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-rw-r--r--lib/Kconfig3
-rw-r--r--lib/Kconfig.debug26
-rw-r--r--lib/Kconfig.kcsan4
-rw-r--r--lib/Kconfig.ubsan2
-rw-r--r--lib/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--lib/bug.c15
-rw-r--r--lib/debugobjects.c5
-rw-r--r--lib/dim/net_dim.c44
-rw-r--r--lib/dump_stack.c4
-rw-r--r--lib/hexdump.c41
-rw-r--r--lib/irq_poll.c8
-rw-r--r--lib/kobject.c32
-rw-r--r--lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c8
-rw-r--r--lib/nmi_backtrace.c4
-rw-r--r--lib/percpu-refcount.c1
-rw-r--r--lib/polynomial.c108
-rw-r--r--lib/random32.c347
-rw-r--r--lib/siphash.c32
-rw-r--r--lib/slub_kunit.c10
-rw-r--r--lib/stackdepot.c67
-rw-r--r--lib/strncpy_from_user.c2
-rw-r--r--lib/strnlen_user.c2
-rw-r--r--lib/vsprintf.c67
-rw-r--r--lib/xarray.c2
24 files changed, 302 insertions, 534 deletions
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig b/lib/Kconfig
index 087e06b4cdfd..6a843639814f 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/Kconfig
@@ -737,3 +737,6 @@ config PLDMFW
config ASN1_ENCODER
tristate
+
+config POLYNOMIAL
+ tristate
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index 36865b37b33b..b8cc65d22169 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -485,24 +485,25 @@ config FRAME_POINTER
larger and slower, but it gives very useful debugging information
in case of kernel bugs. (precise oopses/stacktraces/warnings)
+config OBJTOOL
+ bool
+
config STACK_VALIDATION
bool "Compile-time stack metadata validation"
- depends on HAVE_STACK_VALIDATION
+ depends on HAVE_STACK_VALIDATION && UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER
+ select OBJTOOL
default n
help
- Add compile-time checks to validate stack metadata, including frame
- pointers (if CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is enabled). This helps ensure
- that runtime stack traces are more reliable.
-
- This is also a prerequisite for generation of ORC unwind data, which
- is needed for CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC.
+ Validate frame pointer rules at compile-time. This helps ensure that
+ runtime stack traces are more reliable.
For more information, see
tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.
-config VMLINUX_VALIDATION
+config NOINSTR_VALIDATION
bool
- depends on STACK_VALIDATION && DEBUG_ENTRY
+ depends on HAVE_NOINSTR_VALIDATION && DEBUG_ENTRY
+ select OBJTOOL
default y
config VMLINUX_MAP
@@ -709,6 +710,7 @@ config DEBUG_SLAB
config SLUB_DEBUG_ON
bool "SLUB debugging on by default"
depends on SLUB && SLUB_DEBUG
+ select STACKDEPOT_ALWAYS_INIT if STACKTRACE_SUPPORT
default n
help
Boot with debugging on by default. SLUB boots by default with
@@ -1616,8 +1618,7 @@ config WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
so architecture maintainers really need to do what they can
to get the CRNG seeded sooner after the system is booted.
However, since users cannot do anything actionable to
- address this, by default the kernel will issue only a single
- warning for the first use of unseeded randomness.
+ address this, by default this option is disabled.
Say Y here if you want to receive warnings for all uses of
unseeded randomness. This will be of use primarily for
@@ -2035,10 +2036,11 @@ config KCOV
bool "Code coverage for fuzzing"
depends on ARCH_HAS_KCOV
depends on CC_HAS_SANCOV_TRACE_PC || GCC_PLUGINS
- depends on !ARCH_WANTS_NO_INSTR || STACK_VALIDATION || \
+ depends on !ARCH_WANTS_NO_INSTR || HAVE_NOINSTR_HACK || \
GCC_VERSION >= 120000 || CLANG_VERSION >= 130000
select DEBUG_FS
select GCC_PLUGIN_SANCOV if !CC_HAS_SANCOV_TRACE_PC
+ select OBJTOOL if HAVE_NOINSTR_HACK
help
KCOV exposes kernel code coverage information in a form suitable
for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing).
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kcsan b/lib/Kconfig.kcsan
index de022445fbba..47a693c45864 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.kcsan
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.kcsan
@@ -187,7 +187,9 @@ config KCSAN_WEAK_MEMORY
# We can either let objtool nop __tsan_func_{entry,exit}() and builtin
# atomics instrumentation in .noinstr.text, or use a compiler that can
# implement __no_kcsan to really remove all instrumentation.
- depends on STACK_VALIDATION || CC_IS_GCC || CLANG_VERSION >= 140000
+ depends on !ARCH_WANTS_NO_INSTR || HAVE_NOINSTR_HACK || \
+ CC_IS_GCC || CLANG_VERSION >= 140000
+ select OBJTOOL if HAVE_NOINSTR_HACK
help
Enable support for modeling a subset of weak memory, which allows
detecting a subset of data races due to missing memory barriers.
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
index f3c57ed51838..c4fe15d38b60 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ config UBSAN_UNREACHABLE
bool "Perform checking for unreachable code"
# objtool already handles unreachable checking and gets angry about
# seeing UBSan instrumentation located in unreachable places.
- depends on !STACK_VALIDATION
+ depends on !(OBJTOOL && (STACK_VALIDATION || UNWINDER_ORC || X86_SMAP))
depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=unreachable)
help
This option enables -fsanitize=unreachable which checks for control
diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
index 6b9ffc1bd1ee..89fcae891361 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -263,6 +263,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MEMREGION) += memregion.o
obj-$(CONFIG_STMP_DEVICE) += stmp_device.o
obj-$(CONFIG_IRQ_POLL) += irq_poll.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_POLYNOMIAL) += polynomial.o
+
# stackdepot.c should not be instrumented or call instrumented functions.
# Prevent the compiler from calling builtins like memcmp() or bcmp() from this
# file.
diff --git a/lib/bug.c b/lib/bug.c
index 45a0584f6541..c223a2575b72 100644
--- a/lib/bug.c
+++ b/lib/bug.c
@@ -6,8 +6,7 @@
CONFIG_BUG - emit BUG traps. Nothing happens without this.
CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG - enable this code.
- CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG_RELATIVE_POINTERS - use 32-bit pointers relative to
- the containing struct bug_entry for bug_addr and file.
+ CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG_RELATIVE_POINTERS - use 32-bit relative pointers for bug_addr and file
CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE - emit full file+line information for each BUG
CONFIG_BUG and CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE are potentially user-settable
@@ -53,10 +52,10 @@ extern struct bug_entry __start___bug_table[], __stop___bug_table[];
static inline unsigned long bug_addr(const struct bug_entry *bug)
{
-#ifndef CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG_RELATIVE_POINTERS
- return bug->bug_addr;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG_RELATIVE_POINTERS
+ return (unsigned long)&bug->bug_addr_disp + bug->bug_addr_disp;
#else
- return (unsigned long)bug + bug->bug_addr_disp;
+ return bug->bug_addr;
#endif
}
@@ -131,10 +130,10 @@ void bug_get_file_line(struct bug_entry *bug, const char **file,
unsigned int *line)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE
-#ifndef CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG_RELATIVE_POINTERS
- *file = bug->file;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG_RELATIVE_POINTERS
+ *file = (const char *)&bug->file_disp + bug->file_disp;
#else
- *file = (const char *)bug + bug->file_disp;
+ *file = bug->file;
#endif
*line = bug->line;
#else
diff --git a/lib/debugobjects.c b/lib/debugobjects.c
index 6946f8e204e3..337d797a7141 100644
--- a/lib/debugobjects.c
+++ b/lib/debugobjects.c
@@ -1,11 +1,8 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Generic infrastructure for lifetime debugging of objects.
*
- * Started by Thomas Gleixner
- *
* Copyright (C) 2008, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
- *
- * For licencing details see kernel-base/COPYING
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "ODEBUG: " fmt
diff --git a/lib/dim/net_dim.c b/lib/dim/net_dim.c
index 06811d866775..53f6b9c6e936 100644
--- a/lib/dim/net_dim.c
+++ b/lib/dim/net_dim.c
@@ -12,41 +12,41 @@
* Each profile size must be of NET_DIM_PARAMS_NUM_PROFILES
*/
#define NET_DIM_PARAMS_NUM_PROFILES 5
-#define NET_DIM_DEFAULT_RX_CQ_MODERATION_PKTS_FROM_EQE 256
-#define NET_DIM_DEFAULT_TX_CQ_MODERATION_PKTS_FROM_EQE 128
+#define NET_DIM_DEFAULT_RX_CQ_PKTS_FROM_EQE 256
+#define NET_DIM_DEFAULT_TX_CQ_PKTS_FROM_EQE 128
#define NET_DIM_DEF_PROFILE_CQE 1
#define NET_DIM_DEF_PROFILE_EQE 1
#define NET_DIM_RX_EQE_PROFILES { \
- {1, NET_DIM_DEFAULT_RX_CQ_MODERATION_PKTS_FROM_EQE}, \
- {8, NET_DIM_DEFAULT_RX_CQ_MODERATION_PKTS_FROM_EQE}, \
- {64, NET_DIM_DEFAULT_RX_CQ_MODERATION_PKTS_FROM_EQE}, \
- {128, NET_DIM_DEFAULT_RX_CQ_MODERATION_PKTS_FROM_EQE}, \
- {256, NET_DIM_DEFAULT_RX_CQ_MODERATION_PKTS_FROM_EQE}, \
+ {.usec = 1, .pkts = NET_DIM_DEFAULT_RX_CQ_PKTS_FROM_EQE,}, \
+ {.usec = 8, .pkts = NET_DIM_DEFAULT_RX_CQ_PKTS_FROM_EQE,}, \
+ {.usec = 64, .pkts = NET_DIM_DEFAULT_RX_CQ_PKTS_FROM_EQE,}, \
+ {.usec = 128, .pkts = NET_DIM_DEFAULT_RX_CQ_PKTS_FROM_EQE,}, \
+ {.usec = 256, .pkts = NET_DIM_DEFAULT_RX_CQ_PKTS_FROM_EQE,} \
}
#define NET_DIM_RX_CQE_PROFILES { \
- {2, 256}, \
- {8, 128}, \
- {16, 64}, \
- {32, 64}, \
- {64, 64} \
+ {.usec = 2, .pkts = 256,}, \
+ {.usec = 8, .pkts = 128,}, \
+ {.usec = 16, .pkts = 64,}, \
+ {.usec = 32, .pkts = 64,}, \
+ {.usec = 64, .pkts = 64,} \
}
#define NET_DIM_TX_EQE_PROFILES { \
- {1, NET_DIM_DEFAULT_TX_CQ_MODERATION_PKTS_FROM_EQE}, \
- {8, NET_DIM_DEFAULT_TX_CQ_MODERATION_PKTS_FROM_EQE}, \
- {32, NET_DIM_DEFAULT_TX_CQ_MODERATION_PKTS_FROM_EQE}, \
- {64, NET_DIM_DEFAULT_TX_CQ_MODERATION_PKTS_FROM_EQE}, \
- {128, NET_DIM_DEFAULT_TX_CQ_MODERATION_PKTS_FROM_EQE} \
+ {.usec = 1, .pkts = NET_DIM_DEFAULT_TX_CQ_PKTS_FROM_EQE,}, \
+ {.usec = 8, .pkts = NET_DIM_DEFAULT_TX_CQ_PKTS_FROM_EQE,}, \
+ {.usec = 32, .pkts = NET_DIM_DEFAULT_TX_CQ_PKTS_FROM_EQE,}, \
+ {.usec = 64, .pkts = NET_DIM_DEFAULT_TX_CQ_PKTS_FROM_EQE,}, \
+ {.usec = 128, .pkts = NET_DIM_DEFAULT_TX_CQ_PKTS_FROM_EQE,} \
}
#define NET_DIM_TX_CQE_PROFILES { \
- {5, 128}, \
- {8, 64}, \
- {16, 32}, \
- {32, 32}, \
- {64, 32} \
+ {.usec = 5, .pkts = 128,}, \
+ {.usec = 8, .pkts = 64,}, \
+ {.usec = 16, .pkts = 32,}, \
+ {.usec = 32, .pkts = 32,}, \
+ {.usec = 64, .pkts = 32,} \
}
static const struct dim_cq_moder
diff --git a/lib/dump_stack.c b/lib/dump_stack.c
index 6b7f1bf6715d..83471e81501a 100644
--- a/lib/dump_stack.c
+++ b/lib/dump_stack.c
@@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ asmlinkage __visible void dump_stack_lvl(const char *log_lvl)
* Permit this cpu to perform nested stack dumps while serialising
* against other CPUs
*/
- printk_cpu_lock_irqsave(flags);
+ printk_cpu_sync_get_irqsave(flags);
__dump_stack(log_lvl);
- printk_cpu_unlock_irqrestore(flags);
+ printk_cpu_sync_put_irqrestore(flags);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(dump_stack_lvl);
diff --git a/lib/hexdump.c b/lib/hexdump.c
index 9301578f98e8..06833d404398 100644
--- a/lib/hexdump.c
+++ b/lib/hexdump.c
@@ -22,15 +22,33 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(hex_asc_upper);
*
* hex_to_bin() converts one hex digit to its actual value or -1 in case of bad
* input.
+ *
+ * This function is used to load cryptographic keys, so it is coded in such a
+ * way that there are no conditions or memory accesses that depend on data.
+ *
+ * Explanation of the logic:
+ * (ch - '9' - 1) is negative if ch <= '9'
+ * ('0' - 1 - ch) is negative if ch >= '0'
+ * we "and" these two values, so the result is negative if ch is in the range
+ * '0' ... '9'
+ * we are only interested in the sign, so we do a shift ">> 8"; note that right
+ * shift of a negative value is implementation-defined, so we cast the
+ * value to (unsigned) before the shift --- we have 0xffffff if ch is in
+ * the range '0' ... '9', 0 otherwise
+ * we "and" this value with (ch - '0' + 1) --- we have a value 1 ... 10 if ch is
+ * in the range '0' ... '9', 0 otherwise
+ * we add this value to -1 --- we have a value 0 ... 9 if ch is in the range '0'
+ * ... '9', -1 otherwise
+ * the next line is similar to the previous one, but we need to decode both
+ * uppercase and lowercase letters, so we use (ch & 0xdf), which converts
+ * lowercase to uppercase
*/
-int hex_to_bin(char ch)
+int hex_to_bin(unsigned char ch)
{
- if ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9'))
- return ch - '0';
- ch = tolower(ch);
- if ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'f'))
- return ch - 'a' + 10;
- return -1;
+ unsigned char cu = ch & 0xdf;
+ return -1 +
+ ((ch - '0' + 1) & (unsigned)((ch - '9' - 1) & ('0' - 1 - ch)) >> 8) +
+ ((cu - 'A' + 11) & (unsigned)((cu - 'F' - 1) & ('A' - 1 - cu)) >> 8);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hex_to_bin);
@@ -45,10 +63,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(hex_to_bin);
int hex2bin(u8 *dst, const char *src, size_t count)
{
while (count--) {
- int hi = hex_to_bin(*src++);
- int lo = hex_to_bin(*src++);
+ int hi, lo;
- if ((hi < 0) || (lo < 0))
+ hi = hex_to_bin(*src++);
+ if (unlikely(hi < 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ lo = hex_to_bin(*src++);
+ if (unlikely(lo < 0))
return -EINVAL;
*dst++ = (hi << 4) | lo;
diff --git a/lib/irq_poll.c b/lib/irq_poll.c
index 2f17b488d58e..2d5329a42105 100644
--- a/lib/irq_poll.c
+++ b/lib/irq_poll.c
@@ -188,14 +188,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(irq_poll_init);
static int irq_poll_cpu_dead(unsigned int cpu)
{
/*
- * If a CPU goes away, splice its entries to the current CPU
- * and trigger a run of the softirq
+ * If a CPU goes away, splice its entries to the current CPU and
+ * set the POLL softirq bit. The local_bh_disable()/enable() pair
+ * ensures that it is handled. Otherwise the current CPU could
+ * reach idle with the POLL softirq pending.
*/
+ local_bh_disable();
local_irq_disable();
list_splice_init(&per_cpu(blk_cpu_iopoll, cpu),
this_cpu_ptr(&blk_cpu_iopoll));
__raise_softirq_irqoff(IRQ_POLL_SOFTIRQ);
local_irq_enable();
+ local_bh_enable();
return 0;
}
diff --git a/lib/kobject.c b/lib/kobject.c
index 56fa037501b5..5f0e71ab292c 100644
--- a/lib/kobject.c
+++ b/lib/kobject.c
@@ -54,32 +54,6 @@ void kobject_get_ownership(struct kobject *kobj, kuid_t *uid, kgid_t *gid)
kobj->ktype->get_ownership(kobj, uid, gid);
}
-/*
- * populate_dir - populate directory with attributes.
- * @kobj: object we're working on.
- *
- * Most subsystems have a set of default attributes that are associated
- * with an object that registers with them. This is a helper called during
- * object registration that loops through the default attributes of the
- * subsystem and creates attributes files for them in sysfs.
- */
-static int populate_dir(struct kobject *kobj)
-{
- const struct kobj_type *t = get_ktype(kobj);
- struct attribute *attr;
- int error = 0;
- int i;
-
- if (t && t->default_attrs) {
- for (i = 0; (attr = t->default_attrs[i]) != NULL; i++) {
- error = sysfs_create_file(kobj, attr);
- if (error)
- break;
- }
- }
- return error;
-}
-
static int create_dir(struct kobject *kobj)
{
const struct kobj_type *ktype = get_ktype(kobj);
@@ -90,12 +64,6 @@ static int create_dir(struct kobject *kobj)
if (error)
return error;
- error = populate_dir(kobj);
- if (error) {
- sysfs_remove_dir(kobj);
- return error;
- }
-
if (ktype) {
error = sysfs_create_groups(kobj, ktype->default_groups);
if (error) {
diff --git a/lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c b/lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c
index 926f4823d5ea..fd1728d94bab 100644
--- a/lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c
+++ b/lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c
@@ -271,8 +271,12 @@ static FORCE_INLINE int LZ4_decompress_generic(
ip += length;
op += length;
- /* Necessarily EOF, due to parsing restrictions */
- if (!partialDecoding || (cpy == oend))
+ /* Necessarily EOF when !partialDecoding.
+ * When partialDecoding, it is EOF if we've either
+ * filled the output buffer or
+ * can't proceed with reading an offset for following match.
+ */
+ if (!partialDecoding || (cpy == oend) || (ip >= (iend - 2)))
break;
} else {
/* may overwrite up to WILDCOPYLENGTH beyond cpy */
diff --git a/lib/nmi_backtrace.c b/lib/nmi_backtrace.c
index 199ab201d501..d01aec6ae15c 100644
--- a/lib/nmi_backtrace.c
+++ b/lib/nmi_backtrace.c
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ bool nmi_cpu_backtrace(struct pt_regs *regs)
* Allow nested NMI backtraces while serializing
* against other CPUs.
*/
- printk_cpu_lock_irqsave(flags);
+ printk_cpu_sync_get_irqsave(flags);
if (!READ_ONCE(backtrace_idle) && regs && cpu_in_idle(instruction_pointer(regs))) {
pr_warn("NMI backtrace for cpu %d skipped: idling at %pS\n",
cpu, (void *)instruction_pointer(regs));
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ bool nmi_cpu_backtrace(struct pt_regs *regs)
else
dump_stack();
}
- printk_cpu_unlock_irqrestore(flags);
+ printk_cpu_sync_put_irqrestore(flags);
cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, to_cpumask(backtrace_mask));
return true;
}
diff --git a/lib/percpu-refcount.c b/lib/percpu-refcount.c
index af9302141bcf..e5c5315da274 100644
--- a/lib/percpu-refcount.c
+++ b/lib/percpu-refcount.c
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ int percpu_ref_init(struct percpu_ref *ref, percpu_ref_func_t *release,
data = kzalloc(sizeof(*ref->data), gfp);
if (!data) {
free_percpu((void __percpu *)ref->percpu_count_ptr);
+ ref->percpu_count_ptr = 0;
return -ENOMEM;
}
diff --git a/lib/polynomial.c b/lib/polynomial.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..66d383445fec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/polynomial.c
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Generic polynomial calculation using integer coefficients.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 BAIKAL ELECTRONICS, JSC
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Maxim Kaurkin <maxim.kaurkin@baikalelectronics.ru>
+ * Serge Semin <Sergey.Semin@baikalelectronics.ru>
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/polynomial.h>
+
+/*
+ * Originally this was part of drivers/hwmon/bt1-pvt.c.
+ * There the following conversion is used and should serve as an example here:
+ *
+ * The original translation formulae of the temperature (in degrees of Celsius)
+ * to PVT data and vice-versa are following:
+ *
+ * N = 1.8322e-8*(T^4) + 2.343e-5*(T^3) + 8.7018e-3*(T^2) + 3.9269*(T^1) +
+ * 1.7204e2
+ * T = -1.6743e-11*(N^4) + 8.1542e-8*(N^3) + -1.8201e-4*(N^2) +
+ * 3.1020e-1*(N^1) - 4.838e1
+ *
+ * where T = [-48.380, 147.438]C and N = [0, 1023].
+ *
+ * They must be accordingly altered to be suitable for the integer arithmetics.
+ * The technique is called 'factor redistribution', which just makes sure the
+ * multiplications and divisions are made so to have a result of the operations
+ * within the integer numbers limit. In addition we need to translate the
+ * formulae to accept millidegrees of Celsius. Here what they look like after
+ * the alterations:
+ *
+ * N = (18322e-20*(T^4) + 2343e-13*(T^3) + 87018e-9*(T^2) + 39269e-3*T +
+ * 17204e2) / 1e4
+ * T = -16743e-12*(D^4) + 81542e-9*(D^3) - 182010e-6*(D^2) + 310200e-3*D -
+ * 48380
+ * where T = [-48380, 147438] mC and N = [0, 1023].
+ *
+ * static const struct polynomial poly_temp_to_N = {
+ * .total_divider = 10000,
+ * .terms = {
+ * {4, 18322, 10000, 10000},
+ * {3, 2343, 10000, 10},
+ * {2, 87018, 10000, 10},
+ * {1, 39269, 1000, 1},
+ * {0, 1720400, 1, 1}
+ * }
+ * };
+ *
+ * static const struct polynomial poly_N_to_temp = {
+ * .total_divider = 1,
+ * .terms = {
+ * {4, -16743, 1000, 1},
+ * {3, 81542, 1000, 1},
+ * {2, -182010, 1000, 1},
+ * {1, 310200, 1000, 1},
+ * {0, -48380, 1, 1}
+ * }
+ * };
+ */
+
+/**
+ * polynomial_calc - calculate a polynomial using integer arithmetic
+ *
+ * @poly: pointer to the descriptor of the polynomial
+ * @data: input value of the polynimal
+ *
+ * Calculate the result of a polynomial using only integer arithmetic. For
+ * this to work without too much loss of precision the coefficients has to
+ * be altered. This is called factor redistribution.
+ *
+ * Returns the result of the polynomial calculation.
+ */
+long polynomial_calc(const struct polynomial *poly, long data)
+{
+ const struct polynomial_term *term = poly->terms;
+ long total_divider = poly->total_divider ?: 1;
+ long tmp, ret = 0;
+ int deg;
+
+ /*
+ * Here is the polynomial calculation function, which performs the
+ * redistributed terms calculations. It's pretty straightforward.
+ * We walk over each degree term up to the free one, and perform
+ * the redistributed multiplication of the term coefficient, its
+ * divider (as for the rationale fraction representation), data
+ * power and the rational fraction divider leftover. Then all of
+ * this is collected in a total sum variable, which value is
+ * normalized by the total divider before being returned.
+ */
+ do {
+ tmp = term->coef;
+ for (deg = 0; deg < term->deg; ++deg)
+ tmp = mult_frac(tmp, data, term->divider);
+ ret += tmp / term->divider_leftover;
+ } while ((term++)->deg);
+
+ return ret / total_divider;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(polynomial_calc);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Generic polynomial calculations");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
index 976632003ec6..d5d9029362cb 100644
--- a/lib/random32.c
+++ b/lib/random32.c
@@ -245,25 +245,13 @@ static struct prandom_test2 {
{ 407983964U, 921U, 728767059U },
};
-static u32 __extract_hwseed(void)
-{
- unsigned int val = 0;
-
- (void)(arch_get_random_seed_int(&val) ||
- arch_get_random_int(&val));
-
- return val;
-}
-
-static void prandom_seed_early(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed,
- bool mix_with_hwseed)
+static void prandom_state_selftest_seed(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed)
{
#define LCG(x) ((x) * 69069U) /* super-duper LCG */
-#define HWSEED() (mix_with_hwseed ? __extract_hwseed() : 0)
- state->s1 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(seed), 2U);
- state->s2 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s1), 8U);
- state->s3 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s2), 16U);
- state->s4 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s3), 128U);
+ state->s1 = __seed(LCG(seed), 2U);
+ state->s2 = __seed(LCG(state->s1), 8U);
+ state->s3 = __seed(LCG(state->s2), 16U);
+ state->s4 = __seed(LCG(state->s3), 128U);
}
static int __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
@@ -274,7 +262,7 @@ static int __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(test1); i++) {
struct rnd_state state;
- prandom_seed_early(&state, test1[i].seed, false);
+ prandom_state_selftest_seed(&state, test1[i].seed);
prandom_warmup(&state);
if (test1[i].result != prandom_u32_state(&state))
@@ -289,7 +277,7 @@ static int __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(test2); i++) {
struct rnd_state state;
- prandom_seed_early(&state, test2[i].seed, false);
+ prandom_state_selftest_seed(&state, test2[i].seed);
prandom_warmup(&state);
for (j = 0; j < test2[i].iteration - 1; j++)
@@ -310,324 +298,3 @@ static int __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
}
core_initcall(prandom_state_selftest);
#endif
-
-/*
- * The prandom_u32() implementation is now completely separate from the
- * prandom_state() functions, which are retained (for now) for compatibility.
- *
- * Because of (ab)use in the networking code for choosing random TCP/UDP port
- * numbers, which open DoS possibilities if guessable, we want something
- * stronger than a standard PRNG. But the performance requirements of
- * the network code do not allow robust crypto for this application.
- *
- * So this is a homebrew Junior Spaceman implementation, based on the
- * lowest-latency trustworthy crypto primitive available, SipHash.
- * (The authors of SipHash have not been consulted about this abuse of
- * their work.)
- *
- * Standard SipHash-2-4 uses 2n+4 rounds to hash n words of input to
- * one word of output. This abbreviated version uses 2 rounds per word
- * of output.
- */
-
-struct siprand_state {
- unsigned long v0;
- unsigned long v1;
- unsigned long v2;
- unsigned long v3;
-};
-
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct siprand_state, net_rand_state) __latent_entropy;
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, net_rand_noise);
-EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(net_rand_noise);
-
-/*
- * This is the core CPRNG function. As "pseudorandom", this is not used
- * for truly valuable things, just intended to be a PITA to guess.
- * For maximum speed, we do just two SipHash rounds per word. This is
- * the same rate as 4 rounds per 64 bits that SipHash normally uses,
- * so hopefully it's reasonably secure.
- *
- * There are two changes from the official SipHash finalization:
- * - We omit some constants XORed with v2 in the SipHash spec as irrelevant;
- * they are there only to make the output rounds distinct from the input
- * rounds, and this application has no input rounds.
- * - Rather than returning v0^v1^v2^v3, return v1+v3.
- * If you look at the SipHash round, the last operation on v3 is
- * "v3 ^= v0", so "v0 ^ v3" just undoes that, a waste of time.
- * Likewise "v1 ^= v2". (The rotate of v2 makes a difference, but
- * it still cancels out half of the bits in v2 for no benefit.)
- * Second, since the last combining operation was xor, continue the
- * pattern of alternating xor/add for a tiny bit of extra non-linearity.
- */
-static inline u32 siprand_u32(struct siprand_state *s)
-{
- unsigned long v0 = s->v0, v1 = s->v1, v2 = s->v2, v3 = s->v3;
- unsigned long n = raw_cpu_read(net_rand_noise);
-
- v3 ^= n;
- PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
- PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
- v0 ^= n;
- s->v0 = v0; s->v1 = v1; s->v2 = v2; s->v3 = v3;
- return v1 + v3;
-}
-
-
-/**
- * prandom_u32 - pseudo random number generator
- *
- * A 32 bit pseudo-random number is generated using a fast
- * algorithm suitable for simulation. This algorithm is NOT
- * considered safe for cryptographic use.
- */
-u32 prandom_u32(void)
-{
- struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
- u32 res = siprand_u32(state);
-
- put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
- return res;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32);
-
-/**
- * prandom_bytes - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes
- * @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to
- * @bytes: the requested number of bytes
- */
-void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t bytes)
-{
- struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
- u8 *ptr = buf;
-
- while (bytes >= sizeof(u32)) {
- put_unaligned(siprand_u32(state), (u32 *)ptr);
- ptr += sizeof(u32);
- bytes -= sizeof(u32);
- }
-
- if (bytes > 0) {
- u32 rem = siprand_u32(state);
-
- do {
- *ptr++ = (u8)rem;
- rem >>= BITS_PER_BYTE;
- } while (--bytes > 0);
- }
- put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes);
-
-/**
- * prandom_seed - add entropy to pseudo random number generator
- * @entropy: entropy value
- *
- * Add some additional seed material to the prandom pool.
- * The "entropy" is actually our IP address (the only caller is
- * the network code), not for unpredictability, but to ensure that
- * different machines are initialized differently.
- */
-void prandom_seed(u32 entropy)
-{
- int i;
-
- add_device_randomness(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
-
- for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
- struct siprand_state *state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
- unsigned long v0 = state->v0, v1 = state->v1;
- unsigned long v2 = state->v2, v3 = state->v3;
-
- do {
- v3 ^= entropy;
- PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
- PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
- v0 ^= entropy;
- } while (unlikely(!v0 || !v1 || !v2 || !v3));
-
- WRITE_ONCE(state->v0, v0);
- WRITE_ONCE(state->v1, v1);
- WRITE_ONCE(state->v2, v2);
- WRITE_ONCE(state->v3, v3);
- }
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed);
-
-/*
- * Generate some initially weak seeding values to allow
- * the prandom_u32() engine to be started.
- */
-static int __init prandom_init_early(void)
-{
- int i;
- unsigned long v0, v1, v2, v3;
-
- if (!arch_get_random_long(&v0))
- v0 = jiffies;
- if (!arch_get_random_long(&v1))
- v1 = random_get_entropy();
- v2 = v0 ^ PRND_K0;
- v3 = v1 ^ PRND_K1;
-
- for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
- struct siprand_state *state;
-
- v3 ^= i;
- PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
- PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
- v0 ^= i;
-
- state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
- state->v0 = v0; state->v1 = v1;
- state->v2 = v2; state->v3 = v3;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-core_initcall(prandom_init_early);
-
-
-/* Stronger reseeding when available, and periodically thereafter. */
-static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused);
-
-static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, prandom_reseed);
-
-static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused)
-{
- unsigned long expires;
- int i;
-
- /*
- * Reinitialize each CPU's PRNG with 128 bits of key.
- * No locking on the CPUs, but then somewhat random results are,
- * well, expected.
- */
- for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
- struct siprand_state *state;
- unsigned long v0 = get_random_long(), v2 = v0 ^ PRND_K0;
- unsigned long v1 = get_random_long(), v3 = v1 ^ PRND_K1;
-#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
- int j;
-
- /*
- * On 32-bit machines, hash in two extra words to
- * approximate 128-bit key length. Not that the hash
- * has that much security, but this prevents a trivial
- * 64-bit brute force.
- */
- for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
- unsigned long m = get_random_long();
-
- v3 ^= m;
- PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
- PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3);
- v0 ^= m;
- }
-#endif
- /*
- * Probably impossible in practice, but there is a
- * theoretical risk that a race between this reseeding
- * and the target CPU writing its state back could
- * create the all-zero SipHash fixed point.
- *
- * To ensure that never happens, ensure the state
- * we write contains no zero words.
- */
- state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i);
- WRITE_ONCE(state->v0, v0 ? v0 : -1ul);
- WRITE_ONCE(state->v1, v1 ? v1 : -1ul);
- WRITE_ONCE(state->v2, v2 ? v2 : -1ul);
- WRITE_ONCE(state->v3, v3 ? v3 : -1ul);
- }
-
- /* reseed every ~60 seconds, in [40 .. 80) interval with slack */
- expires = round_jiffies(jiffies + 40 * HZ + prandom_u32_max(40 * HZ));
- mod_timer(&seed_timer, expires);
-}
-
-/*
- * The random ready callback can be called from almost any interrupt.
- * To avoid worrying about whether it's safe to delay that interrupt
- * long enough to seed all CPUs, just schedule an immediate timer event.
- */
-static int prandom_timer_start(struct notifier_block *nb,
- unsigned long action, void *data)
-{
- mod_timer(&seed_timer, jiffies);
- return 0;
-}
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
-/* Principle: True 32-bit random numbers will all have 16 differing bits on
- * average. For each 32-bit number, there are 601M numbers differing by 16
- * bits, and 89% of the numbers differ by at least 12 bits. Note that more
- * than 16 differing bits also implies a correlation with inverted bits. Thus
- * we take 1024 random numbers and compare each of them to the other ones,
- * counting the deviation of correlated bits to 16. Constants report 32,
- * counters 32-log2(TEST_SIZE), and pure randoms, around 6 or lower. With the
- * u32 total, TEST_SIZE may be as large as 4096 samples.
- */
-#define TEST_SIZE 1024
-static int __init prandom32_state_selftest(void)
-{
- unsigned int x, y, bits, samples;
- u32 xor, flip;
- u32 total;
- u32 *data;
-
- data = kmalloc(sizeof(*data) * TEST_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
- return 0;
-
- for (samples = 0; samples < TEST_SIZE; samples++)
- data[samples] = prandom_u32();
-
- flip = total = 0;
- for (x = 0; x < samples; x++) {
- for (y = 0; y < samples; y++) {
- if (x == y)
- continue;
- xor = data[x] ^ data[y];
- flip |= xor;
- bits = hweight32(xor);
- total += (bits - 16) * (bits - 16);
- }
- }
-
- /* We'll return the average deviation as 2*sqrt(corr/samples), which
- * is also sqrt(4*corr/samples) which provides a better resolution.
- */
- bits = int_sqrt(total / (samples * (samples - 1)) * 4);
- if (bits > 6)
- pr_warn("prandom32: self test failed (at least %u bits"
- " correlated, fixed_mask=%#x fixed_value=%#x\n",
- bits, ~flip, data[0] & ~flip);
- else
- pr_info("prandom32: self test passed (less than %u bits"
- " correlated)\n",
- bits+1);
- kfree(data);
- return 0;
-}
-core_initcall(prandom32_state_selftest);
-#endif /* CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST */
-
-/*
- * Start periodic full reseeding as soon as strong
- * random numbers are available.
- */
-static int __init prandom_init_late(void)
-{
- static struct notifier_block random_ready = {
- .notifier_call = prandom_timer_start
- };
- int ret = register_random_ready_notifier(&random_ready);
-
- if (ret == -EALREADY) {
- prandom_timer_start(&random_ready, 0, NULL);
- ret = 0;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-late_initcall(prandom_init_late);
diff --git a/lib/siphash.c b/lib/siphash.c
index 72b9068ab57b..71d315a6ad62 100644
--- a/lib/siphash.c
+++ b/lib/siphash.c
@@ -18,19 +18,13 @@
#include <asm/word-at-a-time.h>
#endif
-#define SIPROUND \
- do { \
- v0 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol64(v0, 32); \
- v2 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^= v2; \
- v0 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 21); v3 ^= v0; \
- v2 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32); \
- } while (0)
+#define SIPROUND SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
#define PREAMBLE(len) \
- u64 v0 = 0x736f6d6570736575ULL; \
- u64 v1 = 0x646f72616e646f6dULL; \
- u64 v2 = 0x6c7967656e657261ULL; \
- u64 v3 = 0x7465646279746573ULL; \
+ u64 v0 = SIPHASH_CONST_0; \
+ u64 v1 = SIPHASH_CONST_1; \
+ u64 v2 = SIPHASH_CONST_2; \
+ u64 v3 = SIPHASH_CONST_3; \
u64 b = ((u64)(len)) << 56; \
v3 ^= key->key[1]; \
v2 ^= key->key[0]; \
@@ -389,19 +383,13 @@ u32 hsiphash_4u32(const u32 first, const u32 second, const u32 third,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hsiphash_4u32);
#else
-#define HSIPROUND \
- do { \
- v0 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 5); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol32(v0, 16); \
- v2 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 8); v3 ^= v2; \
- v0 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 7); v3 ^= v0; \
- v2 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 13); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol32(v2, 16); \
- } while (0)
+#define HSIPROUND HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
#define HPREAMBLE(len) \
- u32 v0 = 0; \
- u32 v1 = 0; \
- u32 v2 = 0x6c796765U; \
- u32 v3 = 0x74656462U; \
+ u32 v0 = HSIPHASH_CONST_0; \
+ u32 v1 = HSIPHASH_CONST_1; \
+ u32 v2 = HSIPHASH_CONST_2; \
+ u32 v3 = HSIPHASH_CONST_3; \
u32 b = ((u32)(len)) << 24; \
v3 ^= key->key[1]; \
v2 ^= key->key[0]; \
diff --git a/lib/slub_kunit.c b/lib/slub_kunit.c
index 8662dc6cb509..7a0564d7cb7a 100644
--- a/lib/slub_kunit.c
+++ b/lib/slub_kunit.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ static int slab_errors;
static void test_clobber_zone(struct kunit *test)
{
struct kmem_cache *s = kmem_cache_create("TestSlub_RZ_alloc", 64, 0,
- SLAB_RED_ZONE, NULL);
+ SLAB_RED_ZONE|SLAB_NO_USER_FLAGS, NULL);
u8 *p = kmem_cache_alloc(s, GFP_KERNEL);
kasan_disable_current();
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static void test_clobber_zone(struct kunit *test)
static void test_next_pointer(struct kunit *test)
{
struct kmem_cache *s = kmem_cache_create("TestSlub_next_ptr_free", 64, 0,
- SLAB_POISON, NULL);
+ SLAB_POISON|SLAB_NO_USER_FLAGS, NULL);
u8 *p = kmem_cache_alloc(s, GFP_KERNEL);
unsigned long tmp;
unsigned long *ptr_addr;
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static void test_next_pointer(struct kunit *test)
static void test_first_word(struct kunit *test)
{
struct kmem_cache *s = kmem_cache_create("TestSlub_1th_word_free", 64, 0,
- SLAB_POISON, NULL);
+ SLAB_POISON|SLAB_NO_USER_FLAGS, NULL);
u8 *p = kmem_cache_alloc(s, GFP_KERNEL);
kmem_cache_free(s, p);
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ static void test_first_word(struct kunit *test)
static void test_clobber_50th_byte(struct kunit *test)
{
struct kmem_cache *s = kmem_cache_create("TestSlub_50th_word_free", 64, 0,
- SLAB_POISON, NULL);
+ SLAB_POISON|SLAB_NO_USER_FLAGS, NULL);
u8 *p = kmem_cache_alloc(s, GFP_KERNEL);
kmem_cache_free(s, p);
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static void test_clobber_50th_byte(struct kunit *test)
static void test_clobber_redzone_free(struct kunit *test)
{
struct kmem_cache *s = kmem_cache_create("TestSlub_RZ_free", 64, 0,
- SLAB_RED_ZONE, NULL);
+ SLAB_RED_ZONE|SLAB_NO_USER_FLAGS, NULL);
u8 *p = kmem_cache_alloc(s, GFP_KERNEL);
kasan_disable_current();
diff --git a/lib/stackdepot.c b/lib/stackdepot.c
index bf5ba9af0500..5ca0d086ef4a 100644
--- a/lib/stackdepot.c
+++ b/lib/stackdepot.c
@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ struct stack_record {
unsigned long entries[]; /* Variable-sized array of entries. */
};
+static bool __stack_depot_want_early_init __initdata = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STACKDEPOT_ALWAYS_INIT);
+static bool __stack_depot_early_init_passed __initdata;
+
static void *stack_slabs[STACK_ALLOC_MAX_SLABS];
static int depot_index;
@@ -162,38 +165,58 @@ static int __init is_stack_depot_disabled(char *str)
}
early_param("stack_depot_disable", is_stack_depot_disabled);
-/*
- * __ref because of memblock_alloc(), which will not be actually called after
- * the __init code is gone, because at that point slab_is_available() is true
- */
-__ref int stack_depot_init(void)
+void __init stack_depot_want_early_init(void)
+{
+ /* Too late to request early init now */
+ WARN_ON(__stack_depot_early_init_passed);
+
+ __stack_depot_want_early_init = true;
+}
+
+int __init stack_depot_early_init(void)
+{
+ size_t size;
+
+ /* This is supposed to be called only once, from mm_init() */
+ if (WARN_ON(__stack_depot_early_init_passed))
+ return 0;
+
+ __stack_depot_early_init_passed = true;
+
+ if (!__stack_depot_want_early_init || stack_depot_disable)
+ return 0;
+
+ size = (STACK_HASH_SIZE * sizeof(struct stack_record *));
+ pr_info("Stack Depot early init allocating hash table with memblock_alloc, %zu bytes\n",
+ size);
+ stack_table = memblock_alloc(size, SMP_CACHE_BYTES);
+
+ if (!stack_table) {
+ pr_err("Stack Depot hash table allocation failed, disabling\n");
+ stack_depot_disable = true;
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int stack_depot_init(void)
{
static DEFINE_MUTEX(stack_depot_init_mutex);
+ int ret = 0;
mutex_lock(&stack_depot_init_mutex);
if (!stack_depot_disable && !stack_table) {
- size_t size = (STACK_HASH_SIZE * sizeof(struct stack_record *));
- int i;
-
- if (slab_is_available()) {
- pr_info("Stack Depot allocating hash table with kvmalloc\n");
- stack_table = kvmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
- } else {
- pr_info("Stack Depot allocating hash table with memblock_alloc\n");
- stack_table = memblock_alloc(size, SMP_CACHE_BYTES);
- }
- if (stack_table) {
- for (i = 0; i < STACK_HASH_SIZE; i++)
- stack_table[i] = NULL;
- } else {
+ pr_info("Stack Depot allocating hash table with kvcalloc\n");
+ stack_table = kvcalloc(STACK_HASH_SIZE, sizeof(struct stack_record *), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!stack_table) {
pr_err("Stack Depot hash table allocation failed, disabling\n");
stack_depot_disable = true;
- mutex_unlock(&stack_depot_init_mutex);
- return -ENOMEM;
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&stack_depot_init_mutex);
- return 0;
+ return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(stack_depot_init);
diff --git a/lib/strncpy_from_user.c b/lib/strncpy_from_user.c
index 08fc72d3ed16..6432b8c3e431 100644
--- a/lib/strncpy_from_user.c
+++ b/lib/strncpy_from_user.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
* hit it), 'max' is the address space maximum (and we return
* -EFAULT if we hit it).
*/
-static inline long do_strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src,
+static __always_inline long do_strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src,
unsigned long count, unsigned long max)
{
const struct word_at_a_time constants = WORD_AT_A_TIME_CONSTANTS;
diff --git a/lib/strnlen_user.c b/lib/strnlen_user.c
index bffa0ebf9f8b..feeb935a2299 100644
--- a/lib/strnlen_user.c
+++ b/lib/strnlen_user.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
* if it fits in a aligned 'long'. The caller needs to check
* the return value against "> max".
*/
-static inline long do_strnlen_user(const char __user *src, unsigned long count, unsigned long max)
+static __always_inline long do_strnlen_user(const char __user *src, unsigned long count, unsigned long max)
{
const struct word_at_a_time constants = WORD_AT_A_TIME_CONSTANTS;
unsigned long align, res = 0;
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index 40d26a07a133..fb77f7bfd126 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -750,61 +750,38 @@ static int __init debug_boot_weak_hash_enable(char *str)
}
early_param("debug_boot_weak_hash", debug_boot_weak_hash_enable);
-static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(not_filled_random_ptr_key);
-static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly;
+static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(filled_random_ptr_key);
static void enable_ptr_key_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
{
- get_random_bytes(&ptr_key, sizeof(ptr_key));
- /* Needs to run from preemptible context */
- static_branch_disable(&not_filled_random_ptr_key);
+ static_branch_enable(&filled_random_ptr_key);
}
-static DECLARE_WORK(enable_ptr_key_work, enable_ptr_key_workfn);
-
-static int fill_random_ptr_key(struct notifier_block *nb,
- unsigned long action, void *data)
-{
- /* This may be in an interrupt handler. */
- queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &enable_ptr_key_work);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static struct notifier_block random_ready = {
- .notifier_call = fill_random_ptr_key
-};
-
-static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
-{
- int key_size = sizeof(ptr_key);
- int ret;
-
- /* Use hw RNG if available. */
- if (get_random_bytes_arch(&ptr_key, key_size) == key_size) {
- static_branch_disable(&not_filled_random_ptr_key);
- return 0;
- }
-
- ret = register_random_ready_notifier(&random_ready);
- if (!ret) {
- return 0;
- } else if (ret == -EALREADY) {
- /* This is in preemptible context */
- enable_ptr_key_workfn(&enable_ptr_key_work);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-early_initcall(initialize_ptr_random);
-
/* Maps a pointer to a 32 bit unique identifier. */
static inline int __ptr_to_hashval(const void *ptr, unsigned long *hashval_out)
{
+ static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly;
unsigned long hashval;
- if (static_branch_unlikely(&not_filled_random_ptr_key))
- return -EAGAIN;
+ if (!static_branch_likely(&filled_random_ptr_key)) {
+ static bool filled = false;
+ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(filling);
+ static DECLARE_WORK(enable_ptr_key_work, enable_ptr_key_workfn);
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ if (!system_unbound_wq ||
+ (!rng_is_initialized() && !rng_has_arch_random()) ||
+ !spin_trylock_irqsave(&filling, flags))
+ return -EAGAIN;
+
+ if (!filled) {
+ get_random_bytes(&ptr_key, sizeof(ptr_key));
+ queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &enable_ptr_key_work);
+ filled = true;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&filling, flags);
+ }
+
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
hashval = (unsigned long)siphash_1u64((u64)ptr, &ptr_key);
diff --git a/lib/xarray.c b/lib/xarray.c
index 4acc88ea7c21..54e646e8e6ee 100644
--- a/lib/xarray.c
+++ b/lib/xarray.c
@@ -207,6 +207,8 @@ static void *xas_descend(struct xa_state *xas, struct xa_node *node)
if (xa_is_sibling(entry)) {
offset = xa_to_sibling(entry);
entry = xa_entry(xas->xa, node, offset);
+ if (node->shift && xa_is_node(entry))
+ entry = XA_RETRY_ENTRY;
}
xas->xa_offset = offset;
Copyright © 1996 – 2023 Jason A. Donenfeld. All Rights Reverse Engineered.