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Should not use assignment in if condition.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Aloisio da Silva <marcelo.as@aol.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220218040140.GA22796@snoopy
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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unregister_netdev need to be called when register_netdev succeeds
qlge_health_create_reporters fails.
Fixes: d8827ae8e22b ("staging: qlge: deal with the case that devlink_health_reporter_create fails")
Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua <hbh25y@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220221085552.93561-1-hbh25y@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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One error handler of wfx_init_common() return without calling
ieee80211_free_hw(hw), which may result in memory leak. And I add
one err label to unify the error handler, which is useful for the
subsequent changes.
Suggested-by: Jérôme Pouiller <jerome.pouiller@silabs.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jérôme Pouiller <jerome.pouiller@silabs.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiaoke Wang <xkernel.wang@foxmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/tencent_24A24A3EFF61206ECCC4B94B1C5C1454E108@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Some variants of the WF200 disallow active scan on channel 12 and 13.
For these parts, the channels 12 and 13 are marked IEEE80211_CHAN_NO_IR.
However, the beacon hint procedure was removing the flag
IEEE80211_CHAN_NO_IR from channels where a BSS is discovered. This was
making subsequent scans to fail because the driver was trying active
scans on prohibited channels.
Signed-off-by: Riccardo Ferrazzo <rferrazzo@came.com>
Reviewed-by: Jérôme Pouiller <jerome.pouiller@silabs.com>
Signed-off-by: Jérôme Pouiller <jerome.pouiller@silabs.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220218105358.283769-1-Jerome.Pouiller@silabs.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Since nvmem_unregister() checks for NULL, no need to repeat in
the caller. Drop duplicate NULL checks.
Acked-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220220151527.17216-14-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Since nvmem_unregister() checks for NULL, no need to repeat in
the caller. Drop duplicate NULL checks.
Acked-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220220151527.17216-13-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Update the example to reflect the new API. I have chosen the brcm-nvram
driver since it seems to be simpler than the qfprom driver.
Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <sean.anderson@seco.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220220151527.17216-12-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Since commit 795ddd18d38f ("nvmem: core: remove regmap dependency"),
nvmem devices do not use the regmap API. Remove references to it from
the documentation.
Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <sean.anderson@seco.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220220151527.17216-11-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Add support for the Security Fuse Processor found on Layerscape SoCs.
This driver implements basic read access.
Signed-off-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220220151527.17216-10-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The Security Fuse Processor provides efuses and is responsible for
reading it at SoC startup and configuring it accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220220151527.17216-9-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Replace unnecessary devm_kstrdup() so to avoid redundant memory allocation.
Suggested-by: Martin Blumenstingl <martin.blumenstingl@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiaoke Wang <xkernel.wang@foxmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220220151527.17216-8-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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D1 has a smaller eFuse block than some other recent SoCs, and it no
longer requires a workaround to read the eFuse data.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel@sholland.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220220151527.17216-7-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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D1 has a SID like other Allwinner SoCs, but with a unique eFuse layout.
Add a new compatible string for it.
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel@sholland.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220220151527.17216-6-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This patch fixes below kernel doc warning,
warning: expecting prototype for qfprom_efuse_reg_write().
Prototype was for qfprom_reg_write() instead
No code changes.
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220220151527.17216-5-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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nvmem_unregister() frees resources and standard pattern is to allow
caller to not care if it's NULL or not. This will reduce burden on
the callers to perform this check.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220220151527.17216-4-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Slightly simplify the devm_nvmem_register() by using the
devm_add_action_or_reset().
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220220151527.17216-3-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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There are no users and seems no will come of the devm_nvmem_unregister().
Remove the function and remove the unused devm_nvmem_match() along with it.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220220151527.17216-2-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Wp-gpios property can be used on NVMEM nodes and the same property can
be also used on MTD NAND nodes. In case of the wp-gpios property is
defined at NAND level node, the GPIO management is done at NAND driver
level. Write protect is disabled when the driver is probed or resumed
and is enabled when the driver is released or suspended.
When no partitions are defined in the NAND DT node, then the NAND DT node
will be passed to NVMEM framework. If wp-gpios property is defined in
this node, the GPIO resource is taken twice and the NAND controller
driver fails to probe.
A new Boolean flag named ignore_wp has been added in nvmem_config.
In case ignore_wp is set, it means that the GPIO is handled by the
provider. Lets set this flag in MTD layer to avoid the conflict on
wp_gpios property.
Fixes: 2a127da461a9 ("nvmem: add support for the write-protect pin")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Kerello <christophe.kerello@foss.st.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220220151432.16605-3-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Wp-gpios property can be used on NVMEM nodes and the same property can
be also used on MTD NAND nodes. In case of the wp-gpios property is
defined at NAND level node, the GPIO management is done at NAND driver
level. Write protect is disabled when the driver is probed or resumed
and is enabled when the driver is released or suspended.
When no partitions are defined in the NAND DT node, then the NAND DT node
will be passed to NVMEM framework. If wp-gpios property is defined in
this node, the GPIO resource is taken twice and the NAND controller
driver fails to probe.
It would be possible to set config->wp_gpio at MTD level before calling
nvmem_register function but NVMEM framework will toggle this GPIO on
each write when this GPIO should only be controlled at NAND level driver
to ensure that the Write Protect has not been enabled.
A way to fix this conflict is to add a new boolean flag in nvmem_config
named ignore_wp. In case ignore_wp is set, the GPIO resource will
be managed by the provider.
Fixes: 2a127da461a9 ("nvmem: add support for the write-protect pin")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Kerello <christophe.kerello@foss.st.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220220151432.16605-2-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Jonathan writes:
1st set of IIO fixes for the 5.17 cycle.
Several drivers:
- Fix a failure to disable runtime in probe error paths. All cases
were introduced in the same rework patch.
adi,ad7124
- Fix incorrect register masking.
adi,ad74413r
- Avoid referencing negative array offsets.
- Use ngpio size when iterating over mask not numebr of channels.
- Fix issue with wrong mask uage getting GPIOs.
adi,admv1014
- Drop check on unsigned less than 0.
adi,ads16480
- Correctly handle devices that don't have burst mode support.
fsl,fxls8962af
- Add missing padding needed between address and data for SPI transfers.
men_z188
- Fix iomap leak in error path.
st,lsm6dsx
- Wait for setting time in oneshot reads to get a stable result.
ti,tsc2046
- Prevent an array overflow.
* tag 'iio-fixes-for-5.17a' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jic23/iio:
iio: imu: st_lsm6dsx: wait for settling time in st_lsm6dsx_read_oneshot
iio: Fix error handling for PM
iio: addac: ad74413r: correct comparator gpio getters mask usage
iio: addac: ad74413r: use ngpio size when iterating over mask
iio: addac: ad74413r: Do not reference negative array offsets
iio: adc: men_z188_adc: Fix a resource leak in an error handling path
iio: frequency: admv1013: remove the always true condition
iio: accel: fxls8962af: add padding to regmap for SPI
iio:imu:adis16480: fix buffering for devices with no burst mode
iio: adc: ad7124: fix mask used for setting AIN_BUFP & AIN_BUFM bits
iio: adc: tsc2046: fix memory corruption by preventing array overflow
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Add display workaround # 1309179469 , which fixes a PHY hang when
switching from TBT mode to DP-alt/legacy mode. The workaround also
requires an IFWI/PHY firmware change, before that this change has no
effect (the DKL_PCS_DW5/SOFTRESET flag is always cleared).
HSDES: 18018237866
HSDES: 16014473319
Signed-off-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: José Roberto de Souza <jose.souza@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220218122611.767974-1-imre.deak@intel.com
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Joel writes:
FSI changes for v5.18
* Improvements in SCOM and OCC drivers for error handling and retries
* Addition of tracepoints for initialisation path
* API for setting long running SBE FIFO operations
* tag 'fsi-for-v5.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/joel/fsi:
fsi: Add trace events in initialization path
fsi: sbefifo: Implement FSI_SBEFIFO_READ_TIMEOUT_SECONDS ioctl
fsi: sbefifo: Use specified value of start of response timeout
fsi: occ: Improve response status checking
fsi: scom: Remove retries in indirect scoms
fsi: scom: Fix error handling
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A dsb(ishst) barrier should be enough to order previous writes with
the system register generating the SGI, as we only need to guarantee
the visibility of data to other CPUs in the inner shareable domain
before we send the SGI.
A micro-benchmark is written to verify the performance impact on
kunpeng920 machine with 2 sockets, each socket has 2 dies, and
each die has 24 CPUs, so totally the system has 2 * 2 * 24 = 96
CPUs. ~2% performance improvement can be seen by this benchmark.
The code of benchmark module:
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/timekeeping.h>
volatile int data0 ____cacheline_aligned;
volatile int data1 ____cacheline_aligned;
volatile int data2 ____cacheline_aligned;
volatile int data3 ____cacheline_aligned;
volatile int data4 ____cacheline_aligned;
volatile int data5 ____cacheline_aligned;
volatile int data6 ____cacheline_aligned;
static void ipi_latency_func(void *val)
{
}
static int __init ipi_latency_init(void)
{
ktime_t stime, etime, delta;
int cpu, i;
int start = smp_processor_id();
stime = ktime_get();
for ( i = 0; i < 1000; i++)
for (cpu = 0; cpu < 96; cpu++) {
data0 = data1 = data2 = data3 = data4 = data5 = data6 = cpu;
smp_call_function_single(cpu, ipi_latency_func, NULL, 1);
}
etime = ktime_get();
delta = ktime_sub(etime, stime);
printk("%s ipi from cpu%d to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:%lld\n",
__func__, start, delta);
return 0;
}
module_init(ipi_latency_init);
static void ipi_latency_exit(void)
{
}
module_exit(ipi_latency_exit);
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("IPI benchmark");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
run the below commands 10 times on both Vanilla and the kernel with this
patch:
# taskset -c 0 insmod test.ko
# rmmod test
The result on vanilla:
ipi_latency_init ipi from cpu0 to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:126757449
ipi_latency_init ipi from cpu0 to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:126784249
ipi_latency_init ipi from cpu0 to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:126177703
ipi_latency_init ipi from cpu0 to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:127022281
ipi_latency_init ipi from cpu0 to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:126184883
ipi_latency_init ipi from cpu0 to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:127374585
ipi_latency_init ipi from cpu0 to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:125778089
ipi_latency_init ipi from cpu0 to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:126974441
ipi_latency_init ipi from cpu0 to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:127357625
ipi_latency_init ipi from cpu0 to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:126228184
The result on the kernel with this patch:
ipi_latency_init ipi from cpu0 to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:124467401
ipi_latency_init ipi from cpu0 to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:123474209
ipi_latency_init ipi from cpu0 to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:123558497
ipi_latency_init ipi from cpu0 to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:122993951
ipi_latency_init ipi from cpu0 to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:122984223
ipi_latency_init ipi from cpu0 to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:123323609
ipi_latency_init ipi from cpu0 to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:124507583
ipi_latency_init ipi from cpu0 to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:123386963
ipi_latency_init ipi from cpu0 to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:123340664
ipi_latency_init ipi from cpu0 to cpu0-95 delta of 1000times:123285324
Signed-off-by: Barry Song <song.bao.hua@hisilicon.com>
[maz: tidied up commit message]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220220061910.6155-1-21cnbao@gmail.com
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When handling reset and power-off PSCI calls from the guest, we
initialise X0 to PSCI_RET_INTERNAL_FAILURE in case the VMM tries to
re-run the vCPU after issuing the call.
Unfortunately, this also means that the VMM cannot see which PSCI call
was issued and therefore cannot distinguish between PSCI SYSTEM_RESET
and SYSTEM_RESET2 calls, which is necessary in order to determine the
validity of the "reset_type" in X1.
Allocate bit 0 of the previously unused 'flags' field of the
system_event structure so that we can indicate the PSCI call used to
initiate the reset.
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220221153524.15397-4-will@kernel.org
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PSCI v1.1 introduces the optional SYSTEM_RESET2 call, which allows the
caller to provide a vendor-specific "reset type" and "cookie" to request
a particular form of reset or shutdown.
Expose this call to the guest and handle it in the same way as PSCI
SYSTEM_RESET, along with some basic range checking on the type argument.
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220221153524.15397-3-will@kernel.org
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Expose PSCI version v1.1 to the guest by default. The only difference
for now is that an updated version number is reported by PSCI_VERSION.
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220221153524.15397-2-will@kernel.org
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This symbol is not used outside of printk.c, so marks it static.
Fix the following sparse warning:
kernel/printk/printk.c:100:19: warning: symbol 'suppress_panic_printk'
was not declared. Should it be static?
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220216031957.9761-1-jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com
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Continuing the reasoning of "random: ensure early RDSEED goes through
mixer on init", we don't want RDRAND interacting with anything without
going through the mixer function, as a backdoored CPU could presumably
cancel out data during an xor, which it'd have a harder time doing when
being forced through a cryptographic hash function. There's actually no
need at all to be calling RDRAND in write_pool(), because before we
extract from the pool, we always do so with 32 bytes of RDSEED hashed in
at that stage. Xoring at this stage is needless and introduces a minor
liability.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Continuing the reasoning of "random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in
entropy extraction" from this series, at init time we also don't want to
be xoring RDSEED directly into the crng. Instead it's safer to put it
into our entropy collector and then re-extract it, so that it goes
through a hash function with preimage resistance. As a matter of hygiene,
we also order these now so that the RDSEED byte are hashed in first,
followed by the bytes that are likely more predictable (e.g. utsname()).
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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This is a preparatory commit for the following one. We simply inline the
various functions that rand_initialize() calls that have no other
callers. The compiler was doing this anyway before. Doing this will
allow us to reorganize this after. We can then move the trust_cpu and
parse_trust_cpu definitions a bit closer to where they're actually used,
which makes the code easier to read.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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As the comment said, this is indeed a "hack". Since it was introduced,
it's been a constant state machine nightmare, with lots of subtle early
boot issues and a wildly complex set of machinery to keep everything in
sync. Rather than continuing to play whack-a-mole with this approach,
this commit simply removes it entirely. This commit is preparation for
"random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys" in this
series, which introduces a simpler (and faster) mechanism to accomplish
the same thing.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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When /dev/random was directly connected with entropy extraction, without
any expansion stage, extract_buf() was called for every 10 bytes of data
read from /dev/random. For that reason, RDRAND was used rather than
RDSEED. At the same time, crng_reseed() was still only called every 5
minutes, so there RDSEED made sense.
Those olden days were also a time when the entropy collector did not use
a cryptographic hash function, which meant most bets were off in terms
of real preimage resistance. For that reason too it didn't matter
_that_ much whether RDSEED was mixed in before or after entropy
extraction; both choices were sort of bad.
But now we have a cryptographic hash function at work, and with that we
get real preimage resistance. We also now only call extract_entropy()
every 5 minutes, rather than every 10 bytes. This allows us to do two
important things.
First, we can switch to using RDSEED in extract_entropy(), as Dominik
suggested. Second, we can ensure that RDSEED input always goes into the
cryptographic hash function with other things before being used
directly. This eliminates a category of attacks in which the CPU knows
the current state of the crng and knows that we're going to xor RDSEED
into it, and so it computes a malicious RDSEED. By going through our
hash function, it would require the CPU to compute a preimage on the
fly, which isn't going to happen.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Suggested-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock, so keep holding that lock
when incrementing crng_init from 0 to 1 in crng_fast_load(). The call to
pr_notice() can wait until the lock is released; this code path cannot
be reached twice, as crng_fast_load() aborts early if crng_init > 0.
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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|
Rather than use spinlocks to protect batched entropy, we can instead
disable interrupts locally, since we're dealing with per-cpu data, and
manage resets with a basic generation counter. At the same time, we
can't quite do this on PREEMPT_RT, where we still want spinlocks-as-
mutexes semantics. So we use a local_lock_t, which provides the right
behavior for each. Because this is a per-cpu lock, that generation
counter is still doing the necessary CPU-to-CPU communication.
This should improve performance a bit. It will also fix the linked splat
that Jonathan received with a PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING=y.
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>
Tested-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YfMa0QgsjCVdRAvJ@latitude/
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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|
The primary_crng is always reseeded from the input_pool, while the NUMA
crngs are always reseeded from the primary_crng. Remove the redundant
'use_input_pool' parameter from crng_reseed() and just directly check
whether the crng is the primary_crng.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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|
This is called from various hwgenerator drivers, so rather than having
one "safe" version for userspace and one "unsafe" version for the
kernel, just make everything safe; the checks are cheap and sensible to
have anyway.
Reported-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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|
Now that POOL_BITS == POOL_MIN_BITS, we must unconditionally wake up
entropy writers after every extraction. Therefore there's no point of
write_wakeup_threshold, so we can move it to the dustbin of unused
compatibility sysctls. While we're at it, we can fix a small comparison
where we were waking up after <= min rather than < min.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
|
|
30e37ec516ae ("random: account for entropy loss due to overwrites")
assumed that adding new entropy to the LFSR pool probabilistically
cancelled out old entropy there, so entropy was credited asymptotically,
approximating Shannon entropy of independent sources (rather than a
stronger min-entropy notion) using 1/8th fractional bits and replacing
a constant 2-2/√𝑒 term (~0.786938) with 3/4 (0.75) to slightly
underestimate it. This wasn't superb, but it was perhaps better than
nothing, so that's what was done. Which entropy specifically was being
cancelled out and how much precisely each time is hard to tell, though
as I showed with the attack code in my previous commit, a motivated
adversary with sufficient information can actually cancel out
everything.
Since we're no longer using an LFSR for entropy accumulation, this
probabilistic cancellation is no longer relevant. Rather, we're now
using a computational hash function as the accumulator and we've
switched to working in the random oracle model, from which we can now
revisit the question of min-entropy accumulation, which is done in
detail in <https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/198>.
Consider a long input bit string that is built by concatenating various
smaller independent input bit strings. Each one of these inputs has a
designated min-entropy, which is what we're passing to
credit_entropy_bits(h). When we pass the concatenation of these to a
random oracle, it means that an adversary trying to receive back the
same reply as us would need to become certain about each part of the
concatenated bit string we passed in, which means becoming certain about
all of those h values. That means we can estimate the accumulation by
simply adding up the h values in calls to credit_entropy_bits(h);
there's no probabilistic cancellation at play like there was said to be
for the LFSR. Incidentally, this is also what other entropy accumulators
based on computational hash functions do as well.
So this commit replaces credit_entropy_bits(h) with essentially `total =
min(POOL_BITS, total + h)`, done with a cmpxchg loop as before.
What if we're wrong and the above is nonsense? It's not, but let's
assume we don't want the actual _behavior_ of the code to change much.
Currently that behavior is not extracting from the input pool until it
has 128 bits of entropy in it. With the old algorithm, we'd hit that
magic 128 number after roughly 256 calls to credit_entropy_bits(1). So,
we can retain more or less the old behavior by waiting to extract from
the input pool until it hits 256 bits of entropy using the new code. For
people concerned about this change, it means that there's not that much
practical behavioral change. And for folks actually trying to model
the behavior rigorously, it means that we have an even higher margin
against attacks.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
|
|
Our pool is 256 bits, and we only ever use all of it or don't use it at
all, which is decided by whether or not it has at least 128 bits in it.
So we can drastically simplify the accounting and cmpxchg loop to do
exactly this. While we're at it, we move the minimum bit size into a
constant so it can be shared between the two places where it matters.
The reason we want any of this is for the case in which an attacker has
compromised the current state, and then bruteforces small amounts of
entropy added to it. By demanding a particular minimum amount of entropy
be present before reseeding, we make that bruteforcing difficult.
Note that this rationale no longer includes anything about /dev/random
blocking at the right moment, since /dev/random no longer blocks (except
for at ~boot), but rather uses the crng. In a former life, /dev/random
was different and therefore required a more nuanced account(), but this
is no longer.
Behaviorally, nothing changes here. This is just a simplification of
the code.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
|
|
The current 4096-bit LFSR used for entropy collection had a few
desirable attributes for the context in which it was created. For
example, the state was huge, which meant that /dev/random would be able
to output quite a bit of accumulated entropy before blocking. It was
also, in its time, quite fast at accumulating entropy byte-by-byte,
which matters given the varying contexts in which mix_pool_bytes() is
called. And its diffusion was relatively high, which meant that changes
would ripple across several words of state rather quickly.
However, it also suffers from a few security vulnerabilities. In
particular, inputs learned by an attacker can be undone, but moreover,
if the state of the pool leaks, its contents can be controlled and
entirely zeroed out. I've demonstrated this attack with this SMT2
script, <https://xn--4db.cc/5o9xO8pb>, which Boolector/CaDiCal solves in
a matter of seconds on a single core of my laptop, resulting in little
proof of concept C demonstrators such as <https://xn--4db.cc/jCkvvIaH/c>.
For basically all recent formal models of RNGs, these attacks represent
a significant cryptographic flaw. But how does this manifest
practically? If an attacker has access to the system to such a degree
that he can learn the internal state of the RNG, arguably there are
other lower hanging vulnerabilities -- side-channel, infoleak, or
otherwise -- that might have higher priority. On the other hand, seed
files are frequently used on systems that have a hard time generating
much entropy on their own, and these seed files, being files, often leak
or are duplicated and distributed accidentally, or are even seeded over
the Internet intentionally, where their contents might be recorded or
tampered with. Seen this way, an otherwise quasi-implausible
vulnerability is a bit more practical than initially thought.
Another aspect of the current mix_pool_bytes() function is that, while
its performance was arguably competitive for the time in which it was
created, it's no longer considered so. This patch improves performance
significantly: on a high-end CPU, an i7-11850H, it improves performance
of mix_pool_bytes() by 225%, and on a low-end CPU, a Cortex-A7, it
improves performance by 103%.
This commit replaces the LFSR of mix_pool_bytes() with a straight-
forward cryptographic hash function, BLAKE2s, which is already in use
for pool extraction. Universal hashing with a secret seed was considered
too, something along the lines of <https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/338>,
but the requirement for a secret seed makes for a chicken & egg problem.
Instead we go with a formally proven scheme using a computational hash
function, described in sections 5.1, 6.4, and B.1.8 of
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/198>.
BLAKE2s outputs 256 bits, which should give us an appropriate amount of
min-entropy accumulation, and a wide enough margin of collision
resistance against active attacks. mix_pool_bytes() becomes a simple
call to blake2s_update(), for accumulation, while the extraction step
becomes a blake2s_final() to generate a seed, with which we can then do
a HKDF-like or BLAKE2X-like expansion, the first part of which we fold
back as an init key for subsequent blake2s_update()s, and the rest we
produce to the caller. This then is provided to our CRNG like usual. In
that expansion step, we make opportunistic use of 32 bytes of RDRAND
output, just as before. We also always reseed the crng with 32 bytes,
unconditionally, or not at all, rather than sometimes with 16 as before,
as we don't win anything by limiting beyond the 16 byte threshold.
Going for a hash function as an entropy collector is a conservative,
proven approach. The result of all this is a much simpler and much less
bespoke construction than what's there now, which not only plugs a
vulnerability but also improves performance considerably.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
|
|
The llvm compiler can generate lots of local labels ('.LBB', '.Ltmpxxx',
'.L__unnamed_xx', etc.). These symbols usually are useless for debugging.
And they might overlap with handwritten symbols.
Before this change, a dumpstack shows a local symbol for epc:
[ 0.040341][ T0] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[ 0.040376][ T0] epc : .LBB6_14+0x22/0x6a
[ 0.040452][ T0] ra : restore_all+0x12/0x6e
The simple solution is that we can ignore all local labels prefixed by '.L'.
For handwritten symbols which need to be preserved should drop the '.L'
prefix.
After this change, the C defined symbol is shown so we can locate the
problematical code immediately:
[ 0.035795][ T0] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[ 0.036332][ T0] epc : trace_hardirqs_on+0x54/0x13c
[ 0.036567][ T0] ra : restore_all+0x12/0x6e
Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
|
|
Merge series from Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>:
DT bindings for stacked and parallel flash/memory devices.
base-commit: e783362eb54cd99b2cac8b3a9aeac942e6f6ac07
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The functions copy_page_to_iter_pipe() and push_pipe() can both
allocate a new pipe_buffer, but the "flags" member initializer is
missing.
Fixes: 241699cd72a8 ("new iov_iter flavour: pipe-backed")
To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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|
Resending this to properly add it to the patch tracker - thanks for letting
me know, Arnd :)
When ARM is enabled, and BITREVERSE is disabled,
Kbuild gives the following warning:
WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE
Depends on [n]: BITREVERSE [=n]
Selected by [y]:
- ARM [=y] && (CPU_32v7M [=n] || CPU_32v7 [=y]) && !CPU_32v6 [=n]
This is because ARM selects HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE
without selecting BITREVERSE, despite
HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE depending on BITREVERSE.
This unmet dependency bug was found by Kismet,
a static analysis tool for Kconfig. Please advise if this
is not the appropriate solution.
Signed-off-by: Julian Braha <julianbraha@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
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|
The kgdb code needs to register an undef hook for the Thumb UDF
instruction that will fault in order to be functional on Thumb2
platforms.
Reported-by: Johannes Stezenbach <js@sig21.net>
Tested-by: Johannes Stezenbach <js@sig21.net>
Fixes: 5cbad0ebf45c ("kgdb: support for ARCH=arm")
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
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|
We need to provide a destroy callback to release the extra fields.
Fixes: 3b9e2ea6c11b ("netfilter: nft_limit: move stateful fields out of expression data")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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|
In case of using console="" or console=null
set console_set_on_cmdline=1 to disable "stdout-path" node from DT.
We basically need to set it every time when __add_preferred_console()
is called with parameter 'user_specified' set.
Therefore we can move setting it into a helper function that is
called from __add_preferred_console().
Suggested-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andre Kalb <andre.kalb@sma.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YgzU4ho8l6XapyG2@pc6682
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Unregister flowtable hooks before they are releases via
nf_tables_flowtable_destroy() otherwise hook core reports UAF.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in nf_hook_entries_grow+0x5a7/0x700 net/netfilter/core.c:142 net/netfilter/core.c:142
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880736f7438 by task syz-executor579/3666
CPU: 0 PID: 3666 Comm: syz-executor579 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] lib/dump_stack.c:106
dump_stack_lvl+0x1dc/0x2d8 lib/dump_stack.c:106 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description+0x65/0x380 mm/kasan/report.c:247 mm/kasan/report.c:247
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:433 [inline]
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:433 [inline] mm/kasan/report.c:450
kasan_report+0x19a/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:450 mm/kasan/report.c:450
nf_hook_entries_grow+0x5a7/0x700 net/netfilter/core.c:142 net/netfilter/core.c:142
__nf_register_net_hook+0x27e/0x8d0 net/netfilter/core.c:429 net/netfilter/core.c:429
nf_register_net_hook+0xaa/0x180 net/netfilter/core.c:571 net/netfilter/core.c:571
nft_register_flowtable_net_hooks+0x3c5/0x730 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:7232 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:7232
nf_tables_newflowtable+0x2022/0x2cf0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:7430 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:7430
nfnetlink_rcv_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:513 [inline]
nfnetlink_rcv_skb_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:634 [inline]
nfnetlink_rcv_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:513 [inline] net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:652
nfnetlink_rcv_skb_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:634 [inline] net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:652
nfnetlink_rcv+0x10e6/0x2550 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:652 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:652
__nft_release_hook() calls nft_unregister_flowtable_net_hooks() which
only unregisters the hooks, then after RCU grace period, it is
guaranteed that no packets add new entries to the flowtable (no flow
offload rules and flowtable hooks are reachable from packet path), so it
is safe to call nf_flow_table_free() which cleans up the remaining
entries from the flowtable (both software and hardware) and it unbinds
the flow_block.
Fixes: ff4bf2f42a40 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add nft_unregister_flowtable_hook()")
Reported-by: syzbot+e918523f77e62790d6d9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Tell about 'console=null|""' and how to use it.
It can be helpful to set (enable) CONFIG_NULL_TTY so that the ttynull
driver is available. This avoids problems with stdin/stdout/stderr of
the init process. Howevere, CONFIG_NULL_TTY cannot be enabled by default
because it can be used by mistake, see the commit a91bd6223ecd ("Revert
"init/console: Use ttynull as a fallback when there is no console"").
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
[pmladek@suse.com: Slightly update wording.]
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220216203745.980-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
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...to help userland apps that need to identify FUSE mounts.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
Marcelo Aloisio da Silva
Hangyu Hua
Xiaoke Wang
Riccardo Ferrazzo
Andy Shevchenko
Sean Anderson
Michael Walle
Samuel Holland
Srinivas Kandagatla
Christophe Kerello
Greg Kroah-Hartman
Imre Deak
Barry Song
Will Deacon
Jiapeng Chong
Jason A. Donenfeld
Dominik Brodowski
Eric Biggers
Changbin Du
Mark Brown
Max Kellermann
Julian Braha
Russell King (Oracle)
Florian Westphal
Andre Kalb
Pablo Neira Ayuso
Randy Dunlap
Jeff Layton