diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/agp/intel-gtt.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/agp/parisc-agp.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/hw_random/Kconfig | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/hw_random/Makefile | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/hw_random/cavium-rng-vf.c | 194 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/hw_random/cavium-rng.c | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/hw_random/cn10k-rng.c | 181 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c | 50 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 248 |
10 files changed, 563 insertions, 149 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/agp/intel-gtt.c b/drivers/char/agp/intel-gtt.c index 5bfdf222d5f9..c53cc9868cd8 100644 --- a/drivers/char/agp/intel-gtt.c +++ b/drivers/char/agp/intel-gtt.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/agp_backend.h> +#include <linux/intel-iommu.h> #include <linux/delay.h> #include <asm/smp.h> #include "agp.h" diff --git a/drivers/char/agp/parisc-agp.c b/drivers/char/agp/parisc-agp.c index ed3c4c42fc23..d68d05d5d383 100644 --- a/drivers/char/agp/parisc-agp.c +++ b/drivers/char/agp/parisc-agp.c @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ agp_ioc_init(void __iomem *ioc_regs) return 0; } -static int +static int __init lba_find_capability(int cap) { struct _parisc_agp_info *info = &parisc_agp_info; @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ fail: return error; } -static int +static int __init find_quicksilver(struct device *dev, void *data) { struct parisc_device **lba = data; @@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ find_quicksilver(struct device *dev, void *data) return 0; } -static int +static int __init parisc_agp_init(void) { extern struct sba_device *sba_list; diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/Kconfig b/drivers/char/hw_random/Kconfig index 814b3d0ca7b7..001b819f5298 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/Kconfig @@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ config HW_RANDOM_MESON config HW_RANDOM_CAVIUM tristate "Cavium ThunderX Random Number Generator support" - depends on HW_RANDOM && PCI && (ARM64 || (COMPILE_TEST && 64BIT)) + depends on HW_RANDOM && PCI && ARM64 default HW_RANDOM help This driver provides kernel-side support for the Random Number @@ -538,6 +538,17 @@ config HW_RANDOM_ARM_SMCCC_TRNG To compile this driver as a module, choose M here: the module will be called arm_smccc_trng. +config HW_RANDOM_CN10K + tristate "Marvell CN10K Random Number Generator support" + depends on HW_RANDOM && PCI && ARM64 + default HW_RANDOM + help + This driver provides support for the True Random Number + generator available in Marvell CN10K SoCs. + + To compile this driver as a module, choose M here. + The module will be called cn10k_rng. If unsure, say Y. + endif # HW_RANDOM config UML_RANDOM diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/Makefile b/drivers/char/hw_random/Makefile index a5a1c765a394..a2f1ce0790d1 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/Makefile +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/Makefile @@ -46,3 +46,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_NPCM) += npcm-rng.o obj-$(CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_CCTRNG) += cctrng.o obj-$(CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_XIPHERA) += xiphera-trng.o obj-$(CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_ARM_SMCCC_TRNG) += arm_smccc_trng.o +obj-$(CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_CN10K) += cn10k-rng.o diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/cavium-rng-vf.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/cavium-rng-vf.c index 3de4a6a443ef..6f66919652bf 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/cavium-rng-vf.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/cavium-rng-vf.c @@ -1,10 +1,7 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* - * Hardware Random Number Generator support for Cavium, Inc. - * Thunder processor family. - * - * This file is subject to the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public - * License. See the file "COPYING" in the main directory of this archive - * for more details. + * Hardware Random Number Generator support. + * Cavium Thunder, Marvell OcteonTx/Tx2 processor families. * * Copyright (C) 2016 Cavium, Inc. */ @@ -15,16 +12,146 @@ #include <linux/pci.h> #include <linux/pci_ids.h> +#include <asm/arch_timer.h> + +/* PCI device IDs */ +#define PCI_DEVID_CAVIUM_RNG_PF 0xA018 +#define PCI_DEVID_CAVIUM_RNG_VF 0xA033 + +#define HEALTH_STATUS_REG 0x38 + +/* RST device info */ +#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_RST_OTX2 0xA085 +#define RST_BOOT_REG 0x1600ULL +#define CLOCK_BASE_RATE 50000000ULL +#define MSEC_TO_NSEC(x) (x * 1000000) + struct cavium_rng { struct hwrng ops; void __iomem *result; + void __iomem *pf_regbase; + struct pci_dev *pdev; + u64 clock_rate; + u64 prev_error; + u64 prev_time; }; +static inline bool is_octeontx(struct pci_dev *pdev) +{ + if (midr_is_cpu_model_range(read_cpuid_id(), MIDR_THUNDERX_83XX, + MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0), + MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(3, 0)) || + midr_is_cpu_model_range(read_cpuid_id(), MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX, + MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0), + MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(3, 0)) || + midr_is_cpu_model_range(read_cpuid_id(), MIDR_THUNDERX, + MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0), + MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(3, 0))) + return true; + + return false; +} + +static u64 rng_get_coprocessor_clkrate(void) +{ + u64 ret = CLOCK_BASE_RATE * 16; /* Assume 800Mhz as default */ + struct pci_dev *pdev; + void __iomem *base; + + pdev = pci_get_device(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CAVIUM, + PCI_DEVICE_ID_RST_OTX2, NULL); + if (!pdev) + goto error; + + base = pci_ioremap_bar(pdev, 0); + if (!base) + goto error_put_pdev; + + /* RST: PNR_MUL * 50Mhz gives clockrate */ + ret = CLOCK_BASE_RATE * ((readq(base + RST_BOOT_REG) >> 33) & 0x3F); + + iounmap(base); + +error_put_pdev: + pci_dev_put(pdev); + +error: + return ret; +} + +static int check_rng_health(struct cavium_rng *rng) +{ + u64 cur_err, cur_time; + u64 status, cycles; + u64 time_elapsed; + + + /* Skip checking health for OcteonTx */ + if (!rng->pf_regbase) + return 0; + + status = readq(rng->pf_regbase + HEALTH_STATUS_REG); + if (status & BIT_ULL(0)) { + dev_err(&rng->pdev->dev, "HWRNG: Startup health test failed\n"); + return -EIO; + } + + cycles = status >> 1; + if (!cycles) + return 0; + + cur_time = arch_timer_read_counter(); + + /* RNM_HEALTH_STATUS[CYCLES_SINCE_HEALTH_FAILURE] + * Number of coprocessor cycles times 2 since the last failure. + * This field doesn't get cleared/updated until another failure. + */ + cycles = cycles / 2; + cur_err = (cycles * 1000000000) / rng->clock_rate; /* In nanosec */ + + /* Ignore errors that happenned a long time ago, these + * are most likely false positive errors. + */ + if (cur_err > MSEC_TO_NSEC(10)) { + rng->prev_error = 0; + rng->prev_time = 0; + return 0; + } + + if (rng->prev_error) { + /* Calculate time elapsed since last error + * '1' tick of CNTVCT is 10ns, since it runs at 100Mhz. + */ + time_elapsed = (cur_time - rng->prev_time) * 10; + time_elapsed += rng->prev_error; + + /* Check if current error is a new one or the old one itself. + * If error is a new one then consider there is a persistent + * issue with entropy, declare hardware failure. + */ + if (cur_err < time_elapsed) { + dev_err(&rng->pdev->dev, "HWRNG failure detected\n"); + rng->prev_error = cur_err; + rng->prev_time = cur_time; + return -EIO; + } + } + + rng->prev_error = cur_err; + rng->prev_time = cur_time; + return 0; +} + /* Read data from the RNG unit */ static int cavium_rng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *dat, size_t max, bool wait) { struct cavium_rng *p = container_of(rng, struct cavium_rng, ops); unsigned int size = max; + int err = 0; + + err = check_rng_health(p); + if (err) + return err; while (size >= 8) { *((u64 *)dat) = readq(p->result); @@ -39,6 +166,39 @@ static int cavium_rng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *dat, size_t max, bool wait) return max; } +static int cavium_map_pf_regs(struct cavium_rng *rng) +{ + struct pci_dev *pdev; + + /* Health status is not supported on 83xx, skip mapping PF CSRs */ + if (is_octeontx(rng->pdev)) { + rng->pf_regbase = NULL; + return 0; + } + + pdev = pci_get_device(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CAVIUM, + PCI_DEVID_CAVIUM_RNG_PF, NULL); + if (!pdev) { + dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Cannot find RNG PF device\n"); + return -EIO; + } + + rng->pf_regbase = ioremap(pci_resource_start(pdev, 0), + pci_resource_len(pdev, 0)); + if (!rng->pf_regbase) { + dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to map PF CSR region\n"); + pci_dev_put(pdev); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + pci_dev_put(pdev); + + /* Get co-processor clock rate */ + rng->clock_rate = rng_get_coprocessor_clkrate(); + + return 0; +} + /* Map Cavium RNG to an HWRNG object */ static int cavium_rng_probe_vf(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id) @@ -50,6 +210,8 @@ static int cavium_rng_probe_vf(struct pci_dev *pdev, if (!rng) return -ENOMEM; + rng->pdev = pdev; + /* Map the RNG result */ rng->result = pcim_iomap(pdev, 0, 0); if (!rng->result) { @@ -67,6 +229,11 @@ static int cavium_rng_probe_vf(struct pci_dev *pdev, pci_set_drvdata(pdev, rng); + /* Health status is available only at PF, hence map PF registers. */ + ret = cavium_map_pf_regs(rng); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = devm_hwrng_register(&pdev->dev, &rng->ops); if (ret) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Error registering device as HWRNG.\n"); @@ -76,10 +243,18 @@ static int cavium_rng_probe_vf(struct pci_dev *pdev, return 0; } +/* Remove the VF */ +static void cavium_rng_remove_vf(struct pci_dev *pdev) +{ + struct cavium_rng *rng; + + rng = pci_get_drvdata(pdev); + iounmap(rng->pf_regbase); +} static const struct pci_device_id cavium_rng_vf_id_table[] = { - { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CAVIUM, 0xa033), 0, 0, 0}, - {0,}, + { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CAVIUM, PCI_DEVID_CAVIUM_RNG_VF) }, + { 0, } }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, cavium_rng_vf_id_table); @@ -87,8 +262,9 @@ static struct pci_driver cavium_rng_vf_driver = { .name = "cavium_rng_vf", .id_table = cavium_rng_vf_id_table, .probe = cavium_rng_probe_vf, + .remove = cavium_rng_remove_vf, }; module_pci_driver(cavium_rng_vf_driver); MODULE_AUTHOR("Omer Khaliq <okhaliq@caviumnetworks.com>"); -MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/cavium-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/cavium-rng.c index 63d6e68c24d2..b96579222408 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/cavium-rng.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/cavium-rng.c @@ -1,10 +1,7 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* - * Hardware Random Number Generator support for Cavium Inc. - * Thunder processor family. - * - * This file is subject to the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public - * License. See the file "COPYING" in the main directory of this archive - * for more details. + * Hardware Random Number Generator support. + * Cavium Thunder, Marvell OcteonTx/Tx2 processor families. * * Copyright (C) 2016 Cavium, Inc. */ @@ -91,4 +88,4 @@ static struct pci_driver cavium_rng_pf_driver = { module_pci_driver(cavium_rng_pf_driver); MODULE_AUTHOR("Omer Khaliq <okhaliq@caviumnetworks.com>"); -MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/cn10k-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/cn10k-rng.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..35001c63648b --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/cn10k-rng.c @@ -0,0 +1,181 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Marvell CN10K RVU Hardware Random Number Generator. + * + * Copyright (C) 2021 Marvell. + * + */ + +#include <linux/hw_random.h> +#include <linux/io.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/pci.h> +#include <linux/pci_ids.h> +#include <linux/delay.h> + +#include <linux/arm-smccc.h> + +/* CSRs */ +#define RNM_CTL_STATUS 0x000 +#define RNM_ENTROPY_STATUS 0x008 +#define RNM_CONST 0x030 +#define RNM_EBG_ENT 0x048 +#define RNM_PF_EBG_HEALTH 0x050 +#define RNM_PF_RANDOM 0x400 +#define RNM_TRNG_RESULT 0x408 + +struct cn10k_rng { + void __iomem *reg_base; + struct hwrng ops; + struct pci_dev *pdev; +}; + +#define PLAT_OCTEONTX_RESET_RNG_EBG_HEALTH_STATE 0xc2000b0f + +static int reset_rng_health_state(struct cn10k_rng *rng) +{ + struct arm_smccc_res res; + + /* Send SMC service call to reset EBG health state */ + arm_smccc_smc(PLAT_OCTEONTX_RESET_RNG_EBG_HEALTH_STATE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &res); + if (res.a0 != 0UL) + return -EIO; + + return 0; +} + +static int check_rng_health(struct cn10k_rng *rng) +{ + u64 status; + int err; + + /* Skip checking health */ + if (!rng->reg_base) + return 0; + + status = readq(rng->reg_base + RNM_PF_EBG_HEALTH); + if (status & BIT_ULL(20)) { + err = reset_rng_health_state(rng); + if (err) { + dev_err(&rng->pdev->dev, "HWRNG: Health test failed (status=%llx)\n", + status); + dev_err(&rng->pdev->dev, "HWRNG: error during reset\n"); + } + } + return 0; +} + +static void cn10k_read_trng(struct cn10k_rng *rng, u64 *value) +{ + u64 upper, lower; + + *value = readq(rng->reg_base + RNM_PF_RANDOM); + + /* HW can run out of entropy if large amount random data is read in + * quick succession. Zeros may not be real random data from HW. + */ + if (!*value) { + upper = readq(rng->reg_base + RNM_PF_RANDOM); + lower = readq(rng->reg_base + RNM_PF_RANDOM); + while (!(upper & 0x00000000FFFFFFFFULL)) + upper = readq(rng->reg_base + RNM_PF_RANDOM); + while (!(lower & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000ULL)) + lower = readq(rng->reg_base + RNM_PF_RANDOM); + + *value = (upper & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000) | (lower & 0xFFFFFFFF); + } +} + +static int cn10k_rng_read(struct hwrng *hwrng, void *data, + size_t max, bool wait) +{ + struct cn10k_rng *rng = (struct cn10k_rng *)hwrng->priv; + unsigned int size; + int err = 0; + u64 value; + + err = check_rng_health(rng); + if (err) + return err; + + size = max; + + while (size >= 8) { + cn10k_read_trng(rng, &value); + + *((u64 *)data) = (u64)value; + size -= 8; + data += 8; + } + + while (size > 0) { + cn10k_read_trng(rng, &value); + + *((u8 *)data) = (u8)value; + size--; + data++; + } + + return max - size; +} + +static int cn10k_rng_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id) +{ + struct cn10k_rng *rng; + int err; + + rng = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*rng), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!rng) + return -ENOMEM; + + rng->pdev = pdev; + pci_set_drvdata(pdev, rng); + + rng->reg_base = pcim_iomap(pdev, 0, 0); + if (!rng->reg_base) { + dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Error while mapping CSRs, exiting\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + rng->ops.name = devm_kasprintf(&pdev->dev, GFP_KERNEL, + "cn10k-rng-%s", dev_name(&pdev->dev)); + if (!rng->ops.name) + return -ENOMEM; + + rng->ops.read = cn10k_rng_read; + rng->ops.quality = 1000; + rng->ops.priv = (unsigned long)rng; + + reset_rng_health_state(rng); + + err = devm_hwrng_register(&pdev->dev, &rng->ops); + if (err) { + dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Could not register hwrng device.\n"); + return err; + } + + return 0; +} + +static void cn10k_rng_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev) +{ + /* Nothing to do */ +} + +static const struct pci_device_id cn10k_rng_id_table[] = { + { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CAVIUM, 0xA098) }, /* RNG PF */ + {0,}, +}; + +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, cn10k_rng_id_table); + +static struct pci_driver cn10k_rng_driver = { + .name = "cn10k_rng", + .id_table = cn10k_rng_id_table, + .probe = cn10k_rng_probe, + .remove = cn10k_rng_remove, +}; + +module_pci_driver(cn10k_rng_driver); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Sunil Goutham <sgoutham@marvell.com>"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Marvell CN10K HW RNG Driver"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c index deed355422f4..c59265146e9c 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c @@ -191,6 +191,8 @@ struct ipmi_user { struct work_struct remove_work; }; +static struct workqueue_struct *remove_work_wq; + static struct ipmi_user *acquire_ipmi_user(struct ipmi_user *user, int *index) __acquires(user->release_barrier) { @@ -1297,7 +1299,7 @@ static void free_user(struct kref *ref) struct ipmi_user *user = container_of(ref, struct ipmi_user, refcount); /* SRCU cleanup must happen in task context. */ - schedule_work(&user->remove_work); + queue_work(remove_work_wq, &user->remove_work); } static void _ipmi_destroy_user(struct ipmi_user *user) @@ -3029,7 +3031,7 @@ cleanup_bmc_device(struct kref *ref) * with removing the device attributes while reading a device * attribute. */ - schedule_work(&bmc->remove_work); + queue_work(remove_work_wq, &bmc->remove_work); } /* @@ -3918,9 +3920,11 @@ static int handle_ipmb_direct_rcv_cmd(struct ipmi_smi *intf, /* We didn't find a user, deliver an error response. */ ipmi_inc_stat(intf, unhandled_commands); - msg->data[0] = ((netfn + 1) << 2) | (msg->rsp[4] & 0x3); - msg->data[1] = msg->rsp[2]; - msg->data[2] = msg->rsp[4] & ~0x3; + msg->data[0] = (netfn + 1) << 2; + msg->data[0] |= msg->rsp[2] & 0x3; /* rqLUN */ + msg->data[1] = msg->rsp[1]; /* Addr */ + msg->data[2] = msg->rsp[2] & ~0x3; /* rqSeq */ + msg->data[2] |= msg->rsp[0] & 0x3; /* rsLUN */ msg->data[3] = cmd; msg->data[4] = IPMI_INVALID_CMD_COMPLETION_CODE; msg->data_size = 5; @@ -4455,13 +4459,24 @@ return_unspecified: msg->rsp[2] = IPMI_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; msg->rsp_size = 3; } else if (msg->type == IPMI_SMI_MSG_TYPE_IPMB_DIRECT) { - /* commands must have at least 3 bytes, responses 4. */ - if (is_cmd && (msg->rsp_size < 3)) { + /* commands must have at least 4 bytes, responses 5. */ + if (is_cmd && (msg->rsp_size < 4)) { ipmi_inc_stat(intf, invalid_commands); goto out; } - if (!is_cmd && (msg->rsp_size < 4)) - goto return_unspecified; + if (!is_cmd && (msg->rsp_size < 5)) { + ipmi_inc_stat(intf, invalid_ipmb_responses); + /* Construct a valid error response. */ + msg->rsp[0] = msg->data[0] & 0xfc; /* NetFN */ + msg->rsp[0] |= (1 << 2); /* Make it a response */ + msg->rsp[0] |= msg->data[2] & 3; /* rqLUN */ + msg->rsp[1] = msg->data[1]; /* Addr */ + msg->rsp[2] = msg->data[2] & 0xfc; /* rqSeq */ + msg->rsp[2] |= msg->data[0] & 0x3; /* rsLUN */ + msg->rsp[3] = msg->data[3]; /* Cmd */ + msg->rsp[4] = IPMI_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; + msg->rsp_size = 5; + } } else if ((msg->data_size >= 2) && (msg->data[0] == (IPMI_NETFN_APP_REQUEST << 2)) && (msg->data[1] == IPMI_SEND_MSG_CMD) @@ -5031,6 +5046,7 @@ struct ipmi_smi_msg *ipmi_alloc_smi_msg(void) if (rv) { rv->done = free_smi_msg; rv->user_data = NULL; + rv->type = IPMI_SMI_MSG_TYPE_NORMAL; atomic_inc(&smi_msg_inuse_count); } return rv; @@ -5376,7 +5392,16 @@ static int ipmi_init_msghandler(void) if (initialized) goto out; - init_srcu_struct(&ipmi_interfaces_srcu); + rv = init_srcu_struct(&ipmi_interfaces_srcu); + if (rv) + goto out; + + remove_work_wq = create_singlethread_workqueue("ipmi-msghandler-remove-wq"); + if (!remove_work_wq) { + pr_err("unable to create ipmi-msghandler-remove-wq workqueue"); + rv = -ENOMEM; + goto out_wq; + } timer_setup(&ipmi_timer, ipmi_timeout, 0); mod_timer(&ipmi_timer, jiffies + IPMI_TIMEOUT_JIFFIES); @@ -5385,6 +5410,9 @@ static int ipmi_init_msghandler(void) initialized = true; +out_wq: + if (rv) + cleanup_srcu_struct(&ipmi_interfaces_srcu); out: mutex_unlock(&ipmi_interfaces_mutex); return rv; @@ -5408,6 +5436,8 @@ static void __exit cleanup_ipmi(void) int count; if (initialized) { + destroy_workqueue(remove_work_wq); + atomic_notifier_chain_unregister(&panic_notifier_list, &panic_block); diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c index 0c62e578749e..48aab77abebf 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c @@ -1659,6 +1659,9 @@ static int ssif_probe(struct i2c_client *client, const struct i2c_device_id *id) } } + ssif_info->client = client; + i2c_set_clientdata(client, ssif_info); + rv = ssif_check_and_remove(client, ssif_info); /* If rv is 0 and addr source is not SI_ACPI, continue probing */ if (!rv && ssif_info->addr_source == SI_ACPI) { @@ -1679,9 +1682,6 @@ static int ssif_probe(struct i2c_client *client, const struct i2c_device_id *id) ipmi_addr_src_to_str(ssif_info->addr_source), client->addr, client->adapter->name, slave_addr); - ssif_info->client = client; - i2c_set_clientdata(client, ssif_info); - /* Now check for system interface capabilities */ msg[0] = IPMI_NETFN_APP_REQUEST << 2; msg[1] = IPMI_GET_SYSTEM_INTERFACE_CAPABILITIES_CMD; @@ -1881,6 +1881,7 @@ static int ssif_probe(struct i2c_client *client, const struct i2c_device_id *id) dev_err(&ssif_info->client->dev, "Unable to start IPMI SSIF: %d\n", rv); + i2c_set_clientdata(client, NULL); kfree(ssif_info); } kfree(resp); diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 605969ed0f96..227fb7802738 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ /* * random.c -- A strong random number generator * - * Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All - * Rights Reserved. + * Copyright (C) 2017-2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved. * * Copyright Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>, 2003, 2004, 2005 * @@ -78,12 +77,12 @@ * an *estimate* of how many bits of randomness have been stored into * the random number generator's internal state. * - * When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the SHA - * hash of the contents of the "entropy pool". The SHA hash avoids + * When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the BLAKE2s + * hash of the contents of the "entropy pool". The BLAKE2s hash avoids * exposing the internal state of the entropy pool. It is believed to * be computationally infeasible to derive any useful information - * about the input of SHA from its output. Even if it is possible to - * analyze SHA in some clever way, as long as the amount of data + * about the input of BLAKE2s from its output. Even if it is possible to + * analyze BLAKE2s in some clever way, as long as the amount of data * returned from the generator is less than the inherent entropy in * the pool, the output data is totally unpredictable. For this * reason, the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many @@ -93,7 +92,7 @@ * If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate * random numbers; however, an attacker may (at least in theory) be * able to infer the future output of the generator from prior - * outputs. This requires successful cryptanalysis of SHA, which is + * outputs. This requires successful cryptanalysis of BLAKE2s, which is * not believed to be feasible, but there is a remote possibility. * Nonetheless, these numbers should be useful for the vast majority * of purposes. @@ -200,8 +199,11 @@ * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size); * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, * unsigned int value); - * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags); + * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq); * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); + * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, + * size_t entropy); + * void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size); * * add_device_randomness() is for adding data to the random pool that * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot). @@ -228,6 +230,14 @@ * particular randomness source. They do this by keeping track of the * first and second order deltas of the event timings. * + * add_hwgenerator_randomness() is for true hardware RNGs, and will credit + * entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will + * block until more entropy is needed. + * + * add_bootloader_randomness() is the same as add_hwgenerator_randomness() or + * add_device_randomness(), depending on whether or not the configuration + * option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set. + * * Ensuring unpredictability at system startup * ============================================ * @@ -336,7 +346,7 @@ #include <linux/completion.h> #include <linux/uuid.h> #include <crypto/chacha.h> -#include <crypto/sha1.h> +#include <crypto/blake2s.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> @@ -356,10 +366,7 @@ #define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) #define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 10 #define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) -#define EXTRACT_SIZE 10 - - -#define LONGS(x) (((x) + sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)/sizeof(unsigned long)) +#define EXTRACT_SIZE (BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE / 2) /* * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is @@ -395,7 +402,7 @@ static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS; * Thanks to Colin Plumb for suggesting this. * * The mixing operation is much less sensitive than the output hash, - * where we use SHA-1. All that we want of mixing operation is that + * where we use BLAKE2s. All that we want of mixing operation is that * it be a good non-cryptographic hash; i.e. it not produce collisions * when fed "random" data of the sort we expect to see. As long as * the pool state differs for different inputs, we have preserved the @@ -450,6 +457,10 @@ struct crng_state { static struct crng_state primary_crng = { .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(primary_crng.lock), + .state[0] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA, + .state[1] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3, + .state[2] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY, + .state[3] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K, }; /* @@ -461,6 +472,7 @@ static struct crng_state primary_crng = { * its value (from 0->1->2). */ static int crng_init = 0; +static bool crng_need_final_init = false; #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1)) static int crng_init_cnt = 0; static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0; @@ -539,7 +551,7 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, unsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5; int input_rotate; int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1; - const char *bytes = in; + const unsigned char *bytes = in; __u32 w; tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1; @@ -751,7 +763,6 @@ static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); -#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA /* * Hack to deal with crazy userspace progams when they are all trying * to access /dev/urandom in parallel. The programs are almost @@ -759,7 +770,6 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); * their brain damage. */ static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool __read_mostly; -#endif static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void); static void numa_crng_init(void); @@ -807,7 +817,7 @@ static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(struct crng_state *crng) return arch_init; } -static void __maybe_unused crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) +static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) { chacha_init_consts(crng->state); _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12); @@ -817,18 +827,46 @@ static void __maybe_unused crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng) { - chacha_init_consts(crng->state); _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0); - if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu) { + if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); numa_crng_init(); crng_init = 2; - pr_notice("crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); + pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); } crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; } -#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA +static void crng_finalize_init(struct crng_state *crng) +{ + if (crng != &primary_crng || crng_init >= 2) + return; + if (!system_wq) { + /* We can't call numa_crng_init until we have workqueues, + * so mark this for processing later. */ + crng_need_final_init = true; + return; + } + + invalidate_batched_entropy(); + numa_crng_init(); + crng_init = 2; + process_random_ready_list(); + wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); + kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); + pr_notice("crng init done\n"); + if (unseeded_warning.missed) { + pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n", + unseeded_warning.missed); + unseeded_warning.missed = 0; + } + if (urandom_warning.missed) { + pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n", + urandom_warning.missed); + urandom_warning.missed = 0; + } +} + static void do_numa_crng_init(struct work_struct *work) { int i; @@ -843,8 +881,8 @@ static void do_numa_crng_init(struct work_struct *work) crng_initialize_secondary(crng); pool[i] = crng; } - mb(); - if (cmpxchg(&crng_node_pool, NULL, pool)) { + /* pairs with READ_ONCE() in select_crng() */ + if (cmpxchg_release(&crng_node_pool, NULL, pool) != NULL) { for_each_node(i) kfree(pool[i]); kfree(pool); @@ -855,20 +893,35 @@ static DECLARE_WORK(numa_crng_init_work, do_numa_crng_init); static void numa_crng_init(void) { - schedule_work(&numa_crng_init_work); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA)) + schedule_work(&numa_crng_init_work); +} + +static struct crng_state *select_crng(void) +{ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA)) { + struct crng_state **pool; + int nid = numa_node_id(); + + /* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in do_numa_crng_init() */ + pool = READ_ONCE(crng_node_pool); + if (pool && pool[nid]) + return pool[nid]; + } + + return &primary_crng; } -#else -static void numa_crng_init(void) {} -#endif /* * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service - * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. + * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of + * bytes processed from cp. */ -static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) +static size_t crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) { unsigned long flags; char *p; + size_t ret = 0; if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags)) return 0; @@ -879,7 +932,7 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) p = (unsigned char *) &primary_crng.state[4]; while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp; - cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; + cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { @@ -887,7 +940,7 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) crng_init = 1; pr_notice("fast init done\n"); } - return 1; + return ret; } /* @@ -962,41 +1015,24 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) crng->state[i+4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv; } memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf)); - crng->init_time = jiffies; + WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); - if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) { - invalidate_batched_entropy(); - numa_crng_init(); - crng_init = 2; - process_random_ready_list(); - wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); - kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); - pr_notice("crng init done\n"); - if (unseeded_warning.missed) { - pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n", - unseeded_warning.missed); - unseeded_warning.missed = 0; - } - if (urandom_warning.missed) { - pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n", - urandom_warning.missed); - urandom_warning.missed = 0; - } - } + crng_finalize_init(crng); } static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, __u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]) { - unsigned long v, flags; - - if (crng_ready() && - (time_after(crng_global_init_time, crng->init_time) || - time_after(jiffies, crng->init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))) - crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng ? &input_pool : NULL); + unsigned long flags, init_time; + + if (crng_ready()) { + init_time = READ_ONCE(crng->init_time); + if (time_after(READ_ONCE(crng_global_init_time), init_time) || + time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL)) + crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng ? + &input_pool : NULL); + } spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); - if (arch_get_random_long(&v)) - crng->state[14] ^= v; chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out); if (crng->state[12] == 0) crng->state[13]++; @@ -1005,15 +1041,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]) { - struct crng_state *crng = NULL; - -#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA - if (crng_node_pool) - crng = crng_node_pool[numa_node_id()]; - if (crng == NULL) -#endif - crng = &primary_crng; - _extract_crng(crng, out); + _extract_crng(select_crng(), out); } /* @@ -1042,15 +1070,7 @@ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) { - struct crng_state *crng = NULL; - -#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA - if (crng_node_pool) - crng = crng_node_pool[numa_node_id()]; - if (crng == NULL) -#endif - crng = &primary_crng; - _crng_backtrack_protect(crng, tmp, used); + _crng_backtrack_protect(select_crng(), tmp, used); } static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) @@ -1242,7 +1262,7 @@ static __u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs) return *ptr; } -void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) +void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) { struct entropy_store *r; struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness); @@ -1269,7 +1289,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) && crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool, - sizeof(fast_pool->pool))) { + sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) { fast_pool->count = 0; fast_pool->last = now; } @@ -1368,56 +1388,49 @@ retry: */ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out) { - int i; - union { - __u32 w[5]; - unsigned long l[LONGS(20)]; - } hash; - __u32 workspace[SHA1_WORKSPACE_WORDS]; + struct blake2s_state state __aligned(__alignof__(unsigned long)); + u8 hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE]; + unsigned long *salt; unsigned long flags; + blake2s_init(&state, sizeof(hash)); + /* * If we have an architectural hardware random number - * generator, use it for SHA's initial vector + * generator, use it for BLAKE2's salt & personal fields. */ - sha1_init(hash.w); - for (i = 0; i < LONGS(20); i++) { + for (salt = (unsigned long *)&state.h[4]; + salt < (unsigned long *)&state.h[8]; ++salt) { unsigned long v; if (!arch_get_random_long(&v)) break; - hash.l[i] = v; + *salt ^= v; } - /* Generate a hash across the pool, 16 words (512 bits) at a time */ + /* Generate a hash across the pool */ spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); - for (i = 0; i < r->poolinfo->poolwords; i += 16) - sha1_transform(hash.w, (__u8 *)(r->pool + i), workspace); + blake2s_update(&state, (const u8 *)r->pool, + r->poolinfo->poolwords * sizeof(*r->pool)); + blake2s_final(&state, hash); /* final zeros out state */ /* * We mix the hash back into the pool to prevent backtracking * attacks (where the attacker knows the state of the pool * plus the current outputs, and attempts to find previous - * ouputs), unless the hash function can be inverted. By - * mixing at least a SHA1 worth of hash data back, we make + * outputs), unless the hash function can be inverted. By + * mixing at least a hash worth of hash data back, we make * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the * hash. */ - __mix_pool_bytes(r, hash.w, sizeof(hash.w)); + __mix_pool_bytes(r, hash, sizeof(hash)); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); - memzero_explicit(workspace, sizeof(workspace)); - - /* - * In case the hash function has some recognizable output - * pattern, we fold it in half. Thus, we always feed back - * twice as much data as we output. + /* Note that EXTRACT_SIZE is half of hash size here, because above + * we've dumped the full length back into mixer. By reducing the + * amount that we emit, we retain a level of forward secrecy. */ - hash.w[0] ^= hash.w[3]; - hash.w[1] ^= hash.w[4]; - hash.w[2] ^= rol32(hash.w[2], 16); - - memcpy(out, &hash, EXTRACT_SIZE); - memzero_explicit(&hash, sizeof(hash)); + memcpy(out, hash, EXTRACT_SIZE); + memzero_explicit(hash, sizeof(hash)); } static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, @@ -1775,6 +1788,8 @@ static void __init init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) int __init rand_initialize(void) { init_std_data(&input_pool); + if (crng_need_final_init) + crng_finalize_init(&primary_crng); crng_initialize_primary(&primary_crng); crng_global_init_time = jiffies; if (ratelimit_disable) { @@ -1816,7 +1831,6 @@ urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) { - unsigned long flags; static int maxwarn = 10; if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) { @@ -1824,9 +1838,6 @@ urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) if (__ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n", current->comm, nbytes); - spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags); - crng_init_cnt = 0; - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); } return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos); @@ -1949,7 +1960,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) if (crng_init < 2) return -ENODATA; crng_reseed(&primary_crng, &input_pool); - crng_global_init_time = jiffies - 1; + WRITE_ONCE(crng_global_init_time, jiffies - 1); return 0; default: return -EINVAL; @@ -2275,15 +2286,20 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool; if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { - crng_fast_load(buffer, count); - return; + size_t ret = crng_fast_load(buffer, count); + mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, ret); + count -= ret; + buffer += ret; + if (!count || crng_init == 0) + return; } /* Suspend writing if we're above the trickle threshold. * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh, * or when the calling thread is about to terminate. */ - wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait, kthread_should_stop() || + wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait, + !system_wq || kthread_should_stop() || ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits); mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, count); credit_entropy_bits(poolp, entropy); |