff_t size;
+ int rc, pathlen = strlen(path);
+
+ char *p;
+
+ /* remove \n */
+ datap = path;
+ strsep(&datap, "\n");
+
+ rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, &size, 0, READING_POLICY);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ datap = data;
+ while (size > 0 && (p = strsep(&datap, "\n"))) {
+ pr_debug("rule: %s\n", p);
+ rc = ima_parse_add_rule(p);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ break;
+ size -= rc;
+ }
+
+ vfree(data);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+ else if (size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ else
+ return pathlen;
+}
+
static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos)
{
@@ -286,9 +324,20 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
result = mutex_lock_interruptible(&ima_write_mutex);
if (result < 0)
goto out_free;
- result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
- mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex);
+ if (data[0] == '/') {
+ result = ima_read_policy(data);
+ } else if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY) {
+ pr_err("IMA: signed policy file (specified as an absolute pathname) required\n");
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
+ "policy_update", "signed policy required",
+ 1, 0);
+ if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
+ result = -EACCES;
+ } else {
+ result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex);
out_free:
kfree(data);
out:
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index bd79f254d204..5d679a685616 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
-#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+
#include "ima.h"
/* name for boot aggregate entry */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 9d96551d0196..391f41751021 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
-#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include "ima.h"
@@ -154,8 +153,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
}
-static int process_measurement(struct file *file, int mask, int function,
- int opened)
+static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+ int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int opened)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -163,9 +162,10 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, int mask, int function,
char *pathbuf = NULL;
const char *pathname = NULL;
int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise;
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL, **xattr_ptr = NULL;
+ struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL;
int xattr_len = 0;
bool violation_check;
+ enum hash_algo hash_algo;
if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return 0;
@@ -174,8 +174,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, int mask, int function,
* bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
* Included is the appraise submask.
*/
- action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, function);
- violation_check = ((function == FILE_CHECK || function == MMAP_CHECK) &&
+ action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, func);
+ violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
(ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
if (!action && !violation_check)
return 0;
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, int mask, int function,
/* Is the appraise rule hook specific? */
if (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE)
- function = FILE_CHECK;
+ func = FILE_CHECK;
inode_lock(inode);
@@ -214,16 +214,19 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, int mask, int function,
/* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
if (!action) {
if (must_appraise)
- rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, function);
+ rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, func);
goto out_digsig;
}
template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) ||
strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0)
- xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
+ /* read 'security.ima' */
+ xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file->f_path.dentry, &xattr_value);
- rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, xattr_ptr, &xattr_len);
+ hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
+
+ rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo);
if (rc != 0) {
if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES;
@@ -237,7 +240,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, int mask, int function,
ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
xattr_value, xattr_len);
if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
- rc = ima_appraise_measurement(function, iint, file, pathname,
+ rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname,
xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);
if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
@@ -270,7 +273,8 @@ out:
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC))
- return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0);
+ return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC,
+ MMAP_CHECK, 0);
return 0;
}
@@ -289,7 +293,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
*/
int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- return process_measurement(bprm->file, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0);
+ return process_measurement(bprm->file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC,
+ BPRM_CHECK, 0);
}
/**
@@ -304,24 +309,26 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened)
{
- return process_measurement(file,
+ return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
FILE_CHECK, opened);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
/**
- * ima_module_check - based on policy, collect/store/appraise measurement.
- * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised
+ * ima_read_file - pre-measure/appraise hook decision based on policy
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
+ * @read_id: caller identifier
*
- * Measure/appraise kernel modules based on policy.
+ * Permit reading a file based on policy. The policy rules are written
+ * in terms of the policy identifier. Appraising the integrity of
+ * a file requires a file descriptor.
*
- * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
- * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
+int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
- if (!file) {
+ if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) {
#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
(ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
@@ -329,18 +336,53 @@ int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
#endif
return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */
}
- return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK, 0);
+ return 0;
}
-int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+static int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
+ [READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
+ [READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
+ [READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
+ [READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
+ [READING_POLICY] = POLICY_CHECK
+};
+
+/**
+ * ima_post_read_file - in memory collect/appraise/audit measurement
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
+ * @buf: pointer to in memory file contents
+ * @size: size of in memory file contents
+ * @read_id: caller identifier
+ *
+ * Measure/appraise/audit in memory file based on policy. Policy rules
+ * are written in terms of a policy identifier.
+ *
+ * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
- if (!file) {
+ enum ima_hooks func;
+
+ if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
(ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
return 0;
}
- return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, FIRMWARE_CHECK, 0);
+
+ if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!file || !buf || size == 0) { /* should never happen */
+ if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
+ return -EACCES;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
+ return process_measurement(file, buf, size, MAY_READ, func, 0);
}
static int __init init_ima(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 0a3b781f18e5..be09e2cacf82 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/parser.h>
@@ -113,6 +114,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] = {
.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
};
static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
@@ -127,6 +129,10 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY
+ {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+#endif
#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
#else
@@ -207,8 +213,8 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
*
* Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
*/
-static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
- struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
+static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
+ enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
@@ -289,7 +295,7 @@ retry:
* In addition to knowing that we need to appraise the file in general,
* we need to differentiate between calling hooks, for hook specific rules.
*/
-static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func)
+static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
{
if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC))
return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
@@ -299,13 +305,12 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func)
return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
case BPRM_CHECK:
return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE;
- case MODULE_CHECK:
- return IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE;
- case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
- return IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE;
case FILE_CHECK:
- default:
+ case POST_SETATTR:
return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
+ case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
+ default:
+ return IMA_READ_APPRAISE;
}
}
@@ -411,13 +416,16 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
&ima_default_rules);
+ if (default_appraise_rules[i].func == POLICY_CHECK)
+ temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
}
ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
+ ima_update_policy_flag();
}
/* Make sure we have a valid policy, at least containing some rules. */
-int ima_check_policy()
+int ima_check_policy(void)
{
if (list_empty(&ima_temp_rules))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -612,6 +620,14 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
entry->func = MMAP_CHECK;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
+ else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK") ==
+ 0)
+ entry->func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK;
+ else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK")
+ == 0)
+ entry->func = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK;
+ else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0)
+ entry->func = POLICY_CHECK;
else
result = -EINVAL;
if (!result)
@@ -770,6 +786,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
else if (entry->func == FIRMWARE_CHECK)
temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
+ else if (entry->func == POLICY_CHECK)
+ temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
audit_log_end(ab);
return result;
@@ -855,7 +873,9 @@ static char *mask_tokens[] = {
enum {
func_file = 0, func_mmap, func_bprm,
- func_module, func_firmware, func_post
+ func_module, func_firmware, func_post,
+ func_kexec_kernel, func_kexec_initramfs,
+ func_policy
};
static char *func_tokens[] = {
@@ -864,6 +884,9 @@ static char *func_tokens[] = {
"BPRM_CHECK",
"MODULE_CHECK",
"FIRMWARE_CHECK",
+ "KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK",
+ "KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK",
+ "POLICY_CHECK",
"POST_SETATTR"
};
@@ -903,6 +926,49 @@ void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
#define mt(token) mask_tokens[token]
#define ft(token) func_tokens[token]
+/*
+ * policy_func_show - display the ima_hooks policy rule
+ */
+static void policy_func_show(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+ char tbuf[64] = {0,};
+
+ switch (func) {
+ case FILE_CHECK:
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_file));
+ break;
+ case MMAP_CHECK:
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_mmap));
+ break;
+ case BPRM_CHECK:
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_bprm));
+ break;
+ case MODULE_CHECK:
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_module));
+ break;
+ case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_firmware));
+ break;
+ case POST_SETATTR:
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_post));
+ break;
+ case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK:
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_kexec_kernel));
+ break;
+ case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_kexec_initramfs));
+ break;
+ case POLICY_CHECK:
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_policy));
+ break;
+ default:
+ snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", func);
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), tbuf);
+ break;
+ }
+ seq_puts(m, " ");
+}
+
int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
@@ -924,33 +990,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
seq_puts(m, " ");
- if (entry->flags & IMA_FUNC) {
- switch (entry->func) {
- case FILE_CHECK:
- seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_file));
- break;
- case MMAP_CHECK:
- seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_mmap));
- break;
- case BPRM_CHECK:
- seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_bprm));
- break;
- case MODULE_CHECK:
- seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_module));
- break;
- case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
- seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_firmware));
- break;
- case POST_SETATTR:
- seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_post));
- break;
- default:
- snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->func);
- seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), tbuf);
- break;
- }
- seq_puts(m, " ");
- }
+ if (entry->flags & IMA_FUNC)
+ policy_func_show(m, entry->func);
if (entry->flags & IMA_MASK) {
if (entry->mask & MAY_EXEC)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 0b7404ebfa80..febd12ed9b55 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
-#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
-
#include "ima.h"
#include "ima_template_lib.h"
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index 2934e3d377f1..f9bae04ba176 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
* File: ima_template_lib.c
* Library of supported template fields.
*/
-#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include "ima_template_lib.h"
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 5efe2ecc538d..c7a111cc7d89 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -45,16 +45,12 @@
#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED 0x00000800
#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE 0x00001000
#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED 0x00002000
-#define IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE 0x00004000
-#define IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED 0x00008000
-#define IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE 0x00010000
-#define IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED 0x00020000
+#define IMA_READ_APPRAISE 0x00004000
+#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED 0x00008000
#define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \
- IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE | \
- IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE)
+ IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE)
#define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \
- IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED | \
- IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED)
+ IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED)
enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
@@ -109,8 +105,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
- enum integrity_status ima_module_status:4;
- enum integrity_status ima_firmware_status:4;
+ enum integrity_status ima_read_status:4;
enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash;
};
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e8ffd92ae2eb..3644b0344d29 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -884,31 +884,33 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode);
}
-int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
+}
+
+int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
int ret;
- ret = call_int_hook(kernel_fw_from_file, 0, file, buf, size);
+ ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id);
if (ret)
return ret;
- return ima_fw_from_file(file, buf, size);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_fw_from_file);
-
-int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
-{
- return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
+ return ima_read_file(file, id);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
-int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
+int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
int ret;
- ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_from_file, 0, file);
+ ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
if (ret)
return ret;
- return ima_module_check(file);
+ return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int flags)
@@ -1691,12 +1693,12 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as),
.kernel_create_files_as =
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_create_files_as),
- .kernel_fw_from_file =
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_fw_from_file),
.kernel_module_request =
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_module_request),
- .kernel_module_from_file =
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_module_from_file),
+ .kernel_read_file =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_read_file),
+ .kernel_post_read_file =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_post_read_file),
.task_fix_setuid =
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_fix_setuid),
.task_setpgid = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setpgid),
Copyright © 1996 – 2023 Jason A. Donenfeld. All Rights Reverse Engineered.