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Edward reported that there's an issue in min/max value bounds
tracking when signed and unsigned compares both provide hints
on limits when having unknown variables. E.g. a program such
as the following should have been rejected:
0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
1: (bf) r2 = r10
2: (07) r2 += -8
3: (18) r1 = 0xffff8a94cda93400
5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7
R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8
8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
9: (b7) r2 = -1
10: (2d) if r1 > r2 goto pc+3
R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0
R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp
11: (65) if r1 s> 0x1 goto pc+2
R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1
R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp
12: (0f) r0 += r1
13: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0
R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=1 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1
R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp
14: (b7) r0 = 0
15: (95) exit
What happens is that in the first part ...
8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
9: (b7) r2 = -1
10: (2d) if r1 > r2 goto pc+3
... r1 carries an unsigned value, and is compared as unsigned
against a register carrying an immediate. Verifier deduces in
reg_set_min_max() that since the compare is unsigned and operation
is greater than (>), that in the fall-through/false case, r1's
minimum bound must be 0 and maximum bound must be r2. Latter is
larger than the bound and thus max value is reset back to being
'invalid' aka BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE. Thus, r1 state is now
'R1=inv,min_value=0'. The subsequent test ...
11: (65) if r1 s> 0x1 goto pc+2
... is a signed compare of r1 with immediate value 1. Here,
verifier deduces in reg_set_min_max() that since the compare
is signed this time and operation is greater than (>), that
in the fall-through/false case, we can deduce that r1's maximum
bound must be 1, meaning with prior test, we result in r1 having
the following state: R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1. Given that
the actual value this holds is -8, the bounds are wrongly deduced.
When this is being added to r0 which holds the map_value(_adj)
type, then subsequent store access in above case will go through
check_mem_access() which invokes check_map_access_adj(), that
will then probe whether the map memory is in bounds based
on the min_value and max_value as well as access size since
the actual unknown value is min_value <= x <= max_value; commit
fce366a9dd0d ("bpf, verifier: fix alu ops against map_value{,
_adj} register types") provides some more explanation on the
semantics.
It's worth to note in this context that in the current code,
min_value and max_value tracking are used for two things, i)
dynamic map value access via check_map_access_adj() and since
commit 06c1c049721a ("bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory")
ii) also enforced at check_helper_mem_access() when passing a
memory address (pointer to packet, map value, stack) and length
pair to a helper and the length in this case is an unknown value
defining an access range through min_value/max_value in that
case. The min_value/max_value tracking is /not/ used in the
direct packet access case to track ranges. However, the issue
also affects case ii), for example, the following crafted program
based on the same principle must be rejected as well:
0: (b7) r2 = 0
1: (bf) r3 = r10
2: (07) r3 += -512
3: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8
4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
5: (b7) r6 = -1
6: (2d) if r4 > r6 goto pc+5
R1=ctx R2=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R3=fp-512
R4=inv,min_value=0 R6=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp
7: (65) if r4 s> 0x1 goto pc+4
R1=ctx R2=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R3=fp-512
R4=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R6=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1
R10=fp
8: (07) r4 += 1
9: (b7) r5 = 0
10: (6a) *(u16 *)(r10 -512) = 0
11: (85) call bpf_skb_load_bytes#26
12: (b7) r0 = 0
13: (95) exit
Meaning, while we initialize the max_value stack slot that the
verifier thinks we access in the [1,2] range, in reality we
pass -7 as length which is interpreted as u32 in the helper.
Thus, this issue is relevant also for the case of helper ranges.
Resetting both bounds in check_reg_overflow() in case only one
of them exceeds limits is also not enough as similar test can be
created that uses values which are within range, thus also here
learned min value in r1 is incorrect when mixed with later signed
test to create a range:
0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
1: (bf) r2 = r10
2: (07) r2 += -8
3: (18) r1 = 0xffff880ad081fa00
5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7
R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8
8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
9: (b7) r2 = 2
10: (3d) if r2 >= r1 goto pc+3
R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3
R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp
11: (65) if r1 s> 0x4 goto pc+2
R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0
R1=inv,min_value=3,max_value=4 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp
12: (0f) r0 += r1
13: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0
R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=4
R1=inv,min_value=3,max_value=4 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp
14: (b7) r0 = 0
15: (95) exit
This leaves us with two options for fixing this: i) to invalidate
all prior learned information once we switch signed context, ii)
to track min/max signed and unsigned boundaries separately as
done in [0]. (Given latter introduces major changes throughout
the whole verifier, it's rather net-next material, thus this
patch follows option i), meaning we can derive bounds either
from only signed tests or only unsigned tests.) There is still the
case of adjust_reg_min_max_vals(), where we adjust bounds on ALU
operations, meaning programs like the following where boundaries
on the reg get mixed in context later on when bounds are merged
on the dst reg must get rejected, too:
0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
1: (bf) r2 = r10
2: (07) r2 += -8
3: (18) r1 = 0xffff89b2bf87ce00
5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+6
R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8
8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
9: (b7) r2 = 2
10: (3d) if r2 >= r1 goto pc+2
R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3
R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp
11: (b7) r7 = 1
12: (65) if r7 s> 0x0 goto pc+2
R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3
R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=imm1,max_value=0 R10=fp
13: (b7) r0 = 0
14: (95) exit
from 12 to 15: R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0
R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=imm1,min_value=1 R10=fp
15: (0f) r7 += r1
16: (65) if r7 s> 0x4 goto pc+2
R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3
R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=inv,min_value=4,max_value=4 R10=fp
17: (0f) r0 += r7
18: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0
R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=4,max_value=4 R1=inv,min_value=3
R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=inv,min_value=4,max_value=4 R10=fp
19: (b7) r0 = 0
20: (95) exit
Meaning, in adjust_reg_min_max_vals() we must also reset range
values on the dst when src/dst registers have mixed signed/
unsigned derived min/max value bounds with one unbounded value
as otherwise they can be added together deducing false boundaries.
Once both boundaries are established from either ALU ops or
compare operations w/o mixing signed/unsigned insns, then they
can safely be added to other regs also having both boundaries
established. Adding regs with one unbounded side to a map value
where the bounded side has been learned w/o mixing ops is
possible, but the resulting map value won't recover from that,
meaning such op is considered invalid on the time of actual
access. Invalid bounds are set on the dst reg in case i) src reg,
or ii) in case dst reg already had them. The only way to recover
would be to perform i) ALU ops but only 'add' is allowed on map
value types or ii) comparisons, but these are disallowed on
pointers in case they span a range. This is fine as only BPF_JEQ
and BPF_JNE may be performed on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers
which potentially turn them into PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE type depending
on the branch, so only here min/max value cannot be invalidated
for them.
In terms of state pruning, value_from_signed is considered
as well in states_equal() when dealing with adjusted map values.
With regards to breaking existing programs, there is a small
risk, but use-cases are rather quite narrow where this could
occur and mixing compares probably unlikely.
Joint work with Josef and Edward.
[0] https://lists.iovisor.org/pipermail/iovisor-dev/2017-June/000822.html
Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Reported-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In some cases, offset can overflow and can cause an infinite loop in
ip6_find_1stfragopt(). Make it unsigned int to prevent the overflow, and
cap it at IPV6_MAXPLEN, since packets larger than that should be invalid.
This problem has been here since before the beginning of git history.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The array data is only populated with valid information from userspace
if cmd != SIOCDEVPRIVATE, other cases the array contains garbage on
the stack. The subsequent switch statement acts on a subcommand in
data[0] which could be any garbage value if cmd is SIOCDEVPRIVATE which
seems incorrect to me. Instead, just return EOPNOTSUPP for the case
where cmd == SIOCDEVPRIVATE to avoid this issue.
As a side note, I suspect that the original intention of the code
was for this ioctl to work just for cmd == SIOCDEVPRIVATE (and the
current logic is reversed). However, I don't wont to change the current
semantics in case any userspace code relies on this existing behaviour.
Detected by CoverityScan, CID#139647 ("Uninitialized scalar variable")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This reverts commit cd8966e75ed3c6b41a37047a904617bc44fa481f.
The duplicate CHANGEADDR event message is sent regardless of link
status whereas the setlink changes only generate a notification when
the link is up. Not sending a notification when the link is down breaks
dhcpcd which only processes hwaddr changes when the link is down.
Fixes reported regression:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196355
Reported-by: Yaroslav Isakov <yaroslav.isakov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Commit f39908d3b1c45 ('net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Set the CMODE for mv88e6390
ports 9 & 10') added support for setting the CMODE for the 6390X family,
but only enabled it for 9290 and 6390 - and left out 6390X.
Fix support for setting the CMODE on 6390X also by assigning
mv88e6390x_port_set_cmode() to the .port_set_cmode function pointer in
mv88e6390x_ops too.
Fixes: f39908d3b1c4 ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Set the CMODE for mv88e6390 ports 9 & 10")
Signed-off-by: Martin Hundebøll <mnhu@prevas.dk>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Reviewed-by: Vivien Didelot <vivien.didelot@savoirfairelinux.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Add SoC specific compatibility strings to the Broadcom DTE
based PTP clock binding document.
Fixed the document heading and node name.
Fixes: 80d6076140b2 ("dt-binding: ptp: add bindings document for dte based ptp clock")
Signed-off-by: Arun Parameswaran <arun.parameswaran@broadcom.com>
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Unconditional reset dwmac before HW init if reset controller is present.
In existing implementation we reset dwmac only after second module
probing:
(module load -> unload -> load again [reset happens])
Now we reset dwmac at every module load:
(module load [reset happens] -> unload -> load again [reset happens])
Also some reset controllers have only reset callback instead of
assert + deassert callbacks pair, so handle this case.
Signed-off-by: Eugeniy Paltsev <Eugeniy.Paltsev@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The ifr.ifr_name is passed around and assumed to be NULL terminated.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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ifr name is assumed to be a valid string by the kernel, but nothing
was forcing username to pass a valid string.
In turn, this would cause panics as we tried to access the string
past it's valid memory.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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We accidentally return an uninitialized variable.
Fixes: cf56c2f892a8 ("netfilter: remove old pre-netns era hook api")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Eric noticed that in udp_recvmsg() we still need to access
skb->dst while processing the IP options.
Since commit 0a463c78d25b ("udp: avoid a cache miss on dequeue")
skb->dst is no more available at recvmsg() time and bad things
will happen if we enter the relevant code path.
This commit address the issue, avoid clearing skb->dst if
any IP options are present into the relevant skb.
Since the IP CB is contained in the first skb cacheline, we can
test it to decide to leverage the consume_stateless_skb()
optimization, without measurable additional cost in the faster
path.
v1 -> v2: updated commit message tags
Fixes: 0a463c78d25b ("udp: avoid a cache miss on dequeue")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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If 'dma_set_mask_and_coherent()' fails, we must undo the previous
'pci_request_regions()' call.
Adjust corresponding 'goto' to jump at the right place of the error
handling path.
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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KMSAN reported use of uninitialized memory in skb_set_hash_from_sk(),
which originated from the TCP request socket created in
cookie_v6_check():
==================================================================
BUG: KMSAN: use of uninitialized memory in tcp_transmit_skb+0xf77/0x3ec0
CPU: 1 PID: 2949 Comm: syz-execprog Not tainted 4.11.0-rc5+ #2931
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
TCP: request_sock_TCPv6: Possible SYN flooding on port 20028. Sending cookies. Check SNMP counters.
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x172/0x1c0 lib/dump_stack.c:52
kmsan_report+0x12a/0x180 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:927
__msan_warning_32+0x61/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:469
skb_set_hash_from_sk ./include/net/sock.h:2011
tcp_transmit_skb+0xf77/0x3ec0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:983
tcp_send_ack+0x75b/0x830 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3493
tcp_delack_timer_handler+0x9a6/0xb90 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:284
tcp_delack_timer+0x1b0/0x310 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:309
call_timer_fn+0x240/0x520 kernel/time/timer.c:1268
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1307
__run_timers+0xc13/0xf10 kernel/time/timer.c:1601
run_timer_softirq+0x36/0xa0 kernel/time/timer.c:1614
__do_softirq+0x485/0x942 kernel/softirq.c:284
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:364
irq_exit+0x1fa/0x230 kernel/softirq.c:405
exiting_irq+0xe/0x10 ./arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:657
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x5a/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:966
apic_timer_interrupt+0x86/0x90 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:489
RIP: 0010:native_restore_fl ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:36
RIP: 0010:arch_local_irq_restore ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:77
RIP: 0010:__msan_poison_alloca+0xed/0x120 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:440
RSP: 0018:ffff880024917cd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff10
RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffff8800224c0000 RCX: 0000000000000005
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffff880000000000 RDI: ffffea0000b6d770
RBP: ffff880024917d58 R08: 0000000000000dd8 R09: 0000000000000004
R10: 0000160000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff85abf810
R13: ffff880024917dd8 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: ffffffff81cabde4
</IRQ>
poll_select_copy_remaining+0xac/0x6b0 fs/select.c:293
SYSC_select+0x4b4/0x4e0 fs/select.c:653
SyS_select+0x76/0xa0 fs/select.c:634
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:204
RIP: 0033:0x4597e7
RSP: 002b:000000c420037ee0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000017
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000004597e7
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 000000c420037ef0 R08: 000000c420037ee0 R09: 0000000000000059
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000042dc20
R13: 00000000000000f3 R14: 0000000000000030 R15: 0000000000000003
chained origin:
save_stack_trace+0x37/0x40 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:302
kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:317
kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x12a/0x1f0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:547
__msan_store_shadow_origin_4+0xac/0x110 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:259
tcp_create_openreq_child+0x709/0x1ae0 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:472
tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock+0x7eb/0x2a30 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1103
tcp_get_cookie_sock+0x136/0x5f0 net/ipv4/syncookies.c:212
cookie_v6_check+0x17a9/0x1b50 net/ipv6/syncookies.c:245
tcp_v6_cookie_check net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:989
tcp_v6_do_rcv+0xdd8/0x1c60 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1298
tcp_v6_rcv+0x41a3/0x4f00 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1487
ip6_input_finish+0x82f/0x1ee0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:279
NF_HOOK ./include/linux/netfilter.h:257
ip6_input+0x239/0x290 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:322
dst_input ./include/net/dst.h:492
ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
NF_HOOK ./include/linux/netfilter.h:257
ipv6_rcv+0x1dbd/0x22e0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:203
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x2f6f/0x3a20 net/core/dev.c:4208
__netif_receive_skb net/core/dev.c:4246
process_backlog+0x667/0xba0 net/core/dev.c:4866
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5268
net_rx_action+0xc95/0x1590 net/core/dev.c:5333
__do_softirq+0x485/0x942 kernel/softirq.c:284
origin:
save_stack_trace+0x37/0x40 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:302
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb1/0x1a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:198
kmsan_kmalloc+0x7f/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:337
kmem_cache_alloc+0x1c2/0x1e0 mm/slub.c:2766
reqsk_alloc ./include/net/request_sock.h:87
inet_reqsk_alloc+0xa4/0x5b0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6200
cookie_v6_check+0x4f4/0x1b50 net/ipv6/syncookies.c:169
tcp_v6_cookie_check net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:989
tcp_v6_do_rcv+0xdd8/0x1c60 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1298
tcp_v6_rcv+0x41a3/0x4f00 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1487
ip6_input_finish+0x82f/0x1ee0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:279
NF_HOOK ./include/linux/netfilter.h:257
ip6_input+0x239/0x290 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:322
dst_input ./include/net/dst.h:492
ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
NF_HOOK ./include/linux/netfilter.h:257
ipv6_rcv+0x1dbd/0x22e0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:203
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x2f6f/0x3a20 net/core/dev.c:4208
__netif_receive_skb net/core/dev.c:4246
process_backlog+0x667/0xba0 net/core/dev.c:4866
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5268
net_rx_action+0xc95/0x1590 net/core/dev.c:5333
__do_softirq+0x485/0x942 kernel/softirq.c:284
==================================================================
Similar error is reported for cookie_v4_check().
Fixes: 58d607d3e52f ("tcp: provide skb->hash to synack packets")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
The global percpu variable ppp_xmit_recursion is used to detect the ppp
xmit recursion to avoid the deadlock, which is caused by one CPU tries to
lock the xmit lock twice. But it would report false recursion when one CPU
wants to send the skb from two different PPP devices, like one L2TP on the
PPPoE. It is a normal case actually.
Now use one percpu member of struct ppp instead of the gloable variable to
detect the xmit recursion of one ppp device.
Fixes: 55454a565836 ("ppp: avoid dealock on recursive xmit")
Signed-off-by: Gao Feng <gfree.wind@vip.163.com>
Signed-off-by: Liu Jianying <jianying.liu@ikuai8.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
When req->rsk_listener is NULL, sk_to_full_sk() returns
NULL too, so we have to check its return value against
NULL here.
Fixes: 40304b2a1567 ("bpf: BPF support for sock_ops")
Reported-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Tested-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Lawrence Brakmo <brakmo@fb.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
GCC 7 added a new -Wimplicit-fallthrough warning. It's only enabled
with W=1, but since linux/jhash.h is included in over hundred places
(including other global headers) it seems worthwhile fixing this
warning.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
We crash in __nf_ct_expect_check, it calls nf_ct_remove_expect on the
uninitialised expectation instead of existing one, so del_timer chokes
on random memory address.
Fixes: ec0e3f01114ad32711243 ("netfilter: nf_ct_expect: Add nf_ct_remove_expect()")
Reported-by: Sergey Kvachonok <ravenexp@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sergey Kvachonok <ravenexp@gmail.com>
Cc: Gao Feng <fgao@ikuai8.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
|
arp packets cannot be forwarded.
They can be bridged, but then they can be filtered using
either ebtables or nftables bridge family.
The bridge netfilter exposes a "call-arptables" switch which
pushes packets into arptables, but lets not expose this for nftables, so better
close this asap.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
|
When doing initial conversion to rhashtable I replaced the bucket
walk with a single rhashtable_lookup_fast().
When moving to rhlist I failed to properly walk the list of identical
tuples, but that is what is needed for this to work correctly.
The table contains the original tuples, so the reply tuples are all
distinct.
We currently decide that mapping is (not) in range only based on the
first entry, but in case its not we need to try the reply tuple of the
next entry until we either find an in-range mapping or we checked
all the entries.
This bug makes nat core attempt collision resolution while it might be
able to use the mapping as-is.
Fixes: 870190a9ec90 ("netfilter: nat: convert nat bysrc hash to rhashtable")
Reported-by: Jaco Kroon <jaco@uls.co.za>
Tested-by: Jaco Kroon <jaco@uls.co.za>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
|
no more users in the tree, remove this.
The old api is racy wrt. module removal, all users have been converted
to the netns-aware api.
The old api pretended we still have global hooks but that has not been
true for a long time.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
|
Verify that the length of the socket buffer is sufficient to cover the
nlmsghdr structure before accessing the nlh->nlmsg_len field for further
input sanitization. If the client only supplies 1-3 bytes of data in
sk_buff, then nlh->nlmsg_len remains partially uninitialized and
contains leftover memory from the corresponding kernel allocation.
Operating on such data may result in indeterminate evaluation of the
nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN expression.
The bug was discovered by a runtime instrumentation designed to detect
use of uninitialized memory in the kernel. The patch prevents this and
other similar tools (e.g. KMSAN) from flagging this behavior in the future.
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Jurczyk <mjurczyk@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
|
Since the skb is attached to the first control block of a fragmented
skb it is possible that the skb could be freed when reclaiming that
control block before all fragments of the skb have been consumed by
the hardware and unmapped.
This commit introduces first_cb and last_cb pointers to the skb
control block used by the driver to keep track of which transmit
control blocks within a transmit ring are the first and last ones
associated with the skb.
It then splits the bcmgenet_free_cb() function into transmit
(bcmgenet_free_tx_cb) and receive (bcmgenet_free_rx_cb) versions
that can handle the unmapping of dma mapped memory and cleaning up
the corresponding control block structure so that the skb is only
freed after the last associated transmit control block is reclaimed.
Fixes: 1c1008c793fa ("net: bcmgenet: add main driver file")
Signed-off-by: Doug Berger <opendmb@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
In case we fail to map a single fragment, we would be leaving the
transmit ring populated with stale entries.
This commit introduces the helper function bcmgenet_put_txcb()
which takes care of rewinding the per-ring write pointer back to
where we left.
It also consolidates the functionality of bcmgenet_xmit_single()
and bcmgenet_xmit_frag() into the bcmgenet_xmit() function to
make the unmapping of control blocks cleaner.
Fixes: 1c1008c793fa ("net: bcmgenet: add main driver file")
Suggested-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Berger <opendmb@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Commit 07d4510f5251 ("dt-bindings: net: bgmac: add bindings documentation for
bgmac") added both brcm,amac-nsp.txt and brcm,bgmac-nsp.txt. The former is
actually the one that got updated and is in use by the bgmac driver while the
latter is duplicating the former and is not used nor updated.
Fixes: 07d4510f5251 ("dt-bindings: net: bgmac: add bindings documentation for bgmac")
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
pci_device_id are not supposed to change at runtime. All functions
working with pci_device_id provided by <linux/pci.h> work with
const pci_device_id. So mark the non-const structs as const.
File size before:
text data bss dec hex filename
11803 544 1 12348 303c isdn/hardware/avm/c4.o
File size After adding 'const':
text data bss dec hex filename
11931 416 1 12348 303c isdn/hardware/avm/c4.o
Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
pci_device_id are not supposed to change at runtime. All functions
working with pci_device_id provided by <linux/pci.h> work with
const pci_device_id. So mark the non-const structs as const.
File size before:
text data bss dec hex filename
21656 1024 96 22776 58f8 isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcpci.o
File size After adding 'const':
text data bss dec hex filename
22424 256 96 22776 58f8 isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcpci.o
Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
pci_device_id are not supposed to change at runtime. All functions
working with pci_device_id provided by <linux/pci.h> work with
const pci_device_id. So mark the non-const structs as const.
File size before:
text data bss dec hex filename
9963 1936 16 11915 2e8b isdn/hardware/mISDN/avmfritz.o
File size After adding 'const':
text data bss dec hex filename
10091 1808 16 11915 2e8b isdn/hardware/mISDN/avmfritz.o
Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
pci_device_id are not supposed to change at runtime. All functions
working with pci_device_id provided by <linux/pci.h> work with
const pci_device_id. So mark the non-const structs as const.
File size before:
text data bss dec hex filename
13959 4080 24 18063 468f isdn/hardware/mISDN/w6692.o
File size After adding 'const':
text data bss dec hex filename
14087 3952 24 18063 468f isdn/hardware/mISDN/w6692.o
Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
pci_device_id are not supposed to change at runtime. All functions
working with pci_device_id provided by <linux/pci.h> work with
const pci_device_id. So mark the non-const structs as const.
File size before:
text data bss dec hex filename
63450 1536 1492 66478 103ae isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcmulti.o
File size After adding 'const':
text data bss dec hex filename
64698 288 1492 66478 103ae isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcmulti.o
Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
pci_device_id are not supposed to change at runtime. All functions
working with pci_device_id provided by <linux/pci.h> work with
const pci_device_id. So mark the non-const structs as const.
File size before:
text data bss dec hex filename
10941 1776 16 12733 31bd isdn/hardware/mISDN/netjet.o
File size After adding 'const':
text data bss dec hex filename
11005 1712 16 12733 31bd isdn/hardware/mISDN/netjet.o
Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
pci_device_id are not supposed to change at runtime. All functions
working with pci_device_id provided by <linux/pci.h> work with
const pci_device_id. So mark the non-const structs as const.
File size before:
text data bss dec hex filename
6224 655 8 6887 1ae7 isdn/hardware/eicon/divasmain.o
File size After adding 'const':
text data bss dec hex filename
6608 271 8 6887 1ae7 isdn/hardware/eicon/divasmain.o
Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
pci_device_id are not supposed to change at runtime. All functions
working with pci_device_id provided by <linux/pci.h> work with
const pci_device_id. So mark the non-const structs as const.
File size before:
text data bss dec hex filename
5989 576 0 6565 19a5 isdn/hisax/hisax_fcpcipnp.o
File size After adding 'const':
text data bss dec hex filename
6085 480 0 6565 19a5 isdn/hisax/hisax_fcpcipnp.o
Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
pci_device_id are not supposed to change at runtime. All functions
working with pci_device_id provided by <linux/pci.h> work with
const pci_device_id. So mark the non-const structs as const.
File size before:
text data bss dec hex filename
10512 536 4 11052 2b2c drivers/isdn/hisax/hfc4s8s_l1.o
File size After adding 'const':
text data bss dec hex filename
10672 376 4 11052 2b2c drivers/isdn/hisax/hfc4s8s_l1.o
Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
pci_device_id are not supposed to change at runtime. All functions
working with pci_device_id provided by <linux/pci.h> work with
const pci_device_id. So mark the non-const structs as const.
File size before:
text data bss dec hex filename
13686 2064 4416 20166 4ec6 drivers/isdn/hisax/config.o
File size After adding 'const':
text data bss dec hex filename
15030 720 4416 20166 4ec6 drivers/isdn/hisax/config.o
Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Fixes the following behavior: for connections that had no RTT sample
at the time of initializing congestion control, BBR was initializing
the pacing rate to a high nominal rate (based an a guess of RTT=1ms,
in case this is LAN traffic). Then BBR never adjusted the pacing rate
downward upon obtaining an actual RTT sample, if the connection never
filled the pipe (e.g. all sends were small app-limited writes()).
This fix adjusts the pacing rate upon obtaining the first RTT sample.
Fixes: 0f8782ea1497 ("tcp_bbr: add BBR congestion control")
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Fix a corner case noticed by Eric Dumazet, where BBR's setting
sk->sk_pacing_rate to 0 during initialization could theoretically
cause packets in the sending host to hang if there were packets "in
flight" in the pacing infrastructure at the time the BBR congestion
control state is initialized. This could occur if the pacing
infrastructure happened to race with bbr_init() in a way such that the
pacer read the 0 rather than the immediately following non-zero pacing
rate.
Fixes: 0f8782ea1497 ("tcp_bbr: add BBR congestion control")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Introduce a helper to initialize the BBR pacing rate unconditionally,
based on the current cwnd and RTT estimate. This is a pure refactor,
but is needed for two following fixes.
Fixes: 0f8782ea1497 ("tcp_bbr: add BBR congestion control")
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Introduce a helper to convert a BBR bandwidth and gain factor to a
pacing rate in bytes per second. This is a pure refactor, but is
needed for two following fixes.
Fixes: 0f8782ea1497 ("tcp_bbr: add BBR congestion control")
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
In bbr_set_pacing_rate(), which decides whether to cut the pacing
rate, there was some code that considered exiting STARTUP to be
equivalent to the notion of filling the pipe (i.e.,
bbr_full_bw_reached()). Specifically, as the code was structured,
exiting STARTUP and going into PROBE_RTT could cause us to cut the
pacing rate down to something silly and low, based on whatever
bandwidth samples we've had so far, when it's possible that all of
them have been small app-limited bandwidth samples that are not
representative of the bandwidth available in the path. (The code was
correct at the time it was written, but the state machine changed
without this spot being adjusted correspondingly.)
Fixes: 0f8782ea1497 ("tcp_bbr: add BBR congestion control")
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
When there is an established connection in direction A->B, it is
possible to receive a packet on port B which then executes
ct(commit,force) without first performing ct() - ie, a lookup.
In this case, we would expect that this packet can delete the existing
entry so that we can commit a connection with direction B->A. However,
currently we only perform a check in skb_nfct_cached() for whether
OVS_CS_F_TRACKED is set and OVS_CS_F_INVALID is not set, ie that a
lookup previously occurred. In the above scenario, a lookup has not
occurred but we should still be able to statelessly look up the
existing entry and potentially delete the entry if it is in the
opposite direction.
This patch extends the check to also hint that if the action has the
force flag set, then we will lookup the existing entry so that the
force check at the end of skb_nfct_cached has the ability to delete
the connection.
Fixes: dd41d330b03 ("openvswitch: Add force commit.")
CC: Pravin Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
CC: dev@openvswitch.org
Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@ovn.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Rose <gvrose8192@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
If the length field of the iterator (|pos.p| or |err|) is past the end
of the chunk, we shouldn't access it.
This bug has been detected by KMSAN. For the following pair of system
calls:
socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, 0x84 /* IPPROTO_??? */) = 3
sendto(3, "A", 1, MSG_OOB, {sa_family=AF_INET6, sin6_port=htons(0),
inet_pton(AF_INET6, "::1", &sin6_addr), sin6_flowinfo=0,
sin6_scope_id=0}, 28) = 1
the tool has reported a use of uninitialized memory:
==================================================================
BUG: KMSAN: use of uninitialized memory in sctp_rcv+0x17b8/0x43b0
CPU: 1 PID: 2940 Comm: probe Not tainted 4.11.0-rc5+ #2926
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs
01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x172/0x1c0 lib/dump_stack.c:52
kmsan_report+0x12a/0x180 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:927
__msan_warning_32+0x61/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:469
__sctp_rcv_init_lookup net/sctp/input.c:1074
__sctp_rcv_lookup_harder net/sctp/input.c:1233
__sctp_rcv_lookup net/sctp/input.c:1255
sctp_rcv+0x17b8/0x43b0 net/sctp/input.c:170
sctp6_rcv+0x32/0x70 net/sctp/ipv6.c:984
ip6_input_finish+0x82f/0x1ee0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:279
NF_HOOK ./include/linux/netfilter.h:257
ip6_input+0x239/0x290 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:322
dst_input ./include/net/dst.h:492
ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
NF_HOOK ./include/linux/netfilter.h:257
ipv6_rcv+0x1dbd/0x22e0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:203
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x2f6f/0x3a20 net/core/dev.c:4208
__netif_receive_skb net/core/dev.c:4246
process_backlog+0x667/0xba0 net/core/dev.c:4866
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5268
net_rx_action+0xc95/0x1590 net/core/dev.c:5333
__do_softirq+0x485/0x942 kernel/softirq.c:284
do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:902
</IRQ>
do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:328
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x25b/0x290 kernel/softirq.c:181
local_bh_enable+0x37/0x40 ./include/linux/bottom_half.h:31
rcu_read_unlock_bh ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:931
ip6_finish_output2+0x19b2/0x1cf0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:124
ip6_finish_output+0x764/0x970 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:149
NF_HOOK_COND ./include/linux/netfilter.h:246
ip6_output+0x456/0x520 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:163
dst_output ./include/net/dst.h:486
NF_HOOK ./include/linux/netfilter.h:257
ip6_xmit+0x1841/0x1c00 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:261
sctp_v6_xmit+0x3b7/0x470 net/sctp/ipv6.c:225
sctp_packet_transmit+0x38cb/0x3a20 net/sctp/output.c:632
sctp_outq_flush+0xeb3/0x46e0 net/sctp/outqueue.c:885
sctp_outq_uncork+0xb2/0xd0 net/sctp/outqueue.c:750
sctp_side_effects net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1773
sctp_do_sm+0x6962/0x6ec0 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1147
sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE+0x12c/0x160 net/sctp/primitive.c:88
sctp_sendmsg+0x43e5/0x4f90 net/sctp/socket.c:1954
inet_sendmsg+0x498/0x670 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:762
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:643
SYSC_sendto+0x608/0x710 net/socket.c:1696
SyS_sendto+0x8a/0xb0 net/socket.c:1664
do_syscall_64+0xe6/0x130 arch/x86/entry/common.c:285
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246
RIP: 0033:0x401133
RSP: 002b:00007fff6d99cd38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002b0 RCX: 0000000000401133
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000494088 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fff6d99cd90 R08: 00007fff6d99cd50 R09: 000000000000001c
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00000000004063d0 R14: 0000000000406460 R15: 0000000000000000
origin:
save_stack_trace+0x37/0x40 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:302
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb1/0x1a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:198
kmsan_poison_shadow+0x6d/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:211
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2743
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x200/0x360 mm/slub.c:4351
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138
__alloc_skb+0x26b/0x840 net/core/skbuff.c:231
alloc_skb ./include/linux/skbuff.h:933
sctp_packet_transmit+0x31e/0x3a20 net/sctp/output.c:570
sctp_outq_flush+0xeb3/0x46e0 net/sctp/outqueue.c:885
sctp_outq_uncork+0xb2/0xd0 net/sctp/outqueue.c:750
sctp_side_effects net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1773
sctp_do_sm+0x6962/0x6ec0 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1147
sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE+0x12c/0x160 net/sctp/primitive.c:88
sctp_sendmsg+0x43e5/0x4f90 net/sctp/socket.c:1954
inet_sendmsg+0x498/0x670 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:762
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:643
SYSC_sendto+0x608/0x710 net/socket.c:1696
SyS_sendto+0x8a/0xb0 net/socket.c:1664
do_syscall_64+0xe6/0x130 arch/x86/entry/common.c:285
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246
==================================================================
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Some time ago David Woodhouse reported skb_under_panic
when we try to push ethernet header to fragmented ipv6 skbs.
It was fixed for ipv6 by Florian Westphal in
commit 1d325d217c7f ("ipv6: ip6_fragment: fix headroom tests and skb leak")
However similar problem still exist in ipv4.
It does not trigger skb_under_panic due paranoid check
in ip_finish_output2, however according to Alexey Kuznetsov
current state is abnormal and ip_fragment should be fixed too.
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The function __mlx4_zone_remove_one_entry always returns zero. So
it is not necessary to check it.
Cc: Joe Jin <joe.jin@oracle.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Yuval Shaia <yuval.shaia@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Computing the alignment manually for going from priv to pub is probably
not such a good idea, and in general the assumption that going from priv
to pub is possible trivially could change, so rather than relying on
that, we change things to just store a pointer to pub. This was sugested
by DaveM in [1].
[1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg443992.html
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Specifying IDM register space in DT is not mendatory for SoCs
where firmware takes care of IDM operations. This patch updates
BGMAC driver's DT binding documentation indicating the same.
Signed-off-by: Abhishek Shah <abhishek.shah@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Jui <ray.jui@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Oza Oza <oza.oza@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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IDM operations are usually one time ops and should be done in
firmware itself. Driver is not supposed to touch IDM registers.
However, for some SoCs', driver is performing IDM read/writes.
So this patch masks IDM operations in case firmware is taking
care of IDM operations.
Signed-off-by: Abhishek Shah <abhishek.shah@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Oza Oza <oza.oza@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Jui <ray.jui@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Return type for idm register write callback should be void as 'writel'
API is used for write operation. However, there no need to have 'return'
in this function.
Signed-off-by: Abhishek Shah <abhishek.shah@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Oza Oza <oza.oza@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Jui <ray.jui@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Marcelo noticed an array overflow caused by commit c28445c3cb07
("sctp: add reconf_enable in asoc ep and netns"), in which sctp
would add SCTP_CID_RECONF into extensions when reconf_enable is
set in sctp_make_init and sctp_make_init_ack.
Then now when all ext chunks are set, 4 ext chunk ids can be put
into extensions array while extensions array size is 3. It would
cause a kernel panic because of this overflow.
This patch is to fix it by defining extensions array size is 4 in
both sctp_make_init and sctp_make_init_ack.
Fixes: c28445c3cb07 ("sctp: add reconf_enable in asoc ep and netns")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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gcc reports that the temporary buffer for computing the
string length may be too small here:
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/lio_ethtool.c: In function 'lio_get_eeprom_len':
/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/lio_ethtool.c:345:21: error: 'sprintf' may write a terminating nul past the end of the destination [-Werror=format-overflow=]
len = sprintf(buf, "boardname:%s serialnum:%s maj:%lld min:%lld\n",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/lio_ethtool.c:345:6: note: 'sprintf' output between 35 and 167 bytes into a destination of size 128
len = sprintf(buf, "boardname:%s serialnum:%s maj:%lld min:%lld\n",
This extends it to 192 bytes, which is certainly enough. As far
as I could tell, there are no other constraints that require a specific
maximum size.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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gcc-7 notices that "-event-%d" could be more than 11 characters long
if we had larger 'vector' numbers:
drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c: In function 'vmxnet3_activate_dev':
drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c:2095:40: error: 'sprintf' may write a terminating nul past the end of the destination [-Werror=format-overflow=]
sprintf(intr->event_msi_vector_name, "%s-event-%d",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c:2095:3: note: 'sprintf' output between 9 and 33 bytes into a destination of size 32
The current code is safe, but making the string a little longer
is harmless and lets gcc see that it's ok.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Daniel Borkmann
Sabrina Dubroca
Colin Ian King
David Ahern
Martin Hundebøll
Arun Parameswaran
Eugeniy Paltsev
David S. Miller
Levin, Alexander
Dan Carpenter
Paolo Abeni
Christophe Jaillet
Alexander Potapenko
Gao Feng
WANG Cong
Jakub Kicinski
Florian Westphal
Mateusz Jurczyk
Doug Berger
Florian Fainelli
Arvind Yadav
Neal Cardwell
Greg Rose
Vasily Averin
Zhu Yanjun
Jason A. Donenfeld
Abhishek Shah
Xin Long
Arnd Bergmann