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-rw-r--r--security/Kconfig2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/secid.c1
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/digsig.c10
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c54
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c9
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c11
-rw-r--r--security/security.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c7
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.c178
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c12
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c17
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c3
20 files changed, 158 insertions, 167 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 27d8b2688f75..d9aa521b5206 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK
config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
default y
- depends on X86 && !UML
+ depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE) && !UML
help
This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by
ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index dca4b7dbf368..aa35939443c4 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -732,7 +732,7 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
return error;
}
-static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info,
+static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
int sig, const struct cred *cred)
{
struct aa_label *cl, *tl;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index f2f22d00db18..4ccec1bcf6f5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -79,7 +79,6 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
struct aa_label *label = aa_secid_to_label(secid);
int len;
- AA_BUG(!secdata);
AA_BUG(!seclen);
if (!label)
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 9bb0a7f2863e..5eacba858e4b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
static struct key *keyring[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX];
-static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
+static const char * const keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
#ifndef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
"_evm",
"_ima",
@@ -37,12 +37,6 @@ static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
"_module",
};
-#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
-static bool init_keyring __initdata = true;
-#else
-static bool init_keyring __initdata;
-#endif
-
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted
#else
@@ -85,7 +79,7 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
struct key_restriction *restriction;
int err = 0;
- if (!init_keyring)
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING))
return 0;
restriction = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_restriction), GFP_KERNEL);
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 8a3905bb02c7..8c25f949ebdb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
#define EVMKEY "evm-key"
#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
-static int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE;
+static const int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE;
struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
static struct crypto_shash *evm_tfm[HASH_ALGO__LAST];
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex);
static unsigned long evm_set_key_flags;
-static char * const evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
+static const char evm_hmac[] = "hmac(sha1)";
/**
* evm_set_key() - set EVM HMAC key from the kernel
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 67db9d9454ca..cc12f3449a72 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ struct ima_template_desc {
char *name;
char *fmt;
int num_fields;
- struct ima_template_field **fields;
+ const struct ima_template_field **fields;
};
struct ima_template_entry {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index a02c5acfd403..99dd1d53fc35 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -51,7 +51,8 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
(*entry)->template_desc = template_desc;
for (i = 0; i < template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
- struct ima_template_field *field = template_desc->fields[i];
+ const struct ima_template_field *field =
+ template_desc->fields[i];
u32 len;
result = field->field_init(event_data,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 7e7e7e7c250a..d9e7728027c6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file,
{
loff_t i_size, offset;
char *rbuf[2] = { NULL, };
- int rc, read = 0, rbuf_len, active = 0, ahash_rc = 0;
+ int rc, rbuf_len, active = 0, ahash_rc = 0;
struct ahash_request *req;
struct scatterlist sg[1];
struct crypto_wait wait;
@@ -257,11 +257,6 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file,
&rbuf_size[1], 0);
}
- if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
- file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
- read = 1;
- }
-
for (offset = 0; offset < i_size; offset += rbuf_len) {
if (!rbuf[1] && offset) {
/* Not using two buffers, and it is not the first
@@ -300,8 +295,6 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file,
/* wait for the last update request to complete */
rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &wait);
out3:
- if (read)
- file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
ima_free_pages(rbuf[0], rbuf_size[0]);
ima_free_pages(rbuf[1], rbuf_size[1]);
out2:
@@ -336,7 +329,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
{
loff_t i_size, offset = 0;
char *rbuf;
- int rc, read = 0;
+ int rc;
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, tfm);
shash->tfm = tfm;
@@ -357,11 +350,6 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
if (!rbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
- file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
- read = 1;
- }
-
while (offset < i_size) {
int rbuf_len;
@@ -378,8 +366,6 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
if (rc)
break;
}
- if (read)
- file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
kfree(rbuf);
out:
if (!rc)
@@ -420,6 +406,8 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
{
loff_t i_size;
int rc;
+ struct file *f = file;
+ bool new_file_instance = false, modified_flags = false;
/*
* For consistency, fail file's opened with the O_DIRECT flag on
@@ -431,15 +419,41 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
return -EINVAL;
}
- i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+ /* Open a new file instance in O_RDONLY if we cannot read */
+ if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
+ int flags = file->f_flags & ~(O_WRONLY | O_APPEND |
+ O_TRUNC | O_CREAT | O_NOCTTY | O_EXCL);
+ flags |= O_RDONLY;
+ f = dentry_open(&file->f_path, flags, file->f_cred);
+ if (IS_ERR(f)) {
+ /*
+ * Cannot open the file again, lets modify f_flags
+ * of original and continue
+ */
+ pr_info_ratelimited("Unable to reopen file for reading.\n");
+ f = file;
+ f->f_flags |= FMODE_READ;
+ modified_flags = true;
+ } else {
+ new_file_instance = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(f));
if (ima_ahash_minsize && i_size >= ima_ahash_minsize) {
- rc = ima_calc_file_ahash(file, hash);
+ rc = ima_calc_file_ahash(f, hash);
if (!rc)
- return 0;
+ goto out;
}
- return ima_calc_file_shash(file, hash);
+ rc = ima_calc_file_shash(f, hash);
+out:
+ if (new_file_instance)
+ fput(f);
+ else if (modified_flags)
+ f->f_flags &= ~FMODE_READ;
+ return rc;
}
/*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index ae9d5c766a3c..3183cc23d0f8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -42,14 +42,14 @@ static int __init default_canonical_fmt_setup(char *str)
__setup("ima_canonical_fmt", default_canonical_fmt_setup);
static int valid_policy = 1;
-#define TMPBUFLEN 12
+
static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(char __user *buf, size_t count,
loff_t *ppos, atomic_long_t *val)
{
- char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ char tmpbuf[32]; /* greater than largest 'long' string value */
ssize_t len;
- len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%li\n", atomic_long_read(val));
+ len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf), "%li\n", atomic_long_read(val));
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, len);
}
@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
/* 6th: template specific data */
for (i = 0; i < e->template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
enum ima_show_type show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY;
- struct ima_template_field *field = e->template_desc->fields[i];
+ const struct ima_template_field *field =
+ e->template_desc->fields[i];
if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "d") == 0)
show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index faac9ecaa0ae..59d834219cd6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
#include "ima.h"
/* name for boot aggregate entry */
-static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate";
+static const char boot_aggregate_name[] = "boot_aggregate";
struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip;
/* Add the boot aggregate to the IMA measurement list and extend
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 2d31921fbda4..1b88d58e1325 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
return 0;
}
-static int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
+static const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
[READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
[READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
[READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 30db39b23804..b631b8bc7624 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static struct ima_template_desc builtin_templates[] = {
static LIST_HEAD(defined_templates);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(template_list);
-static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
+static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
{.field_id = "d", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
.field_show = ima_show_template_digest},
{.field_id = "n", .field_init = ima_eventname_init,
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;
static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name);
static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
- struct ima_template_field ***fields,
+ const struct ima_template_field ***fields,
int *num_fields);
static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
@@ -125,7 +125,8 @@ static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name)
return found ? template_desc : NULL;
}
-static struct ima_template_field *lookup_template_field(const char *field_id)
+static const struct ima_template_field *
+lookup_template_field(const char *field_id)
{
int i;
@@ -153,11 +154,11 @@ static int template_fmt_size(const char *template_fmt)
}
static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
- struct ima_template_field ***fields,
+ const struct ima_template_field ***fields,
int *num_fields)
{
const char *template_fmt_ptr;
- struct ima_template_field *found_fields[IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX];
+ const struct ima_template_field *found_fields[IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX];
int template_num_fields;
int i, len;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 2055af907eba..04d173eb93f6 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1158,7 +1158,7 @@ int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p);
}
-int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
int sig, const struct cred *cred)
{
return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9651bccae270..7ce683259357 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1508,6 +1508,11 @@ static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
}
rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
path, tclass, sid);
+ if (rc == -ENOENT) {
+ /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
+ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ rc = 0;
+ }
}
free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
return rc;
@@ -4186,7 +4191,7 @@ static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
}
-static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
int sig, const struct cred *cred)
{
u32 secid;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 39475fb455bc..2fe459df3c85 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -218,9 +218,7 @@ int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
/*
* Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
* `context' based on the string representation in
- * the string `*scontext'. Update `*scontext' to
- * point to the end of the string representation of
- * the MLS fields.
+ * the string `scontext'.
*
* This function modifies the string in place, inserting
* NULL characters to terminate the MLS fields.
@@ -235,22 +233,21 @@ int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
*/
int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
char oldc,
- char **scontext,
+ char *scontext,
struct context *context,
struct sidtab *s,
u32 def_sid)
{
-
- char delim;
- char *scontextp, *p, *rngptr;
+ char *sensitivity, *cur_cat, *next_cat, *rngptr;
struct level_datum *levdatum;
struct cat_datum *catdatum, *rngdatum;
- int l, rc = -EINVAL;
+ int l, rc, i;
+ char *rangep[2];
if (!pol->mls_enabled) {
- if (def_sid != SECSID_NULL && oldc)
- *scontext += strlen(*scontext) + 1;
- return 0;
+ if ((def_sid != SECSID_NULL && oldc) || (*scontext) == '\0')
+ return 0;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
/*
@@ -261,113 +258,94 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
struct context *defcon;
if (def_sid == SECSID_NULL)
- goto out;
+ return -EINVAL;
defcon = sidtab_search(s, def_sid);
if (!defcon)
- goto out;
+ return -EINVAL;
- rc = mls_context_cpy(context, defcon);
- goto out;
+ return mls_context_cpy(context, defcon);
}
- /* Extract low sensitivity. */
- scontextp = p = *scontext;
- while (*p && *p != ':' && *p != '-')
- p++;
-
- delim = *p;
- if (delim != '\0')
- *p++ = '\0';
+ /*
+ * If we're dealing with a range, figure out where the two parts
+ * of the range begin.
+ */
+ rangep[0] = scontext;
+ rangep[1] = strchr(scontext, '-');
+ if (rangep[1]) {
+ rangep[1][0] = '\0';
+ rangep[1]++;
+ }
+ /* For each part of the range: */
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
- levdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_levels.table, scontextp);
- if (!levdatum) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ /* Split sensitivity and category set. */
+ sensitivity = rangep[l];
+ if (sensitivity == NULL)
+ break;
+ next_cat = strchr(sensitivity, ':');
+ if (next_cat)
+ *(next_cat++) = '\0';
+ /* Parse sensitivity. */
+ levdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_levels.table, sensitivity);
+ if (!levdatum)
+ return -EINVAL;
context->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
- if (delim == ':') {
- /* Extract category set. */
- while (1) {
- scontextp = p;
- while (*p && *p != ',' && *p != '-')
- p++;
- delim = *p;
- if (delim != '\0')
- *p++ = '\0';
-
- /* Separate into range if exists */
- rngptr = strchr(scontextp, '.');
- if (rngptr != NULL) {
- /* Remove '.' */
- *rngptr++ = '\0';
- }
+ /* Extract category set. */
+ while (next_cat != NULL) {
+ cur_cat = next_cat;
+ next_cat = strchr(next_cat, ',');
+ if (next_cat != NULL)
+ *(next_cat++) = '\0';
+
+ /* Separate into range if exists */
+ rngptr = strchr(cur_cat, '.');
+ if (rngptr != NULL) {
+ /* Remove '.' */
+ *rngptr++ = '\0';
+ }
- catdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_cats.table,
- scontextp);
- if (!catdatum) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ catdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_cats.table, cur_cat);
+ if (!catdatum)
+ return -EINVAL;
- rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat,
- catdatum->value - 1, 1);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
-
- /* If range, set all categories in range */
- if (rngptr) {
- int i;
-
- rngdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_cats.table, rngptr);
- if (!rngdatum) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (catdatum->value >= rngdatum->value) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
- for (i = catdatum->value; i < rngdatum->value; i++) {
- rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, i, 1);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- }
- }
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat,
+ catdatum->value - 1, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* If range, set all categories in range */
+ if (rngptr == NULL)
+ continue;
+
+ rngdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_cats.table, rngptr);
+ if (!rngdatum)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (catdatum->value >= rngdatum->value)
+ return -EINVAL;
- if (delim != ',')
- break;
+ for (i = catdatum->value; i < rngdatum->value; i++) {
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, i, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
}
}
- if (delim == '-') {
- /* Extract high sensitivity. */
- scontextp = p;
- while (*p && *p != ':')
- p++;
-
- delim = *p;
- if (delim != '\0')
- *p++ = '\0';
- } else
- break;
}
- if (l == 0) {
+ /* If we didn't see a '-', the range start is also the range end. */
+ if (rangep[1] == NULL) {
context->range.level[1].sens = context->range.level[0].sens;
rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[1].cat,
&context->range.level[0].cat);
if (rc)
- goto out;
+ return rc;
}
- *scontext = ++p;
- rc = 0;
-out:
- return rc;
+
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -379,21 +357,19 @@ out:
int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
- char *tmpstr, *freestr;
+ char *tmpstr;
int rc;
if (!p->mls_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
- /* we need freestr because mls_context_to_sid will change
- the value of tmpstr */
- tmpstr = freestr = kstrdup(str, gfp_mask);
+ tmpstr = kstrdup(str, gfp_mask);
if (!tmpstr) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
} else {
- rc = mls_context_to_sid(p, ':', &tmpstr, context,
+ rc = mls_context_to_sid(p, ':', tmpstr, context,
NULL, SECSID_NULL);
- kfree(freestr);
+ kfree(tmpstr);
}
return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
index 9a3ff7af70ad..67093647576d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l);
int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *p,
char oldc,
- char **scontext,
+ char *scontext,
struct context *context,
struct sidtab *s,
u32 def_sid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index e9394e7adc84..f4eadd3f7350 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -1101,7 +1101,7 @@ static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1))
return -EINVAL;
- str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
+ str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!str)
return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index f3def298a90e..12e414394530 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1365,7 +1365,6 @@ int security_sid_to_context_force(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid,
static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
struct sidtab *sidtabp,
char *scontext,
- u32 scontext_len,
struct context *ctx,
u32 def_sid)
{
@@ -1426,15 +1425,12 @@ static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
ctx->type = typdatum->value;
- rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, &p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
+ rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
if (rc)
goto out;
- rc = -EINVAL;
- if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len)
- goto out;
-
/* Check the validity of the new context. */
+ rc = -EINVAL;
if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
goto out;
rc = 0;
@@ -1489,7 +1485,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(struct selinux_state *state,
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
rc = string_to_context_struct(policydb, sidtab, scontext2,
- scontext_len, &context, def_sid);
+ &context, def_sid);
if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
context.str = str;
context.len = strlen(str) + 1;
@@ -1958,7 +1954,7 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key,
goto out;
rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
- c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
+ &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
kfree(s);
if (!rc) {
pr_info("SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 2fb56bcf1316..81fb4c1631e9 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -421,6 +421,7 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
struct task_smack *tsp;
struct smack_known *tracer_known;
+ const struct cred *tracercred;
if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
@@ -429,7 +430,8 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
}
rcu_read_lock();
- tsp = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
+ tracercred = __task_cred(tracer);
+ tsp = tracercred->security;
tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
@@ -439,7 +441,7 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
rc = 0;
else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
rc = -EACCES;
- else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ else if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_SYS_PTRACE, tracercred))
rc = 0;
else
rc = -EACCES;
@@ -1841,6 +1843,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
+ const struct cred *tcred;
struct file *file;
int rc;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -1854,8 +1857,12 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
skp = file->f_security;
rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL);
rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
- if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tcred = __task_cred(tsk);
+ if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, tcred))
rc = 0;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
@@ -2251,7 +2258,7 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
* Return 0 if write access is permitted
*
*/
-static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
int sig, const struct cred *cred)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -3467,7 +3474,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
*/
final = &smack_known_star;
/*
- * No break.
+ * Fall through.
*
* If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
* but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index f6482e53d55a..06b517075ec0 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -2853,7 +2853,6 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_ptrace_ops = {
static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
int rc;
- struct inode *root_inode;
static const struct tree_descr smack_files[] = {
[SMK_LOAD] = {
@@ -2917,8 +2916,6 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
return rc;
}
- root_inode = d_inode(sb->s_root);
-
return 0;
}
Copyright © 1996 – 2023 Jason A. Donenfeld. All Rights Reverse Engineered.