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-rw-r--r--arch/Kconfig146
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 144 deletions
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index d1f2ed462ac8..8543bc3c21fe 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -408,150 +408,6 @@ config SECCOMP_FILTER
See Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst for details.
-preferred-plugin-hostcc := $(if-success,[ $(gcc-version) -ge 40800 ],$(HOSTCXX),$(HOSTCC))
-
-config PLUGIN_HOSTCC
- string
- default "$(shell,$(srctree)/scripts/gcc-plugin.sh "$(preferred-plugin-hostcc)" "$(HOSTCXX)" "$(CC)")"
- help
- Host compiler used to build GCC plugins. This can be $(HOSTCXX),
- $(HOSTCC), or a null string if GCC plugin is unsupported.
-
-config HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
- bool
- help
- An arch should select this symbol if it supports building with
- GCC plugins.
-
-menuconfig GCC_PLUGINS
- bool "GCC plugins"
- depends on HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
- depends on PLUGIN_HOSTCC != ""
- help
- GCC plugins are loadable modules that provide extra features to the
- compiler. They are useful for runtime instrumentation and static analysis.
-
- See Documentation/gcc-plugins.txt for details.
-
-config GCC_PLUGIN_CYC_COMPLEXITY
- bool "Compute the cyclomatic complexity of a function" if EXPERT
- depends on GCC_PLUGINS
- depends on !COMPILE_TEST # too noisy
- help
- The complexity M of a function's control flow graph is defined as:
- M = E - N + 2P
- where
-
- E = the number of edges
- N = the number of nodes
- P = the number of connected components (exit nodes).
-
- Enabling this plugin reports the complexity to stderr during the
- build. It mainly serves as a simple example of how to create a
- gcc plugin for the kernel.
-
-config GCC_PLUGIN_SANCOV
- bool
- depends on GCC_PLUGINS
- help
- This plugin inserts a __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() call at the start of
- basic blocks. It supports all gcc versions with plugin support (from
- gcc-4.5 on). It is based on the commit "Add fuzzing coverage support"
- by Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>.
-
-config GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
- bool "Generate some entropy during boot and runtime"
- depends on GCC_PLUGINS
- help
- By saying Y here the kernel will instrument some kernel code to
- extract some entropy from both original and artificially created
- program state. This will help especially embedded systems where
- there is little 'natural' source of entropy normally. The cost
- is some slowdown of the boot process (about 0.5%) and fork and
- irq processing.
-
- Note that entropy extracted this way is not cryptographically
- secure!
-
- This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
- * https://grsecurity.net/
- * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
-
-config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
- bool "Force initialization of variables containing userspace addresses"
- depends on GCC_PLUGINS
- # Currently STRUCTLEAK inserts initialization out of live scope of
- # variables from KASAN point of view. This leads to KASAN false
- # positive reports. Prohibit this combination for now.
- depends on !KASAN_EXTRA
- help
- This plugin zero-initializes any structures containing a
- __user attribute. This can prevent some classes of information
- exposures.
-
- This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
- * https://grsecurity.net/
- * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
-
-config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
- bool "Force initialize all struct type variables passed by reference"
- depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
- depends on !COMPILE_TEST
- help
- Zero initialize any struct type local variable that may be passed by
- reference without having been initialized.
-
-config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
- bool "Report forcefully initialized variables"
- depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
- depends on !COMPILE_TEST # too noisy
- help
- This option will cause a warning to be printed each time the
- structleak plugin finds a variable it thinks needs to be
- initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected
- by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings.
-
-config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
- bool "Randomize layout of sensitive kernel structures"
- depends on GCC_PLUGINS
- select MODVERSIONS if MODULES
- help
- If you say Y here, the layouts of structures that are entirely
- function pointers (and have not been manually annotated with
- __no_randomize_layout), or structures that have been explicitly
- marked with __randomize_layout, will be randomized at compile-time.
- This can introduce the requirement of an additional information
- exposure vulnerability for exploits targeting these structure
- types.
-
- Enabling this feature will introduce some performance impact,
- slightly increase memory usage, and prevent the use of forensic
- tools like Volatility against the system (unless the kernel
- source tree isn't cleaned after kernel installation).
-
- The seed used for compilation is located at
- scripts/gcc-plgins/randomize_layout_seed.h. It remains after
- a make clean to allow for external modules to be compiled with
- the existing seed and will be removed by a make mrproper or
- make distclean.
-
- Note that the implementation requires gcc 4.7 or newer.
-
- This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
- * https://grsecurity.net/
- * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
-
-config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE
- bool "Use cacheline-aware structure randomization"
- depends on GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
- depends on !COMPILE_TEST # do not reduce test coverage
- help
- If you say Y here, the RANDSTRUCT randomization will make a
- best effort at restricting randomization to cacheline-sized
- groups of elements. It will further not randomize bitfields
- in structures. This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT
- at the cost of weakened randomization.
-
config HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR
bool
help
@@ -975,3 +831,5 @@ config REFCOUNT_FULL
security flaw exploits.
source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig"
+
+source "scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig"