diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/Kconfig | 63 |
1 files changed, 63 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index 99839c23d453..f761142976e5 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -222,6 +222,10 @@ config GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD config GENERIC_IDLE_POLL_SETUP bool +# Select if arch has all set_memory_ro/rw/x/nx() functions in asm/cacheflush.h +config ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY + bool + # Select if arch init_task initializer is different to init/init_task.c config ARCH_INIT_TASK bool @@ -410,6 +414,28 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY * https://grsecurity.net/ * https://pax.grsecurity.net/ +config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK + bool "Force initialization of variables containing userspace addresses" + depends on GCC_PLUGINS + help + This plugin zero-initializes any structures that containing a + __user attribute. This can prevent some classes of information + exposures. + + This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at: + * https://grsecurity.net/ + * https://pax.grsecurity.net/ + +config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE + bool "Report forcefully initialized variables" + depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK + depends on !COMPILE_TEST + help + This option will cause a warning to be printed each time the + structleak plugin finds a variable it thinks needs to be + initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected + by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings. + config HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR bool help @@ -781,4 +807,41 @@ config VMAP_STACK the stack to map directly to the KASAN shadow map using a formula that is incorrect if the stack is in vmalloc space. +config ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX + def_bool n + +config ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT + def_bool n + +config ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX + def_bool n + +config STRICT_KERNEL_RWX + bool "Make kernel text and rodata read-only" if ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX + depends on ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX + default !ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX || ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT + help + If this is set, kernel text and rodata memory will be made read-only, + and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides + protection against certain security exploits (e.g. executing the heap + or modifying text) + + These features are considered standard security practice these days. + You should say Y here in almost all cases. + +config ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX + def_bool n + +config STRICT_MODULE_RWX + bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO" if ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX + depends on ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX && MODULES + default !ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX || ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT + help + If this is set, module text and rodata memory will be made read-only, + and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides + protection against certain security exploits (e.g. writing to text) + +config ARCH_WANT_RELAX_ORDER + bool + source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig" |