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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c162
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c21
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/head64.c74
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S19
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c12
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/setup.c79
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/sev.c183
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c14
14 files changed, 353 insertions, 235 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 2ff3e600f426..6aef9ee28a39 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) += tls.o
obj-y += step.o
obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TXT) += tboot.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ISA_DMA_API) += i8237.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_STACKTRACE) += stacktrace.o
+obj-y += stacktrace.o
obj-y += cpu/
obj-y += acpi/
obj-y += reboot.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c
index 03bb2f343ddb..8a25b1c0d480 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c
@@ -50,6 +50,14 @@ static bool amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
case CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT:
return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED;
+ /*
+ * With SEV, the rep string I/O instructions need to be unrolled
+ * but SEV-ES supports them through the #VC handler.
+ */
+ case CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO:
+ return (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED) &&
+ !(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED);
+
default:
return false;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 0083464de5e3..79b3d67addcc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ set_register:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(native_write_cr0);
-void native_write_cr4(unsigned long val)
+void __no_profile native_write_cr4(unsigned long val)
{
unsigned long bits_changed = 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
index c9f0f3d63f75..eaf25a234ff5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ static u64 mbm_overflow_count(u64 prev_msr, u64 cur_msr, unsigned int width)
u64 shift = 64 - width, chunks;
chunks = (cur_msr << shift) - (prev_msr << shift);
- return chunks >>= shift;
+ return chunks >> shift;
}
static u64 __mon_event_count(u32 rmid, struct rmid_read *rr)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
index 8471a8b9b48e..4b41efc9e367 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
@@ -6,11 +6,13 @@
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
+#include <linux/node.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sysfs.h>
#include <asm/sgx.h>
#include "driver.h"
#include "encl.h"
@@ -20,6 +22,7 @@ struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS];
static int sgx_nr_epc_sections;
static struct task_struct *ksgxd_tsk;
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(ksgxd_waitq);
+static DEFINE_XARRAY(sgx_epc_address_space);
/*
* These variables are part of the state of the reclaimer, and must be accessed
@@ -60,6 +63,24 @@ static void __sgx_sanitize_pages(struct list_head *dirty_page_list)
page = list_first_entry(dirty_page_list, struct sgx_epc_page, list);
+ /*
+ * Checking page->poison without holding the node->lock
+ * is racy, but losing the race (i.e. poison is set just
+ * after the check) just means __eremove() will be uselessly
+ * called for a page that sgx_free_epc_page() will put onto
+ * the node->sgx_poison_page_list later.
+ */
+ if (page->poison) {
+ struct sgx_epc_section *section = &sgx_epc_sections[page->section];
+ struct sgx_numa_node *node = section->node;
+
+ spin_lock(&node->lock);
+ list_move(&page->list, &node->sgx_poison_page_list);
+ spin_unlock(&node->lock);
+
+ continue;
+ }
+
ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page));
if (!ret) {
/*
@@ -471,6 +492,7 @@ static struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_node(int nid)
page = list_first_entry(&node->free_page_list, struct sgx_epc_page, list);
list_del_init(&page->list);
+ page->flags = 0;
spin_unlock(&node->lock);
atomic_long_dec(&sgx_nr_free_pages);
@@ -624,7 +646,12 @@ void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
spin_lock(&node->lock);
- list_add_tail(&page->list, &node->free_page_list);
+ page->owner = NULL;
+ if (page->poison)
+ list_add(&page->list, &node->sgx_poison_page_list);
+ else
+ list_add_tail(&page->list, &node->free_page_list);
+ page->flags = SGX_EPC_PAGE_IS_FREE;
spin_unlock(&node->lock);
atomic_long_inc(&sgx_nr_free_pages);
@@ -648,17 +675,102 @@ static bool __init sgx_setup_epc_section(u64 phys_addr, u64 size,
}
section->phys_addr = phys_addr;
+ xa_store_range(&sgx_epc_address_space, section->phys_addr,
+ phys_addr + size - 1, section, GFP_KERNEL);
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
section->pages[i].section = index;
section->pages[i].flags = 0;
section->pages[i].owner = NULL;
+ section->pages[i].poison = 0;
list_add_tail(&section->pages[i].list, &sgx_dirty_page_list);
}
return true;
}
+bool arch_is_platform_page(u64 paddr)
+{
+ return !!xa_load(&sgx_epc_address_space, paddr);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_is_platform_page);
+
+static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_paddr_to_page(u64 paddr)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_section *section;
+
+ section = xa_load(&sgx_epc_address_space, paddr);
+ if (!section)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return &section->pages[PFN_DOWN(paddr - section->phys_addr)];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called in process context to handle a hardware reported
+ * error in an SGX EPC page.
+ * If the MF_ACTION_REQUIRED bit is set in flags, then the
+ * context is the task that consumed the poison data. Otherwise
+ * this is called from a kernel thread unrelated to the page.
+ */
+int arch_memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int flags)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_page *page = sgx_paddr_to_page(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
+ struct sgx_epc_section *section;
+ struct sgx_numa_node *node;
+
+ /*
+ * mm/memory-failure.c calls this routine for all errors
+ * where there isn't a "struct page" for the address. But that
+ * includes other address ranges besides SGX.
+ */
+ if (!page)
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ /*
+ * If poison was consumed synchronously. Send a SIGBUS to
+ * the task. Hardware has already exited the SGX enclave and
+ * will not allow re-entry to an enclave that has a memory
+ * error. The signal may help the task understand why the
+ * enclave is broken.
+ */
+ if (flags & MF_ACTION_REQUIRED)
+ force_sig(SIGBUS);
+
+ section = &sgx_epc_sections[page->section];
+ node = section->node;
+
+ spin_lock(&node->lock);
+
+ /* Already poisoned? Nothing more to do */
+ if (page->poison)
+ goto out;
+
+ page->poison = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * If the page is on a free list, move it to the per-node
+ * poison page list.
+ */
+ if (page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_IS_FREE) {
+ list_move(&page->list, &node->sgx_poison_page_list);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * TBD: Add additional plumbing to enable pre-emptive
+ * action for asynchronous poison notification. Until
+ * then just hope that the poison:
+ * a) is not accessed - sgx_free_epc_page() will deal with it
+ * when the user gives it back
+ * b) results in a recoverable machine check rather than
+ * a fatal one
+ */
+out:
+ spin_unlock(&node->lock);
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* A section metric is concatenated in a way that @low bits 12-31 define the
* bits 12-31 of the metric and @high bits 0-19 define the bits 32-51 of the
@@ -670,6 +782,48 @@ static inline u64 __init sgx_calc_section_metric(u64 low, u64 high)
((high & GENMASK_ULL(19, 0)) << 32);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+static ssize_t sgx_total_bytes_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lu\n", sgx_numa_nodes[dev->id].size);
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(sgx_total_bytes);
+
+static umode_t arch_node_attr_is_visible(struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct attribute *attr, int idx)
+{
+ /* Make all x86/ attributes invisible when SGX is not initialized: */
+ if (nodes_empty(sgx_numa_mask))
+ return 0;
+
+ return attr->mode;
+}
+
+static struct attribute *arch_node_dev_attrs[] = {
+ &dev_attr_sgx_total_bytes.attr,
+ NULL,
+};
+
+const struct attribute_group arch_node_dev_group = {
+ .name = "x86",
+ .attrs = arch_node_dev_attrs,
+ .is_visible = arch_node_attr_is_visible,
+};
+
+static void __init arch_update_sysfs_visibility(int nid)
+{
+ struct node *node = node_devices[nid];
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = sysfs_update_group(&node->dev.kobj, &arch_node_dev_group);
+
+ if (ret)
+ pr_err("sysfs update failed (%d), files may be invisible", ret);
+}
+#else /* !CONFIG_NUMA */
+static void __init arch_update_sysfs_visibility(int nid) {}
+#endif
+
static bool __init sgx_page_cache_init(void)
{
u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx, type;
@@ -713,10 +867,16 @@ static bool __init sgx_page_cache_init(void)
if (!node_isset(nid, sgx_numa_mask)) {
spin_lock_init(&sgx_numa_nodes[nid].lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sgx_numa_nodes[nid].free_page_list);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sgx_numa_nodes[nid].sgx_poison_page_list);
node_set(nid, sgx_numa_mask);
+ sgx_numa_nodes[nid].size = 0;
+
+ /* Make SGX-specific node sysfs files visible: */
+ arch_update_sysfs_visibility(nid);
}
sgx_epc_sections[i].node = &sgx_numa_nodes[nid];
+ sgx_numa_nodes[nid].size += size;
sgx_nr_epc_sections++;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h
index 4628acec0009..0f17def9fe6f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h
@@ -26,9 +26,13 @@
/* Pages, which are being tracked by the page reclaimer. */
#define SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED BIT(0)
+/* Pages on free list */
+#define SGX_EPC_PAGE_IS_FREE BIT(1)
+
struct sgx_epc_page {
unsigned int section;
- unsigned int flags;
+ u16 flags;
+ u16 poison;
struct sgx_encl_page *owner;
struct list_head list;
};
@@ -39,6 +43,8 @@ struct sgx_epc_page {
*/
struct sgx_numa_node {
struct list_head free_page_list;
+ struct list_head sgx_poison_page_list;
+ unsigned long size;
spinlock_t lock;
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
index 8ea306b1bf8e..dd3777ac0443 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
@@ -99,6 +99,19 @@ bool irq_fpu_usable(void)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(irq_fpu_usable);
/*
+ * Track AVX512 state use because it is known to slow the max clock
+ * speed of the core.
+ */
+static void update_avx_timestamp(struct fpu *fpu)
+{
+
+#define AVX512_TRACKING_MASK (XFEATURE_MASK_ZMM_Hi256 | XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM)
+
+ if (fpu->fpstate->regs.xsave.header.xfeatures & AVX512_TRACKING_MASK)
+ fpu->avx512_timestamp = jiffies;
+}
+
+/*
* Save the FPU register state in fpu->fpstate->regs. The register state is
* preserved.
*
@@ -116,13 +129,7 @@ void save_fpregs_to_fpstate(struct fpu *fpu)
{
if (likely(use_xsave())) {
os_xsave(fpu->fpstate);
-
- /*
- * AVX512 state is tracked here because its use is
- * known to slow the max clock speed of the core.
- */
- if (fpu->fpstate->regs.xsave.header.xfeatures & XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512)
- fpu->avx512_timestamp = jiffies;
+ update_avx_timestamp(fpu);
return;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index fc5371a7e9d1..de563db9cdcd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -126,6 +126,36 @@ static bool __head check_la57_support(unsigned long physaddr)
}
#endif
+static unsigned long sme_postprocess_startup(struct boot_params *bp, pmdval_t *pmd)
+{
+ unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Encrypt the kernel and related (if SME is active) */
+ sme_encrypt_kernel(bp);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear the memory encryption mask from the .bss..decrypted section.
+ * The bss section will be memset to zero later in the initialization so
+ * there is no need to zero it after changing the memory encryption
+ * attribute.
+ */
+ if (sme_get_me_mask()) {
+ vaddr = (unsigned long)__start_bss_decrypted;
+ vaddr_end = (unsigned long)__end_bss_decrypted;
+ for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr += PMD_SIZE) {
+ i = pmd_index(vaddr);
+ pmd[i] -= sme_get_me_mask();
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Return the SME encryption mask (if SME is active) to be used as a
+ * modifier for the initial pgdir entry programmed into CR3.
+ */
+ return sme_get_me_mask();
+}
+
/* Code in __startup_64() can be relocated during execution, but the compiler
* doesn't have to generate PC-relative relocations when accessing globals from
* that function. Clang actually does not generate them, which leads to
@@ -135,7 +165,6 @@ static bool __head check_la57_support(unsigned long physaddr)
unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr,
struct boot_params *bp)
{
- unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end;
unsigned long load_delta, *p;
unsigned long pgtable_flags;
pgdval_t *pgd;
@@ -276,34 +305,7 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr,
*/
*fixup_long(&phys_base, physaddr) += load_delta - sme_get_me_mask();
- /* Encrypt the kernel and related (if SME is active) */
- sme_encrypt_kernel(bp);
-
- /*
- * Clear the memory encryption mask from the .bss..decrypted section.
- * The bss section will be memset to zero later in the initialization so
- * there is no need to zero it after changing the memory encryption
- * attribute.
- *
- * This is early code, use an open coded check for SME instead of
- * using cc_platform_has(). This eliminates worries about removing
- * instrumentation or checking boot_cpu_data in the cc_platform_has()
- * function.
- */
- if (sme_get_me_mask()) {
- vaddr = (unsigned long)__start_bss_decrypted;
- vaddr_end = (unsigned long)__end_bss_decrypted;
- for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr += PMD_SIZE) {
- i = pmd_index(vaddr);
- pmd[i] -= sme_get_me_mask();
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Return the SME encryption mask (if SME is active) to be used as a
- * modifier for the initial pgdir entry programmed into CR3.
- */
- return sme_get_me_mask();
+ return sme_postprocess_startup(bp, pmd);
}
unsigned long __startup_secondary_64(void)
@@ -485,6 +487,10 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init x86_64_start_kernel(char * real_mode_data)
clear_bss();
+ /*
+ * This needs to happen *before* kasan_early_init() because latter maps stuff
+ * into that page.
+ */
clear_page(init_top_pgt);
/*
@@ -496,6 +502,16 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init x86_64_start_kernel(char * real_mode_data)
kasan_early_init();
+ /*
+ * Flush global TLB entries which could be left over from the trampoline page
+ * table.
+ *
+ * This needs to happen *after* kasan_early_init() as KASAN-enabled .configs
+ * instrument native_write_cr4() so KASAN must be initialized for that
+ * instrumentation to work.
+ */
+ __native_tlb_flush_global(this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4));
+
idt_setup_early_handler();
copy_bootdata(__va(real_mode_data));
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index d8b3ebd2bb85..9c63fc5988cd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -166,9 +166,26 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
call sev_verify_cbit
popq %rsi
- /* Switch to new page-table */
+ /*
+ * Switch to new page-table
+ *
+ * For the boot CPU this switches to early_top_pgt which still has the
+ * indentity mappings present. The secondary CPUs will switch to the
+ * init_top_pgt here, away from the trampoline_pgd and unmap the
+ * indentity mapped ranges.
+ */
movq %rax, %cr3
+ /*
+ * Do a global TLB flush after the CR3 switch to make sure the TLB
+ * entries from the identity mapping are flushed.
+ */
+ movq %cr4, %rcx
+ movq %rcx, %rax
+ xorq $X86_CR4_PGE, %rcx
+ movq %rcx, %cr4
+ movq %rax, %cr4
+
/* Ensure I am executing from virtual addresses */
movq $1f, %rax
ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
index 0a40df66a40d..fa700b46588e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
@@ -113,17 +113,9 @@ void __noreturn machine_real_restart(unsigned int type)
spin_unlock(&rtc_lock);
/*
- * Switch back to the initial page table.
+ * Switch to the trampoline page table.
*/
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
- load_cr3(initial_page_table);
-#else
- write_cr3(real_mode_header->trampoline_pgd);
-
- /* Exiting long mode will fail if CR4.PCIDE is set. */
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID))
- cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_PCIDE);
-#endif
+ load_trampoline_pgtable();
/* Jump to the identity-mapped low memory code */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 6a190c7f4d71..f7a132eb794d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#include <asm/kasan.h>
#include <asm/kaslr.h>
#include <asm/mce.h>
+#include <asm/memtype.h>
#include <asm/mtrr.h>
#include <asm/realmode.h>
#include <asm/olpc_ofw.h>
@@ -713,9 +714,6 @@ static void __init early_reserve_memory(void)
early_reserve_initrd();
- if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
- efi_memblock_x86_reserve_range();
-
memblock_x86_reserve_range_setup_data();
reserve_ibft_region();
@@ -742,28 +740,6 @@ dump_kernel_offset(struct notifier_block *self, unsigned long v, void *p)
return 0;
}
-static char * __init prepare_command_line(void)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL
-#ifdef CONFIG_CMDLINE_OVERRIDE
- strlcpy(boot_command_line, builtin_cmdline, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
-#else
- if (builtin_cmdline[0]) {
- /* append boot loader cmdline to builtin */
- strlcat(builtin_cmdline, " ", COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
- strlcat(builtin_cmdline, boot_command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
- strlcpy(boot_command_line, builtin_cmdline, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
- }
-#endif
-#endif
-
- strlcpy(command_line, boot_command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
-
- parse_early_param();
-
- return command_line;
-}
-
/*
* Determine if we were loaded by an EFI loader. If so, then we have also been
* passed the efi memmap, systab, etc., so we should use these data structures
@@ -853,23 +829,6 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
x86_init.oem.arch_setup();
/*
- * x86_configure_nx() is called before parse_early_param() (called by
- * prepare_command_line()) to detect whether hardware doesn't support
- * NX (so that the early EHCI debug console setup can safely call
- * set_fixmap()). It may then be called again from within noexec_setup()
- * during parsing early parameters to honor the respective command line
- * option.
- */
- x86_configure_nx();
-
- /*
- * This parses early params and it needs to run before
- * early_reserve_memory() because latter relies on such settings
- * supplied as early params.
- */
- *cmdline_p = prepare_command_line();
-
- /*
* Do some memory reservations *before* memory is added to memblock, so
* memblock allocations won't overwrite it.
*
@@ -902,6 +861,36 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
bss_resource.start = __pa_symbol(__bss_start);
bss_resource.end = __pa_symbol(__bss_stop)-1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL
+#ifdef CONFIG_CMDLINE_OVERRIDE
+ strlcpy(boot_command_line, builtin_cmdline, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
+#else
+ if (builtin_cmdline[0]) {
+ /* append boot loader cmdline to builtin */
+ strlcat(builtin_cmdline, " ", COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
+ strlcat(builtin_cmdline, boot_command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
+ strlcpy(boot_command_line, builtin_cmdline, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
+ }
+#endif
+#endif
+
+ strlcpy(command_line, boot_command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
+ *cmdline_p = command_line;
+
+ /*
+ * x86_configure_nx() is called before parse_early_param() to detect
+ * whether hardware doesn't support NX (so that the early EHCI debug
+ * console setup can safely call set_fixmap()). It may then be called
+ * again from within noexec_setup() during parsing early parameters
+ * to honor the respective command line option.
+ */
+ x86_configure_nx();
+
+ parse_early_param();
+
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
+ efi_memblock_x86_reserve_range();
+
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
/*
* Memory used by the kernel cannot be hot-removed because Linux
@@ -979,7 +968,11 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
max_pfn = e820__end_of_ram_pfn();
/* update e820 for memory not covered by WB MTRRs */
- mtrr_bp_init();
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MTRR))
+ mtrr_bp_init();
+ else
+ pat_disable("PAT support disabled because CONFIG_MTRR is disabled in the kernel.");
+
if (mtrr_trim_uncached_memory(max_pfn))
max_pfn = e820__end_of_ram_pfn();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
index 787dc5f568b5..ce987688bbc0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ void __init do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
fail:
/* Terminate the guest */
- sev_es_terminate(GHCB_SEV_ES_REASON_GENERAL_REQUEST);
+ sev_es_terminate(GHCB_SEV_ES_GEN_REQ);
}
static enum es_result vc_insn_string_read(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index a9fc2ac7a8bd..e6d316a01fdd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/realmode.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/svm.h>
#include <asm/smp.h>
@@ -86,9 +87,6 @@ struct ghcb_state {
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sev_es_runtime_data*, runtime_data);
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_es_enable_key);
-/* Needed in vc_early_forward_exception */
-void do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr);
-
static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long sp = regs->sp;
@@ -209,9 +207,6 @@ static noinstr struct ghcb *__sev_get_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
return ghcb;
}
-/* Needed in vc_early_forward_exception */
-void do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr);
-
static inline u64 sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr(void)
{
return __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB);
@@ -797,22 +792,6 @@ static void __init vc_early_forward_exception(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
do_early_exception(ctxt->regs, trapnr);
}
-static long *vc_insn_get_reg(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
-{
- long *reg_array;
- int offset;
-
- reg_array = (long *)ctxt->regs;
- offset = insn_get_modrm_reg_off(&ctxt->insn, ctxt->regs);
-
- if (offset < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- offset /= sizeof(long);
-
- return reg_array + offset;
-}
-
static long *vc_insn_get_rm(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
long *reg_array;
@@ -860,76 +839,6 @@ static enum es_result vc_do_mmio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
return sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, true, ctxt, exit_code, exit_info_1, exit_info_2);
}
-static enum es_result vc_handle_mmio_twobyte_ops(struct ghcb *ghcb,
- struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
-{
- struct insn *insn = &ctxt->insn;
- unsigned int bytes = 0;
- enum es_result ret;
- int sign_byte;
- long *reg_data;
-
- switch (insn->opcode.bytes[1]) {
- /* MMIO Read w/ zero-extension */
- case 0xb6:
- bytes = 1;
- fallthrough;
- case 0xb7:
- if (!bytes)
- bytes = 2;
-
- ret = vc_do_mmio(ghcb, ctxt, bytes, true);
- if (ret)
- break;
-
- /* Zero extend based on operand size */
- reg_data = vc_insn_get_reg(ctxt);
- if (!reg_data)
- return ES_DECODE_FAILED;
-
- memset(reg_data, 0, insn->opnd_bytes);
-
- memcpy(reg_data, ghcb->shared_buffer, bytes);
- break;
-
- /* MMIO Read w/ sign-extension */
- case 0xbe:
- bytes = 1;
- fallthrough;
- case 0xbf:
- if (!bytes)
- bytes = 2;
-
- ret = vc_do_mmio(ghcb, ctxt, bytes, true);
- if (ret)
- break;
-
- /* Sign extend based on operand size */
- reg_data = vc_insn_get_reg(ctxt);
- if (!reg_data)
- return ES_DECODE_FAILED;
-
- if (bytes == 1) {
- u8 *val = (u8 *)ghcb->shared_buffer;
-
- sign_byte = (*val & 0x80) ? 0xff : 0x00;
- } else {
- u16 *val = (u16 *)ghcb->shared_buffer;
-
- sign_byte = (*val & 0x8000) ? 0xff : 0x00;
- }
- memset(reg_data, sign_byte, insn->opnd_bytes);
-
- memcpy(reg_data, ghcb->shared_buffer, bytes);
- break;
-
- default:
- ret = ES_UNSUPPORTED;
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
/*
* The MOVS instruction has two memory operands, which raises the
* problem that it is not known whether the access to the source or the
@@ -997,83 +906,79 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_mmio_movs(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
return ES_RETRY;
}
-static enum es_result vc_handle_mmio(struct ghcb *ghcb,
- struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+static enum es_result vc_handle_mmio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct insn *insn = &ctxt->insn;
unsigned int bytes = 0;
+ enum mmio_type mmio;
enum es_result ret;
+ u8 sign_byte;
long *reg_data;
- switch (insn->opcode.bytes[0]) {
- /* MMIO Write */
- case 0x88:
- bytes = 1;
- fallthrough;
- case 0x89:
- if (!bytes)
- bytes = insn->opnd_bytes;
+ mmio = insn_decode_mmio(insn, &bytes);
+ if (mmio == MMIO_DECODE_FAILED)
+ return ES_DECODE_FAILED;
- reg_data = vc_insn_get_reg(ctxt);
+ if (mmio != MMIO_WRITE_IMM && mmio != MMIO_MOVS) {
+ reg_data = insn_get_modrm_reg_ptr(insn, ctxt->regs);
if (!reg_data)
return ES_DECODE_FAILED;
+ }
+ switch (mmio) {
+ case MMIO_WRITE:
memcpy(ghcb->shared_buffer, reg_data, bytes);
-
ret = vc_do_mmio(ghcb, ctxt, bytes, false);
break;
-
- case 0xc6:
- bytes = 1;
- fallthrough;
- case 0xc7:
- if (!bytes)
- bytes = insn->opnd_bytes;
-
+ case MMIO_WRITE_IMM:
memcpy(ghcb->shared_buffer, insn->immediate1.bytes, bytes);
-
ret = vc_do_mmio(ghcb, ctxt, bytes, false);
break;
-
- /* MMIO Read */
- case 0x8a:
- bytes = 1;
- fallthrough;
- case 0x8b:
- if (!bytes)
- bytes = insn->opnd_bytes;
-
+ case MMIO_READ:
ret = vc_do_mmio(ghcb, ctxt, bytes, true);
if (ret)
break;
- reg_data = vc_insn_get_reg(ctxt);
- if (!reg_data)
- return ES_DECODE_FAILED;
-
/* Zero-extend for 32-bit operation */
if (bytes == 4)
*reg_data = 0;
memcpy(reg_data, ghcb->shared_buffer, bytes);
break;
+ case MMIO_READ_ZERO_EXTEND:
+ ret = vc_do_mmio(ghcb, ctxt, bytes, true);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
- /* MOVS instruction */
- case 0xa4:
- bytes = 1;
- fallthrough;
- case 0xa5:
- if (!bytes)
- bytes = insn->opnd_bytes;
+ /* Zero extend based on operand size */
+ memset(reg_data, 0, insn->opnd_bytes);
+ memcpy(reg_data, ghcb->shared_buffer, bytes);
+ break;
+ case MMIO_READ_SIGN_EXTEND:
+ ret = vc_do_mmio(ghcb, ctxt, bytes, true);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
- ret = vc_handle_mmio_movs(ctxt, bytes);
+ if (bytes == 1) {
+ u8 *val = (u8 *)ghcb->shared_buffer;
+
+ sign_byte = (*val & 0x80) ? 0xff : 0x00;
+ } else {
+ u16 *val = (u16 *)ghcb->shared_buffer;
+
+ sign_byte = (*val & 0x8000) ? 0xff : 0x00;
+ }
+
+ /* Sign extend based on operand size */
+ memset(reg_data, sign_byte, insn->opnd_bytes);
+ memcpy(reg_data, ghcb->shared_buffer, bytes);
break;
- /* Two-Byte Opcodes */
- case 0x0f:
- ret = vc_handle_mmio_twobyte_ops(ghcb, ctxt);
+ case MMIO_MOVS:
+ ret = vc_handle_mmio_movs(ctxt, bytes);
break;
default:
ret = ES_UNSUPPORTED;
+ break;
}
return ret;
@@ -1432,7 +1337,7 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_KERNEL(exc_vmm_communication)
show_regs(regs);
/* Ask hypervisor to sev_es_terminate */
- sev_es_terminate(GHCB_SEV_ES_REASON_GENERAL_REQUEST);
+ sev_es_terminate(GHCB_SEV_ES_GEN_REQ);
/* If that fails and we get here - just panic */
panic("Returned from Terminate-Request to Hypervisor\n");
@@ -1480,7 +1385,7 @@ bool __init handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs)
/* Do initial setup or terminate the guest */
if (unlikely(boot_ghcb == NULL && !sev_es_setup_ghcb()))
- sev_es_terminate(GHCB_SEV_ES_REASON_GENERAL_REQUEST);
+ sev_es_terminate(GHCB_SEV_ES_GEN_REQ);
vc_ghcb_invalidate(boot_ghcb);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
index ac2909f0cab3..617012f4619f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
@@ -579,6 +579,17 @@ static struct sched_domain_topology_level x86_numa_in_package_topology[] = {
{ NULL, },
};
+static struct sched_domain_topology_level x86_hybrid_topology[] = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
+ { cpu_smt_mask, x86_smt_flags, SD_INIT_NAME(SMT) },
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_MC
+ { cpu_coregroup_mask, x86_core_flags, SD_INIT_NAME(MC) },
+#endif
+ { cpu_cpu_mask, SD_INIT_NAME(DIE) },
+ { NULL, },
+};
+
static struct sched_domain_topology_level x86_topology[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
{ cpu_smt_mask, x86_smt_flags, SD_INIT_NAME(SMT) },
@@ -1469,8 +1480,11 @@ void __init native_smp_cpus_done(unsigned int max_cpus)
calculate_max_logical_packages();
+ /* XXX for now assume numa-in-package and hybrid don't overlap */
if (x86_has_numa_in_package)
set_sched_topology(x86_numa_in_package_topology);
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_HYBRID_CPU))
+ set_sched_topology(x86_hybrid_topology);
nmi_selftest();
impress_friends();
Copyright © 1996 – 2023 Jason A. Donenfeld. All Rights Reverse Engineered.