diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/Kconfig | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/agp/alpha-agp.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/hw_random/Kconfig | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/hw_random/Makefile | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/hw_random/msm-rng.c | 183 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/kcs_bmc.c | 31 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/mem.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 88 |
10 files changed, 89 insertions, 254 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig index 212f447938ae..ce277ee0a28a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig @@ -554,3 +554,17 @@ config ADI endmenu +config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU + bool "Trust the CPU manufacturer to initialize Linux's CRNG" + depends on X86 || S390 || PPC + default n + help + Assume that CPU manufacturer (e.g., Intel or AMD for RDSEED or + RDRAND, IBM for the S390 and Power PC architectures) is trustworthy + for the purposes of initializing Linux's CRNG. Since this is not + something that can be independently audited, this amounts to trusting + that CPU manufacturer (perhaps with the insistence or mandate + of a Nation State's intelligence or law enforcement agencies) + has not installed a hidden back door to compromise the CPU's + random number generation facilities. + diff --git a/drivers/char/agp/alpha-agp.c b/drivers/char/agp/alpha-agp.c index 53fe633df1e8..c9bf2c219841 100644 --- a/drivers/char/agp/alpha-agp.c +++ b/drivers/char/agp/alpha-agp.c @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ #include "agp.h" -static int alpha_core_agp_vm_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) +static vm_fault_t alpha_core_agp_vm_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) { alpha_agp_info *agp = agp_bridge->dev_private_data; dma_addr_t dma_addr; diff --git a/drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c b/drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c index e50c29c97ca7..c69e39fdd02b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c +++ b/drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static u64 amd64_configure(struct pci_dev *hammer, u64 gatt_table) /* Address to map to */ pci_read_config_dword(hammer, AMD64_GARTAPERTUREBASE, &tmp); - aperturebase = tmp << 25; + aperturebase = (u64)tmp << 25; aper_base = (aperturebase & PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_MASK); enable_gart_translation(hammer, gatt_table); @@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ static int fix_northbridge(struct pci_dev *nb, struct pci_dev *agp, u16 cap) pci_read_config_dword(nb, AMD64_GARTAPERTURECTL, &nb_order); nb_order = (nb_order >> 1) & 7; pci_read_config_dword(nb, AMD64_GARTAPERTUREBASE, &nb_base); - nb_aper = nb_base << 25; + nb_aper = (u64)nb_base << 25; /* Northbridge seems to contain crap. Try the AGP bridge. */ diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/Kconfig b/drivers/char/hw_random/Kconfig index c34b257d852d..dac895dc01b9 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/Kconfig @@ -307,19 +307,6 @@ config HW_RANDOM_HISI If unsure, say Y. -config HW_RANDOM_MSM - tristate "Qualcomm SoCs Random Number Generator support" - depends on HW_RANDOM && ARCH_QCOM - default HW_RANDOM - ---help--- - This driver provides kernel-side support for the Random Number - Generator hardware found on Qualcomm SoCs. - - To compile this driver as a module, choose M here. the - module will be called msm-rng. - - If unsure, say Y. - config HW_RANDOM_ST tristate "ST Microelectronics HW Random Number Generator support" depends on HW_RANDOM && ARCH_STI diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/Makefile b/drivers/char/hw_random/Makefile index 533e913c93d1..e35ec3ce3a20 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/Makefile +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/Makefile @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_POWERNV) += powernv-rng.o obj-$(CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_HISI) += hisi-rng.o obj-$(CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_BCM2835) += bcm2835-rng.o obj-$(CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_IPROC_RNG200) += iproc-rng200.o -obj-$(CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_MSM) += msm-rng.o obj-$(CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_ST) += st-rng.o obj-$(CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_XGENE) += xgene-rng.o obj-$(CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_STM32) += stm32-rng.o diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/msm-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/msm-rng.c deleted file mode 100644 index 841fee845ec9..000000000000 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/msm-rng.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,183 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2011-2013, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 and - * only version 2 as published by the Free Software Foundation. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - */ -#include <linux/clk.h> -#include <linux/err.h> -#include <linux/hw_random.h> -#include <linux/io.h> -#include <linux/module.h> -#include <linux/of.h> -#include <linux/platform_device.h> - -/* Device specific register offsets */ -#define PRNG_DATA_OUT 0x0000 -#define PRNG_STATUS 0x0004 -#define PRNG_LFSR_CFG 0x0100 -#define PRNG_CONFIG 0x0104 - -/* Device specific register masks and config values */ -#define PRNG_LFSR_CFG_MASK 0x0000ffff -#define PRNG_LFSR_CFG_CLOCKS 0x0000dddd -#define PRNG_CONFIG_HW_ENABLE BIT(1) -#define PRNG_STATUS_DATA_AVAIL BIT(0) - -#define MAX_HW_FIFO_DEPTH 16 -#define MAX_HW_FIFO_SIZE (MAX_HW_FIFO_DEPTH * 4) -#define WORD_SZ 4 - -struct msm_rng { - void __iomem *base; - struct clk *clk; - struct hwrng hwrng; -}; - -#define to_msm_rng(p) container_of(p, struct msm_rng, hwrng) - -static int msm_rng_enable(struct hwrng *hwrng, int enable) -{ - struct msm_rng *rng = to_msm_rng(hwrng); - u32 val; - int ret; - - ret = clk_prepare_enable(rng->clk); - if (ret) - return ret; - - if (enable) { - /* Enable PRNG only if it is not already enabled */ - val = readl_relaxed(rng->base + PRNG_CONFIG); - if (val & PRNG_CONFIG_HW_ENABLE) - goto already_enabled; - - val = readl_relaxed(rng->base + PRNG_LFSR_CFG); - val &= ~PRNG_LFSR_CFG_MASK; - val |= PRNG_LFSR_CFG_CLOCKS; - writel(val, rng->base + PRNG_LFSR_CFG); - - val = readl_relaxed(rng->base + PRNG_CONFIG); - val |= PRNG_CONFIG_HW_ENABLE; - writel(val, rng->base + PRNG_CONFIG); - } else { - val = readl_relaxed(rng->base + PRNG_CONFIG); - val &= ~PRNG_CONFIG_HW_ENABLE; - writel(val, rng->base + PRNG_CONFIG); - } - -already_enabled: - clk_disable_unprepare(rng->clk); - return 0; -} - -static int msm_rng_read(struct hwrng *hwrng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait) -{ - struct msm_rng *rng = to_msm_rng(hwrng); - size_t currsize = 0; - u32 *retdata = data; - size_t maxsize; - int ret; - u32 val; - - /* calculate max size bytes to transfer back to caller */ - maxsize = min_t(size_t, MAX_HW_FIFO_SIZE, max); - - ret = clk_prepare_enable(rng->clk); - if (ret) - return ret; - - /* read random data from hardware */ - do { - val = readl_relaxed(rng->base + PRNG_STATUS); - if (!(val & PRNG_STATUS_DATA_AVAIL)) - break; - - val = readl_relaxed(rng->base + PRNG_DATA_OUT); - if (!val) - break; - - *retdata++ = val; - currsize += WORD_SZ; - - /* make sure we stay on 32bit boundary */ - if ((maxsize - currsize) < WORD_SZ) - break; - } while (currsize < maxsize); - - clk_disable_unprepare(rng->clk); - - return currsize; -} - -static int msm_rng_init(struct hwrng *hwrng) -{ - return msm_rng_enable(hwrng, 1); -} - -static void msm_rng_cleanup(struct hwrng *hwrng) -{ - msm_rng_enable(hwrng, 0); -} - -static int msm_rng_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) -{ - struct resource *res; - struct msm_rng *rng; - int ret; - - rng = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*rng), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!rng) - return -ENOMEM; - - platform_set_drvdata(pdev, rng); - - res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0); - rng->base = devm_ioremap_resource(&pdev->dev, res); - if (IS_ERR(rng->base)) - return PTR_ERR(rng->base); - - rng->clk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, "core"); - if (IS_ERR(rng->clk)) - return PTR_ERR(rng->clk); - - rng->hwrng.name = KBUILD_MODNAME, - rng->hwrng.init = msm_rng_init, - rng->hwrng.cleanup = msm_rng_cleanup, - rng->hwrng.read = msm_rng_read, - - ret = devm_hwrng_register(&pdev->dev, &rng->hwrng); - if (ret) { - dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to register hwrng\n"); - return ret; - } - - return 0; -} - -static const struct of_device_id msm_rng_of_match[] = { - { .compatible = "qcom,prng", }, - {} -}; -MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, msm_rng_of_match); - -static struct platform_driver msm_rng_driver = { - .probe = msm_rng_probe, - .driver = { - .name = KBUILD_MODNAME, - .of_match_table = of_match_ptr(msm_rng_of_match), - } -}; -module_platform_driver(msm_rng_driver); - -MODULE_ALIAS("platform:" KBUILD_MODNAME); -MODULE_AUTHOR("The Linux Foundation"); -MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Qualcomm MSM random number generator driver"); -MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c index ad353be871bf..90ec010bffbd 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c @@ -2088,8 +2088,10 @@ static int try_smi_init(struct smi_info *new_smi) return 0; out_err: - ipmi_unregister_smi(new_smi->intf); - new_smi->intf = NULL; + if (new_smi->intf) { + ipmi_unregister_smi(new_smi->intf); + new_smi->intf = NULL; + } kfree(init_name); diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/kcs_bmc.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/kcs_bmc.c index fbfc05e3f3d1..bb882ab161fe 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/kcs_bmc.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/kcs_bmc.c @@ -210,34 +210,23 @@ static void kcs_bmc_handle_cmd(struct kcs_bmc *kcs_bmc) int kcs_bmc_handle_event(struct kcs_bmc *kcs_bmc) { unsigned long flags; - int ret = 0; + int ret = -ENODATA; u8 status; spin_lock_irqsave(&kcs_bmc->lock, flags); - if (!kcs_bmc->running) { - kcs_force_abort(kcs_bmc); - ret = -ENODEV; - goto out_unlock; - } - - status = read_status(kcs_bmc) & (KCS_STATUS_IBF | KCS_STATUS_CMD_DAT); - - switch (status) { - case KCS_STATUS_IBF | KCS_STATUS_CMD_DAT: - kcs_bmc_handle_cmd(kcs_bmc); - break; - - case KCS_STATUS_IBF: - kcs_bmc_handle_data(kcs_bmc); - break; + status = read_status(kcs_bmc); + if (status & KCS_STATUS_IBF) { + if (!kcs_bmc->running) + kcs_force_abort(kcs_bmc); + else if (status & KCS_STATUS_CMD_DAT) + kcs_bmc_handle_cmd(kcs_bmc); + else + kcs_bmc_handle_data(kcs_bmc); - default: - ret = -ENODATA; - break; + ret = 0; } -out_unlock: spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcs_bmc->lock, flags); return ret; diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c index ffeb60d3434c..df66a9dd0aae 100644 --- a/drivers/char/mem.c +++ b/drivers/char/mem.c @@ -708,6 +708,7 @@ static int mmap_zero(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) #endif if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) return shmem_zero_setup(vma); + vma_set_anonymous(vma); return 0; } diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index a8fb0020ba5c..bf5f99fc36f1 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -402,7 +402,8 @@ static struct poolinfo { /* * Static global variables */ -static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_wait); +static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait); +static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait); static struct fasync_struct *fasync; static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock); @@ -721,8 +722,8 @@ retry: /* should we wake readers? */ if (entropy_bits >= random_read_wakeup_bits && - wq_has_sleeper(&random_wait)) { - wake_up_interruptible_poll(&random_wait, POLLIN); + wq_has_sleeper(&random_read_wait)) { + wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); } /* If the input pool is getting full, send some @@ -781,6 +782,7 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void); static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng) { int i; + int arch_init = 1; unsigned long rv; memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); @@ -791,10 +793,18 @@ static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng) _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12); for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && - !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) + !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) { rv = random_get_entropy(); + arch_init = 0; + } crng->state[i] ^= rv; } +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU + if (arch_init) { + crng_init = 2; + pr_notice("random: crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); + } +#endif crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; } @@ -1121,8 +1131,6 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num) } sample; long delta, delta2, delta3; - preempt_disable(); - sample.jiffies = jiffies; sample.cycles = random_get_entropy(); sample.num = num; @@ -1160,8 +1168,6 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num) * and limit entropy entimate to 12 bits. */ credit_entropy_bits(r, min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11)); - - preempt_enable(); } void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, @@ -1396,7 +1402,7 @@ retry: trace_debit_entropy(r->name, 8 * ibytes); if (ibytes && (r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) < random_write_wakeup_bits) { - wake_up_interruptible_poll(&random_wait, POLLOUT); + wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); } @@ -1658,6 +1664,21 @@ int wait_for_random_bytes(void) EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes); /* + * Returns whether or not the urandom pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed + * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the + * /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32, + * ,u64,int,long} family of functions. + * + * Returns: true if the urandom pool has been seeded. + * false if the urandom pool has not been seeded. + */ +bool rng_is_initialized(void) +{ + return crng_ready(); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized); + +/* * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the nonblocking * pool is initialised. * @@ -1724,30 +1745,31 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback); * key known by the NSA). So it's useful if we need the speed, but * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to * have put in a back door. + * + * Return number of bytes filled in. */ -void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes) +int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes) { + int left = nbytes; char *p = buf; - trace_get_random_bytes_arch(nbytes, _RET_IP_); - while (nbytes) { + trace_get_random_bytes_arch(left, _RET_IP_); + while (left) { unsigned long v; - int chunk = min(nbytes, (int)sizeof(unsigned long)); + int chunk = min_t(int, left, sizeof(unsigned long)); if (!arch_get_random_long(&v)) break; - + memcpy(p, &v, chunk); p += chunk; - nbytes -= chunk; + left -= chunk; } - if (nbytes) - get_random_bytes(p, nbytes); + return nbytes - left; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); - /* * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data * @@ -1838,7 +1860,7 @@ _random_read(int nonblock, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes) if (nonblock) return -EAGAIN; - wait_event_interruptible(random_wait, + wait_event_interruptible(random_read_wait, ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >= random_read_wakeup_bits); if (signal_pending(current)) @@ -1875,17 +1897,14 @@ urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) return ret; } -static struct wait_queue_head * -random_get_poll_head(struct file *file, __poll_t events) -{ - return &random_wait; -} - static __poll_t -random_poll_mask(struct file *file, __poll_t events) +random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait) { - __poll_t mask = 0; + __poll_t mask; + poll_wait(file, &random_read_wait, wait); + poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait); + mask = 0; if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >= random_read_wakeup_bits) mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM; if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) < random_write_wakeup_bits) @@ -1897,14 +1916,22 @@ static int write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count) { size_t bytes; - __u32 buf[16]; + __u32 t, buf[16]; const char __user *p = buffer; while (count > 0) { + int b, i = 0; + bytes = min(count, sizeof(buf)); if (copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes)) return -EFAULT; + for (b = bytes ; b > 0 ; b -= sizeof(__u32), i++) { + if (!arch_get_random_int(&t)) + break; + buf[i] ^= t; + } + count -= bytes; p += bytes; @@ -1992,8 +2019,7 @@ static int random_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on) const struct file_operations random_fops = { .read = random_read, .write = random_write, - .get_poll_head = random_get_poll_head, - .poll_mask = random_poll_mask, + .poll = random_poll, .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl, .fasync = random_fasync, .llseek = noop_llseek, @@ -2326,7 +2352,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh, * or when the calling thread is about to terminate. */ - wait_event_interruptible(random_wait, kthread_should_stop() || + wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait, kthread_should_stop() || ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits); mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, count); credit_entropy_bits(poolp, entropy); |