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2017-10-18pkcs7: Prevent NULL pointer dereference, since sinfo is not always set.Eric Sesterhenn1-0/+3
The ASN.1 parser does not necessarily set the sinfo field, this patch prevents a NULL pointer dereference on broken input. Fixes: 99db44350672 ("PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type") Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn <eric.sesterhenn@x41-dsec.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3+
2017-10-18KEYS: checking the input id parameters before finding asymmetric keyChun-Yi Lee1-0/+2
For finding asymmetric key, the input id_0 and id_1 parameters can not be NULL at the same time. This patch adds the BUG_ON checking for id_0 and id_1. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-10-18KEYS: Fix the wrong index when checking the existence of second idChun-Yi Lee1-1/+1
Fix the wrong index number when checking the existence of second id in function of finding asymmetric key. The id_1 is the second id that the index in array must be 1 but not 0. Fixes: 9eb029893ad5 (KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key()) Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-06-09crypto : asymmetric_keys : verify_pefile:zero memory content before freeingLoganaden Velvindron1-2/+2
Signed-off-by: Loganaden Velvindron <logan@hackers.mu> Signed-off-by: Yasir Auleear <yasirmx@hackers.mu> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-06-09X.509: Fix error code in x509_cert_parse()Dan Carpenter1-0/+1
We forgot to set the error code on this path so it could result in returning NULL which leads to a NULL dereference. Fixes: db6c43bd2132 ("crypto: KEYS: convert public key and digsig asym to the akcipher api") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-05-23crypto: asymmetric_keys - handle EBUSY due to backlog correctlyGilad Ben-Yossef1-1/+1
public_key_verify_signature() was passing the CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG flag to akcipher_request_set_callback() but was not handling correctly the case where a -EBUSY error could be returned from the call to crypto_akcipher_verify() if backlog was used, possibly casuing data corruption due to use-after-free of buffers. Resolve this by handling -EBUSY correctly. Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-04-04KEYS: Keyring asymmetric key restrict method with chainingMat Martineau2-45/+144
Add a restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain link restriction that searches for signing keys in the destination keyring in addition to the signing key or keyring designated when the destination keyring was created. Userspace enables this behavior by including the "chain" option in the keyring restriction: keyctl(KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, keyring, "asymmetric", "key_or_keyring:<signing key>:chain"); Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
2017-04-04KEYS: Restrict asymmetric key linkage using a specific keychainMat Martineau2-1/+105
Adds restrict_link_by_signature_keyring(), which uses the restrict_key member of the provided destination_keyring data structure as the key or keyring to search for signing keys. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
2017-04-04KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key typeMat Martineau1-8/+44
Look up asymmetric keyring restriction information using the key-type lookup_restrict hook. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
2017-04-03KEYS: Split role of the keyring pointer for keyring restrict functionsMat Martineau1-3/+5
The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring. Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
2017-04-03PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificatesDavid Howells2-8/+25
PKCS#7: Handle certificates that are blacklisted when verifying the chain of trust on the signatures on a PKCS#7 message. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-04-03X.509: Allow X.509 certs to be blacklistedDavid Howells2-0/+16
Allow X.509 certs to be blacklisted based on their TBSCertificate hash. This is convenient since we have to determine this anyway to be able to check the signature on an X.509 certificate. This is also what UEFI uses in its blacklist. If a certificate built into the kernel is blacklisted, something like the following might then be seen during boot: X.509: Cert 123412341234c55c1dcc601ab8e172917706aa32fb5eaf826813547fdf02dd46 is blacklisted Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (-129) where the hex string shown is the blacklisted hash. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-12-15Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6Linus Torvalds1-0/+1
Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu: "This fixes the following issues: - a crash regression in the new skcipher walker - incorrect return value in public_key_verify_signature - fix for in-place signing in the sign-file utility" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: crypto: skcipher - fix crash in virtual walk sign-file: Fix inplace signing when src and dst names are both specified crypto: asymmetric_keys - set error code on failure
2016-12-14crypto: asymmetric_keys - set error code on failurePan Bian1-0/+1
In function public_key_verify_signature(), returns variable ret on error paths. When the call to kmalloc() fails, the value of ret is 0, and it is not set to an errno before returning. This patch fixes the bug. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=188891 Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-11-25X.509: Fix double free in x509_cert_parse() [ver #3]Andrey Ryabinin1-1/+0
We shouldn't free cert->pub->key in x509_cert_parse() because x509_free_certificate() also does this: BUG: Double free or freeing an invalid pointer ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff81896c20>] dump_stack+0x63/0x83 [<ffffffff81356571>] kasan_object_err+0x21/0x70 [<ffffffff81356ed9>] kasan_report_double_free+0x49/0x60 [<ffffffff813561ad>] kasan_slab_free+0x9d/0xc0 [<ffffffff81350b7a>] kfree+0x8a/0x1a0 [<ffffffff81844fbf>] public_key_free+0x1f/0x30 [<ffffffff818455d4>] x509_free_certificate+0x24/0x90 [<ffffffff818460bc>] x509_cert_parse+0x2bc/0x300 [<ffffffff81846cae>] x509_key_preparse+0x3e/0x330 [<ffffffff818444cf>] asymmetric_key_preparse+0x6f/0x100 [<ffffffff8178bec0>] key_create_or_update+0x260/0x5f0 [<ffffffff8178e6d9>] SyS_add_key+0x199/0x2a0 [<ffffffff821d823b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad Object at ffff880110bd1900, in cache kmalloc-512 size: 512 .... Freed: PID = 2579 [<ffffffff8104283b>] save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 [<ffffffff813558f6>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [<ffffffff81356183>] kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0 [<ffffffff81350b7a>] kfree+0x8a/0x1a0 [<ffffffff818460a3>] x509_cert_parse+0x2a3/0x300 [<ffffffff81846cae>] x509_key_preparse+0x3e/0x330 [<ffffffff818444cf>] asymmetric_key_preparse+0x6f/0x100 [<ffffffff8178bec0>] key_create_or_update+0x260/0x5f0 [<ffffffff8178e6d9>] SyS_add_key+0x199/0x2a0 [<ffffffff821d823b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad Fixes: db6c43bd2132 ("crypto: KEYS: convert public key and digsig asym to the akcipher api") Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-07-18KEYS: Fix for erroneous trust of incorrectly signed X.509 certsMat Martineau1-1/+1
Arbitrary X.509 certificates without authority key identifiers (AKIs) can be added to "trusted" keyrings, including IMA or EVM certs loaded from the filesystem. Signature verification is currently bypassed for certs without AKIs. Trusted keys were recently refactored, and this bug is not present in 4.6. restrict_link_by_signature should return -ENOKEY (no matching parent certificate found) if the certificate being evaluated has no AKIs, instead of bypassing signature checks and returning 0 (new certificate accepted). Reported-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-07-18pefile: Fix the failure of calculation for digestLans Zhang1-1/+6
Commit e68503bd68 forgot to set digest_len and thus cause the following error reported by kexec when launching a crash kernel: kexec_file_load failed: Bad message Fixes: e68503bd68 (KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content) Signed-off-by: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com> Tested-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-07-18PKCS#7: Fix panic when referring to the empty AKID when DEBUG definedLans Zhang1-1/+1
This fix resolves the following kernel panic if an empty or missing AuthorityKeyIdentifier is encountered and DEBUG is defined in pkcs7_verify.c. [ 459.041989] PKEY: <==public_key_verify_signature() = 0 [ 459.041993] PKCS7: Verified signature 1 [ 459.041995] PKCS7: ==> pkcs7_verify_sig_chain() [ 459.041999] PKCS7: verify Sample DB Certificate for SCP: 01 [ 459.042002] PKCS7: - issuer Sample KEK Certificate for SCP [ 459.042014] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 459.042135] IP: [<ffffffff813e7b4c>] pkcs7_verify+0x72c/0x7f0 [ 459.042217] PGD 739e6067 PUD 77719067 PMD 0 [ 459.042286] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 459.042328] Modules linked in: [ 459.042368] CPU: 0 PID: 474 Comm: kexec Not tainted 4.7.0-rc7-WR8.0.0.0_standard+ #18 [ 459.042462] Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 10/09/2014 [ 459.042586] task: ffff880073a50000 ti: ffff8800738e8000 task.ti: ffff8800738e8000 [ 459.042675] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff813e7b4c>] [<ffffffff813e7b4c>] pkcs7_verify+0x72c/0x7f0 [ 459.042784] RSP: 0018:ffff8800738ebd58 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 459.042845] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880076b7da80 RCX: 0000000000000006 [ 459.042929] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff81c85001 RDI: ffffffff81ca00a9 [ 459.043014] RBP: ffff8800738ebd98 R08: 0000000000000400 R09: ffff8800788a304c [ 459.043098] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000000060ca R12: ffff8800769a2bc0 [ 459.043182] R13: ffff880077358300 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8800769a2dc0 [ 459.043268] FS: 00007f24cc741700(0000) GS:ffff880074e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 459.043365] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 459.043431] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000073a36000 CR4: 00000000001006f0 [ 459.043514] Stack: [ 459.043530] 0000000000000000 ffffffbf00000020 31ffffff813e68b0 0000000000000002 [ 459.043644] ffff8800769a2bc0 0000000000000000 00000000007197b8 0000000000000002 [ 459.043756] ffff8800738ebdd8 ffffffff81153fb1 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 459.043869] Call Trace: [ 459.043898] [<ffffffff81153fb1>] verify_pkcs7_signature+0x61/0x140 [ 459.043974] [<ffffffff813e7f0b>] verify_pefile_signature+0x2cb/0x830 [ 459.044052] [<ffffffff813e8470>] ? verify_pefile_signature+0x830/0x830 [ 459.044134] [<ffffffff81048e25>] bzImage64_verify_sig+0x15/0x20 [ 459.046332] [<ffffffff81046e09>] arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig+0x29/0x40 [ 459.048552] [<ffffffff810f10e4>] SyS_kexec_file_load+0x1f4/0x6c0 [ 459.050768] [<ffffffff81050e36>] ? __do_page_fault+0x1b6/0x550 [ 459.052996] [<ffffffff8199241f>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x17/0x93 [ 459.055242] Code: e8 0a d6 ff ff 85 c0 0f 88 7a fb ff ff 4d 39 fd 4d 89 7d 08 74 45 4d 89 fd e9 14 fe ff ff 4d 8b 76 08 31 c0 48 c7 c7 a9 00 ca 81 <41> 0f b7 36 49 8d 56 02 e8 d0 91 d6 ff 4d 8b 3c 24 4d 85 ff 0f [ 459.060535] RIP [<ffffffff813e7b4c>] pkcs7_verify+0x72c/0x7f0 [ 459.063040] RSP <ffff8800738ebd58> [ 459.065456] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 459.075998] ---[ end trace c15f0e897cda28dc ]--- Signed-off-by: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-05-30Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6Linus Torvalds1-0/+1
Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu: "This fixes the following issues: - missing selection in public_key that may result in a build failure - Potential crash in error path in omap-sham - ccp AES XTS bug that affects requests larger than 4096" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: crypto: ccp - Fix AES XTS error for request sizes above 4096 crypto: public_key: select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER crypto: omap-sham - potential Oops on error in probe
2016-05-19crypto: public_key: select CRYPTO_AKCIPHERArnd Bergmann1-0/+1
In some rare randconfig builds, we can end up with ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE enabled but CRYPTO_AKCIPHER disabled, which fails to link because of the reference to crypto_alloc_akcipher: crypto/built-in.o: In function `public_key_verify_signature': :(.text+0x110e4): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_akcipher' This adds a Kconfig 'select' statement to ensure the dependency is always there. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-05-11KEYS: The PKCS#7 test key type should use the secondary keyringDavid Howells1-1/+1
The PKCS#7 test key type should use the secondary keyring instead of the built-in keyring if available as the source of trustworthy keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()David Howells3-56/+33
Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to __key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not. What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring. Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the trustworthiness of a new key. With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through one of the contained keys. Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could be secondarily linked. To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data. If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted() resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code still works correctly with this as it was previously using KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there is no system keyring against which trust can be determined. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11KEYS: Make the system trusted keyring depend on the asymmetric key typeDavid Howells1-1/+1
Make the system trusted keyring depend on the asymmetric key type as there's not a lot of point having it if you can't then load asymmetric keys onto it. This requires the ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE to be made a bool, not a tristate, as the Kconfig language doesn't then correctly force ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE to 'y' rather than 'm' if SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING is 'y'. Making SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING *select* ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE instead doesn't work as the Kconfig interpreter then wrongly complains about dependency loops. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11X.509: Move the trust validation code out to its own fileDavid Howells4-80/+116
Move the X.509 trust validation code out to its own file so that it can be generalised. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11X.509: Use verify_signature() if we have a struct key * to useDavid Howells1-2/+1
We should call verify_signature() rather than directly calling public_key_verify_signature() if we have a struct key to use as we shouldn't be poking around in the private data of the key struct as that's subtype dependent. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key()David Howells4-35/+33
Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key(). It doesn't really have any dependencies on X.509 features as it uses generalised IDs and the public_key structs that contain data extracted from X.509. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11KEYS: Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.cDavid Howells2-89/+89
Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.c so that it can be generalised. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-06PKCS#7: Make trust determination dependent on contents of trust keyringDavid Howells5-19/+5
Make the determination of the trustworthiness of a key dependent on whether a key that can verify it is present in the supplied ring of trusted keys rather than whether or not the verifying key has KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set. verify_pkcs7_signature() will return -ENOKEY if the PKCS#7 message trust chain cannot be verified. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-06KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal contentDavid Howells6-104/+59
Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content through a callback. This allows all the PKCS#7 stuff to be hidden inside this function and removed from the PE file parser and the PKCS#7 test key. If external content is not required, NULL should be passed as data to the function. If the callback is not required, that can be set to NULL. The function is now called verify_pkcs7_signature() to contrast with verify_pefile_signature() and the definitions of both have been moved into linux/verification.h along with the key_being_used_for enum. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-06X.509: Fix self-signed determinationDavid Howells1-0/+9
There's a bug in the code determining whether a certificate is self-signed or not: if they have neither AKID nor SKID then we just assume that the cert is self-signed, which may not be true. Fix this by checking that the raw subject name matches the raw issuer name and that the public key algorithm for the key and signature are both the same in addition to requiring that the AKID bits match. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-06X.509: Extract signature digest and make self-signed cert checks earlierDavid Howells4-71/+110
Extract the signature digest for an X.509 certificate earlier, at the end of x509_cert_parse() rather than leaving it to the callers thereof since it has to be called anyway. Further, immediately after that, check the signature on self-signed certificates, also rather in the callers of x509_cert_parse(). We note in the x509_certificate struct the following bits of information: (1) Whether the signature is self-signed (even if we can't check the signature due to missing crypto). (2) Whether the key held in the certificate needs unsupported crypto to be used. We may get a PKCS#7 message with X.509 certs that we can't make use of - we just ignore them and give ENOPKG at the end it we couldn't verify anything if at least one of these unusable certs are in the chain of trust. (3) Whether the signature held in the certificate needs unsupported crypto to be checked. We can still use the key held in this certificate, even if we can't check the signature on it - if it is held in the system trusted keyring, for instance. We just can't add it to a ring of trusted keys or follow it further up the chain of trust. Making these checks earlier allows x509_check_signature() to be removed and replaced with direct calls to public_key_verify_signature(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-06PKCS#7: Make the signature a pointer rather than embedding itDavid Howells4-48/+55
Point to the public_key_signature struct from the pkcs7_signed_info struct rather than embedding it. This makes the code consistent with the X.509 signature handling and makes it possible to have a common cleanup function. We also save a copy of the digest in the signature without sharing the memory with the crypto layer metadata. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-06X.509: Retain the key verification dataDavid Howells5-66/+67
Retain the key verification data (ie. the struct public_key_signature) including the digest and the key identifiers. Note that this means that we need to take a separate copy of the digest in x509_get_sig_params() rather than lumping it in with the crypto layer data. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-06KEYS: Add identifier pointers to public_key_signature structDavid Howells1-0/+4
Add key identifier pointers to public_key_signature struct so that they can be used to retain the identifier of the key to be used to verify the signature in both PKCS#7 and X.509. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-06KEYS: Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric keyDavid Howells4-9/+34
Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key in the 4th element of the key payload and provide a way for it to be destroyed. For the public key subtype, this will be a public_key_signature struct. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-06X.509: Whitespace cleanupDavid Howells1-2/+2
Clean up some whitespace. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-05PKCS#7: fix missing break on OID_sha224 caseColin Ian King1-0/+1
The OID_sha224 case is missing a break and it falls through to the -ENOPKG error default. Since HASH_ALGO_SHA224 seems to be supported, this looks like an unintentional missing break. Fixes: 07f081fb5057 ("PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.2+ Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-03-30Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6Linus Torvalds1-0/+2
Pull crypto fix from Herbert Xu: "This fixes a bug in pkcs7_validate_trust and its users where the output value may in fact be taken from uninitialised memory" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: PKCS#7: pkcs7_validate_trust(): initialize the _trusted output argument
2016-03-23PKCS#7: pkcs7_validate_trust(): initialize the _trusted output argumentNicolai Stange1-0/+2
Despite what the DocBook comment to pkcs7_validate_trust() says, the *_trusted argument is never set to false. pkcs7_validate_trust() only positively sets *_trusted upon encountering a trusted PKCS#7 SignedInfo block. This is quite unfortunate since its callers, system_verify_data() for example, depend on pkcs7_validate_trust() clearing *_trusted on non-trust. Indeed, UBSAN splats when attempting to load the uninitialized local variable 'trusted' from system_verify_data() in pkcs7_validate_trust(): UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c:194:14 load of value 82 is not a valid value for type '_Bool' [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff818c4d35>] dump_stack+0xbc/0x117 [<ffffffff818c4c79>] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0x169/0x169 [<ffffffff8194113b>] ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x4e [<ffffffff819419fa>] __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value+0x111/0x158 [<ffffffff819418e9>] ? val_to_string.constprop.12+0xcf/0xcf [<ffffffff818334a4>] ? x509_request_asymmetric_key+0x114/0x370 [<ffffffff814b83f0>] ? kfree+0x220/0x370 [<ffffffff818312c2>] ? public_key_verify_signature_2+0x32/0x50 [<ffffffff81835e04>] pkcs7_validate_trust+0x524/0x5f0 [<ffffffff813c391a>] system_verify_data+0xca/0x170 [<ffffffff813c3850>] ? top_trace_array+0x9b/0x9b [<ffffffff81510b29>] ? __vfs_read+0x279/0x3d0 [<ffffffff8129372f>] mod_verify_sig+0x1ff/0x290 [...] The implication is that pkcs7_validate_trust() effectively grants trust when it really shouldn't have. Fix this by explicitly setting *_trusted to false at the very beginning of pkcs7_validate_trust(). Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-03-03X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enumDavid Howells8-67/+46
Make the identifier public key and digest algorithm fields text instead of enum. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-03-03akcipher: Move the RSA DER encoding check to the crypto layerDavid Howells4-243/+93
Move the RSA EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding from the asymmetric-key public_key subtype to the rsa crypto module's pkcs1pad template. This means that the public_key subtype no longer has any dependencies on public key type. To make this work, the following changes have been made: (1) The rsa pkcs1pad template is now used for RSA keys. This strips off the padding and returns just the message hash. (2) In a previous patch, the pkcs1pad template gained an optional second parameter that, if given, specifies the hash used. We now give this, and pkcs1pad checks the encoded message E(M) for the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding and verifies that the correct digest OID is present. (3) The crypto driver in crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c is now reduced to something that doesn't care about what the encryption actually does and and has been merged into public_key.c. (4) CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA is gone. Module signing must set CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA=y instead. Thoughts: (*) Should the encoding style (eg. raw, EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5) also be passed to the padding template? Should there be multiple padding templates registered that share most of the code? Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-02-29X.509: Handle midnight alternative notation in GeneralizedTimeDavid Howells1-1/+1
The ASN.1 GeneralizedTime object carries an ISO 8601 format date and time. The time is permitted to show midnight as 00:00 or 24:00 (the latter being equivalent of 00:00 of the following day). The permitted value is checked in x509_decode_time() but the actual handling is left to mktime64(). Without this patch, certain X.509 certificates will be rejected and could lead to an unbootable kernel. Note that with this patch we also permit any 24:mm:ss time and extend this to UTCTime, which whilst not strictly correct don't permit much leeway in fiddling date strings. Reported-by: Rudolf Polzer <rpolzer@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> cc: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
2016-02-29X.509: Support leap secondsDavid Howells1-1/+1
The format of ASN.1 GeneralizedTime seems to be specified by ISO 8601 [X.680 46.3] and this apparently supports leap seconds (ie. the seconds field is 60). It's not entirely clear that ASN.1 expects it, but we can relax the seconds check slightly for GeneralizedTime. This results in us passing a time with sec as 60 to mktime64(), which handles it as being a duplicate of the 0th second of the next minute. We can't really do otherwise without giving the kernel much greater knowledge of where all the leap seconds are. Unfortunately, this would require change the mapping of the kernel's current-time-in-seconds. UTCTime, however, only supports a seconds value in the range 00-59, but for the sake of simplicity allow this with UTCTime also. Without this patch, certain X.509 certificates will be rejected, potentially making a kernel unbootable. Reported-by: Rudolf Polzer <rpolzer@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> cc: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
2016-02-29X.509: Fix leap year handling againDavid Howells1-4/+4
There are still a couple of minor issues in the X.509 leap year handling: (1) To avoid doing a modulus-by-400 in addition to a modulus-by-100 when determining whether the year is a leap year or not, I divided the year by 100 after doing the modulus-by-100, thereby letting the compiler do one instruction for both, and then did a modulus-by-4. Unfortunately, I then passed the now-modified year value to mktime64() to construct a time value. Since this isn't a fast path and since mktime64() does a bunch of divisions, just condense down to "% 400". It's also easier to read. (2) The default month length for any February where the year doesn't divide by four exactly is obtained from the month_length[] array where the value is 29, not 28. This is fixed by altering the table. Reported-by: Rudolf Polzer <rpolzer@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2016-02-29PKCS#7: fix unitialized boolean 'want'Colin Ian King1-1/+1
The boolean want is not initialized and hence garbage. The default should be false (later it is only set to true on tne sinfo->authattrs check). Found with static analysis using CoverityScan Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-02-10crypto: KEYS: convert public key and digsig asym to the akcipher apiTadeusz Struk11-271/+124
This patch converts the module verification code to the new akcipher API. Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-02-09crypto: keys - Revert "convert public key to akcipher api"Herbert Xu11-124/+272
This needs to go through the security tree so I'm reverting the patches for now. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-02-06crypto: asymmetric_keys - convert public key and digsig asym to the akcipher apiTadeusz Struk11-272/+124
This patch converts the module verification code to the new akcipher API. Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-01-25PKCS#7: Don't require SpcSpOpusInfo in Authenticode pkcs7 signaturesPeter Jones1-3/+1
Dave Young reported: > Hi, > > I saw the warning "Missing required AuthAttr" when testing kexec, > known issue? Idea about how to fix it? > > The kernel is latest linus tree plus sevral patches from Toshi to > cleanup io resource structure. > > in function pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs(): > if (!test_bit(sinfo_has_content_type, &sinfo->aa_set) || > !test_bit(sinfo_has_message_digest, &sinfo->aa_set) || > (ctx->msg->data_type == OID_msIndirectData && > !test_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set))) { > pr_warn("Missing required AuthAttr\n"); > return -EBADMSG; > } > > The third condition below is true: > (ctx->msg->data_type == OID_msIndirectData && > !test_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set)) > > I signed the kernel with redhat test key like below: > pesign -c 'Red Hat Test Certificate' -i arch/x86/boot/bzImage -o /boot/vmlinuz-4.4.0-rc8+ -s --force And right he is! The Authenticode specification is a paragon amongst technical documents, and has this pearl of wisdom to offer: --------------------------------- Authenticode-Specific SignerInfo UnauthenticatedAttributes Structures The following Authenticode-specific data structures are present in SignerInfo authenticated attributes. SpcSpOpusInfo SpcSpOpusInfo is identified by SPC_SP_OPUS_INFO_OBJID (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.12) and is defined as follows: SpcSpOpusInfo ::= SEQUENCE { programName [0] EXPLICIT SpcString OPTIONAL, moreInfo [1] EXPLICIT SpcLink OPTIONAL, } --#public-- SpcSpOpusInfo has two fields: programName This field contains the program description: If publisher chooses not to specify a description, the SpcString structure contains a zero-length program name. If the publisher chooses to specify a description, the SpcString structure contains a Unicode string. moreInfo This field is set to an SPCLink structure that contains a URL for a Web site with more information about the signer. The URL is an ASCII string. --------------------------------- Which is to say that this is an optional *unauthenticated* field which may be present in the Authenticated Attribute list. This is not how pkcs7 is supposed to work, so when David implemented this, he didn't appreciate the subtlety the original spec author was working with, and missed the part of the sublime prose that says this Authenticated Attribute is an Unauthenticated Attribute. As a result, the code in question simply takes as given that the Authenticated Attributes should be authenticated. But this one should not, individually. Because it says it's not authenticated. It still has to hash right so the TBS digest is correct. So it is both authenticated and unauthenticated, all at once. Truly, a wonder of technical accomplishment. Additionally, pesign's implementation has always attempted to be compatible with the signatures emitted from contemporary versions of Microsoft's signtool.exe. During the initial implementation, Microsoft signatures always produced the same values for SpcSpOpusInfo - {U"Microsoft Windows", "http://www.microsoft.com"} - without regard to who the signer was. Sometime between Windows 8 and Windows 8.1 they stopped including the field in their signatures altogether, and as such pesign stopped producing them in commits c0c4da6 and d79cb0c, sometime around June of 2012. The theory here is that anything that breaks with pesign signatures would also be breaking with signtool.exe sigs as well, and that'll be a more noticed problem for firmwares parsing it, so it'll get fixed. The fact that we've done exactly this bug in Linux code is first class, grade A irony. So anyway, we should not be checking this field for presence or any particular value: if the field exists, it should be at the right place, but aside from that, as long as the hash matches the field is good. Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Tested-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-01-17Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-securityLinus Torvalds1-0/+2
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: - EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel (EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring. - Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks. - Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2. - Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA. * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits) selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix KEYS: refcount bug fix ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking IMA: policy can be updated zero times selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm() selinux: export validatetrans decisions gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code ...
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