diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst | 246 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 37 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/devicetree/bindings/hwmon/ti,tmp401.yaml | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/loongarch/introduction.rst | 15 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/loongarch/irq-chip-model.rst | 22 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst | 37 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/networking/phy.rst | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/translations/zh_CN/loongarch/introduction.rst | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/translations/zh_CN/loongarch/irq-chip-model.rst | 14 |
11 files changed, 362 insertions, 32 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu index 2ad01cad7f1c..bcc974d276dc 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu @@ -526,6 +526,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data Date: January 2018 Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst index 8cbc711cda93..4df436e7c417 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst @@ -17,3 +17,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time. special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst core-scheduling.rst l1d_flush.rst + processor_mmio_stale_data.rst diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9393c50b5afc --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst @@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ +========================================= +Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities +========================================= + +Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities are a class of memory-mapped I/O +(MMIO) vulnerabilities that can expose data. The sequences of operations for +exposing data range from simple to very complex. Because most of the +vulnerabilities require the attacker to have access to MMIO, many environments +are not affected. System environments using virtualization where MMIO access is +provided to untrusted guests may need mitigation. These vulnerabilities are +not transient execution attacks. However, these vulnerabilities may propagate +stale data into core fill buffers where the data can subsequently be inferred +by an unmitigated transient execution attack. Mitigation for these +vulnerabilities includes a combination of microcode update and software +changes, depending on the platform and usage model. Some of these mitigations +are similar to those used to mitigate Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) or +those used to mitigate Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS). + +Data Propagators +================ +Propagators are operations that result in stale data being copied or moved from +one microarchitectural buffer or register to another. Processor MMIO Stale Data +Vulnerabilities are operations that may result in stale data being directly +read into an architectural, software-visible state or sampled from a buffer or +register. + +Fill Buffer Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP) +----------------------------------------- +Stale data may propagate from fill buffers (FB) into the non-coherent portion +of the uncore on some non-coherent writes. Fill buffer propagation by itself +does not make stale data architecturally visible. Stale data must be propagated +to a location where it is subject to reading or sampling. + +Sideband Stale Data Propagator (SSDP) +------------------------------------- +The sideband stale data propagator (SSDP) is limited to the client (including +Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation. The sideband response buffer is +shared by all client cores. For non-coherent reads that go to sideband +destinations, the uncore logic returns 64 bytes of data to the core, including +both requested data and unrequested stale data, from a transaction buffer and +the sideband response buffer. As a result, stale data from the sideband +response and transaction buffers may now reside in a core fill buffer. + +Primary Stale Data Propagator (PSDP) +------------------------------------ +The primary stale data propagator (PSDP) is limited to the client (including +Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation. Similar to the sideband response +buffer, the primary response buffer is shared by all client cores. For some +processors, MMIO primary reads will return 64 bytes of data to the core fill +buffer including both requested data and unrequested stale data. This is +similar to the sideband stale data propagator. + +Vulnerabilities +=============== +Device Register Partial Write (DRPW) (CVE-2022-21166) +----------------------------------------------------- +Some endpoint MMIO registers incorrectly handle writes that are smaller than +the register size. Instead of aborting the write or only copying the correct +subset of bytes (for example, 2 bytes for a 2-byte write), more bytes than +specified by the write transaction may be written to the register. On +processors affected by FBSDP, this may expose stale data from the fill buffers +of the core that created the write transaction. + +Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS) (CVE-2022-21125) +---------------------------------------------------- +After propagators may have moved data around the uncore and copied stale data +into client core fill buffers, processors affected by MFBDS can leak data from +the fill buffer. It is limited to the client (including Intel Xeon server E3) +uncore implementation. + +Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR) (CVE-2022-21123) +------------------------------------------------ +It is similar to Shared Buffer Data Sampling (SBDS) except that the data is +directly read into the architectural software-visible state. It is limited to +the client (including Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation. + +Affected Processors +=================== +Not all the CPUs are affected by all the variants. For instance, most +processors for the server market (excluding Intel Xeon E3 processors) are +impacted by only Device Register Partial Write (DRPW). + +Below is the list of affected Intel processors [#f1]_: + + =================== ============ ========= + Common name Family_Model Steppings + =================== ============ ========= + HASWELL_X 06_3FH 2,4 + SKYLAKE_L 06_4EH 3 + BROADWELL_X 06_4FH All + SKYLAKE_X 06_55H 3,4,6,7,11 + BROADWELL_D 06_56H 3,4,5 + SKYLAKE 06_5EH 3 + ICELAKE_X 06_6AH 4,5,6 + ICELAKE_D 06_6CH 1 + ICELAKE_L 06_7EH 5 + ATOM_TREMONT_D 06_86H All + LAKEFIELD 06_8AH 1 + KABYLAKE_L 06_8EH 9 to 12 + ATOM_TREMONT 06_96H 1 + ATOM_TREMONT_L 06_9CH 0 + KABYLAKE 06_9EH 9 to 13 + COMETLAKE 06_A5H 2,3,5 + COMETLAKE_L 06_A6H 0,1 + ROCKETLAKE 06_A7H 1 + =================== ============ ========= + +If a CPU is in the affected processor list, but not affected by a variant, it +is indicated by new bits in MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. As described in a later +section, mitigation largely remains the same for all the variants, i.e. to +clear the CPU fill buffers via VERW instruction. + +New bits in MSRs +================ +Newer processors and microcode update on existing affected processors added new +bits to IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. These bits can be used to enumerate +specific variants of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities and mitigation +capability. + +MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES +-------------------------- +Bit 13 - SBDR_SSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by either the + Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR) vulnerability or the sideband stale + data propagator (SSDP). +Bit 14 - FBSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by the Fill Buffer + Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP). +Bit 15 - PSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by Primary Stale Data + Propagator (PSDP). +Bit 17 - FB_CLEAR - When set, VERW instruction will overwrite CPU fill buffer + values as part of MD_CLEAR operations. Processors that do not + enumerate MDS_NO (meaning they are affected by MDS) but that do + enumerate support for both L1D_FLUSH and MD_CLEAR implicitly enumerate + FB_CLEAR as part of their MD_CLEAR support. +Bit 18 - FB_CLEAR_CTRL - Processor supports read and write to MSR + IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[FB_CLEAR_DIS]. On such processors, the FB_CLEAR_DIS + bit can be set to cause the VERW instruction to not perform the + FB_CLEAR action. Not all processors that support FB_CLEAR will support + FB_CLEAR_CTRL. + +MSR IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL +--------------------- +Bit 3 - FB_CLEAR_DIS - When set, VERW instruction does not perform the FB_CLEAR +action. This may be useful to reduce the performance impact of FB_CLEAR in +cases where system software deems it warranted (for example, when performance +is more critical, or the untrusted software has no MMIO access). Note that +FB_CLEAR_DIS has no impact on enumeration (for example, it does not change +FB_CLEAR or MD_CLEAR enumeration) and it may not be supported on all processors +that enumerate FB_CLEAR. + +Mitigation +========== +Like MDS, all variants of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities have the +same mitigation strategy to force the CPU to clear the affected buffers before +an attacker can extract the secrets. + +This is achieved by using the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in +combination with a microcode update. The microcode clears the affected CPU +buffers when the VERW instruction is executed. + +Kernel reuses the MDS function to invoke the buffer clearing: + + mds_clear_cpu_buffers() + +On MDS affected CPUs, the kernel already invokes CPU buffer clear on +kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state (idle) transitions. No +additional mitigation is needed on such CPUs. + +For CPUs not affected by MDS or TAA, mitigation is needed only for the attacker +with MMIO capability. Therefore, VERW is not required for kernel/userspace. For +virtualization case, VERW is only needed at VMENTER for a guest with MMIO +capability. + +Mitigation points +----------------- +Return to user space +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ +Same mitigation as MDS when affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise no mitigation +needed. + +C-State transition +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ +Control register writes by CPU during C-state transition can propagate data +from fill buffer to uncore buffers. Execute VERW before C-state transition to +clear CPU fill buffers. + +Guest entry point +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ +Same mitigation as MDS when processor is also affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise +execute VERW at VMENTER only for MMIO capable guests. On CPUs not affected by +MDS/TAA, guest without MMIO access cannot extract secrets using Processor MMIO +Stale Data vulnerabilities, so there is no need to execute VERW for such guests. + +Mitigation control on the kernel command line +--------------------------------------------- +The kernel command line allows to control the Processor MMIO Stale Data +mitigations at boot time with the option "mmio_stale_data=". The valid +arguments for this option are: + + ========== ================================================================= + full If the CPU is vulnerable, enable mitigation; CPU buffer clearing + on exit to userspace and when entering a VM. Idle transitions are + protected as well. It does not automatically disable SMT. + full,nosmt Same as full, with SMT disabled on vulnerable CPUs. This is the + complete mitigation. + off Disables mitigation completely. + ========== ================================================================= + +If the CPU is affected and mmio_stale_data=off is not supplied on the kernel +command line, then the kernel selects the appropriate mitigation. + +Mitigation status information +----------------------------- +The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current +vulnerability status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and +which mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is: + + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data + +The possible values in this file are: + + .. list-table:: + + * - 'Not affected' + - The processor is not vulnerable + * - 'Vulnerable' + - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled + * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode' + - The processor is vulnerable, but microcode is not updated. The + mitigation is enabled on a best effort basis. + * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers' + - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is + enabled. + +If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended to +the above information: + + ======================== =========================================== + 'SMT vulnerable' SMT is enabled + 'SMT disabled' SMT is disabled + 'SMT Host state unknown' Kernel runs in a VM, Host SMT state unknown + ======================== =========================================== + +References +---------- +.. [#f1] Affected Processors + https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 8090130b544b..2522b11e593f 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2469,7 +2469,6 @@ protected: nVHE-based mode with support for guests whose state is kept private from the host. - Not valid if the kernel is running in EL2. Defaults to VHE/nVHE based on hardware support. Setting mode to "protected" will disable kexec and hibernation @@ -3176,6 +3175,7 @@ srbds=off [X86,INTEL] no_entry_flush [PPC] no_uaccess_flush [PPC] + mmio_stale_data=off [X86] Exceptions: This does not have any effect on @@ -3197,6 +3197,7 @@ Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86] mds=full,nosmt [X86] tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt [X86] + mmio_stale_data=full,nosmt [X86] mminit_loglevel= [KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this @@ -3206,6 +3207,40 @@ log everything. Information is printed at KERN_DEBUG so loglevel=8 may also need to be specified. + mmio_stale_data= + [X86,INTEL] Control mitigation for the Processor + MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities. + + Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of + vulnerabilities that may expose data after an MMIO + operation. Exposed data could originate or end in + the same CPU buffers as affected by MDS and TAA. + Therefore, similar to MDS and TAA, the mitigation + is to clear the affected CPU buffers. + + This parameter controls the mitigation. The + options are: + + full - Enable mitigation on vulnerable CPUs + + full,nosmt - Enable mitigation and disable SMT on + vulnerable CPUs. + + off - Unconditionally disable mitigation + + On MDS or TAA affected machines, + mmio_stale_data=off can be prevented by an active + MDS or TAA mitigation as these vulnerabilities are + mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to + disable this mitigation, you need to specify + mds=off and tsx_async_abort=off too. + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to + mmio_stale_data=full. + + For details see: + Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst + module.sig_enforce [KNL] When CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is set, this means that modules without (valid) signatures will fail to load. diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/hwmon/ti,tmp401.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/hwmon/ti,tmp401.yaml index fe0ac08faa1a..0e8ddf0ad789 100644 --- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/hwmon/ti,tmp401.yaml +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/hwmon/ti,tmp401.yaml @@ -40,9 +40,8 @@ properties: value to be used for converting remote channel measurements to temperature. $ref: /schemas/types.yaml#/definitions/int32 - items: - minimum: -128 - maximum: 127 + minimum: -128 + maximum: 127 ti,beta-compensation: description: diff --git a/Documentation/loongarch/introduction.rst b/Documentation/loongarch/introduction.rst index 2bf40ad370df..216b3f390e80 100644 --- a/Documentation/loongarch/introduction.rst +++ b/Documentation/loongarch/introduction.rst @@ -45,10 +45,12 @@ Name Alias Usage Preserved ``$r23``-``$r31`` ``$s0``-``$s8`` Static registers Yes ================= =============== =================== ============ -Note: The register ``$r21`` is reserved in the ELF psABI, but used by the Linux -kernel for storing the percpu base address. It normally has no ABI name, but is -called ``$u0`` in the kernel. You may also see ``$v0`` or ``$v1`` in some old code, -however they are deprecated aliases of ``$a0`` and ``$a1`` respectively. +.. Note:: + The register ``$r21`` is reserved in the ELF psABI, but used by the Linux + kernel for storing the percpu base address. It normally has no ABI name, + but is called ``$u0`` in the kernel. You may also see ``$v0`` or ``$v1`` + in some old code,however they are deprecated aliases of ``$a0`` and ``$a1`` + respectively. FPRs ---- @@ -69,8 +71,9 @@ Name Alias Usage Preserved ``$f24``-``$f31`` ``$fs0``-``$fs7`` Static registers Yes ================= ================== =================== ============ -Note: You may see ``$fv0`` or ``$fv1`` in some old code, however they are deprecated -aliases of ``$fa0`` and ``$fa1`` respectively. +.. Note:: + You may see ``$fv0`` or ``$fv1`` in some old code, however they are + deprecated aliases of ``$fa0`` and ``$fa1`` respectively. VRs ---- diff --git a/Documentation/loongarch/irq-chip-model.rst b/Documentation/loongarch/irq-chip-model.rst index 8d88f7ab2e5e..7988f4192363 100644 --- a/Documentation/loongarch/irq-chip-model.rst +++ b/Documentation/loongarch/irq-chip-model.rst @@ -145,12 +145,16 @@ Documentation of Loongson's LS7A chipset: https://github.com/loongson/LoongArch-Documentation/releases/latest/download/Loongson-7A1000-usermanual-2.00-EN.pdf (in English) -Note: CPUINTC is CSR.ECFG/CSR.ESTAT and its interrupt controller described -in Section 7.4 of "LoongArch Reference Manual, Vol 1"; LIOINTC is "Legacy I/O -Interrupts" described in Section 11.1 of "Loongson 3A5000 Processor Reference -Manual"; EIOINTC is "Extended I/O Interrupts" described in Section 11.2 of -"Loongson 3A5000 Processor Reference Manual"; HTVECINTC is "HyperTransport -Interrupts" described in Section 14.3 of "Loongson 3A5000 Processor Reference -Manual"; PCH-PIC/PCH-MSI is "Interrupt Controller" described in Section 5 of -"Loongson 7A1000 Bridge User Manual"; PCH-LPC is "LPC Interrupts" described in -Section 24.3 of "Loongson 7A1000 Bridge User Manual". +.. Note:: + - CPUINTC is CSR.ECFG/CSR.ESTAT and its interrupt controller described + in Section 7.4 of "LoongArch Reference Manual, Vol 1"; + - LIOINTC is "Legacy I/OInterrupts" described in Section 11.1 of + "Loongson 3A5000 Processor Reference Manual"; + - EIOINTC is "Extended I/O Interrupts" described in Section 11.2 of + "Loongson 3A5000 Processor Reference Manual"; + - HTVECINTC is "HyperTransport Interrupts" described in Section 14.3 of + "Loongson 3A5000 Processor Reference Manual"; + - PCH-PIC/PCH-MSI is "Interrupt Controller" described in Section 5 of + "Loongson 7A1000 Bridge User Manual"; + - PCH-LPC is "LPC Interrupts" described in Section 24.3 of + "Loongson 7A1000 Bridge User Manual". diff --git a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst index 04216564a03c..9f41961d11d5 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst @@ -2925,6 +2925,43 @@ plpmtud_probe_interval - INTEGER Default: 0 +reconf_enable - BOOLEAN + Enable or disable extension of Stream Reconfiguration functionality + specified in RFC6525. This extension provides the ability to "reset" + a stream, and it includes the Parameters of "Outgoing/Incoming SSN + Reset", "SSN/TSN Reset" and "Add Outgoing/Incoming Streams". + + - 1: Enable extension. + - 0: Disable extension. + + Default: 0 + +intl_enable - BOOLEAN + Enable or disable extension of User Message Interleaving functionality + specified in RFC8260. This extension allows the interleaving of user + messages sent on different streams. With this feature enabled, I-DATA + chunk will replace DATA chunk to carry user messages if also supported + by the peer. Note that to use this feature, one needs to set this option + to 1 and also needs to set socket options SCTP_FRAGMENT_INTERLEAVE to 2 + and SCTP_INTERLEAVING_SUPPORTED to 1. + + - 1: Enable extension. + - 0: Disable extension. + + Default: 0 + +ecn_enable - BOOLEAN + Control use of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) by SCTP. + Like in TCP, ECN is used only when both ends of the SCTP connection + indicate support for it. This feature is useful in avoiding losses + due to congestion by allowing supporting routers to signal congestion + before having to drop packets. + + 1: Enable ecn. + 0: Disable ecn. + + Default: 1 + ``/proc/sys/net/core/*`` ======================== diff --git a/Documentation/networking/phy.rst b/Documentation/networking/phy.rst index d43da709bf40..704f31da5167 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/phy.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/phy.rst @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ Whenever possible, use the PHY side RGMII delay for these reasons: * PHY device drivers in PHYLIB being reusable by nature, being able to configure correctly a specified delay enables more designs with similar delay - requirements to be operate correctly + requirements to be operated correctly For cases where the PHY is not capable of providing this delay, but the Ethernet MAC driver is capable of doing so, the correct phy_interface_t value diff --git a/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/loongarch/introduction.rst b/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/loongarch/introduction.rst index e31a1a928c48..11686ee0caeb 100644 --- a/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/loongarch/introduction.rst +++ b/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/loongarch/introduction.rst @@ -46,10 +46,11 @@ LA64中每个寄存器为64位宽。 ``$r0`` 的内容总是固定为0,而其 ``$r23``-``$r31`` ``$s0``-``$s8`` 静态寄存器 是 ================= =============== =================== ========== -注意:``$r21``寄存器在ELF psABI中保留未使用,但是在Linux内核用于保存每CPU -变量基地址。该寄存器没有ABI命名,不过在内核中称为``$u0``。在一些遗留代码 -中有时可能见到``$v0``和``$v1``,它们是``$a0``和``$a1``的别名,属于已经废弃 -的用法。 +.. note:: + 注意: ``$r21`` 寄存器在ELF psABI中保留未使用,但是在Linux内核用于保 + 存每CPU变量基地址。该寄存器没有ABI命名,不过在内核中称为 ``$u0`` 。在 + 一些遗留代码中有时可能见到 ``$v0`` 和 ``$v1`` ,它们是 ``$a0`` 和 + ``$a1`` 的别名,属于已经废弃的用法。 浮点寄存器 ---------- @@ -68,8 +69,9 @@ LA64中每个寄存器为64位宽。 ``$r0`` 的内容总是固定为0,而其 ``$f24``-``$f31`` ``$fs0``-``$fs7`` 静态寄存器 是 ================= ================== =================== ========== -注意:在一些遗留代码中有时可能见到 ``$v0`` 和 ``$v1`` ,它们是 ``$a0`` -和 ``$a1`` 的别名,属于已经废弃的用法。 +.. note:: + 注意:在一些遗留代码中有时可能见到 ``$v0`` 和 ``$v1`` ,它们是 + ``$a0`` 和 ``$a1`` 的别名,属于已经废弃的用法。 向量寄存器 diff --git a/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/loongarch/irq-chip-model.rst b/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/loongarch/irq-chip-model.rst index 2a4c3ad38be4..fb5d23b49ed5 100644 --- a/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/loongarch/irq-chip-model.rst +++ b/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/loongarch/irq-chip-model.rst @@ -147,9 +147,11 @@ PCH-LPC:: https://github.com/loongson/LoongArch-Documentation/releases/latest/download/Loongson-7A1000-usermanual-2.00-EN.pdf (英文版) -注:CPUINTC即《龙芯架构参考手册卷一》第7.4节所描述的CSR.ECFG/CSR.ESTAT寄存器及其中断 -控制逻辑;LIOINTC即《龙芯3A5000处理器使用手册》第11.1节所描述的“传统I/O中断”;EIOINTC -即《龙芯3A5000处理器使用手册》第11.2节所描述的“扩展I/O中断”;HTVECINTC即《龙芯3A5000 -处理器使用手册》第14.3节所描述的“HyperTransport中断”;PCH-PIC/PCH-MSI即《龙芯7A1000桥 -片用户手册》第5章所描述的“中断控制器”;PCH-LPC即《龙芯7A1000桥片用户手册》第24.3节所 -描述的“LPC中断”。 +.. note:: + - CPUINTC:即《龙芯架构参考手册卷一》第7.4节所描述的CSR.ECFG/CSR.ESTAT寄存器及其 + 中断控制逻辑; + - LIOINTC:即《龙芯3A5000处理器使用手册》第11.1节所描述的“传统I/O中断”; + - EIOINTC:即《龙芯3A5000处理器使用手册》第11.2节所描述的“扩展I/O中断”; + - HTVECINTC:即《龙芯3A5000处理器使用手册》第14.3节所描述的“HyperTransport中断”; + - PCH-PIC/PCH-MSI:即《龙芯7A1000桥片用户手册》第5章所描述的“中断控制器”; + - PCH-LPC:即《龙芯7A1000桥片用户手册》第24.3节所描述的“LPC中断”。 |