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2021-05-01Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-securityLinus Torvalds1-0/+1
Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris: "Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün. Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing. From Mickaël's cover letter: "The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict themselves. Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD Pledge/Unveil. In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features. This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing, init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]" The cover letter and v34 posting is here: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/ See also: https://landlock.io/ This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several years" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2] * tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features landlock: Add user and kernel documentation samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example selftests/landlock: Add user space tests landlock: Add syscall implementations arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls fs,security: Add sb_delete hook landlock: Support filesystem access-control LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock landlock: Add ptrace restrictions landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials landlock: Add ruleset and domain management landlock: Add object management
2021-04-22landlock: Add user and kernel documentationMickaël Salaün1-0/+1
Add a first document describing userspace API: how to define and enforce a Landlock security policy. This is explained with a simple example. The Landlock system calls are described with their expected behavior and current limitations. Another document is dedicated to kernel developers, describing guiding principles and some important kernel structures. This documentation can be built with the Sphinx framework. Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Vincent Dagonneau <vincent.dagonneau@ssi.gouv.fr> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-13-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-03-04docs/bpf: Add bpf() syscall command referenceJoe Stringer1-0/+1
Generate the syscall command reference from the UAPI header file and include it in the main bpf docs page. Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@cilium.io> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin@isovalent.com> Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210302171947.2268128-15-joe@cilium.io
2020-12-30Documentation: Add documentation for new platform_profile sysfs attributeMark Pearson1-0/+1
On modern systems the platform performance, temperature, fan and other hardware related characteristics are often dynamically configurable. The profile is often automatically adjusted to the load by some automatic-mechanism (which may very well live outside the kernel). These auto platform-adjustment mechanisms often can be configured with one of several 'platform-profiles', with either a bias towards low-power consumption or towards performance (and higher power consumption and thermals). Introduce a new platform_profile sysfs API which offers a generic API for selecting the performance-profile of these automatic-mechanisms. Co-developed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Pearson <markpearson@lenovo.com> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2020-10-28docs: userspace-api: add iommu.rst to the index fileMauro Carvalho Chehab1-0/+1
There's a new uAPI doc for IOMMU. Add it to the index file. Should address this warning: .../Documentation/userspace-api/iommu.rst: WARNING: document isn't included in any toctree Fixes: d0023e3ee28d ("docs: IOMMU user API") Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cc55219a551e29848e2282cd8939a4115067234c.1603791716.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2020-04-14media: docs: get rid of Documentation/media/Mauro Carvalho Chehab1-0/+1
Now that everything got moved, we can get rid of the old media directory. Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
2019-10-10docs: Move the user-space ioctl() docs to userspace-apiJonathan Corbet1-0/+1
This is strictly user-space material at this point, so put it with the other user-space API documentation. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2019-07-15docs: ocxl.rst: add it to the uAPI bookMauro Carvalho Chehab1-0/+1
The content of this file is user-faced. Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
2018-05-03prctl: Add speculation control prctlsThomas Gleixner1-0/+1
Add two new prctls to control aspects of speculation related vulnerabilites and their mitigations to provide finer grained control over performance impacting mitigations. PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bit 0-2 with the following meaning: Bit Define Description 0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is disabled 2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is enabled If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature. If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation misfeature will fail. PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which is selected by arg2 of prctl(2) per task. arg3 is used to hand in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE. The common return values are: EINVAL prctl is not implemented by the architecture or the unused prctl() arguments are not 0 ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL has these additional return values: ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's not either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE ENXIO prctl control of the selected speculation misfeature is disabled The first supported controlable speculation misfeature is PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS. Add the define so this can be shared between architectures. Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen and mostly rewritten. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2017-05-18doc: ReSTify no_new_privs.txtKees Cook1-0/+1
This updates no_new_privs documentation to ReST markup and adds it to the user-space API documentation. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-05-18doc: ReSTify seccomp_filter.txtKees Cook1-0/+1
This updates seccomp_filter.txt for ReST markup, and moves it under the user-space API index, since it describes how application author can use seccomp. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-04-02docs: Convert unshare.txt to RST and add to the user-space API manualJonathan Corbet1-0/+2
This is a straightforward conversion, without any real textual changes. Since this document has seen no substantive changes since its addition in 2006, some such changes are probably warranted. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-04-02docs: Create a user-space API guideJonathan Corbet1-0/+24
This is meant to be the place for documentation relevant to application developers. It's empty for the moment, but at least we have a place now! Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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