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This appears to be some kind of copy and paste error, and is actually
dead code.
Pre: f = 0 ⇒ (f >> 32) = 0
f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[0]);
Post: 0 ≤ f < 2³²
put_unaligned_le32(f, dst);
Pre: 0 ≤ f < 2³² ⇒ (f >> 32) = 0
f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[1]);
Post: 0 ≤ f < 2³²
put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 4);
Pre: 0 ≤ f < 2³² ⇒ (f >> 32) = 0
f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[2]);
Post: 0 ≤ f < 2³²
put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 8);
Pre: 0 ≤ f < 2³² ⇒ (f >> 32) = 0
f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[3]);
Post: 0 ≤ f < 2³²
put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 12);
Therefore this sequence is redundant. And Andy's code appears to handle
misalignment acceptably.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.
However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.
Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.
Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.
So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove this flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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For glue code that's used by Zinc, the actual Crypto API functions might
not necessarily exist, and don't need to exist either. Before this
patch, there are valid build configurations that lead to a unbuildable
kernel. This fixes it to conditionalize those symbols on the existence
of the proper config entry.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This is a straight import of the OpenSSL/CRYPTOGAMS Poly1305 implementation for
MIPS authored by Andy Polyakov, a prior 64-bit only version of which has been
contributed by him to the OpenSSL project. The file 'poly1305-mips.pl' is taken
straight from this upstream GitHub repository [0] at commit
d22ade312a7af958ec955620b0d241cf42c37feb, and already contains all the changes
required to build it as part of a Linux kernel module.
[0] https://github.com/dot-asm/cryptogams
Co-developed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@cryptogams.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@cryptogams.org>
Co-developed-by: René van Dorst <opensource@vdorst.com>
Signed-off-by: René van Dorst <opensource@vdorst.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This integrates the accelerated MIPS 32r2 implementation of ChaCha
into both the API and library interfaces of the kernel crypto stack.
The significance of this is that, in addition to becoming available
as an accelerated library implementation, it can also be used by
existing crypto API code such as Adiantum (for block encryption on
ultra low performance cores) or IPsec using chacha20poly1305. These
are use cases that have already opted into using the abstract crypto
API. In order to support Adiantum, the core assembler routine has
been adapted to take the round count as a function argument rather
than hardcoding it to 20.
Co-developed-by: René van Dorst <opensource@vdorst.com>
Signed-off-by: René van Dorst <opensource@vdorst.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This imports the accelerated MIPS 32r2 ChaCha20 implementation from the
Zinc patch set.
Co-developed-by: René van Dorst <opensource@vdorst.com>
Signed-off-by: René van Dorst <opensource@vdorst.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This module registers crc32 and crc32c algorithms that use the
optional CRC32[bhwd] and CRC32C[bhwd] instructions in MIPSr6 cores.
Signed-off-by: Marcin Nowakowski <marcin.nowakowski@mips.com>
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/18601/
[jhogan@kernel.org: Add CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY flag on Eric Biggers'
suggestion, due to commit a208fa8f3303 ("crypto: hash - annotate
algorithms taking optional key") in v4.16-rc1]
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Jason A. Donenfeld
Eric Biggers
Ard Biesheuvel
Marcin Nowakowski