diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 918 |
1 files changed, 833 insertions, 85 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 5c2cb5bd84ce..a2e763703c30 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -1,15 +1,7 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook * Copyright (c) 2018 Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or - * modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public - * License as published by the Free Software Foundation. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but - * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU - * General Public License for more details. */ #include <uapi/linux/btf.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> @@ -334,7 +326,8 @@ static bool type_is_sk_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) { return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON || - type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK; + type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || + type == PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; } static bool reg_type_may_be_null(enum bpf_reg_type type) @@ -406,6 +399,7 @@ static const char * const reg_type_str[] = { [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = "tcp_sock", [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL] = "tcp_sock_or_null", [PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER] = "tp_buffer", + [PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK] = "xdp_sock", }; static char slot_type_char[] = { @@ -453,12 +447,12 @@ static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, verbose(env, " R%d", i); print_liveness(env, reg->live); verbose(env, "=%s", reg_type_str[t]); + if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) + verbose(env, "P"); if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { /* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */ verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); - if (t == PTR_TO_STACK) - verbose(env, ",call_%d", func(env, reg)->callsite); } else { verbose(env, "(id=%d", reg->id); if (reg_type_may_be_refcounted_or_null(t)) @@ -520,11 +514,17 @@ static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, continue; verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); print_liveness(env, state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live); - if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) - verbose(env, "=%s", - reg_type_str[state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.type]); - else + if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) { + reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; + t = reg->type; + verbose(env, "=%s", reg_type_str[t]); + if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) + verbose(env, "P"); + if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) + verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); + } else { verbose(env, "=%s", types_buf); + } } if (state->acquired_refs && state->refs[0].id) { verbose(env, " refs=%d", state->refs[0].id); @@ -673,6 +673,13 @@ static void free_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state) kfree(state); } +static void clear_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_state *state) +{ + kfree(state->jmp_history); + state->jmp_history = NULL; + state->jmp_history_cnt = 0; +} + static void free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, bool free_self) { @@ -682,6 +689,7 @@ static void free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, free_func_state(state->frame[i]); state->frame[i] = NULL; } + clear_jmp_history(state); if (free_self) kfree(state); } @@ -709,8 +717,18 @@ static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state, const struct bpf_verifier_state *src) { struct bpf_func_state *dst; + u32 jmp_sz = sizeof(struct bpf_idx_pair) * src->jmp_history_cnt; int i, err; + if (dst_state->jmp_history_cnt < src->jmp_history_cnt) { + kfree(dst_state->jmp_history); + dst_state->jmp_history = kmalloc(jmp_sz, GFP_USER); + if (!dst_state->jmp_history) + return -ENOMEM; + } + memcpy(dst_state->jmp_history, src->jmp_history, jmp_sz); + dst_state->jmp_history_cnt = src->jmp_history_cnt; + /* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them */ for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) { free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]); @@ -719,6 +737,10 @@ static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state, dst_state->speculative = src->speculative; dst_state->curframe = src->curframe; dst_state->active_spin_lock = src->active_spin_lock; + dst_state->branches = src->branches; + dst_state->parent = src->parent; + dst_state->first_insn_idx = src->first_insn_idx; + dst_state->last_insn_idx = src->last_insn_idx; for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) { dst = dst_state->frame[i]; if (!dst) { @@ -734,6 +756,23 @@ static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state, return 0; } +static void update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) +{ + while (st) { + u32 br = --st->branches; + + /* WARN_ON(br > 1) technically makes sense here, + * but see comment in push_stack(), hence: + */ + WARN_ONCE((int)br < 0, + "BUG update_branch_counts:branches_to_explore=%d\n", + br); + if (br) + break; + st = st->parent; + } +} + static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx, int *insn_idx) { @@ -787,6 +826,18 @@ static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, env->stack_size); goto err; } + if (elem->st.parent) { + ++elem->st.parent->branches; + /* WARN_ON(branches > 2) technically makes sense here, + * but + * 1. speculative states will bump 'branches' for non-branch + * instructions + * 2. is_state_visited() heuristics may decide not to create + * a new state for a sequence of branches and all such current + * and cloned states will be pointing to a single parent state + * which might have large 'branches' count. + */ + } return &elem->st; err: free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); @@ -934,6 +985,9 @@ static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; reg->umin_value = 0; reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; + + /* constant backtracking is enabled for root only for now */ + reg->precise = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ? false : true; } /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */ @@ -1345,6 +1399,434 @@ static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, return 0; } +/* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */ +static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) +{ + u32 cnt = cur->jmp_history_cnt; + struct bpf_idx_pair *p; + + cnt++; + p = krealloc(cur->jmp_history, cnt * sizeof(*p), GFP_USER); + if (!p) + return -ENOMEM; + p[cnt - 1].idx = env->insn_idx; + p[cnt - 1].prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; + cur->jmp_history = p; + cur->jmp_history_cnt = cnt; + return 0; +} + +/* Backtrack one insn at a time. If idx is not at the top of recorded + * history then previous instruction came from straight line execution. + */ +static int get_prev_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, int i, + u32 *history) +{ + u32 cnt = *history; + + if (cnt && st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].idx == i) { + i = st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].prev_idx; + (*history)--; + } else { + i--; + } + return i; +} + +/* For given verifier state backtrack_insn() is called from the last insn to + * the first insn. Its purpose is to compute a bitmask of registers and + * stack slots that needs precision in the parent verifier state. + */ +static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, + u32 *reg_mask, u64 *stack_mask) +{ + const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { + .cb_print = verbose, + .private_data = env, + }; + struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + idx; + u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); + u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); + u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); + u32 dreg = 1u << insn->dst_reg; + u32 sreg = 1u << insn->src_reg; + u32 spi; + + if (insn->code == 0) + return 0; + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { + verbose(env, "regs=%x stack=%llx before ", *reg_mask, *stack_mask); + verbose(env, "%d: ", idx); + print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); + } + + if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { + if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) + return 0; + if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { + if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { + /* dreg = sreg + * dreg needs precision after this insn + * sreg needs precision before this insn + */ + *reg_mask &= ~dreg; + *reg_mask |= sreg; + } else { + /* dreg = K + * dreg needs precision after this insn. + * Corresponding register is already marked + * as precise=true in this verifier state. + * No further markings in parent are necessary + */ + *reg_mask &= ~dreg; + } + } else { + if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { + /* dreg += sreg + * both dreg and sreg need precision + * before this insn + */ + *reg_mask |= sreg; + } /* else dreg += K + * dreg still needs precision before this insn + */ + } + } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { + if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) + return 0; + *reg_mask &= ~dreg; + + /* scalars can only be spilled into stack w/o losing precision. + * Load from any other memory can be zero extended. + * The desire to keep that precision is already indicated + * by 'precise' mark in corresponding register of this state. + * No further tracking necessary. + */ + if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_FP) + return 0; + if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) + return 0; + + /* dreg = *(u64 *)[fp - off] was a fill from the stack. + * that [fp - off] slot contains scalar that needs to be + * tracked with precision + */ + spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; + if (spi >= 64) { + verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); + WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); + return -EFAULT; + } + *stack_mask |= 1ull << spi; + } else if (class == BPF_STX) { + if (*reg_mask & dreg) + /* stx shouldn't be using _scalar_ dst_reg + * to access memory. It means backtracking + * encountered a case of pointer subtraction. + */ + return -ENOTSUPP; + /* scalars can only be spilled into stack */ + if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) + return 0; + if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) + return 0; + spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; + if (spi >= 64) { + verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); + WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); + return -EFAULT; + } + if (!(*stack_mask & (1ull << spi))) + return 0; + *stack_mask &= ~(1ull << spi); + *reg_mask |= sreg; + } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { + if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { + if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) + return -ENOTSUPP; + /* regular helper call sets R0 */ + *reg_mask &= ~1; + if (*reg_mask & 0x3f) { + /* if backtracing was looking for registers R1-R5 + * they should have been found already. + */ + verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", *reg_mask); + WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); + return -EFAULT; + } + } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { + return -ENOTSUPP; + } + } else if (class == BPF_LD) { + if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) + return 0; + *reg_mask &= ~dreg; + /* It's ld_imm64 or ld_abs or ld_ind. + * For ld_imm64 no further tracking of precision + * into parent is necessary + */ + if (mode == BPF_IND || mode == BPF_ABS) + /* to be analyzed */ + return -ENOTSUPP; + } else if (class == BPF_ST) { + if (*reg_mask & dreg) + /* likely pointer subtraction */ + return -ENOTSUPP; + } + return 0; +} + +/* the scalar precision tracking algorithm: + * . at the start all registers have precise=false. + * . scalar ranges are tracked as normal through alu and jmp insns. + * . once precise value of the scalar register is used in: + * . ptr + scalar alu + * . if (scalar cond K|scalar) + * . helper_call(.., scalar, ...) where ARG_CONST is expected + * backtrack through the verifier states and mark all registers and + * stack slots with spilled constants that these scalar regisers + * should be precise. + * . during state pruning two registers (or spilled stack slots) + * are equivalent if both are not precise. + * + * Note the verifier cannot simply walk register parentage chain, + * since many different registers and stack slots could have been + * used to compute single precise scalar. + * + * The approach of starting with precise=true for all registers and then + * backtrack to mark a register as not precise when the verifier detects + * that program doesn't care about specific value (e.g., when helper + * takes register as ARG_ANYTHING parameter) is not safe. + * + * It's ok to walk single parentage chain of the verifier states. + * It's possible that this backtracking will go all the way till 1st insn. + * All other branches will be explored for needing precision later. + * + * The backtracking needs to deal with cases like: + * R8=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) R9_w=map_value(id=0,off=40,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) + * r9 -= r8 + * r5 = r9 + * if r5 > 0x79f goto pc+7 + * R5_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=1951,var_off=(0x0; 0x7ff)) + * r5 += 1 + * ... + * call bpf_perf_event_output#25 + * where .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO + * + * and this case: + * r6 = 1 + * call foo // uses callee's r6 inside to compute r0 + * r0 += r6 + * if r0 == 0 goto + * + * to track above reg_mask/stack_mask needs to be independent for each frame. + * + * Also if parent's curframe > frame where backtracking started, + * the verifier need to mark registers in both frames, otherwise callees + * may incorrectly prune callers. This is similar to + * commit 7640ead93924 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differences") + * + * For now backtracking falls back into conservative marking. + */ +static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_verifier_state *st) +{ + struct bpf_func_state *func; + struct bpf_reg_state *reg; + int i, j; + + /* big hammer: mark all scalars precise in this path. + * pop_stack may still get !precise scalars. + */ + for (; st; st = st->parent) + for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { + func = st->frame[i]; + for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { + reg = &func->regs[j]; + if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) + continue; + reg->precise = true; + } + for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { + if (func->stack[j].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) + continue; + reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; + if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) + continue; + reg->precise = true; + } + } +} + +static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, + int spi) +{ + struct bpf_verifier_state *st = env->cur_state; + int first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; + int last_idx = env->insn_idx; + struct bpf_func_state *func; + struct bpf_reg_state *reg; + u32 reg_mask = regno >= 0 ? 1u << regno : 0; + u64 stack_mask = spi >= 0 ? 1ull << spi : 0; + bool skip_first = true; + bool new_marks = false; + int i, err; + + if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) + /* backtracking is root only for now */ + return 0; + + func = st->frame[st->curframe]; + if (regno >= 0) { + reg = &func->regs[regno]; + if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { + WARN_ONCE(1, "backtracing misuse"); + return -EFAULT; + } + if (!reg->precise) + new_marks = true; + else + reg_mask = 0; + reg->precise = true; + } + + while (spi >= 0) { + if (func->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) { + stack_mask = 0; + break; + } + reg = &func->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; + if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { + stack_mask = 0; + break; + } + if (!reg->precise) + new_marks = true; + else + stack_mask = 0; + reg->precise = true; + break; + } + + if (!new_marks) + return 0; + if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) + return 0; + for (;;) { + DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); + u32 history = st->jmp_history_cnt; + + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) + verbose(env, "last_idx %d first_idx %d\n", last_idx, first_idx); + for (i = last_idx;;) { + if (skip_first) { + err = 0; + skip_first = false; + } else { + err = backtrack_insn(env, i, ®_mask, &stack_mask); + } + if (err == -ENOTSUPP) { + mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st); + return 0; + } else if (err) { + return err; + } + if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) + /* Found assignment(s) into tracked register in this state. + * Since this state is already marked, just return. + * Nothing to be tracked further in the parent state. + */ + return 0; + if (i == first_idx) + break; + i = get_prev_insn_idx(st, i, &history); + if (i >= env->prog->len) { + /* This can happen if backtracking reached insn 0 + * and there are still reg_mask or stack_mask + * to backtrack. + * It means the backtracking missed the spot where + * particular register was initialized with a constant. + */ + verbose(env, "BUG backtracking idx %d\n", i); + WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); + return -EFAULT; + } + } + st = st->parent; + if (!st) + break; + + new_marks = false; + func = st->frame[st->curframe]; + bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask); + for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { + reg = &func->regs[i]; + if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { + reg_mask &= ~(1u << i); + continue; + } + if (!reg->precise) + new_marks = true; + reg->precise = true; + } + + bitmap_from_u64(mask, stack_mask); + for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { + if (i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) { + /* This can happen if backtracking + * is propagating stack precision where + * caller has larger stack frame + * than callee, but backtrack_insn() should + * have returned -ENOTSUPP. + */ + verbose(env, "BUG spi %d stack_size %d\n", + i, func->allocated_stack); + WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); + return -EFAULT; + } + + if (func->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) { + stack_mask &= ~(1ull << i); + continue; + } + reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; + if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { + stack_mask &= ~(1ull << i); + continue; + } + if (!reg->precise) + new_marks = true; + reg->precise = true; + } + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { + print_verifier_state(env, func); + verbose(env, "parent %s regs=%x stack=%llx marks\n", + new_marks ? "didn't have" : "already had", + reg_mask, stack_mask); + } + + if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) + break; + if (!new_marks) + break; + + last_idx = st->last_insn_idx; + first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; + } + return 0; +} + +static int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) +{ + return __mark_chain_precision(env, regno, -1); +} + +static int mark_chain_precision_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int spi) +{ + return __mark_chain_precision(env, -1, spi); +} + static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) { switch (type) { @@ -1363,6 +1845,7 @@ static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: + case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: return true; default: return false; @@ -1375,6 +1858,23 @@ static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); } +static bool register_is_const(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) +{ + return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); +} + +static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, + int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) +{ + int i; + + state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = *reg; + state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; + + for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) + state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_SPILL; +} + /* check_stack_read/write functions track spill/fill of registers, * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access() */ @@ -1384,7 +1884,8 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, { struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err; - enum bpf_reg_type type; + u32 dst_reg = env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx].dst_reg; + struct bpf_reg_state *reg = NULL; err = realloc_func_state(state, round_up(slot + 1, BPF_REG_SIZE), state->acquired_refs, true); @@ -1401,27 +1902,48 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; - if (value_regno >= 0 && - is_spillable_regtype((type = cur->regs[value_regno].type))) { - + if (value_regno >= 0) + reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; + + if (reg && size == BPF_REG_SIZE && register_is_const(reg) && + !register_is_null(reg) && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { + if (dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) { + /* The backtracking logic can only recognize explicit + * stack slot address like [fp - 8]. Other spill of + * scalar via different register has to be conervative. + * Backtrack from here and mark all registers as precise + * that contributed into 'reg' being a constant. + */ + err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); + if (err) + return err; + } + save_register_state(state, spi, reg); + } else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) { /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */ if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { + verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n"); return -EACCES; } - if (state != cur && type == PTR_TO_STACK) { + if (state != cur && reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n"); return -EINVAL; } - /* save register state */ - state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = cur->regs[value_regno]; - state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; + if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { + bool sanitize = false; - for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { - if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_MISC && - !env->allow_ptr_leaks) { + if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && + register_is_const(&state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr)) + sanitize = true; + for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) + if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_MISC) { + sanitize = true; + break; + } + if (sanitize) { int *poff = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_off; int soff = (-spi - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE; @@ -1444,8 +1966,8 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } *poff = soff; } - state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_SPILL; } + save_register_state(state, spi, reg); } else { u8 type = STACK_MISC; @@ -1468,9 +1990,13 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; /* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */ - if (value_regno >= 0 && - register_is_null(&cur->regs[value_regno])) + if (reg && register_is_null(reg)) { + /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ + err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); + if (err) + return err; type = STACK_ZERO; + } /* Mark slots affected by this stack write. */ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) @@ -1487,6 +2013,7 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; + struct bpf_reg_state *reg; u8 *stype; if (reg_state->allocated_stack <= slot) { @@ -1495,11 +2022,21 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, return -EACCES; } stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type; + reg = ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; if (stype[0] == STACK_SPILL) { if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { - verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n"); - return -EACCES; + if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { + verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); + verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n"); + return -EACCES; + } + if (value_regno >= 0) { + mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno); + state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; + } + mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); + return 0; } for (i = 1; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_SPILL) { @@ -1510,17 +2047,14 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (value_regno >= 0) { /* restore register state from stack */ - state->regs[value_regno] = reg_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; + state->regs[value_regno] = *reg; /* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited() * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions */ state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; } - mark_reg_read(env, ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, - reg_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent, - REG_LIVE_READ64); - return 0; + mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); } else { int zeros = 0; @@ -1535,23 +2069,32 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, off, i, size); return -EACCES; } - mark_reg_read(env, ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, - reg_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent, - REG_LIVE_READ64); + mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); if (value_regno >= 0) { if (zeros == size) { /* any size read into register is zero extended, * so the whole register == const_zero */ __mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[value_regno]); + /* backtracking doesn't support STACK_ZERO yet, + * so mark it precise here, so that later + * backtracking can stop here. + * Backtracking may not need this if this register + * doesn't participate in pointer adjustment. + * Forward propagation of precise flag is not + * necessary either. This mark is only to stop + * backtracking. Any register that contributed + * to const 0 was marked precise before spill. + */ + state->regs[value_regno].precise = true; } else { /* have read misc data from the stack */ mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno); } state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; } - return 0; } + return 0; } static int check_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, @@ -1717,6 +2260,13 @@ static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, env->seen_direct_write = true; return true; + + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: + if (t == BPF_WRITE) + env->seen_direct_write = true; + + return true; + default: return false; } @@ -1843,6 +2393,9 @@ static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: valid = bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); break; + case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: + valid = bpf_xdp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); + break; default: valid = false; } @@ -2007,6 +2560,9 @@ static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: pointer_desc = "tcp_sock "; break; + case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: + pointer_desc = "xdp_sock "; + break; default: break; } @@ -2406,7 +2962,7 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, { struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); - int err, min_off, max_off, i, slot, spi; + int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi; if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK) { /* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */ @@ -2494,6 +3050,14 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, *stype = STACK_MISC; goto mark; } + if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && + state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE) { + __mark_reg_unknown(&state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); + for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) + state->stack[spi].slot_type[j] = STACK_MISC; + goto mark; + } + err: if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", @@ -2845,6 +3409,8 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, reg->umax_value, zero_size_allowed, meta); + if (!err) + err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); } else if (arg_type_is_int_ptr(arg_type)) { int size = int_ptr_type_to_size(arg_type); @@ -2893,22 +3459,23 @@ static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage) goto error; break; - /* devmap returns a pointer to a live net_device ifindex that we cannot - * allow to be modified from bpf side. So do not allow lookup elements - * for now. - */ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP: - if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) + if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && + func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) goto error; break; /* Restrict bpf side of cpumap and xskmap, open when use-cases * appear. */ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP: - case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP: if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) goto error; break; + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP: + if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && + func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) + goto error; + break; case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) @@ -3799,6 +4366,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: + case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n", dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]); return -EACCES; @@ -4276,6 +4844,7 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg; struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0}; u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); + int err; dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; src_reg = NULL; @@ -4302,11 +4871,17 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, * This is legal, but we have to reverse our * src/dest handling in computing the range */ + err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); + if (err) + return err; return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, src_reg, dst_reg); } } else if (ptr_reg) { /* pointer += scalar */ + err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); + if (err) + return err; return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, src_reg); } @@ -5038,6 +5613,9 @@ static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state, if (reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta) { reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; reg->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta; + } else if (reg->map_ptr->map_type == + BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) { + reg->type = PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; } else { reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; } @@ -5209,9 +5787,10 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch = env->cur_state; struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch; struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs; - struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs; + struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs, *src_reg = NULL; u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); bool is_jmp32; + int pred = -1; int err; /* Only conditional jumps are expected to reach here. */ @@ -5236,6 +5815,7 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, insn->src_reg); return -EACCES; } + src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; } else { if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); @@ -5251,20 +5831,29 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; is_jmp32 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32; - if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { - int pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode, - is_jmp32); - - if (pred == 1) { - /* only follow the goto, ignore fall-through */ - *insn_idx += insn->off; - return 0; - } else if (pred == 0) { - /* only follow fall-through branch, since - * that's where the program will go - */ - return 0; - } + if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) + pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, insn->imm, + opcode, is_jmp32); + else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && + tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off)) + pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, src_reg->var_off.value, + opcode, is_jmp32); + if (pred >= 0) { + err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); + if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && !err) + err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); + if (err) + return err; + } + if (pred == 1) { + /* only follow the goto, ignore fall-through */ + *insn_idx += insn->off; + return 0; + } else if (pred == 0) { + /* only follow fall-through branch, since + * that's where the program will go + */ + return 0; } other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx, @@ -5513,16 +6102,20 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1); switch (env->prog->type) { + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: + if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG || + env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_RECVMSG) + range = tnum_range(1, 1); case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS) { range = tnum_range(0, 3); enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_range(2, 3); } case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK: - case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE: case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: break; default: return 0; @@ -5546,7 +6139,7 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) verbose(env, "has unknown scalar value"); } tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), range); - verbose(env, " should have been %s\n", tn_buf); + verbose(env, " should have been in %s\n", tn_buf); return -EINVAL; } @@ -5621,7 +6214,8 @@ static void init_explored_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) * w - next instruction * e - edge */ -static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) +static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + bool loop_ok) { int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack; int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state; @@ -5651,6 +6245,8 @@ static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w; return 1; } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) { + if (loop_ok && env->allow_ptr_leaks) + return 0; verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); verbose_linfo(env, w, "%d: ", w); verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); @@ -5702,7 +6298,7 @@ peek_stack: if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { goto mark_explored; } else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { - ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env); + ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); if (ret == 1) goto peek_stack; else if (ret < 0) @@ -5711,7 +6307,8 @@ peek_stack: init_explored_state(env, t + 1); if (insns[t].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) { init_explored_state(env, t); - ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, env); + ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, + env, false); if (ret == 1) goto peek_stack; else if (ret < 0) @@ -5724,11 +6321,16 @@ peek_stack: } /* unconditional jump with single edge */ ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, - FALLTHROUGH, env); + FALLTHROUGH, env, true); if (ret == 1) goto peek_stack; else if (ret < 0) goto err_free; + /* unconditional jmp is not a good pruning point, + * but it's marked, since backtracking needs + * to record jmp history in is_state_visited(). + */ + init_explored_state(env, t + insns[t].off + 1); /* tell verifier to check for equivalent states * after every call and jump */ @@ -5737,13 +6339,13 @@ peek_stack: } else { /* conditional jump with two edges */ init_explored_state(env, t); - ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env); + ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, true); if (ret == 1) goto peek_stack; else if (ret < 0) goto err_free; - ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env); + ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env, true); if (ret == 1) goto peek_stack; else if (ret < 0) @@ -5753,7 +6355,7 @@ peek_stack: /* all other non-branch instructions with single * fall-through edge */ - ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env); + ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); if (ret == 1) goto peek_stack; else if (ret < 0) @@ -6186,6 +6788,8 @@ static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn, sl = *explored_state(env, insn); while (sl) { + if (sl->state.branches) + goto next; if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn || sl->state.curframe != cur->curframe) goto next; @@ -6227,6 +6831,8 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, switch (rold->type) { case SCALAR_VALUE: if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { + if (!rold->precise && !rcur->precise) + return true; /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ return range_within(rold, rcur) && tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); @@ -6299,6 +6905,7 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: + case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: /* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above * would have accepted */ @@ -6549,19 +7156,92 @@ static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, return 0; } +/* find precise scalars in the previous equivalent state and + * propagate them into the current state + */ +static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + const struct bpf_verifier_state *old) +{ + struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg; + struct bpf_func_state *state; + int i, err = 0; + + state = old->frame[old->curframe]; + state_reg = state->regs; + for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++, state_reg++) { + if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || + !state_reg->precise) + continue; + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) + verbose(env, "propagating r%d\n", i); + err = mark_chain_precision(env, i); + if (err < 0) + return err; + } + + for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { + if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) + continue; + state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; + if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || + !state_reg->precise) + continue; + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) + verbose(env, "propagating fp%d\n", + (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); + err = mark_chain_precision_stack(env, i); + if (err < 0) + return err; + } + return 0; +} + +static bool states_maybe_looping(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, + struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) +{ + struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur; + int i, fr = cur->curframe; + + if (old->curframe != fr) + return false; + + fold = old->frame[fr]; + fcur = cur->frame[fr]; + for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) + if (memcmp(&fold->regs[i], &fcur->regs[i], + offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent))) + return false; + return true; +} + + static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) { struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl; struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, **pprev; struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new; int i, j, err, states_cnt = 0; + bool add_new_state = false; + cur->last_insn_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; if (!env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].prune_point) /* this 'insn_idx' instruction wasn't marked, so we will not * be doing state search here */ return 0; + /* bpf progs typically have pruning point every 4 instructions + * http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-1 + * Do not add new state for future pruning if the verifier hasn't seen + * at least 2 jumps and at least 8 instructions. + * This heuristics helps decrease 'total_states' and 'peak_states' metric. + * In tests that amounts to up to 50% reduction into total verifier + * memory consumption and 20% verifier time speedup. + */ + if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed >= 2 && + env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed >= 8) + add_new_state = true; + pprev = explored_state(env, insn_idx); sl = *pprev; @@ -6571,6 +7251,30 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) states_cnt++; if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn_idx) goto next; + if (sl->state.branches) { + if (states_maybe_looping(&sl->state, cur) && + states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) { + verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); + verbose(env, "infinite loop detected at insn %d\n", insn_idx); + return -EINVAL; + } + /* if the verifier is processing a loop, avoid adding new state + * too often, since different loop iterations have distinct + * states and may not help future pruning. + * This threshold shouldn't be too low to make sure that + * a loop with large bound will be rejected quickly. + * The most abusive loop will be: + * r1 += 1 + * if r1 < 1000000 goto pc-2 + * 1M insn_procssed limit / 100 == 10k peak states. + * This threshold shouldn't be too high either, since states + * at the end of the loop are likely to be useful in pruning. + */ + if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed < 20 && + env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed < 100) + add_new_state = false; + goto miss; + } if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) { sl->hit_cnt++; /* reached equivalent register/stack state, @@ -6584,11 +7288,27 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) * this state and will pop a new one. */ err = propagate_liveness(env, &sl->state, cur); + + /* if previous state reached the exit with precision and + * current state is equivalent to it (except precsion marks) + * the precision needs to be propagated back in + * the current state. + */ + err = err ? : push_jmp_history(env, cur); + err = err ? : propagate_precision(env, &sl->state); if (err) return err; return 1; } - sl->miss_cnt++; +miss: + /* when new state is not going to be added do not increase miss count. + * Otherwise several loop iterations will remove the state + * recorded earlier. The goal of these heuristics is to have + * states from some iterations of the loop (some in the beginning + * and some at the end) to help pruning. + */ + if (add_new_state) + sl->miss_cnt++; /* heuristic to determine whether this state is beneficial * to keep checking from state equivalence point of view. * Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn and verification time, @@ -6600,6 +7320,11 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) */ *pprev = sl->next; if (sl->state.frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) { + u32 br = sl->state.branches; + + WARN_ONCE(br, + "BUG live_done but branches_to_explore %d\n", + br); free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); kfree(sl); env->peak_states--; @@ -6623,20 +7348,27 @@ next: env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt; if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES) - return 0; + return push_jmp_history(env, cur); - /* there were no equivalent states, remember current one. - * technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet, + if (!add_new_state) + return push_jmp_history(env, cur); + + /* There were no equivalent states, remember the current one. + * Technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet, * but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe) - * or it will be rejected. Since there are no loops, we won't be + * or it will be rejected. When there are no loops the verifier won't be * seeing this tuple (frame[0].callsite, frame[1].callsite, .. insn_idx) - * again on the way to bpf_exit + * again on the way to bpf_exit. + * When looping the sl->state.branches will be > 0 and this state + * will not be considered for equivalence until branches == 0. */ new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL); if (!new_sl) return -ENOMEM; env->total_states++; env->peak_states++; + env->prev_jmps_processed = env->jmps_processed; + env->prev_insn_processed = env->insn_processed; /* add new state to the head of linked list */ new = &new_sl->state; @@ -6647,6 +7379,12 @@ next: return err; } new->insn_idx = insn_idx; + WARN_ONCE(new->branches != 1, + "BUG is_state_visited:branches_to_explore=%d insn %d\n", new->branches, insn_idx); + + cur->parent = new; + cur->first_insn_idx = insn_idx; + clear_jmp_history(cur); new_sl->next = *explored_state(env, insn_idx); *explored_state(env, insn_idx) = new_sl; /* connect new state to parentage chain. Current frame needs all @@ -6656,17 +7394,18 @@ next: * the state of the call instruction (with WRITTEN set), and r0 comes * from callee with its full parentage chain, anyway. */ - for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) - for (i = j < cur->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) - cur->frame[j]->regs[i].parent = &new->frame[j]->regs[i]; /* clear write marks in current state: the writes we did are not writes * our child did, so they don't screen off its reads from us. * (There are no read marks in current state, because reads always mark * their parent and current state never has children yet. Only * explored_states can get read marks.) */ - for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) - cur->frame[cur->curframe]->regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; + for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { + for (i = j < cur->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) + cur->frame[j]->regs[i].parent = &new->frame[j]->regs[i]; + for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) + cur->frame[j]->regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; + } /* all stack frames are accessible from callee, clear them all */ for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { @@ -6693,6 +7432,7 @@ static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type) case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: + case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: return false; default: return true; @@ -6724,6 +7464,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) struct bpf_reg_state *regs; int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; bool do_print_state = false; + int prev_insn_idx = -1; env->prev_linfo = NULL; @@ -6732,6 +7473,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return -ENOMEM; state->curframe = 0; state->speculative = false; + state->branches = 1; state->frame[0] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_func_state), GFP_KERNEL); if (!state->frame[0]) { kfree(state); @@ -6748,6 +7490,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) u8 class; int err; + env->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; if (env->insn_idx >= insn_cnt) { verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n", env->insn_idx, insn_cnt); @@ -6820,6 +7563,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) regs = cur_regs(env); env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = true; + prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx; if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { err = check_alu_op(env, insn); @@ -6938,6 +7682,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); + env->jmps_processed++; if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || insn->off != 0 || @@ -6992,7 +7737,6 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (state->curframe) { /* exit from nested function */ - env->prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx; err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx); if (err) return err; @@ -7023,7 +7767,8 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (err) return err; process_bpf_exit: - err = pop_stack(env, &env->prev_insn_idx, + update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state); + err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx, &env->insn_idx); if (err < 0) { if (err != -ENOENT) @@ -7826,6 +8571,9 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access; break; + case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: + convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access; + break; default: continue; } |