1 files changed, 441 insertions, 143 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
index 82513b6b0abd..88f33c0efb23 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -82,6 +82,19 @@ int alg_test(const char *driver, const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask)
 struct aead_test_suite {
 	const struct aead_testvec *vecs;
 	unsigned int count;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set if trying to decrypt an inauthentic ciphertext with this
+	 * algorithm might result in EINVAL rather than EBADMSG, due to other
+	 * validation the algorithm does on the inputs such as length checks.
+	 */
+	unsigned int einval_allowed : 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set if the algorithm intentionally ignores the last 8 bytes of the
+	 * AAD buffer during decryption.
+	 */
+	unsigned int esp_aad : 1;
 };
 
 struct cipher_test_suite {
@@ -259,6 +272,9 @@ struct test_sg_division {
  *	       where 0 is aligned to a 2*(MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK+1) byte boundary
  * @iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask: if true, add the algorithm's alignmask to
  *				     the @iv_offset
+ * @key_offset: misalignment of the key, where 0 is default alignment
+ * @key_offset_relative_to_alignmask: if true, add the algorithm's alignmask to
+ *				      the @key_offset
  * @finalization_type: what finalization function to use for hashes
  * @nosimd: execute with SIMD disabled?  Requires !CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP.
  */
@@ -269,7 +285,9 @@ struct testvec_config {
 	struct test_sg_division src_divs[XBUFSIZE];
 	struct test_sg_division dst_divs[XBUFSIZE];
 	unsigned int iv_offset;
+	unsigned int key_offset;
 	bool iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask;
+	bool key_offset_relative_to_alignmask;
 	enum finalization_type finalization_type;
 	bool nosimd;
 };
@@ -297,6 +315,7 @@ static const struct testvec_config default_cipher_testvec_configs[] = {
 		.name = "unaligned buffer, offset=1",
 		.src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000, .offset = 1 } },
 		.iv_offset = 1,
+		.key_offset = 1,
 	}, {
 		.name = "buffer aligned only to alignmask",
 		.src_divs = {
@@ -308,6 +327,8 @@ static const struct testvec_config default_cipher_testvec_configs[] = {
 		},
 		.iv_offset = 1,
 		.iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask = true,
+		.key_offset = 1,
+		.key_offset_relative_to_alignmask = true,
 	}, {
 		.name = "two even aligned splits",
 		.src_divs = {
@@ -323,6 +344,7 @@ static const struct testvec_config default_cipher_testvec_configs[] = {
 			{ .proportion_of_total = 4800, .offset = 18 },
 		},
 		.iv_offset = 3,
+		.key_offset = 3,
 	}, {
 		.name = "misaligned splits crossing pages, inplace",
 		.inplace = true,
@@ -355,6 +377,7 @@ static const struct testvec_config default_hash_testvec_configs[] = {
 		.name = "init+update+final misaligned buffer",
 		.src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000, .offset = 1 } },
 		.finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL,
+		.key_offset = 1,
 	}, {
 		.name = "digest buffer aligned only to alignmask",
 		.src_divs = {
@@ -365,6 +388,8 @@ static const struct testvec_config default_hash_testvec_configs[] = {
 			},
 		},
 		.finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST,
+		.key_offset = 1,
+		.key_offset_relative_to_alignmask = true,
 	}, {
 		.name = "init+update+update+final two even splits",
 		.src_divs = {
@@ -740,6 +765,49 @@ static int build_cipher_test_sglists(struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls,
 				 alignmask, dst_total_len, NULL, NULL);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Support for testing passing a misaligned key to setkey():
+ *
+ * If cfg->key_offset is set, copy the key into a new buffer at that offset,
+ * optionally adding alignmask.  Else, just use the key directly.
+ */
+static int prepare_keybuf(const u8 *key, unsigned int ksize,
+			  const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+			  unsigned int alignmask,
+			  const u8 **keybuf_ret, const u8 **keyptr_ret)
+{
+	unsigned int key_offset = cfg->key_offset;
+	u8 *keybuf = NULL, *keyptr = (u8 *)key;
+
+	if (key_offset != 0) {
+		if (cfg->key_offset_relative_to_alignmask)
+			key_offset += alignmask;
+		keybuf = kmalloc(key_offset + ksize, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!keybuf)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		keyptr = keybuf + key_offset;
+		memcpy(keyptr, key, ksize);
+	}
+	*keybuf_ret = keybuf;
+	*keyptr_ret = keyptr;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Like setkey_f(tfm, key, ksize), but sometimes misalign the key */
+#define do_setkey(setkey_f, tfm, key, ksize, cfg, alignmask)		\
+({									\
+	const u8 *keybuf, *keyptr;					\
+	int err;							\
+									\
+	err = prepare_keybuf((key), (ksize), (cfg), (alignmask),	\
+			     &keybuf, &keyptr);				\
+	if (err == 0) {							\
+		err = setkey_f((tfm), keyptr, (ksize));			\
+		kfree(keybuf);						\
+	}								\
+	err;								\
+})
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
 
 /* Generate a random length in range [0, max_len], but prefer smaller values */
@@ -759,27 +827,39 @@ static unsigned int generate_random_length(unsigned int max_len)
 	}
 }
 
-/* Sometimes make some random changes to the given data buffer */
-static void mutate_buffer(u8 *buf, size_t count)
+/* Flip a random bit in the given nonempty data buffer */
+static void flip_random_bit(u8 *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	size_t bitpos;
+
+	bitpos = prandom_u32() % (size * 8);
+	buf[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos % 8);
+}
+
+/* Flip a random byte in the given nonempty data buffer */
+static void flip_random_byte(u8 *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	buf[prandom_u32() % size] ^= 0xff;
+}
+
+/* Sometimes make some random changes to the given nonempty data buffer */
+static void mutate_buffer(u8 *buf, size_t size)
 {
 	size_t num_flips;
 	size_t i;
-	size_t pos;
 
 	/* Sometimes flip some bits */
 	if (prandom_u32() % 4 == 0) {
-		num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << (prandom_u32() % 8), count * 8);
-		for (i = 0; i < num_flips; i++) {
-			pos = prandom_u32() % (count * 8);
-			buf[pos / 8] ^= 1 << (pos % 8);
-		}
+		num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << (prandom_u32() % 8), size * 8);
+		for (i = 0; i < num_flips; i++)
+			flip_random_bit(buf, size);
 	}
 
 	/* Sometimes flip some bytes */
 	if (prandom_u32() % 4 == 0) {
-		num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << (prandom_u32() % 8), count);
+		num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << (prandom_u32() % 8), size);
 		for (i = 0; i < num_flips; i++)
-			buf[prandom_u32() % count] ^= 0xff;
+			flip_random_byte(buf, size);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -966,6 +1046,11 @@ static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct testvec_config *cfg,
 		p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " iv_offset=%u", cfg->iv_offset);
 	}
 
+	if (prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) {
+		cfg->key_offset = 1 + (prandom_u32() % MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK);
+		p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " key_offset=%u", cfg->key_offset);
+	}
+
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(!valid_testvec_config(cfg));
 }
 
@@ -1103,7 +1188,8 @@ static int test_shash_vec_cfg(const char *driver,
 
 	/* Set the key, if specified */
 	if (vec->ksize) {
-		err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->ksize);
+		err = do_setkey(crypto_shash_setkey, tfm, vec->key, vec->ksize,
+				cfg, alignmask);
 		if (err) {
 			if (err == vec->setkey_error)
 				return 0;
@@ -1290,7 +1376,8 @@ static int test_ahash_vec_cfg(const char *driver,
 
 	/* Set the key, if specified */
 	if (vec->ksize) {
-		err = crypto_ahash_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->ksize);
+		err = do_setkey(crypto_ahash_setkey, tfm, vec->key, vec->ksize,
+				cfg, alignmask);
 		if (err) {
 			if (err == vec->setkey_error)
 				return 0;
@@ -1853,7 +1940,6 @@ static int test_aead_vec_cfg(const char *driver, int enc,
 		 cfg->iv_offset +
 		 (cfg->iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask ? alignmask : 0);
 	struct kvec input[2];
-	int expected_error;
 	int err;
 
 	/* Set the key */
@@ -1861,7 +1947,9 @@ static int test_aead_vec_cfg(const char *driver, int enc,
 		crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
 	else
 		crypto_aead_clear_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
-	err = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->klen);
+
+	err = do_setkey(crypto_aead_setkey, tfm, vec->key, vec->klen,
+			cfg, alignmask);
 	if (err && err != vec->setkey_error) {
 		pr_err("alg: aead: %s setkey failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n",
 		       driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error, err,
@@ -1972,20 +2060,31 @@ static int test_aead_vec_cfg(const char *driver, int enc,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	/* Check for success or failure */
-	expected_error = vec->novrfy ? -EBADMSG : vec->crypt_error;
-	if (err) {
-		if (err == expected_error)
-			return 0;
-		pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
-		       driver, op, vec_name, expected_error, err, cfg->name);
-		return err;
-	}
-	if (expected_error) {
-		pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+	/* Check for unexpected success or failure, or wrong error code */
+	if ((err == 0 && vec->novrfy) ||
+	    (err != vec->crypt_error && !(err == -EBADMSG && vec->novrfy))) {
+		char expected_error[32];
+
+		if (vec->novrfy &&
+		    vec->crypt_error != 0 && vec->crypt_error != -EBADMSG)
+			sprintf(expected_error, "-EBADMSG or %d",
+				vec->crypt_error);
+		else if (vec->novrfy)
+			sprintf(expected_error, "-EBADMSG");
+		else
+			sprintf(expected_error, "%d", vec->crypt_error);
+		if (err) {
+			pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%s, actual_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+			       driver, op, vec_name, expected_error, err,
+			       cfg->name);
+			return err;
+		}
+		pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
 		       driver, op, vec_name, expected_error, cfg->name);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
+	if (err) /* Expectedly failed. */
+		return 0;
 
 	/* Check for the correct output (ciphertext or plaintext) */
 	err = verify_correct_output(&tsgls->dst, enc ? vec->ctext : vec->ptext,
@@ -2047,25 +2146,129 @@ static int test_aead_vec(const char *driver, int enc,
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+
+struct aead_extra_tests_ctx {
+	struct aead_request *req;
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+	const char *driver;
+	const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc;
+	struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls;
+	unsigned int maxdatasize;
+	unsigned int maxkeysize;
+
+	struct aead_testvec vec;
+	char vec_name[64];
+	char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN];
+	struct testvec_config cfg;
+};
+
 /*
- * Generate an AEAD test vector from the given implementation.
- * Assumes the buffers in 'vec' were already allocated.
+ * Make at least one random change to a (ciphertext, AAD) pair.  "Ciphertext"
+ * here means the full ciphertext including the authentication tag.  The
+ * authentication tag (and hence also the ciphertext) is assumed to be nonempty.
+ */
+static void mutate_aead_message(struct aead_testvec *vec, bool esp_aad)
+{
+	const unsigned int aad_tail_size = esp_aad ? 8 : 0;
+	const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen;
+
+	if (prandom_u32() % 2 == 0 && vec->alen > aad_tail_size) {
+		 /* Mutate the AAD */
+		flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen - aad_tail_size);
+		if (prandom_u32() % 2 == 0)
+			return;
+	}
+	if (prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) {
+		/* Mutate auth tag (assuming it's at the end of ciphertext) */
+		flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->ctext + vec->plen, authsize);
+	} else {
+		/* Mutate any part of the ciphertext */
+		flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Minimum authentication tag size in bytes at which we assume that we can
+ * reliably generate inauthentic messages, i.e. not generate an authentic
+ * message by chance.
+ */
+#define MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE 8
+
+static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req,
+				  const struct aead_test_suite *suite,
+				  struct aead_testvec *vec,
+				  bool prefer_inauthentic)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+	const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen;
+	const bool inauthentic = (authsize >= MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE) &&
+				 (prefer_inauthentic || prandom_u32() % 4 == 0);
+
+	/* Generate the AAD. */
+	generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen);
+
+	if (inauthentic && prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) {
+		/* Generate a random ciphertext. */
+		generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen);
+	} else {
+		int i = 0;
+		struct scatterlist src[2], dst;
+		u8 iv[MAX_IVLEN];
+		DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+
+		/* Generate a random plaintext and encrypt it. */
+		sg_init_table(src, 2);
+		if (vec->alen)
+			sg_set_buf(&src[i++], vec->assoc, vec->alen);
+		if (vec->plen) {
+			generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->plen);
+			sg_set_buf(&src[i++], vec->ptext, vec->plen);
+		}
+		sg_init_one(&dst, vec->ctext, vec->alen + vec->clen);
+		memcpy(iv, vec->iv, ivsize);
+		aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, crypto_req_done, &wait);
+		aead_request_set_crypt(req, src, &dst, vec->plen, iv);
+		aead_request_set_ad(req, vec->alen);
+		vec->crypt_error = crypto_wait_req(crypto_aead_encrypt(req),
+						   &wait);
+		/* If encryption failed, we're done. */
+		if (vec->crypt_error != 0)
+			return;
+		memmove((u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->ctext + vec->alen, vec->clen);
+		if (!inauthentic)
+			return;
+		/*
+		 * Mutate the authentic (ciphertext, AAD) pair to get an
+		 * inauthentic one.
+		 */
+		mutate_aead_message(vec, suite->esp_aad);
+	}
+	vec->novrfy = 1;
+	if (suite->einval_allowed)
+		vec->crypt_error = -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate an AEAD test vector 'vec' using the implementation specified by
+ * 'req'.  The buffers in 'vec' must already be allocated.
+ *
+ * If 'prefer_inauthentic' is true, then this function will generate inauthentic
+ * test vectors (i.e. vectors with 'vec->novrfy=1') more often.
  */
 static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct aead_request *req,
 					 struct aead_testvec *vec,
+					 const struct aead_test_suite *suite,
 					 unsigned int maxkeysize,
 					 unsigned int maxdatasize,
-					 char *name, size_t max_namelen)
+					 char *name, size_t max_namelen,
+					 bool prefer_inauthentic)
 {
 	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
 	const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
-	unsigned int maxauthsize = crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->maxauthsize;
+	const unsigned int maxauthsize = crypto_aead_maxauthsize(tfm);
 	unsigned int authsize;
 	unsigned int total_len;
-	int i;
-	struct scatterlist src[2], dst;
-	u8 iv[MAX_IVLEN];
-	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
 
 	/* Key: length in [0, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize */
 	vec->klen = maxkeysize;
@@ -2081,81 +2284,101 @@ static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct aead_request *req,
 	authsize = maxauthsize;
 	if (prandom_u32() % 4 == 0)
 		authsize = prandom_u32() % (maxauthsize + 1);
+	if (prefer_inauthentic && authsize < MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE)
+		authsize = MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE;
 	if (WARN_ON(authsize > maxdatasize))
 		authsize = maxdatasize;
 	maxdatasize -= authsize;
 	vec->setauthsize_error = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, authsize);
 
-	/* Plaintext and associated data */
+	/* AAD, plaintext, and ciphertext lengths */
 	total_len = generate_random_length(maxdatasize);
 	if (prandom_u32() % 4 == 0)
 		vec->alen = 0;
 	else
 		vec->alen = generate_random_length(total_len);
 	vec->plen = total_len - vec->alen;
-	generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen);
-	generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->plen);
-
 	vec->clen = vec->plen + authsize;
 
 	/*
-	 * If the key or authentication tag size couldn't be set, no need to
-	 * continue to encrypt.
+	 * Generate the AAD, plaintext, and ciphertext.  Not applicable if the
+	 * key or the authentication tag size couldn't be set.
 	 */
-	if (vec->setkey_error || vec->setauthsize_error)
-		goto done;
-
-	/* Ciphertext */
-	sg_init_table(src, 2);
-	i = 0;
-	if (vec->alen)
-		sg_set_buf(&src[i++], vec->assoc, vec->alen);
-	if (vec->plen)
-		sg_set_buf(&src[i++], vec->ptext, vec->plen);
-	sg_init_one(&dst, vec->ctext, vec->alen + vec->clen);
-	memcpy(iv, vec->iv, ivsize);
-	aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, crypto_req_done, &wait);
-	aead_request_set_crypt(req, src, &dst, vec->plen, iv);
-	aead_request_set_ad(req, vec->alen);
-	vec->crypt_error = crypto_wait_req(crypto_aead_encrypt(req), &wait);
-	if (vec->crypt_error == 0)
-		memmove((u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->ctext + vec->alen, vec->clen);
-done:
+	vec->novrfy = 0;
+	vec->crypt_error = 0;
+	if (vec->setkey_error == 0 && vec->setauthsize_error == 0)
+		generate_aead_message(req, suite, vec, prefer_inauthentic);
 	snprintf(name, max_namelen,
-		 "\"random: alen=%u plen=%u authsize=%u klen=%u\"",
-		 vec->alen, vec->plen, authsize, vec->klen);
+		 "\"random: alen=%u plen=%u authsize=%u klen=%u novrfy=%d\"",
+		 vec->alen, vec->plen, authsize, vec->klen, vec->novrfy);
+}
+
+static void try_to_generate_inauthentic_testvec(
+					struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+		generate_random_aead_testvec(ctx->req, &ctx->vec,
+					     &ctx->test_desc->suite.aead,
+					     ctx->maxkeysize, ctx->maxdatasize,
+					     ctx->vec_name,
+					     sizeof(ctx->vec_name), true);
+		if (ctx->vec.novrfy)
+			return;
+	}
 }
 
 /*
- * Test the AEAD algorithm represented by @req against the corresponding generic
- * implementation, if one is available.
+ * Generate inauthentic test vectors (i.e. ciphertext, AAD pairs that aren't the
+ * result of an encryption with the key) and verify that decryption fails.
  */
-static int test_aead_vs_generic_impl(const char *driver,
-				     const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc,
-				     struct aead_request *req,
-				     struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+static int test_aead_inauthentic_inputs(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx)
 {
-	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
-	const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
-	const unsigned int maxauthsize = crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->maxauthsize;
-	const unsigned int blocksize = crypto_aead_blocksize(tfm);
-	const unsigned int maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN;
+	unsigned int i;
+	int err;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) {
+		/*
+		 * Since this part of the tests isn't comparing the
+		 * implementation to another, there's no point in testing any
+		 * test vectors other than inauthentic ones (vec.novrfy=1) here.
+		 *
+		 * If we're having trouble generating such a test vector, e.g.
+		 * if the algorithm keeps rejecting the generated keys, don't
+		 * retry forever; just continue on.
+		 */
+		try_to_generate_inauthentic_testvec(ctx);
+		if (ctx->vec.novrfy) {
+			generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->cfg, ctx->cfgname,
+						       sizeof(ctx->cfgname));
+			err = test_aead_vec_cfg(ctx->driver, DECRYPT, &ctx->vec,
+						ctx->vec_name, &ctx->cfg,
+						ctx->req, ctx->tsgls);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+		}
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test the AEAD algorithm against the corresponding generic implementation, if
+ * one is available.
+ */
+static int test_aead_vs_generic_impl(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = ctx->tfm;
 	const char *algname = crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->base.cra_name;
-	const char *generic_driver = test_desc->generic_driver;
+	const char *driver = ctx->driver;
+	const char *generic_driver = ctx->test_desc->generic_driver;
 	char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
 	struct crypto_aead *generic_tfm = NULL;
 	struct aead_request *generic_req = NULL;
-	unsigned int maxkeysize;
 	unsigned int i;
-	struct aead_testvec vec = { 0 };
-	char vec_name[64];
-	struct testvec_config *cfg;
-	char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN];
 	int err;
 
-	if (noextratests)
-		return 0;
-
 	if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */
 		err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver);
 		if (err)
@@ -2179,12 +2402,6 @@ static int test_aead_vs_generic_impl(const char *driver,
 		return err;
 	}
 
-	cfg = kzalloc(sizeof(*cfg), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!cfg) {
-		err = -ENOMEM;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
 	generic_req = aead_request_alloc(generic_tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!generic_req) {
 		err = -ENOMEM;
@@ -2193,24 +2410,27 @@ static int test_aead_vs_generic_impl(const char *driver,
 
 	/* Check the algorithm properties for consistency. */
 
-	if (maxauthsize != crypto_aead_alg(generic_tfm)->maxauthsize) {
+	if (crypto_aead_maxauthsize(tfm) !=
+	    crypto_aead_maxauthsize(generic_tfm)) {
 		pr_err("alg: aead: maxauthsize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
-		       driver, maxauthsize,
-		       crypto_aead_alg(generic_tfm)->maxauthsize);
+		       driver, crypto_aead_maxauthsize(tfm),
+		       crypto_aead_maxauthsize(generic_tfm));
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (ivsize != crypto_aead_ivsize(generic_tfm)) {
+	if (crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm) != crypto_aead_ivsize(generic_tfm)) {
 		pr_err("alg: aead: ivsize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
-		       driver, ivsize, crypto_aead_ivsize(generic_tfm));
+		       driver, crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm),
+		       crypto_aead_ivsize(generic_tfm));
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (blocksize != crypto_aead_blocksize(generic_tfm)) {
+	if (crypto_aead_blocksize(tfm) != crypto_aead_blocksize(generic_tfm)) {
 		pr_err("alg: aead: blocksize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
-		       driver, blocksize, crypto_aead_blocksize(generic_tfm));
+		       driver, crypto_aead_blocksize(tfm),
+		       crypto_aead_blocksize(generic_tfm));
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -2219,55 +2439,93 @@ static int test_aead_vs_generic_impl(const char *driver,
 	 * Now generate test vectors using the generic implementation, and test
 	 * the other implementation against them.
 	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) {
+		generate_random_aead_testvec(generic_req, &ctx->vec,
+					     &ctx->test_desc->suite.aead,
+					     ctx->maxkeysize, ctx->maxdatasize,
+					     ctx->vec_name,
+					     sizeof(ctx->vec_name), false);
+		generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->cfg, ctx->cfgname,
+					       sizeof(ctx->cfgname));
+		if (!ctx->vec.novrfy) {
+			err = test_aead_vec_cfg(driver, ENCRYPT, &ctx->vec,
+						ctx->vec_name, &ctx->cfg,
+						ctx->req, ctx->tsgls);
+			if (err)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		if (ctx->vec.crypt_error == 0 || ctx->vec.novrfy) {
+			err = test_aead_vec_cfg(driver, DECRYPT, &ctx->vec,
+						ctx->vec_name, &ctx->cfg,
+						ctx->req, ctx->tsgls);
+			if (err)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+	err = 0;
+out:
+	crypto_free_aead(generic_tfm);
+	aead_request_free(generic_req);
+	return err;
+}
 
-	maxkeysize = 0;
-	for (i = 0; i < test_desc->suite.aead.count; i++)
-		maxkeysize = max_t(unsigned int, maxkeysize,
-				   test_desc->suite.aead.vecs[i].klen);
+static int test_aead_extra(const char *driver,
+			   const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc,
+			   struct aead_request *req,
+			   struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+	struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx;
+	unsigned int i;
+	int err;
 
-	vec.key = kmalloc(maxkeysize, GFP_KERNEL);
-	vec.iv = kmalloc(ivsize, GFP_KERNEL);
-	vec.assoc = kmalloc(maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
-	vec.ptext = kmalloc(maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
-	vec.ctext = kmalloc(maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!vec.key || !vec.iv || !vec.assoc || !vec.ptext || !vec.ctext) {
+	if (noextratests)
+		return 0;
+
+	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	ctx->req = req;
+	ctx->tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	ctx->driver = driver;
+	ctx->test_desc = test_desc;
+	ctx->tsgls = tsgls;
+	ctx->maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN;
+	ctx->maxkeysize = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < test_desc->suite.aead.count; i++)
+		ctx->maxkeysize = max_t(unsigned int, ctx->maxkeysize,
+					test_desc->suite.aead.vecs[i].klen);
+
+	ctx->vec.key = kmalloc(ctx->maxkeysize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	ctx->vec.iv = kmalloc(crypto_aead_ivsize(ctx->tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+	ctx->vec.assoc = kmalloc(ctx->maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	ctx->vec.ptext = kmalloc(ctx->maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	ctx->vec.ctext = kmalloc(ctx->maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->vec.key || !ctx->vec.iv || !ctx->vec.assoc ||
+	    !ctx->vec.ptext || !ctx->vec.ctext) {
 		err = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) {
-		generate_random_aead_testvec(generic_req, &vec,
-					     maxkeysize, maxdatasize,
-					     vec_name, sizeof(vec_name));
-		generate_random_testvec_config(cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname));
+	err = test_aead_inauthentic_inputs(ctx);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
 
-		err = test_aead_vec_cfg(driver, ENCRYPT, &vec, vec_name, cfg,
-					req, tsgls);
-		if (err)
-			goto out;
-		err = test_aead_vec_cfg(driver, DECRYPT, &vec, vec_name, cfg,
-					req, tsgls);
-		if (err)
-			goto out;
-		cond_resched();
-	}
-	err = 0;
+	err = test_aead_vs_generic_impl(ctx);
 out:
-	kfree(cfg);
-	kfree(vec.key);
-	kfree(vec.iv);
-	kfree(vec.assoc);
-	kfree(vec.ptext);
-	kfree(vec.ctext);
-	crypto_free_aead(generic_tfm);
-	aead_request_free(generic_req);
+	kfree(ctx->vec.key);
+	kfree(ctx->vec.iv);
+	kfree(ctx->vec.assoc);
+	kfree(ctx->vec.ptext);
+	kfree(ctx->vec.ctext);
+	kfree(ctx);
 	return err;
 }
 #else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
-static int test_aead_vs_generic_impl(const char *driver,
-				     const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc,
-				     struct aead_request *req,
-				     struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+static int test_aead_extra(const char *driver,
+			   const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc,
+			   struct aead_request *req,
+			   struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -2336,7 +2594,7 @@ static int alg_test_aead(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
-	err = test_aead_vs_generic_impl(driver, desc, req, tsgls);
+	err = test_aead_extra(driver, desc, req, tsgls);
 out:
 	free_cipher_test_sglists(tsgls);
 	aead_request_free(req);
@@ -2457,7 +2715,8 @@ static int test_skcipher_vec_cfg(const char *driver, int enc,
 	else
 		crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(tfm,
 					    CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
-	err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->klen);
+	err = do_setkey(crypto_skcipher_setkey, tfm, vec->key, vec->klen,
+			cfg, alignmask);
 	if (err) {
 		if (err == vec->setkey_error)
 			return 0;
@@ -2647,7 +2906,7 @@ static void generate_random_cipher_testvec(struct skcipher_request *req,
 					   char *name, size_t max_namelen)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
-	const unsigned int maxkeysize = tfm->keysize;
+	const unsigned int maxkeysize = crypto_skcipher_max_keysize(tfm);
 	const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm);
 	struct scatterlist src, dst;
 	u8 iv[MAX_IVLEN];
@@ -2678,6 +2937,15 @@ static void generate_random_cipher_testvec(struct skcipher_request *req,
 	skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, crypto_req_done, &wait);
 	skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst, vec->len, iv);
 	vec->crypt_error = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
+	if (vec->crypt_error != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * The only acceptable error here is for an invalid length, so
+		 * skcipher decryption should fail with the same error too.
+		 * We'll test for this.  But to keep the API usage well-defined,
+		 * explicitly initialize the ciphertext buffer too.
+		 */
+		memset((u8 *)vec->ctext, 0, vec->len);
+	}
 done:
 	snprintf(name, max_namelen, "\"random: len=%u klen=%u\"",
 		 vec->len, vec->klen);
@@ -2693,6 +2961,7 @@ static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *driver,
 					 struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	const unsigned int maxkeysize = crypto_skcipher_max_keysize(tfm);
 	const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm);
 	const unsigned int blocksize = crypto_skcipher_blocksize(tfm);
 	const unsigned int maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN;
@@ -2751,9 +3020,19 @@ static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *driver,
 
 	/* Check the algorithm properties for consistency. */
 
-	if (tfm->keysize != generic_tfm->keysize) {
+	if (crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(tfm) !=
+	    crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(generic_tfm)) {
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: min keysize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+		       driver, crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(tfm),
+		       crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(generic_tfm));
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (maxkeysize != crypto_skcipher_max_keysize(generic_tfm)) {
 		pr_err("alg: skcipher: max keysize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
-		       driver, tfm->keysize, generic_tfm->keysize);
+		       driver, maxkeysize,
+		       crypto_skcipher_max_keysize(generic_tfm));
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -2778,7 +3057,7 @@ static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *driver,
 	 * the other implementation against them.
 	 */
 
-	vec.key = kmalloc(tfm->keysize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	vec.key = kmalloc(maxkeysize, GFP_KERNEL);
 	vec.iv = kmalloc(ivsize, GFP_KERNEL);
 	vec.ptext = kmalloc(maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
 	vec.ctext = kmalloc(maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -3862,7 +4141,8 @@ static int alg_test_null(const struct alg_test_desc *desc,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-#define __VECS(tv)	{ .vecs = tv, .count = ARRAY_SIZE(tv) }
+#define ____VECS(tv)	.vecs = tv, .count = ARRAY_SIZE(tv)
+#define __VECS(tv)	{ ____VECS(tv) }
 
 /* Please keep this list sorted by algorithm name. */
 static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
@@ -4168,7 +4448,10 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
 		.test = alg_test_aead,
 		.fips_allowed = 1,
 		.suite = {
-			.aead = __VECS(aes_ccm_tv_template)
+			.aead = {
+				____VECS(aes_ccm_tv_template),
+				.einval_allowed = 1,
+			}
 		}
 	}, {
 		.alg = "cfb(aes)",
@@ -4916,7 +5199,11 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
 		.test = alg_test_aead,
 		.fips_allowed = 1,
 		.suite = {
-			.aead = __VECS(aes_gcm_rfc4106_tv_template)
+			.aead = {
+				____VECS(aes_gcm_rfc4106_tv_template),
+				.einval_allowed = 1,
+				.esp_aad = 1,
+			}
 		}
 	}, {
 		.alg = "rfc4309(ccm(aes))",
@@ -4924,14 +5211,21 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
 		.test = alg_test_aead,
 		.fips_allowed = 1,
 		.suite = {
-			.aead = __VECS(aes_ccm_rfc4309_tv_template)
+			.aead = {
+				____VECS(aes_ccm_rfc4309_tv_template),
+				.einval_allowed = 1,
+				.esp_aad = 1,
+			}
 		}
 	}, {
 		.alg = "rfc4543(gcm(aes))",
 		.generic_driver = "rfc4543(gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic))",
 		.test = alg_test_aead,
 		.suite = {
-			.aead = __VECS(aes_gcm_rfc4543_tv_template)
+			.aead = {
+				____VECS(aes_gcm_rfc4543_tv_template),
+				.einval_allowed = 1,
+			}
 		}
 	}, {
 		.alg = "rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)",
@@ -4943,7 +5237,11 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
 		.alg = "rfc7539esp(chacha20,poly1305)",
 		.test = alg_test_aead,
 		.suite = {
-			.aead = __VECS(rfc7539esp_tv_template)
+			.aead = {
+				____VECS(rfc7539esp_tv_template),
+				.einval_allowed = 1,
+				.esp_aad = 1,
+			}
 		}
 	}, {
 		.alg = "rmd128",