diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 82 |
1 files changed, 44 insertions, 38 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 33fd061305c4..f5d304736852 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ * * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations. * - * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> + * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com> * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com> * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> @@ -815,7 +815,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || - !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore")) + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") || + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") || + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS; if (!sbsec->behavior) { @@ -1303,6 +1305,7 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc case SOCK_SEQPACKET: return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET; case SOCK_DGRAM: + case SOCK_RAW: return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET; } break; @@ -2317,6 +2320,7 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS); int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt); int rc; + u32 av; if (!nnp && !nosuid) return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */ @@ -2325,24 +2329,40 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, return 0; /* No change in credentials */ /* - * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid - * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are - * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions - * of the current SID. + * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability, + * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the + * policy allows the corresponding permission between + * the old and new contexts. */ - rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid); - if (rc) { - /* - * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid. - * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller. - * nosuid: Permission denied to file. - */ + if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition) { + av = 0; if (nnp) - return -EPERM; - else - return -EACCES; + av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION; + if (nosuid) + av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION; + rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, + SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL); + if (!rc) + return 0; } - return 0; + + /* + * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs, + * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset + * of the permissions of the current SID. + */ + rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid); + if (!rc) + return 0; + + /* + * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid. + * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller. + * nosuid: Permission denied to file. + */ + if (nnp) + return -EPERM; + return -EACCES; } static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) @@ -2356,7 +2376,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not * the script interpreter */ - if (bprm->cred_prepared) + if (bprm->called_set_creds) return 0; old_tsec = current_security(); @@ -2442,30 +2462,17 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */ bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; - } - - return 0; -} -static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) -{ - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); - u32 sid, osid; - int atsecure = 0; - - sid = tsec->sid; - osid = tsec->osid; - - if (osid != sid) { /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless the noatsecure permission is granted between the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */ - atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, - SECCLASS_PROCESS, - PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL); + rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, + SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE, + NULL); + bprm->secureexec |= !!rc; } - return !!atsecure; + return 0; } static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd) @@ -6266,7 +6273,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, selinux_bprm_secureexec), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security), @@ -6530,7 +6536,7 @@ security_initcall(selinux_init); #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) -static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = { +static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = { { .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, |