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... and fold its function body into its single call site.
No functional changes:
# arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.o:
text data bss dec hex filename
5994 385 1 6380 18ec amd.o.before
5994 385 1 6380 18ec amd.o.after
md5:
99ec6daa095b502297884e949c520f90 amd.o.before.asm
99ec6daa095b502297884e949c520f90 amd.o.after.asm
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200123165811.5288-1-bp@alien8.de
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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
MPX is being removed from the kernel due to a lack of support
in the toolchain going forward (gcc).
This removes all the remaining (dead at this point) MPX handling
code remaining in the tree. The only remaining code is the XSAVE
support for MPX state which is currently needd for KVM to handle
VMs which might use MPX.
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
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Commit
334b0f4e9b1b ("x86/resctrl: Fix a deadlock due to inaccurate reference")
changed the argument to rdtgroup_kn_lock_live()/rdtgroup_kn_unlock()
within mkdir_rdt_prepare(). That change resulted in an unused function
parameter to mkdir_rdt_prepare().
Clean up the unused function parameter in mkdir_rdt_prepare() and its
callers rdtgroup_mkdir_mon() and rdtgroup_mkdir_ctrl_mon().
Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Shen <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1578500886-21771-5-git-send-email-xiaochen.shen@intel.com
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There is a race condition which results in a deadlock when rmdir and
mkdir execute concurrently:
$ ls /sys/fs/resctrl/c1/mon_groups/m1/
cpus cpus_list mon_data tasks
Thread 1: rmdir /sys/fs/resctrl/c1
Thread 2: mkdir /sys/fs/resctrl/c1/mon_groups/m1
3 locks held by mkdir/48649:
#0: (sb_writers#17){.+.+}, at: [<ffffffffb4ca2aa0>] mnt_want_write+0x20/0x50
#1: (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#8/1){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffb4c8c13b>] filename_create+0x7b/0x170
#2: (rdtgroup_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffb4a4389d>] rdtgroup_kn_lock_live+0x3d/0x70
4 locks held by rmdir/48652:
#0: (sb_writers#17){.+.+}, at: [<ffffffffb4ca2aa0>] mnt_want_write+0x20/0x50
#1: (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#8/1){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffb4c8c3cf>] do_rmdir+0x13f/0x1e0
#2: (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#8){++++}, at: [<ffffffffb4c86d5d>] vfs_rmdir+0x4d/0x120
#3: (rdtgroup_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffb4a4389d>] rdtgroup_kn_lock_live+0x3d/0x70
Thread 1 is deleting control group "c1". Holding rdtgroup_mutex,
kernfs_remove() removes all kernfs nodes under directory "c1"
recursively, then waits for sub kernfs node "mon_groups" to drop active
reference.
Thread 2 is trying to create a subdirectory "m1" in the "mon_groups"
directory. The wrapper kernfs_iop_mkdir() takes an active reference to
the "mon_groups" directory but the code drops the active reference to
the parent directory "c1" instead.
As a result, Thread 1 is blocked on waiting for active reference to drop
and never release rdtgroup_mutex, while Thread 2 is also blocked on
trying to get rdtgroup_mutex.
Thread 1 (rdtgroup_rmdir) Thread 2 (rdtgroup_mkdir)
(rmdir /sys/fs/resctrl/c1) (mkdir /sys/fs/resctrl/c1/mon_groups/m1)
------------------------- -------------------------
kernfs_iop_mkdir
/*
* kn: "m1", parent_kn: "mon_groups",
* prgrp_kn: parent_kn->parent: "c1",
*
* "mon_groups", parent_kn->active++: 1
*/
kernfs_get_active(parent_kn)
kernfs_iop_rmdir
/* "c1", kn->active++ */
kernfs_get_active(kn)
rdtgroup_kn_lock_live
atomic_inc(&rdtgrp->waitcount)
/* "c1", kn->active-- */
kernfs_break_active_protection(kn)
mutex_lock
rdtgroup_rmdir_ctrl
free_all_child_rdtgrp
sentry->flags = RDT_DELETED
rdtgroup_ctrl_remove
rdtgrp->flags = RDT_DELETED
kernfs_get(kn)
kernfs_remove(rdtgrp->kn)
__kernfs_remove
/* "mon_groups", sub_kn */
atomic_add(KN_DEACTIVATED_BIAS, &sub_kn->active)
kernfs_drain(sub_kn)
/*
* sub_kn->active == KN_DEACTIVATED_BIAS + 1,
* waiting on sub_kn->active to drop, but it
* never drops in Thread 2 which is blocked
* on getting rdtgroup_mutex.
*/
Thread 1 hangs here ---->
wait_event(sub_kn->active == KN_DEACTIVATED_BIAS)
...
rdtgroup_mkdir
rdtgroup_mkdir_mon(parent_kn, prgrp_kn)
mkdir_rdt_prepare(parent_kn, prgrp_kn)
rdtgroup_kn_lock_live(prgrp_kn)
atomic_inc(&rdtgrp->waitcount)
/*
* "c1", prgrp_kn->active--
*
* The active reference on "c1" is
* dropped, but not matching the
* actual active reference taken
* on "mon_groups", thus causing
* Thread 1 to wait forever while
* holding rdtgroup_mutex.
*/
kernfs_break_active_protection(
prgrp_kn)
/*
* Trying to get rdtgroup_mutex
* which is held by Thread 1.
*/
Thread 2 hangs here ----> mutex_lock
...
The problem is that the creation of a subdirectory in the "mon_groups"
directory incorrectly releases the active protection of its parent
directory instead of itself before it starts waiting for rdtgroup_mutex.
This is triggered by the rdtgroup_mkdir() flow calling
rdtgroup_kn_lock_live()/rdtgroup_kn_unlock() with kernfs node of the
parent control group ("c1") as argument. It should be called with kernfs
node "mon_groups" instead. What is currently missing is that the
kn->priv of "mon_groups" is NULL instead of pointing to the rdtgrp.
Fix it by pointing kn->priv to rdtgrp when "mon_groups" is created. Then
it could be passed to rdtgroup_kn_lock_live()/rdtgroup_kn_unlock()
instead. And then it operates on the same rdtgroup structure but handles
the active reference of kernfs node "mon_groups" to prevent deadlock.
The same changes are also made to the "mon_data" directories.
This results in some unused function parameters that will be cleaned up
in follow-up patch as the focus here is on the fix only in support of
backporting efforts.
Fixes: c7d9aac61311 ("x86/intel_rdt/cqm: Add mkdir support for RDT monitoring")
Suggested-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Shen <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1578500886-21771-4-git-send-email-xiaochen.shen@intel.com
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There is a race condition in the following scenario which results in an
use-after-free issue when reading a monitoring file and deleting the
parent ctrl_mon group concurrently:
Thread 1 calls atomic_inc() to take refcount of rdtgrp and then calls
kernfs_break_active_protection() to drop the active reference of kernfs
node in rdtgroup_kn_lock_live().
In Thread 2, kernfs_remove() is a blocking routine. It waits on all sub
kernfs nodes to drop the active reference when removing all subtree
kernfs nodes recursively. Thread 2 could block on kernfs_remove() until
Thread 1 calls kernfs_break_active_protection(). Only after
kernfs_remove() completes the refcount of rdtgrp could be trusted.
Before Thread 1 calls atomic_inc() and kernfs_break_active_protection(),
Thread 2 could call kfree() when the refcount of rdtgrp (sentry) is 0
instead of 1 due to the race.
In Thread 1, in rdtgroup_kn_unlock(), referring to earlier rdtgrp memory
(rdtgrp->waitcount) which was already freed in Thread 2 results in
use-after-free issue.
Thread 1 (rdtgroup_mondata_show) Thread 2 (rdtgroup_rmdir)
-------------------------------- -------------------------
rdtgroup_kn_lock_live
/*
* kn active protection until
* kernfs_break_active_protection(kn)
*/
rdtgrp = kernfs_to_rdtgroup(kn)
rdtgroup_kn_lock_live
atomic_inc(&rdtgrp->waitcount)
mutex_lock
rdtgroup_rmdir_ctrl
free_all_child_rdtgrp
/*
* sentry->waitcount should be 1
* but is 0 now due to the race.
*/
kfree(sentry)*[1]
/*
* Only after kernfs_remove()
* completes, the refcount of
* rdtgrp could be trusted.
*/
atomic_inc(&rdtgrp->waitcount)
/* kn->active-- */
kernfs_break_active_protection(kn)
rdtgroup_ctrl_remove
rdtgrp->flags = RDT_DELETED
/*
* Blocking routine, wait for
* all sub kernfs nodes to drop
* active reference in
* kernfs_break_active_protection.
*/
kernfs_remove(rdtgrp->kn)
rdtgroup_kn_unlock
mutex_unlock
atomic_dec_and_test(
&rdtgrp->waitcount)
&& (flags & RDT_DELETED)
kernfs_unbreak_active_protection(kn)
kfree(rdtgrp)
mutex_lock
mon_event_read
rdtgroup_kn_unlock
mutex_unlock
/*
* Use-after-free: refer to earlier rdtgrp
* memory which was freed in [1].
*/
atomic_dec_and_test(&rdtgrp->waitcount)
&& (flags & RDT_DELETED)
/* kn->active++ */
kernfs_unbreak_active_protection(kn)
kfree(rdtgrp)
Fix it by moving free_all_child_rdtgrp() to after kernfs_remove() in
rdtgroup_rmdir_ctrl() to ensure it has the accurate refcount of rdtgrp.
Fixes: f3cbeacaa06e ("x86/intel_rdt/cqm: Add rmdir support")
Suggested-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Shen <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1578500886-21771-3-git-send-email-xiaochen.shen@intel.com
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A resource group (rdtgrp) contains a reference count (rdtgrp->waitcount)
that indicates how many waiters expect this rdtgrp to exist. Waiters
could be waiting on rdtgroup_mutex or some work sitting on a task's
workqueue for when the task returns from kernel mode or exits.
The deletion of a rdtgrp is intended to have two phases:
(1) while holding rdtgroup_mutex the necessary cleanup is done and
rdtgrp->flags is set to RDT_DELETED,
(2) after releasing the rdtgroup_mutex, the rdtgrp structure is freed
only if there are no waiters and its flag is set to RDT_DELETED. Upon
gaining access to rdtgroup_mutex or rdtgrp, a waiter is required to check
for the RDT_DELETED flag.
When unmounting the resctrl file system or deleting ctrl_mon groups,
all of the subdirectories are removed and the data structure of rdtgrp
is forcibly freed without checking rdtgrp->waitcount. If at this point
there was a waiter on rdtgrp then a use-after-free issue occurs when the
waiter starts running and accesses the rdtgrp structure it was waiting
on.
See kfree() calls in [1], [2] and [3] in these two call paths in
following scenarios:
(1) rdt_kill_sb() -> rmdir_all_sub() -> free_all_child_rdtgrp()
(2) rdtgroup_rmdir() -> rdtgroup_rmdir_ctrl() -> free_all_child_rdtgrp()
There are several scenarios that result in use-after-free issue in
following:
Scenario 1:
-----------
In Thread 1, rdtgroup_tasks_write() adds a task_work callback
move_myself(). If move_myself() is scheduled to execute after Thread 2
rdt_kill_sb() is finished, referring to earlier rdtgrp memory
(rdtgrp->waitcount) which was already freed in Thread 2 results in
use-after-free issue.
Thread 1 (rdtgroup_tasks_write) Thread 2 (rdt_kill_sb)
------------------------------- ----------------------
rdtgroup_kn_lock_live
atomic_inc(&rdtgrp->waitcount)
mutex_lock
rdtgroup_move_task
__rdtgroup_move_task
/*
* Take an extra refcount, so rdtgrp cannot be freed
* before the call back move_myself has been invoked
*/
atomic_inc(&rdtgrp->waitcount)
/* Callback move_myself will be scheduled for later */
task_work_add(move_myself)
rdtgroup_kn_unlock
mutex_unlock
atomic_dec_and_test(&rdtgrp->waitcount)
&& (flags & RDT_DELETED)
mutex_lock
rmdir_all_sub
/*
* sentry and rdtgrp are freed
* without checking refcount
*/
free_all_child_rdtgrp
kfree(sentry)*[1]
kfree(rdtgrp)*[2]
mutex_unlock
/*
* Callback is scheduled to execute
* after rdt_kill_sb is finished
*/
move_myself
/*
* Use-after-free: refer to earlier rdtgrp
* memory which was freed in [1] or [2].
*/
atomic_dec_and_test(&rdtgrp->waitcount)
&& (flags & RDT_DELETED)
kfree(rdtgrp)
Scenario 2:
-----------
In Thread 1, rdtgroup_tasks_write() adds a task_work callback
move_myself(). If move_myself() is scheduled to execute after Thread 2
rdtgroup_rmdir() is finished, referring to earlier rdtgrp memory
(rdtgrp->waitcount) which was already freed in Thread 2 results in
use-after-free issue.
Thread 1 (rdtgroup_tasks_write) Thread 2 (rdtgroup_rmdir)
------------------------------- -------------------------
rdtgroup_kn_lock_live
atomic_inc(&rdtgrp->waitcount)
mutex_lock
rdtgroup_move_task
__rdtgroup_move_task
/*
* Take an extra refcount, so rdtgrp cannot be freed
* before the call back move_myself has been invoked
*/
atomic_inc(&rdtgrp->waitcount)
/* Callback move_myself will be scheduled for later */
task_work_add(move_myself)
rdtgroup_kn_unlock
mutex_unlock
atomic_dec_and_test(&rdtgrp->waitcount)
&& (flags & RDT_DELETED)
rdtgroup_kn_lock_live
atomic_inc(&rdtgrp->waitcount)
mutex_lock
rdtgroup_rmdir_ctrl
free_all_child_rdtgrp
/*
* sentry is freed without
* checking refcount
*/
kfree(sentry)*[3]
rdtgroup_ctrl_remove
rdtgrp->flags = RDT_DELETED
rdtgroup_kn_unlock
mutex_unlock
atomic_dec_and_test(
&rdtgrp->waitcount)
&& (flags & RDT_DELETED)
kfree(rdtgrp)
/*
* Callback is scheduled to execute
* after rdt_kill_sb is finished
*/
move_myself
/*
* Use-after-free: refer to earlier rdtgrp
* memory which was freed in [3].
*/
atomic_dec_and_test(&rdtgrp->waitcount)
&& (flags & RDT_DELETED)
kfree(rdtgrp)
If CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB=y, Slab corruption on kmalloc-2k can be observed
like following. Note that "0x6b" is POISON_FREE after kfree(). The
corrupted bits "0x6a", "0x64" at offset 0x424 correspond to
waitcount member of struct rdtgroup which was freed:
Slab corruption (Not tainted): kmalloc-2k start=ffff9504c5b0d000, len=2048
420: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6a 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkjkkkkkkkkkkk
Single bit error detected. Probably bad RAM.
Run memtest86+ or a similar memory test tool.
Next obj: start=ffff9504c5b0d800, len=2048
000: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
010: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Slab corruption (Not tainted): kmalloc-2k start=ffff9504c58ab800, len=2048
420: 6b 6b 6b 6b 64 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkdkkkkkkkkkkk
Prev obj: start=ffff9504c58ab000, len=2048
000: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
010: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Fix this by taking reference count (waitcount) of rdtgrp into account in
the two call paths that currently do not do so. Instead of always
freeing the resource group it will only be freed if there are no waiters
on it. If there are waiters, the resource group will have its flags set
to RDT_DELETED.
It will be left to the waiter to free the resource group when it starts
running and finding that it was the last waiter and the resource group
has been removed (rdtgrp->flags & RDT_DELETED) since. (1) rdt_kill_sb()
-> rmdir_all_sub() -> free_all_child_rdtgrp() (2) rdtgroup_rmdir() ->
rdtgroup_rmdir_ctrl() -> free_all_child_rdtgrp()
Fixes: f3cbeacaa06e ("x86/intel_rdt/cqm: Add rmdir support")
Fixes: 60cf5e101fd4 ("x86/intel_rdt: Add mkdir to resctrl file system")
Suggested-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Shen <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1578500886-21771-2-git-send-email-xiaochen.shen@intel.com
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Both functions call init_intel_cacheinfo() which computes L2 and L3 cache
sizes from CPUID(4). But then they also call cpu_detect_cache_sizes() a
bit later which computes ->x86_tlbsize and L2 size from CPUID(80000006).
However, the latter call is not needed because
- on these CPUs, CPUID(80000006).EBX for ->x86_tlbsize is reserved
- CPUID(80000006).ECX for the L2 size has the same result as CPUID(4)
Therefore, remove the latter call to simplify the code.
[ bp: Rewrite commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Tony W Wang-oc <TonyWWang-oc@zhaoxin.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1579075257-6985-1-git-send-email-TonyWWang-oc@zhaoxin.com
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Monitoring tools that want to find out which resctrl control and monitor
groups a task belongs to must currently read the "tasks" file in every
group until they locate the process ID.
Add an additional file /proc/{pid}/cpu_resctrl_groups to provide this
information:
1) res:
mon:
resctrl is not available.
2) res:/
mon:
Task is part of the root resctrl control group, and it is not associated
to any monitor group.
3) res:/
mon:mon0
Task is part of the root resctrl control group and monitor group mon0.
4) res:group0
mon:
Task is part of resctrl control group group0, and it is not associated
to any monitor group.
5) res:group0
mon:mon1
Task is part of resctrl control group group0 and monitor group mon1.
Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jinshi Chen <jinshi.chen@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200115092851.14761-1-yu.c.chen@intel.com
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Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Misc fixes:
- a resctrl fix for uninitialized objects found by debugobjects
- a resctrl memory leak fix
- fix the unintended re-enabling of the of SME and SEV CPU flags if
memory encryption was disabled at bootup via the MSR space"
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/CPU/AMD: Ensure clearing of SME/SEV features is maintained
x86/resctrl: Fix potential memory leak
x86/resctrl: Fix an imbalance in domain_remove_cpu()
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Currently, there are three static keys in the resctrl file system:
rdt_mon_enable_key and rdt_alloc_enable_key indicate if the monitoring
feature and the allocation feature are enabled, respectively. The
rdt_enable_key is enabled when either the monitoring feature or the
allocation feature is enabled.
If no monitoring feature is present (either hardware doesn't support a
monitoring feature or the feature is disabled by the kernel command line
option "rdt="), rdt_enable_key is still enabled but rdt_mon_enable_key
is disabled.
MBM is a monitoring feature. The MBM overflow handler intends to
check if the monitoring feature is not enabled for fast return.
So check the rdt_mon_enable_key in it instead of the rdt_enable_key as
former is the more accurate check.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Fixes: e33026831bdb ("x86/intel_rdt/mbm: Handle counter overflow")
Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Shen <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1576094705-13660-1-git-send-email-xiaochen.shen@intel.com
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New Zhaoxin family 7 CPUs are not affected by the SWAPGS vulnerability. So
mark these CPUs in the cpu vulnerability whitelist accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Tony W Wang-oc <TonyWWang-oc@zhaoxin.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1579227872-26972-3-git-send-email-TonyWWang-oc@zhaoxin.com
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New Zhaoxin family 7 CPUs are not affected by SPECTRE_V2. So define a
separate cpu_vuln_whitelist bit NO_SPECTRE_V2 and add these CPUs to the cpu
vulnerability whitelist.
Signed-off-by: Tony W Wang-oc <TonyWWang-oc@zhaoxin.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1579227872-26972-2-git-send-email-TonyWWang-oc@zhaoxin.com
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/proc/cpuinfo currently reports Hardware Lock Elision (HLE) feature to
be present on boot cpu even if it was disabled during the bootup. This
is because cpuinfo_x86->x86_capability HLE bit is not updated after TSX
state is changed via the new MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL.
Update the cached HLE bit also since it is expected to change after an
update to CPUID_CLEAR bit in MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL.
Fixes: 95c5824f75f3 ("x86/cpu: Add a "tsx=" cmdline option with TSX disabled by default")
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2529b99546294c893dfa1c89e2b3e46da3369a59.1578685425.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
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If the SME and SEV features are present via CPUID, but memory encryption
support is not enabled (MSR 0xC001_0010[23]), the feature flags are cleared
using clear_cpu_cap(). However, if get_cpu_cap() is later called, these
feature flags will be reset back to present, which is not desired.
Change from using clear_cpu_cap() to setup_clear_cpu_cap() so that the
clearing of the flags is maintained.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.16.x-
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/226de90a703c3c0be5a49565047905ac4e94e8f3.1579125915.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
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Add support for a new version of the Load Store unit bank type as
indicated by its McaType value, which will be present in future SMCA
systems.
Add the new (HWID, MCATYPE) tuple. Reuse the same name, since this is
logically the same to the user.
Also, add the new error descriptions to edac_mce_amd.
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200110015651.14887-2-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com
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Don't print an error message about VMX being disabled by BIOS if KVM,
the sole user of VMX, is disabled. E.g. if KVM is disabled and the MSR
is unlocked, the kernel will intentionally disable VMX when locking
feature control and then complain that "BIOS" disabled VMX.
Fixes: ef4d3bf19855 ("x86/cpu: Clear VMX feature flag if VMX is not fully enabled")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200114202545.20296-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
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It is relatively easy to trigger the following boot splat on an Ice Lake
client platform. The call stack is like:
kernel BUG at kernel/timer/timer.c:1152!
Call Trace:
__queue_delayed_work
queue_delayed_work_on
therm_throt_process
intel_thermal_interrupt
...
The reason is that a CPU's thermal interrupt is enabled prior to
executing its hotplug onlining callback which will initialize the
throttling workqueues.
Such a race can lead to therm_throt_process() accessing an uninitialized
therm_work, leading to the above BUG at a very early bootup stage.
Therefore, unmask the thermal interrupt vector only after having setup
the workqueues completely.
[ bp: Heavily massage commit message and correct comment formatting. ]
Fixes: f6656208f04e ("x86/mce/therm_throt: Optimize notifications of thermal throttle")
Signed-off-by: Chuansheng Liu <chuansheng.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200107004116.59353-1-chuansheng.liu@intel.com
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Add a new feature flag, X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, to track whether
IA32_FEAT_CTL has been initialized. This will allow KVM, and any future
subsystems that depend on IA32_FEAT_CTL, to rely purely on cpufeatures
to query platform support, e.g. allows a future patch to remove KVM's
manual IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR checks.
Various features (on platforms that support IA32_FEAT_CTL) are dependent
on IA32_FEAT_CTL being configured and locked, e.g. VMX and LMCE. The
MSR is always configured during boot, but only if the CPU vendor is
recognized by the kernel. Because CPUID doesn't incorporate the current
IA32_FEAT_CTL value in its reporting of relevant features, it's possible
for a feature to be reported as supported in cpufeatures but not truly
enabled, e.g. if the CPU supports VMX but the kernel doesn't recognize
the CPU.
As a result, without the flag, KVM would see VMX as supported even if
IA32_FEAT_CTL hasn't been initialized, and so would need to manually
read the MSR and check the various enabling bits to avoid taking an
unexpected #GP on VMXON.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-14-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
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Set the synthetic VMX cpufeatures, which need to be kept to preserve
/proc/cpuinfo's ABI, in the common IA32_FEAT_CTL initialization code.
Remove the vendor code that manually sets the synthetic flags.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-13-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
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Add support for generating VMX feature names in capflags.c and use the
resulting x86_vmx_flags to print the VMX flags in /proc/cpuinfo. Don't
print VMX flags if no bits are set in word 0, which holds Pin Controls.
Pin Control's INTR and NMI exiting are fundamental pillars of VMX, if
they are not supported then the CPU is broken, it does not actually
support VMX, or the kernel wasn't built with support for the target CPU.
Print the features in a dedicated "vmx flags" line to avoid polluting
the common "flags" and to avoid having to prefix all flags with "vmx_",
which results in horrendously long names.
Keep synthetic VMX flags in cpufeatures to preserve /proc/cpuinfo's ABI
for those flags. This means that "flags" and "vmx flags" will have
duplicate entries for tpr_shadow (virtual_tpr), vnmi, ept, flexpriority,
vpid and ept_ad, but caps the pollution of "flags" at those six VMX
features. The vendor-specific code that populates the synthetic flags
will be consolidated in a future patch to further minimize the lasting
damage.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-12-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
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Add an entry in struct cpuinfo_x86 to track VMX capabilities and fill
the capabilities during IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR initialization.
Make the VMX capabilities dependent on IA32_FEAT_CTL and
X86_FEATURE_NAMES so as to avoid unnecessary overhead on CPUs that can't
possibly support VMX, or when /proc/cpuinfo is not available.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-11-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
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Now that IA32_FEAT_CTL is always configured and locked for CPUs that are
known to support VMX[*], clear the VMX capability flag if the MSR is
unsupported or BIOS disabled VMX, i.e. locked IA32_FEAT_CTL and didn't
set the appropriate VMX enable bit.
[*] Because init_ia32_feat_ctl() is called from vendors ->c_init(), it's
still possible for IA32_FEAT_CTL to be left unlocked when VMX is
supported by the CPU. This is not fatal, and will be addressed in a
future patch.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-9-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
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Use the recently added IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR initialization sequence to
opportunistically enable VMX support when running on a Zhaoxin CPU.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-8-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
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Use the recently added IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR initialization sequence to
opportunistically enable VMX support when running on a Centaur CPU.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-7-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
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WARN if the IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR is somehow left unlocked now that CPU
initialization unconditionally locks the MSR.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-6-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
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Opportunistically initialize IA32_FEAT_CTL to enable VMX when the MSR is
left unlocked by BIOS. Configuring feature control at boot time paves
the way for similar enabling of other features, e.g. Software Guard
Extensions (SGX).
Temporarily leave equivalent KVM code in place in order to avoid
introducing a regression on Centaur and Zhaoxin CPUs, e.g. removing
KVM's code would leave the MSR unlocked on those CPUs and would break
existing functionality if people are loading kvm_intel on Centaur and/or
Zhaoxin. Defer enablement of the boot-time configuration on Centaur and
Zhaoxin to future patches to aid bisection.
Note, Local Machine Check Exceptions (LMCE) are also supported by the
kernel and enabled via feature control, but the kernel currently uses
LMCE if and only if the feature is explicitly enabled by BIOS. Keep
the current behavior to avoid introducing bugs, future patches can opt
in to opportunistic enabling if it's deemed desirable to do so.
Always lock IA32_FEAT_CTL if it exists, even if the CPU doesn't support
VMX, so that other existing and future kernel code that queries the MSR
can assume it's locked.
Start from a clean slate when constructing the value to write to
IA32_FEAT_CTL, i.e. ignore whatever value BIOS left in the MSR so as not
to enable random features or fault on the WRMSR.
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-5-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
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As pointed out by Boris, the defines for bits in IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL
are quite a mouthful, especially the VMX bits which must differentiate
between enabling VMX inside and outside SMX (TXT) operation. Rename the
MSR and its bit defines to abbreviate FEATURE_CONTROL as FEAT_CTL to
make them a little friendlier on the eyes.
Arguably, the MSR itself should keep the full IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL name
to match Intel's SDM, but a future patch will add a dedicated Kconfig,
file and functions for the MSR. Using the full name for those assets is
rather unwieldy, so bite the bullet and use IA32_FEAT_CTL so that its
nomenclature is consistent throughout the kernel.
Opportunistically, fix a few other annoyances with the defines:
- Relocate the bit defines so that they immediately follow the MSR
define, e.g. aren't mistaken as belonging to MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL.
- Add whitespace around the block of feature control defines to make
it clear they're all related.
- Use BIT() instead of manually encoding the bit shift.
- Use "VMX" instead of "VMXON" to match the SDM.
- Append "_ENABLED" to the LMCE (Local Machine Check Exception) bit to
be consistent with the kernel's verbiage used for all other feature
control bits. Note, the SDM refers to the LMCE bit as LMCE_ON,
likely to differentiate it from IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL.LMCE_EN. Ignore
the (literal) one-off usage of _ON, the SDM is simply "wrong".
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-2-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
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When writing a pid to file "tasks", a callback function move_myself() is
queued to this task to be called when the task returns from kernel mode
or exits. The purpose of move_myself() is to activate the newly assigned
closid and/or rmid associated with this task. This activation is done by
calling resctrl_sched_in() from move_myself(), the same function that is
called when switching to this task.
If this work is successfully queued but then the task enters PF_EXITING
status (e.g., receiving signal SIGKILL, SIGTERM) prior to the
execution of the callback move_myself(), move_myself() still calls
resctrl_sched_in() since the task status is not currently considered.
When a task is exiting, the data structure of the task itself will
be freed soon. Calling resctrl_sched_in() to write the register that
controls the task's resources is unnecessary and it implies extra
performance overhead.
Add check on task status in move_myself() and return immediately if the
task is PF_EXITING.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Shen <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1578500026-21152-1-git-send-email-xiaochen.shen@intel.com
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The function mce_severity() is not required to update its msg argument.
In fact, mce_severity_amd() does not, which makes mce_no_way_out()
return uninitialized data, which may be used later for printing.
Assuming that implementations of mce_severity() either always or never
update the msg argument (which is currently the case), it is sufficient
to initialize the temporary variable in mce_no_way_out().
While at it, avoid printing a useless "Unknown".
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200103150722.20313-4-jschoenh@amazon.de
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Since commit
8b38937b7ab5 ("x86/mce: Do not enter deferred errors into the generic
pool twice")
the mce=nobootlog option has become mostly ineffective (after being only
slightly ineffective before), as the code is taking actions on MCEs left
over from boot when they have a usable address.
Move the check for MCP_DONTLOG a bit outward to make it effective again.
Also, since commit
011d82611172 ("RAS: Add a Corrected Errors Collector")
the two branches of the remaining "if" at the bottom of machine_check_poll()
do same. Unify them.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200103150722.20313-3-jschoenh@amazon.de
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Commit
fa92c5869426 ("x86, mce: Support memory error recovery for both UCNA
and Deferred error in machine_check_poll")
added handling of UCNA and Deferred errors by adding them to the ring
for SRAO errors.
Later, commit
fd4cf79fcc4b ("x86/mce: Remove the MCE ring for Action Optional errors")
switched storage from the SRAO ring to the unified pool that is still
in use today. In order to only act on the intended errors, a filter
for MCE_AO_SEVERITY is used -- effectively removing handling of
UCNA/Deferred errors again.
Extend the severity filter to include UCNA/Deferred errors again.
Also, generalize the naming of the notifier from SRAO to UC to capture
the extended scope.
Note, that this change may cause a message like the following to appear,
as the same address may be reported as SRAO and as UCNA:
Memory failure: 0x5fe3284: already hardware poisoned
Technically, this is a return to previous behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200103150722.20313-2-jschoenh@amazon.de
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Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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.. in order to fix a -Wmissing-prototype warning.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Thiel <b.thiel@posteo.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200109121723.8151-1-b.thiel@posteo.de
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set_cache_qos_cfg() is leaking memory when the given level is not
RDT_RESOURCE_L3 or RDT_RESOURCE_L2. At the moment, this function is
called with only valid levels but move the allocation after the valid
level checks in order to make it more robust and future proof.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Fixes: 99adde9b370de ("x86/intel_rdt: Enable L2 CDP in MSR IA32_L2_QOS_CFG")
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200102165844.133133-1-shakeelb@google.com
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A system that supports resource monitoring may have multiple resources
while not all of these resources are capable of monitoring. Monitoring
related state is initialized only for resources that are capable of
monitoring and correspondingly this state should subsequently only be
removed from these resources that are capable of monitoring.
domain_add_cpu() calls domain_setup_mon_state() only when r->mon_capable
is true where it will initialize d->mbm_over. However,
domain_remove_cpu() calls cancel_delayed_work(&d->mbm_over) without
checking r->mon_capable resulting in an attempt to cancel d->mbm_over on
all resources, even those that never initialized d->mbm_over because
they are not capable of monitoring. Hence, it triggers a debugobjects
warning when offlining CPUs because those timer debugobjects are never
initialized:
ODEBUG: assert_init not available (active state 0) object type:
timer_list hint: 0x0
WARNING: CPU: 143 PID: 789 at lib/debugobjects.c:484
debug_print_object
Hardware name: HP Synergy 680 Gen9/Synergy 680 Gen9 Compute Module, BIOS I40 05/23/2018
RIP: 0010:debug_print_object
Call Trace:
debug_object_assert_init
del_timer
try_to_grab_pending
cancel_delayed_work
resctrl_offline_cpu
cpuhp_invoke_callback
cpuhp_thread_fun
smpboot_thread_fn
kthread
ret_from_fork
Fixes: e33026831bdb ("x86/intel_rdt/mbm: Handle counter overflow")
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: john.stultz@linaro.org
Cc: sboyd@kernel.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: tj@kernel.org
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191211033042.2188-1-cai@lca.pw
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Conflicts:
init/main.c
lib/Kconfig.debug
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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The mutex in mce_inject_log() became unnecessary with commit
5de97c9f6d85 ("x86/mce: Factor out and deprecate the /dev/mcelog driver"),
though the original reason for its presence only vanished with commit
7298f08ea887 ("x86/mcelog: Get rid of RCU remnants").
Drop the mutex. And as that makes mce_inject_log() identical to mce_log(),
get rid of the former in favor of the latter.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191210000733.17979-7-jschoenh@amazon.de
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In commit
b2f9d678e28c ("x86/mce: Check for faults tagged in EXTABLE_CLASS_FAULT exception table entries")
another call to mce_panic() was introduced. Pass the message of the
handled MCE to that instance of mce_panic() as well, as there doesn't
seem to be a reason not to.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191210000733.17979-6-jschoenh@amazon.de
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throttle_active_work() is only called if CONFIG_SYSFS is set, otherwise
we get a harmless warning:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/therm_throt.c:238:13: error: 'throttle_active_work' \
defined but not used [-Werror=unused-function]
Mark the function as __maybe_unused to avoid the warning.
Fixes: f6656208f04e ("x86/mce/therm_throt: Optimize notifications of thermal throttle")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>
Cc: bberg@redhat.com
Cc: ckellner@redhat.com
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: hdegoede@redhat.com
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191210203925.3119091-1-arnd@arndb.de
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The function mce_severity_amd_smca() requires m->bank to be initialized
for correct operation. Fix the one case, where mce_severity() is called
without doing so.
Fixes: 6bda529ec42e ("x86/mce: Grade uncorrected errors for SMCA-enabled systems")
Fixes: d28af26faa0b ("x86/MCE: Initialize mce.bank in the case of a fatal error in mce_no_way_out()")
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Yazen Ghannam <Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191210000733.17979-4-jschoenh@amazon.de
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Each logical CPU in Scalable MCA systems controls a unique set of MCA
banks in the system. These banks are not shared between CPUs. The bank
types and ordering will be the same across CPUs on currently available
systems.
However, some CPUs may see a bank as Reserved/Read-as-Zero (RAZ) while
other CPUs do not. In this case, the bank seen as Reserved on one CPU is
assumed to be the same type as the bank seen as a known type on another
CPU.
In general, this occurs when the hardware represented by the MCA bank
is disabled, e.g. disabled memory controllers on certain models, etc.
The MCA bank is disabled in the hardware, so there is no possibility of
getting an MCA/MCE from it even if it is assumed to have a known type.
For example:
Full system:
Bank | Type seen on CPU0 | Type seen on CPU1
------------------------------------------------
0 | LS | LS
1 | UMC | UMC
2 | CS | CS
System with hardware disabled:
Bank | Type seen on CPU0 | Type seen on CPU1
------------------------------------------------
0 | LS | LS
1 | UMC | RAZ
2 | CS | CS
For this reason, there is a single, global struct smca_banks[] that is
initialized at boot time. This array is initialized on each CPU as it
comes online. However, the array will not be updated if an entry already
exists.
This works as expected when the first CPU (usually CPU0) has all
possible MCA banks enabled. But if the first CPU has a subset, then it
will save a "Reserved" type in smca_banks[]. Successive CPUs will then
not be able to update smca_banks[] even if they encounter a known bank
type.
This may result in unexpected behavior. Depending on the system
configuration, a user may observe issues enumerating the MCA
thresholding sysfs interface. The issues may be as trivial as sysfs
entries not being available, or as severe as system hangs.
For example:
Bank | Type seen on CPU0 | Type seen on CPU1
------------------------------------------------
0 | LS | LS
1 | RAZ | UMC
2 | CS | CS
Extend the smca_banks[] entry check to return if the entry is a
non-reserved type. Otherwise, continue so that CPUs that encounter a
known bank type can update smca_banks[].
Fixes: 68627a697c19 ("x86/mce/AMD, EDAC/mce_amd: Enumerate Reserved SMCA bank type")
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191121141508.141273-1-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com
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... because interrupts are disabled that early and sending IPIs can
deadlock:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/sched/completion.c:99
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/1
no locks held by swapper/1/0.
irq event stamp: 0
hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff8106dda9>] copy_process+0x8b9/0x1ca0
softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8106dda9>] copy_process+0x8b9/0x1ca0
softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
Preemption disabled at:
[<ffffffff8104703b>] start_secondary+0x3b/0x190
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc2+ #1
Hardware name: GIGABYTE MZ01-CE1-00/MZ01-CE1-00, BIOS F02 08/29/2018
Call Trace:
dump_stack
___might_sleep.cold.92
wait_for_completion
? generic_exec_single
rdmsr_safe_on_cpu
? wrmsr_on_cpus
mce_amd_feature_init
mcheck_cpu_init
identify_cpu
identify_secondary_cpu
smp_store_cpu_info
start_secondary
secondary_startup_64
The function smca_configure() is called only on the current CPU anyway,
therefore replace rdmsr_safe_on_cpu() with atomic rdmsr_safe() and avoid
the IPI.
[ bp: Update commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/157252708836.3876.4604398213417262402.stgit@buzz
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... so that all current and future pr_* statements in this file have the
proper prefix.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191112221823.19677-2-bp@alien8.de
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... because it is used only there.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191112221823.19677-1-bp@alien8.de
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pat.h is a file whose main purpose is to provide the memtype_*() APIs.
PAT is the low level hardware mechanism - but the high level abstraction
is memtype.
So name the header <memtype.h> as well - this goes hand in hand with memtype.c
and memtype_interval.c.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Zhang Xiaoxu noted that physical address locations for MTRR were visible
to non-root users, which could be considered an information leak.
In discussing[1] the options for solving this, it sounded like just
moving the capable check into open() was the first step.
If this breaks userspace, then we will have a test case for the more
conservative approaches discussed in the thread. In summary:
- MTRR should check capabilities at open time (or retain the
checks on the opener's permissions for later checks).
- changing the DAC permissions might break something that expects to
open mtrr when not uid 0.
- if we leave the DAC permissions alone and just move the capable check
to the opener, we should get the desired protection. (i.e. check
against CAP_SYS_ADMIN not just the wider uid 0.)
- if that still breaks things, as in userspace expects to be able to
read other parts of the file as non-uid-0 and non-CAP_SYS_ADMIN, then
we need to censor the contents using the opener's permissions. For
example, as done in other /proc cases, like commit
51d7b120418e ("/proc/iomem: only expose physical resource addresses to privileged users").
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/201911110934.AC5BA313@keescook/
Reported-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/201911181308.63F06502A1@keescook
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... by moving the function up in the file.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191108200815.24589-1-bp@alien8.de
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Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Various fixes:
- Fix the PAT performance regression that downgraded write-combining
device memory regions to uncached.
- There's been a number of bugs in 32-bit double fault handling -
hopefully all fixed now.
- Fix an LDT crash
- Fix an FPU over-optimization that broke with GCC9 code
optimizations.
- Misc cleanups"
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/mm/pat: Fix off-by-one bugs in interval tree search
x86/ioperm: Save an indentation level in tss_update_io_bitmap()
x86/fpu: Don't cache access to fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx
x86/entry/32: Remove unused 'restore_all_notrace' local label
x86/ptrace: Document FSBASE and GSBASE ABI oddities
x86/ptrace: Remove set_segment_reg() implementations for current
x86/traps: die() instead of panicking on a double fault
x86/doublefault/32: Rewrite the x86_32 #DF handler and unify with 64-bit
x86/doublefault/32: Move #DF stack and TSS to cpu_entry_area
x86/doublefault/32: Rename doublefault.c to doublefault_32.c
x86/traps: Disentangle the 32-bit and 64-bit doublefault code
lkdtm: Add a DOUBLE_FAULT crash type on x86
selftests/x86/single_step_syscall: Check SYSENTER directly
x86/mm/32: Sync only to VMALLOC_END in vmalloc_sync_all()
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Borislav Petkov
Dave Hansen
Xiaochen Shen
Tony W Wang-oc
Chen Yu
Ingo Molnar
Linus Torvalds
Pawan Gupta
Tom Lendacky
Yazen Ghannam
Sean Christopherson
Chuansheng Liu
Jan H. Schönherr
Benjamin Thiel
Shakeel Butt
Qian Cai
Arnd Bergmann
Konstantin Khlebnikov
Kees Cook