diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/lsm.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 58 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 84 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 48 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/dh.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 17 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 19 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 78 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 |
14 files changed, 253 insertions, 88 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index c4302067a3ad..27d8b2688f75 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode" default y - depends on X86_64 && !UML + depends on X86 && !UML help This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped @@ -153,7 +153,6 @@ config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR config HARDENED_USERCOPY bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR - select BUG imply STRICT_DEVMEM help This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 74f17376202b..8b8b70620bbe 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR); } -static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file) { struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file); struct aa_label *label; @@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) return 0; } - label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); + label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(file->f_cred); if (!unconfined(label)) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode }; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 6a8f67714c83..004919d9bf09 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -156,6 +156,64 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE <http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net> If unsure, say N. +config IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY + bool "IMA build time configured policy rules" + depends on IMA_APPRAISE && INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + default n + help + This option defines an IMA appraisal policy at build time, which + is enforced at run time without having to specify a builtin + policy name on the boot command line. The build time appraisal + policy rules persist after loading a custom policy. + + Depending on the rules configured, this policy may require kernel + modules, firmware, the kexec kernel image, and/or the IMA policy + to be signed. Unsigned files might prevent the system from + booting or applications from working properly. + +config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_FIRMWARE_SIGS + bool "Appraise firmware signatures" + depends on IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY + default n + help + This option defines a policy requiring all firmware to be signed, + including the regulatory.db. If both this option and + CFG80211_REQUIRE_SIGNED_REGDB are enabled, then both signature + verification methods are necessary. + +config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_KEXEC_SIGS + bool "Appraise kexec kernel image signatures" + depends on IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY + default n + help + Enabling this rule will require all kexec'ed kernel images to + be signed and verified by a public key on the trusted IMA + keyring. + + Kernel image signatures can not be verified by the original + kexec_load syscall. Enabling this rule will prevent its + usage. + +config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_MODULE_SIGS + bool "Appraise kernel modules signatures" + depends on IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY + default n + help + Enabling this rule will require all kernel modules to be signed + and verified by a public key on the trusted IMA keyring. + + Kernel module signatures can only be verified by IMA-appraisal, + via the finit_module syscall. Enabling this rule will prevent + the usage of the init_module syscall. + +config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS + bool "Appraise IMA policy signature" + depends on IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY + default n + help + Enabling this rule will require the IMA policy to be signed and + and verified by a key on the trusted IMA keyring. + config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM bool "ima_appraise boot parameter" depends on IMA_APPRAISE diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 354bb5716ce3..a597b2795d2d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -232,13 +232,14 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); #define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES 0x08 #define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE 0x10 #define IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY 0x20 +#define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC 0x40 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len, int opened); + int xattr_len); int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file); enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, @@ -254,7 +255,7 @@ static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len, int opened) + int xattr_len) { return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 8bd7a0733e51..deec1804a00a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len, int opened) + int xattr_len) { static const char op[] = "appraise_data"; const char *cause = "unknown"; @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, cause = iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED ? "IMA-signature-required" : "missing-hash"; status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL; - if (opened & FILE_CREATED) + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED) iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE; if ((iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) && (!(iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) || diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index dca44cf7838e..2d31921fbda4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, - enum ima_hooks func, int opened) + enum ima_hooks func) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL; @@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) { inode_lock(inode); rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname, - xattr_value, xattr_len, opened); + xattr_value, xattr_len); inode_unlock(inode); } if (action & IMA_AUDIT) @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, - 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0); + 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); } return 0; @@ -364,13 +364,13 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0); + MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); if (ret) return ret; security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid); return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK, 0); + MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); } /** @@ -383,14 +383,14 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */ -int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened) +int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { u32 secid; security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | - MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK, opened); + MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); @@ -429,16 +429,14 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) */ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { - bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); - - if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) { - if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && - (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { - pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n"); - return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ - } - return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */ - } + /* + * READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER + * + * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the + * firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion + * of IMA's signature verification any more than when using two + * buffers? + */ return 0; } @@ -472,14 +470,13 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) { if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && - (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) + (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { + pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n"); return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ + } return 0; } - if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */ - return 0; - /* permit signed certs */ if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE) return 0; @@ -493,7 +490,50 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, - MAY_READ, func, 0); + MAY_READ, func); +} + +/** + * ima_load_data - appraise decision based on policy + * @id: kernel load data caller identifier + * + * Callers of this LSM hook can not measure, appraise, or audit the + * data provided by userspace. Enforce policy rules requring a file + * signature (eg. kexec'ed kernel image). + * + * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES. + */ +int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) +{ + bool sig_enforce; + + if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) != IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) + return 0; + + switch (id) { + case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE: + if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC) { + pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n"); + return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ + } + break; + case LOADING_FIRMWARE: + if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) { + pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n"); + return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ + } + break; + case LOADING_MODULE: + sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); + + if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES)) { + pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n"); + return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ + } + default: + break; + } + return 0; } static int __init init_ima(void) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index cdcc9a7b4e24..1659abb344f9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ int ima_policy_flag; static int temp_ima_appraise; +static int build_ima_appraise __ro_after_init; #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6 enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE, @@ -162,6 +163,25 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = { #endif }; +static struct ima_rule_entry build_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = { +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_MODULE_SIGS + {.action = APPRAISE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, + .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_FIRMWARE_SIGS + {.action = APPRAISE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, + .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_KEXEC_SIGS + {.action = APPRAISE, .func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, + .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS + {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, + .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, +#endif +}; + static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { {.action = APPRAISE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, @@ -435,7 +455,7 @@ void ima_update_policy_flag(void) ima_policy_flag |= entry->action; } - ima_appraise |= temp_ima_appraise; + ima_appraise |= (build_ima_appraise | temp_ima_appraise); if (!ima_appraise) ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE; } @@ -448,6 +468,8 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func) return IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE; else if (func == POLICY_CHECK) return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY; + else if (func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) + return IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC; return 0; } @@ -486,8 +508,8 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) } /* - * Insert the appraise rules requiring file signatures, prior to - * any other appraise rules. + * Insert the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules requiring file + * signatures, prior to any other appraise rules. */ for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++) { list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules); @@ -495,6 +517,26 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) ima_appraise_flag(secure_boot_rules[i].func); } + /* + * Insert the build time appraise rules requiring file signatures + * for both the initial and custom policies, prior to other appraise + * rules. + */ + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(build_appraise_rules); i++) { + struct ima_rule_entry *entry; + + if (!secure_boot_entries) + list_add_tail(&build_appraise_rules[i].list, + &ima_default_rules); + + entry = kmemdup(&build_appraise_rules[i], sizeof(*entry), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (entry) + list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules); + build_ima_appraise |= + ima_appraise_flag(build_appraise_rules[i].func); + } + for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) { list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules); diff --git a/security/keys/dh.c b/security/keys/dh.c index f7403821db7f..b203f7758f97 100644 --- a/security/keys/dh.c +++ b/security/keys/dh.c @@ -142,6 +142,8 @@ static void kdf_dealloc(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc) * The src pointer is defined as Z || other info where Z is the shared secret * from DH and other info is an arbitrary string (see SP800-56A section * 5.8.1.2). + * + * 'dlen' must be a multiple of the digest size. */ static int kdf_ctr(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen, u8 *dst, unsigned int dlen, unsigned int zlen) @@ -205,8 +207,8 @@ static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, { uint8_t *outbuf = NULL; int ret; - size_t outbuf_len = round_up(buflen, - crypto_shash_digestsize(sdesc->shash.tfm)); + size_t outbuf_len = roundup(buflen, + crypto_shash_digestsize(sdesc->shash.tfm)); outbuf = kmalloc(outbuf_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!outbuf) { diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c index 5fa191252c8f..0716af28808a 100644 --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c @@ -173,9 +173,15 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) return 0; } +static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) +{ + return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id); +} + static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data), }; void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void) diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 68f46d849abe..ab4f96347ebb 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -118,6 +118,8 @@ static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result) if (*result == NULL) { *result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL); + if (*result == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; } else { /* Check if it is the last registered name */ if (match_last_lsm(*result, new)) @@ -970,11 +972,11 @@ int security_file_receive(struct file *file) return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file); } -int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +int security_file_open(struct file *file) { int ret; - ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file, cred); + ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file); if (ret) return ret; @@ -1056,6 +1058,17 @@ int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); +int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) +{ + int ret; + + ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id); + if (ret) + return ret; + return ima_load_data(id); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data); + int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) { diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index f78318af8254..ad9a9b8e9979 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3860,7 +3860,7 @@ static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file) return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file)); } -static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file) { struct file_security_struct *fsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; @@ -3884,7 +3884,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) * new inode label or new policy. * This check is not redundant - do not remove. */ - return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file)); + return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file)); } /* task security operations */ @@ -4071,6 +4071,20 @@ static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, return rc; } +static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) +{ + int rc = 0; + + switch (id) { + case LOADING_MODULE: + rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL); + default: + break; + } + + return rc; +} + static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -6970,6 +6984,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid), diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 5cc9101ab79b..f3a5a138a096 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -441,22 +441,16 @@ static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info; struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data; int ret; - mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); - ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY, SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL); if (ret) - goto out; + return ret; - ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len); -out: - mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); - return ret; + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len); } static vm_fault_t sel_mmap_policy_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) @@ -1188,25 +1182,29 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, ret = -EINVAL; if (index >= fsi->bool_num || strcmp(name, fsi->bool_pending_names[index])) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; ret = -ENOMEM; page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!page) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(fsi->state, index); if (cur_enforcing < 0) { ret = cur_enforcing; - goto out; + goto out_unlock; } length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing, fsi->bool_pending_values[index]); - ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length); -out: mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); + ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length); +out_free: free_page((unsigned long)page); return ret; + +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); + goto out_free; } static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, @@ -1219,6 +1217,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK; const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; + if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* No partial writes. */ + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(page)) + return PTR_ERR(page); + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -1233,22 +1242,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, fsi->bool_pending_names[index])) goto out; - length = -ENOMEM; - if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) - goto out; - - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(page)) { - length = PTR_ERR(page); - page = NULL; - goto out; - } - length = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) goto out; @@ -1280,6 +1273,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, ssize_t length; int new_value; + if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* No partial writes. */ + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(page)) + return PTR_ERR(page); + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -1289,22 +1293,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, if (length) goto out; - length = -ENOMEM; - if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) - goto out; - - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(page)) { - length = PTR_ERR(page); - page = NULL; - goto out; - } - length = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) goto out; diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 7ad226018f51..9ab8097dab7c 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1927,9 +1927,9 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) * * Returns 0 */ -static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +static int smack_file_open(struct file *file) { - struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security; + struct task_smack *tsp = file->f_cred->security; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct smk_audit_info ad; int rc; @@ -1937,7 +1937,7 @@ static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad); - rc = smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, MAY_READ, rc); + rc = smk_bu_credfile(file->f_cred, file, MAY_READ, rc); return rc; } @@ -2296,6 +2296,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p); isp->smk_inode = skp; + isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT; } /* diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index 213b8c593668..9f932e2d6852 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, * * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. */ -static int tomoyo_file_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred) +static int tomoyo_file_open(struct file *f) { int flags = f->f_flags; /* Don't check read permission here if called from do_execve(). */ |