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-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c10
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c3
-rw-r--r--security/keys/big_key.c11
-rw-r--r--security/keys/dh.c35
-rw-r--r--security/keys/proc.c34
-rw-r--r--security/security.c6
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c90
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c18
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c2
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c22
10 files changed, 136 insertions, 95 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 48620c93d697..f4c33abd9959 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -449,6 +449,8 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
magic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
memcpy(&cap->data, &nscap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
cap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(magic);
+ } else {
+ size = -ENOMEM;
}
}
kfree(tmpbuf);
@@ -917,6 +919,8 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns = dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
+
/* Ignore non-security xattrs */
if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) != 0)
@@ -929,7 +933,7 @@ int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0)
return 0;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
@@ -947,6 +951,8 @@ int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
*/
int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns = dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
+
/* Ignore non-security xattrs */
if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) != 0)
@@ -962,7 +968,7 @@ int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
return 0;
}
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index a46fba322340..facf9cdd577d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -200,7 +200,8 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
int size;
bool ima_present = false;
- if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
+ if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) ||
+ inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
desc = init_desc(type);
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index 933623784ccd..2806e70d7f8f 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <keys/big_key-type.h>
#include <crypto/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/gcm.h>
struct big_key_buf {
unsigned int nr_pages;
@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
* Crypto names for big_key data authenticated encryption
*/
static const char big_key_alg_name[] = "gcm(aes)";
+#define BIG_KEY_IV_SIZE GCM_AES_IV_SIZE
/*
* Crypto algorithms for big_key data authenticated encryption
@@ -109,7 +111,7 @@ static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, struct big_key_buf *buf, size_t dat
* an .update function, so there's no chance we'll wind up reusing the
* key to encrypt updated data. Simply put: one key, one encryption.
*/
- u8 zero_nonce[crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead)];
+ u8 zero_nonce[BIG_KEY_IV_SIZE];
aead_req = aead_request_alloc(big_key_aead, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!aead_req)
@@ -425,6 +427,13 @@ static int __init big_key_init(void)
pr_err("Can't alloc crypto: %d\n", ret);
return ret;
}
+
+ if (unlikely(crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead) != BIG_KEY_IV_SIZE)) {
+ WARN(1, "big key algorithm changed?");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_aead;
+ }
+
ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(big_key_aead, ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("Can't set crypto auth tag len: %d\n", ret);
diff --git a/security/keys/dh.c b/security/keys/dh.c
index d1ea9f325f94..f7403821db7f 100644
--- a/security/keys/dh.c
+++ b/security/keys/dh.c
@@ -162,8 +162,8 @@ static int kdf_ctr(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
goto err;
if (zlen && h) {
- u8 tmpbuffer[h];
- size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, zlen, h);
+ u8 tmpbuffer[32];
+ size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, zlen, sizeof(tmpbuffer));
memset(tmpbuffer, 0, chunk);
do {
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ static int kdf_ctr(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
goto err;
zlen -= chunk;
- chunk = min_t(size_t, zlen, h);
+ chunk = min_t(size_t, zlen, sizeof(tmpbuffer));
} while (zlen);
}
@@ -183,24 +183,13 @@ static int kdf_ctr(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
goto err;
}
- if (dlen < h) {
- u8 tmpbuffer[h];
-
- err = crypto_shash_final(desc, tmpbuffer);
- if (err)
- goto err;
- memcpy(dst, tmpbuffer, dlen);
- memzero_explicit(tmpbuffer, h);
- return 0;
- } else {
- err = crypto_shash_final(desc, dst);
- if (err)
- goto err;
+ err = crypto_shash_final(desc, dst);
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
- dlen -= h;
- dst += h;
- counter = cpu_to_be32(be32_to_cpu(counter) + 1);
- }
+ dlen -= h;
+ dst += h;
+ counter = cpu_to_be32(be32_to_cpu(counter) + 1);
}
return 0;
@@ -216,14 +205,16 @@ static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc,
{
uint8_t *outbuf = NULL;
int ret;
+ size_t outbuf_len = round_up(buflen,
+ crypto_shash_digestsize(sdesc->shash.tfm));
- outbuf = kmalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ outbuf = kmalloc(outbuf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!outbuf) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
- ret = kdf_ctr(sdesc, kbuf, kbuflen, outbuf, buflen, lzero);
+ ret = kdf_ctr(sdesc, kbuf, kbuflen, outbuf, outbuf_len, lzero);
if (ret)
goto err;
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index fbc4af5c6c9f..5af2934965d8 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
#include <asm/errno.h>
#include "internal.h"
-static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);
static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos);
static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos);
static void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v);
@@ -31,14 +30,6 @@ static const struct seq_operations proc_keys_ops = {
.show = proc_keys_show,
};
-static const struct file_operations proc_keys_fops = {
- .open = proc_keys_open,
- .read = seq_read,
- .llseek = seq_lseek,
- .release = seq_release,
-};
-
-static int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);
static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos);
static void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos);
static void proc_key_users_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v);
@@ -51,13 +42,6 @@ static const struct seq_operations proc_key_users_ops = {
.show = proc_key_users_show,
};
-static const struct file_operations proc_key_users_fops = {
- .open = proc_key_users_open,
- .read = seq_read,
- .llseek = seq_lseek,
- .release = seq_release,
-};
-
/*
* Declare the /proc files.
*/
@@ -65,11 +49,11 @@ static int __init key_proc_init(void)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *p;
- p = proc_create("keys", 0, NULL, &proc_keys_fops);
+ p = proc_create_seq("keys", 0, NULL, &proc_keys_ops);
if (!p)
panic("Cannot create /proc/keys\n");
- p = proc_create("key-users", 0, NULL, &proc_key_users_fops);
+ p = proc_create_seq("key-users", 0, NULL, &proc_key_users_ops);
if (!p)
panic("Cannot create /proc/key-users\n");
@@ -96,11 +80,6 @@ static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct seq_file *p, struct rb_node *n)
return n;
}
-static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
- return seq_open(file, &proc_keys_ops);
-}
-
static struct key *find_ge_key(struct seq_file *p, key_serial_t id)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p);
@@ -293,15 +272,6 @@ static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_
return __key_user_next(user_ns, n);
}
-/*
- * Implement "/proc/key-users" to provides a list of the key users and their
- * quotas.
- */
-static int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
- return seq_open(file, &proc_key_users_ops);
-}
-
static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
__acquires(key_user_lock)
{
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7bc2fde023a7..68f46d849abe 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1358,6 +1358,12 @@ int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
protocol, kern);
}
+int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, 0, socka, sockb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair);
+
int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 713c1648014f..25905d09500e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -274,11 +274,10 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
* Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
* @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
* allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
- * invalid. The @opt_dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode;
- * when no dentry is available, set it to NULL instead.
+ * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
*/
static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
- struct dentry *opt_dentry,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
bool may_sleep)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
@@ -295,7 +294,7 @@ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
* @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
* found; in that case, continue using the old label.
*/
- inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, opt_dentry);
+ inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
}
return 0;
}
@@ -1568,8 +1567,15 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
/* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
} else {
- /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
+ /*
+ * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
+ * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
+ * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
+ * two, depending upon that...
+ */
dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+ if (!dentry)
+ dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
}
if (!dentry) {
/*
@@ -1674,14 +1680,19 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
/* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
* procfs inodes */
- if (opt_dentry)
+ if (opt_dentry) {
/* Called from d_instantiate or
* d_splice_alias. */
dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
- else
+ } else {
/* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
- * find a dentry. */
+ * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
+ * a connected one, so try that first.
+ */
dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+ if (!dentry)
+ dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
+ }
/*
* This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
* before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
@@ -4570,6 +4581,18 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
return err;
}
+static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
+ struct socket *sockb)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+
+ sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
+ sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
permission check between the socket and the port number. */
@@ -4577,6 +4600,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
u16 family;
int err;
@@ -4588,11 +4612,11 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
family = sk->sk_family;
if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
char *addrp;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
+ u16 family_sa = address->sa_family;
unsigned short snum;
u32 sid, node_perm;
@@ -4602,11 +4626,20 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
* need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
* sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
*/
- switch (address->sa_family) {
+ switch (family_sa) {
+ case AF_UNSPEC:
case AF_INET:
if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
return -EINVAL;
addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+ if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
+ /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
+ * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
+ */
+ if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
+ goto err_af;
+ family_sa = AF_INET;
+ }
snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
break;
@@ -4618,15 +4651,14 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
break;
default:
- /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
- * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
- */
- if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
- return -EINVAL;
- else
- return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+ goto err_af;
}
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+ ad.u.net = &net;
+ ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
+ ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
+
if (snum) {
int low, high;
@@ -4638,10 +4670,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
snum, &sid);
if (err)
goto out;
- ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
- ad.u.net = &net;
- ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
- ad.u.net->family = family;
err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sksec->sid, sid,
sksec->sclass,
@@ -4673,16 +4701,11 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
break;
}
- err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
+ err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
if (err)
goto out;
- ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
- ad.u.net = &net;
- ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
- ad.u.net->family = family;
-
- if (address->sa_family == AF_INET)
+ if (family_sa == AF_INET)
ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
else
ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
@@ -4695,6 +4718,11 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
}
out:
return err;
+err_af:
+ /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
+ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
@@ -4772,7 +4800,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
- ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
+ ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
if (err)
@@ -5273,6 +5301,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
while (walk_size < addrlen) {
addr = addr_buf;
switch (addr->sa_family) {
+ case AF_UNSPEC:
case AF_INET:
len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
break;
@@ -5280,7 +5309,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
break;
default:
- return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
err = -EINVAL;
@@ -7002,6 +7031,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 35fd77737c59..f3d374d2ca04 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -168,10 +168,12 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (length)
goto out;
audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
- "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
+ "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u"
+ " enabled=%d old-enabled=%d lsm=selinux res=1",
new_value, old_value,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
- audit_get_sessionid(current));
+ audit_get_sessionid(current),
+ selinux_enabled, selinux_enabled);
enforcing_set(state, new_value);
if (new_value)
avc_ss_reset(state->avc, 0);
@@ -279,6 +281,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char *page;
ssize_t length;
int new_value;
+ int enforcing;
if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -296,13 +299,16 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
goto out;
if (new_value) {
+ enforcing = enforcing_enabled(fsi->state);
length = selinux_disable(fsi->state);
if (length)
goto out;
audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
- "selinux=0 auid=%u ses=%u",
+ "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u"
+ " enabled=%d old-enabled=%d lsm=selinux res=1",
+ enforcing, enforcing,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
- audit_get_sessionid(current));
+ audit_get_sessionid(current), 0, 1);
}
length = count;
@@ -453,7 +459,7 @@ out:
return ret;
}
-static int sel_mmap_policy_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
+static vm_fault_t sel_mmap_policy_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
struct policy_load_memory *plm = vmf->vma->vm_file->private_data;
unsigned long offset;
@@ -576,7 +582,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
out1:
audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
- "policy loaded auid=%u ses=%u",
+ "auid=%u ses=%u lsm=selinux res=1",
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
audit_get_sessionid(current));
out:
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 0fd8ad955a38..a2d44824121c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1494,7 +1494,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(struct selinux_state *state,
scontext_len, &context, def_sid);
if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
context.str = str;
- context.len = scontext_len;
+ context.len = strlen(str) + 1;
str = NULL;
} else if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 0b414836bebd..dcb976f98df2 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2842,6 +2842,27 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
}
+/**
+ * smack_socket_socketpair - create socket pair
+ * @socka: one socket
+ * @sockb: another socket
+ *
+ * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
+ struct socket *sockb)
+{
+ struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+
+ asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
+ bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
/**
* smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
@@ -4724,6 +4745,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, smack_socket_socketpair),
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
#endif
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