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-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/smp.c415
1 files changed, 311 insertions, 104 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index c09a821f381d..1ab3dc9c8f99 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
#define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
-#define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev) (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &(dev)->dev_flags) ? \
+#define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev) (hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) ? \
0x1f : 0x07)
#define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07
@@ -70,7 +70,19 @@ enum {
SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY,
SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER,
SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING,
- SMP_FLAG_OOB,
+ SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB,
+ SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB,
+};
+
+struct smp_dev {
+ /* Secure Connections OOB data */
+ u8 local_pk[64];
+ u8 local_sk[32];
+ u8 local_rand[16];
+ bool debug_key;
+
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
+ struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac;
};
struct smp_chan {
@@ -84,7 +96,8 @@ struct smp_chan {
u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */
u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
- u8 rr[16];
+ u8 rr[16]; /* Remote OOB ra/rb value */
+ u8 lr[16]; /* Local OOB ra/rb value */
u8 enc_key_size;
u8 remote_key_dist;
bdaddr_t id_addr;
@@ -478,18 +491,18 @@ bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
const bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
{
struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
- struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
+ struct smp_dev *smp;
u8 hash[3];
int err;
if (!chan || !chan->data)
return false;
- tfm = chan->data;
+ smp = chan->data;
BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
- err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
+ err = smp_ah(smp->tfm_aes, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
if (err)
return false;
@@ -499,20 +512,20 @@ bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
{
struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
- struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
+ struct smp_dev *smp;
int err;
if (!chan || !chan->data)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- tfm = chan->data;
+ smp = chan->data;
get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */
rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */
- err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
+ err = smp_ah(smp->tfm_aes, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
if (err < 0)
return err;
@@ -521,6 +534,53 @@ int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
return 0;
}
+int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+ struct smp_dev *smp;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!chan || !chan->data)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ smp = chan->data;
+
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
+ BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
+ memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
+ memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
+ smp->debug_key = true;
+ } else {
+ while (true) {
+ /* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
+ if (!ecc_make_key(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk))
+ return -EIO;
+
+ /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
+ * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
+ */
+ if (memcmp(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
+ break;
+ }
+ smp->debug_key = false;
+ }
+
+ SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
+ SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
+ SMP_DBG("OOB Private Key: %32phN", smp->local_sk);
+
+ get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16);
+
+ err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->local_pk,
+ smp->local_rand, 0, hash);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
+ memcpy(rand, smp->local_rand, 16);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
{
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
@@ -589,7 +649,7 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
- if (test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
@@ -597,18 +657,18 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
}
- if (test_bit(HCI_RPA_RESOLVING, &hdev->dev_flags))
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
- if (test_bit(HCI_PRIVACY, &hdev->dev_flags))
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
- if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) &&
(authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) {
struct oob_data *oob_data;
u8 bdaddr_type;
- if (test_bit(HCI_SSP_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) {
local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
}
@@ -621,10 +681,12 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst,
bdaddr_type);
if (oob_data && oob_data->present) {
- set_bit(SMP_FLAG_OOB, &smp->flags);
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags);
oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT;
memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16);
memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16);
+ SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Confirmation: %16phN", smp->pcnf);
+ SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Random: %16phN", smp->rr);
}
} else {
@@ -681,9 +743,9 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
- kfree(smp->csrk);
- kfree(smp->slave_csrk);
- kfree(smp->link_key);
+ kzfree(smp->csrk);
+ kzfree(smp->slave_csrk);
+ kzfree(smp->link_key);
crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
crypto_free_hash(smp->tfm_cmac);
@@ -692,7 +754,7 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
* support hasn't been explicitly enabled.
*/
if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG &&
- !test_bit(HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
+ !hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
smp->ltk = NULL;
@@ -717,7 +779,7 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
}
chan->data = NULL;
- kfree(smp);
+ kzfree(smp);
hci_conn_drop(hcon);
}
@@ -818,6 +880,12 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
return 0;
}
+ /* If this function is used for SC -> legacy fallback we
+ * can only recover the just-works case.
+ */
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
/* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) {
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags);
@@ -1052,7 +1120,7 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
/* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant
* flag is not set.
*/
- if (!test_bit(HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
+ if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS) &&
key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) {
list_del_rcu(&key->list);
kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
@@ -1097,13 +1165,13 @@ static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
return;
if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
- kfree(smp->link_key);
+ kzfree(smp->link_key);
smp->link_key = NULL;
return;
}
if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
- kfree(smp->link_key);
+ kzfree(smp->link_key);
smp->link_key = NULL;
return;
}
@@ -1252,7 +1320,10 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
if (csrk) {
- csrk->master = 0x00;
+ if (hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
+ csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_AUTHENTICATED;
+ else
+ csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED;
memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
}
smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
@@ -1297,7 +1368,7 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
smp->tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_aes)) {
BT_ERR("Unable to create ECB crypto context");
- kfree(smp);
+ kzfree(smp);
return NULL;
}
@@ -1305,7 +1376,7 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) {
BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
- kfree(smp);
+ kzfree(smp);
return NULL;
}
@@ -1601,15 +1672,15 @@ static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp,
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
- if (test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
}
- if (test_bit(HCI_RPA_RESOLVING, &hdev->dev_flags))
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
- if (test_bit(HCI_PRIVACY, &hdev->dev_flags))
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
if (!rsp) {
@@ -1661,22 +1732,29 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
- if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
+ if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
- if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ONLY, &hdev->dev_flags) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
+ /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
+ * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
+ * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
+ */
+ if (req->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT)
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
+
/* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */
if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
/* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */
if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags) &&
- !test_bit(HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP, &hdev->dbg_flags))
+ !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED;
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
@@ -1734,14 +1812,19 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
+ /* Strictly speaking we shouldn't allow Pairing Confirm for the
+ * SC case, however some implementations incorrectly copy RFU auth
+ * req bits from our security request, which may create a false
+ * positive SC enablement.
+ */
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
/* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */
return 0;
- } else {
- SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
}
/* Request setup of TK */
@@ -1758,7 +1841,26 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
BT_DBG("");
- if (test_bit(HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+ struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
+
+ if (!chan || !chan->data)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ smp_dev = chan->data;
+
+ memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64);
+ memcpy(smp->local_sk, smp_dev->local_sk, 32);
+ memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16);
+
+ if (smp_dev->debug_key)
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
+
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
@@ -1777,8 +1879,9 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
}
}
+done:
SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
- SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", &smp->local_pk[32]);
+ SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
SMP_DBG("Local Private Key: %32phN", smp->local_sk);
smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
@@ -1813,9 +1916,16 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
- if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ONLY, &hdev->dev_flags) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+ /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
+ * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
+ * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
+ */
+ if (rsp->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT)
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
+
smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
@@ -1882,10 +1992,6 @@ static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
BT_DBG("");
- /* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */
- if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
- return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
-
if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
@@ -1898,6 +2004,47 @@ static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
return 0;
}
+/* Work-around for some implementations that incorrectly copy RFU bits
+ * from our security request and thereby create the impression that
+ * we're doing SC when in fact the remote doesn't support it.
+ */
+static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
+ u8 auth;
+
+ /* The issue is only observed when we're in slave role */
+ if (hcon->out)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) {
+ BT_ERR("Refusing SMP SC -> legacy fallback in SC-only mode");
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+ }
+
+ BT_ERR("Trying to fall back to legacy SMP");
+
+ req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+ rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+
+ /* Rebuild key dist flags which may have been cleared for SC */
+ smp->remote_key_dist = (req->init_key_dist & rsp->resp_key_dist);
+
+ auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
+
+ if (tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability)) {
+ BT_ERR("Failed to fall back to legacy SMP");
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+ }
+
+ clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
@@ -1911,8 +2058,19 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
- if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
- return sc_check_confirm(smp);
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
+ return sc_check_confirm(smp);
+
+ BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm");
+
+ ret = fixup_sc_false_positive(smp);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
if (conn->hcon->out) {
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
@@ -1923,8 +2081,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
return smp_confirm(smp);
- else
- set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
+
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
return 0;
}
@@ -2083,7 +2241,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
- if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ONLY, &hdev->dev_flags) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
@@ -2104,7 +2262,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (!smp)
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
- if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags) &&
+ if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
@@ -2138,7 +2296,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
chan = conn->smp;
- if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags))
+ if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
return 1;
if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
@@ -2167,7 +2325,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
- if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags))
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC;
/* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
@@ -2352,7 +2510,10 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
if (csrk) {
- csrk->master = 0x01;
+ if (conn->hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
+ csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_AUTHENTICATED;
+ else
+ csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_UNAUTHENTICATED;
memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
}
smp->csrk = csrk;
@@ -2368,7 +2529,8 @@ static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote;
u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method;
- if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_OOB, &smp->flags))
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags) ||
+ test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags))
return REQ_OOB;
/* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs
@@ -2422,6 +2584,16 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64);
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
+ err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk,
+ smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val);
+ if (err)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ if (memcmp(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
+ return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+ }
+
/* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving
* the key from the initiating device.
*/
@@ -2432,7 +2604,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
- SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", &smp->remote_pk[32]);
+ SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32);
if (!ecdh_shared_secret(smp->remote_pk, smp->local_sk, smp->dhkey))
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
@@ -2470,14 +2642,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
- err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk,
- smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val);
- if (err)
- return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
-
- if (memcmp(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
- return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
-
if (hcon->out)
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
@@ -2550,6 +2714,8 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
+ else if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
+ memcpy(r, smp->lr, 16);
err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r,
io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e);
@@ -2600,7 +2766,7 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (skb->len < 1)
return -EILSEQ;
- if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
+ if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) {
reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
goto done;
}
@@ -2738,16 +2904,16 @@ static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
return;
/* Secure Connections support must be enabled */
- if (!test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags))
+ if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
return;
/* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */
if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) &&
- !test_bit(HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP, &hdev->dbg_flags))
+ !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
return;
/* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */
- if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags))
+ if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
return;
/* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */
@@ -2851,7 +3017,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
- bt_cb(skb)->chan = chan;
+ bt_cb(skb)->l2cap.chan = chan;
return skb;
}
@@ -2924,51 +3090,63 @@ static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
{
struct l2cap_chan *chan;
- struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
+ struct smp_dev *smp;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
+ struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac;
if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) {
- tfm_aes = NULL;
+ smp = NULL;
goto create_chan;
}
- tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, 0);
+ smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!smp)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
- BT_ERR("Unable to create crypto context");
+ BT_ERR("Unable to create ECB crypto context");
+ kzfree(smp);
return ERR_CAST(tfm_aes);
}
+ tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_hash("cmac(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
+ BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
+ kzfree(smp);
+ return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac);
+ }
+
+ smp->tfm_aes = tfm_aes;
+ smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac;
+
create_chan:
chan = l2cap_chan_create();
if (!chan) {
- crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
+ if (smp) {
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
+ crypto_free_hash(smp->tfm_cmac);
+ kzfree(smp);
+ }
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
- chan->data = tfm_aes;
+ chan->data = smp;
l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid);
l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP) {
- /* If usage of static address is forced or if the devices
- * does not have a public address, then listen on the static
- * address.
- *
- * In case BR/EDR has been disabled on a dual-mode controller
- * and a static address has been configued, then listen on
- * the static address instead.
- */
- if (test_bit(HCI_FORCE_STATIC_ADDR, &hdev->dbg_flags) ||
- !bacmp(&hdev->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY) ||
- (!test_bit(HCI_BREDR_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
- bacmp(&hdev->static_addr, BDADDR_ANY))) {
- bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->static_addr);
- chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
- } else {
- bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
+ u8 bdaddr_type;
+
+ hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &chan->src, &bdaddr_type);
+
+ if (bdaddr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
- }
+ else
+ chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
} else {
bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
@@ -2987,14 +3165,18 @@ create_chan:
static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
{
- struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
+ struct smp_dev *smp;
BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
- tfm_aes = chan->data;
- if (tfm_aes) {
+ smp = chan->data;
+ if (smp) {
chan->data = NULL;
- crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
+ if (smp->tfm_aes)
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
+ if (smp->tfm_cmac)
+ crypto_free_hash(smp->tfm_cmac);
+ kzfree(smp);
}
l2cap_chan_put(chan);
@@ -3007,7 +3189,7 @@ static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_read(struct file *file,
struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
char buf[3];
- buf[0] = test_bit(HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP, &hdev->dbg_flags) ? 'Y': 'N';
+ buf[0] = hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP) ? 'Y': 'N';
buf[1] = '\n';
buf[2] = '\0';
return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, 2);
@@ -3029,7 +3211,7 @@ static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_write(struct file *file,
if (strtobool(buf, &enable))
return -EINVAL;
- if (enable == test_bit(HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP, &hdev->dbg_flags))
+ if (enable == hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
return -EALREADY;
if (enable) {
@@ -3048,7 +3230,7 @@ static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_write(struct file *file,
smp_del_chan(chan);
}
- change_bit(HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP, &hdev->dbg_flags);
+ hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP);
return count;
}
@@ -3367,6 +3549,21 @@ static int __init test_h6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac)
return 0;
}
+static char test_smp_buffer[32];
+
+static ssize_t test_smp_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, test_smp_buffer,
+ strlen(test_smp_buffer));
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations test_smp_fops = {
+ .open = simple_open,
+ .read = test_smp_read,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes,
struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac)
{
@@ -3379,49 +3576,49 @@ static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes,
err = test_ah(tfm_aes);
if (err) {
BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed");
- return err;
+ goto done;
}
err = test_c1(tfm_aes);
if (err) {
BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed");
- return err;
+ goto done;
}
err = test_s1(tfm_aes);
if (err) {
BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed");
- return err;
+ goto done;
}
err = test_f4(tfm_cmac);
if (err) {
BT_ERR("smp_f4 test failed");
- return err;
+ goto done;
}
err = test_f5(tfm_cmac);
if (err) {
BT_ERR("smp_f5 test failed");
- return err;
+ goto done;
}
err = test_f6(tfm_cmac);
if (err) {
BT_ERR("smp_f6 test failed");
- return err;
+ goto done;
}
err = test_g2(tfm_cmac);
if (err) {
BT_ERR("smp_g2 test failed");
- return err;
+ goto done;
}
err = test_h6(tfm_cmac);
if (err) {
BT_ERR("smp_h6 test failed");
- return err;
+ goto done;
}
rettime = ktime_get();
@@ -3430,7 +3627,17 @@ static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes,
BT_INFO("SMP test passed in %llu usecs", duration);
- return 0;
+done:
+ if (!err)
+ snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer),
+ "PASS (%llu usecs)\n", duration);
+ else
+ snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), "FAIL\n");
+
+ debugfs_create_file("selftest_smp", 0444, bt_debugfs, NULL,
+ &test_smp_fops);
+
+ return err;
}
int __init bt_selftest_smp(void)