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2020-10-02crypto: caam/qi2 - add support for XTS with 16B IVAndrei Botila1-5/+10
Newer CAAM versions (Era 9+) support 16B IVs. Since for these devices the HW limitation is no longer present newer version should process the requests containing 16B IVs directly in hardware without using a fallback. Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-10-02crypto: caam/qi - add support for XTS with 16B IVAndrei Botila1-4/+8
Newer CAAM versions (Era 9+) support 16B IVs. Since for these devices the HW limitation is no longer present newer version should process the requests containing 16B IVs directly in hardware without using a fallback. Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-10-02crypto: caam/jr - add support for XTS with 16B IVAndrei Botila2-15/+24
Newer CAAM versions (Era 9+) support 16B IVs. Since for these devices the HW limitation is no longer present newer version should process the requests containing 16B IVs directly in hardware without using a fallback. Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-10-02crypto: caam - add xts check for block length equal to zeroAndrei Botila3-4/+24
XTS should not return succes when dealing with block length equal to zero. This is different than the rest of the skcipher algorithms. Fixes: 31bb2f0da1b50 ("crypto: caam - check zero-length input") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.4+ Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-10-02crypto: caam/qi2 - add support for more XTS key lengthsAndrei Botila1-4/+12
CAAM accelerator only supports XTS-AES-128 and XTS-AES-256 since it adheres strictly to the standard. All the other key lengths are accepted and processed through a fallback as long as they pass the xts_verify_key() checks. Fixes: 226853ac3ebe ("crypto: caam/qi2 - add skcipher algorithms") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+ Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-10-02crypto: caam/qi - add support for more XTS key lengthsAndrei Botila1-3/+10
CAAM accelerator only supports XTS-AES-128 and XTS-AES-256 since it adheres strictly to the standard. All the other key lengths are accepted and processed through a fallback as long as they pass the xts_verify_key() checks. Fixes: b189817cf789 ("crypto: caam/qi - add ablkcipher and authenc algorithms") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+ Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-10-02crypto: caam/jr - add support for more XTS key lengthsAndrei Botila1-3/+10
CAAM accelerator only supports XTS-AES-128 and XTS-AES-256 since it adheres strictly to the standard. All the other key lengths are accepted and processed through a fallback as long as they pass the xts_verify_key() checks. Fixes: c6415a6016bf ("crypto: caam - add support for acipher xts(aes)") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.4+ Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-10-02crypto: caam/qi2 - add fallback for XTS with more than 8B IVAndrei Botila3-5/+78
A hardware limitation exists for CAAM until Era 9 which restricts the accelerator to IVs with only 8 bytes. When CAAM has a lower era a fallback is necessary to process 16 bytes IV. Fixes: 226853ac3ebe ("crypto: caam/qi2 - add skcipher algorithms") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+ Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-10-02crypto: caam/qi - add fallback for XTS with more than 8B IVAndrei Botila2-5/+68
A hardware limitation exists for CAAM until Era 9 which restricts the accelerator to IVs with only 8 bytes. When CAAM has a lower era a fallback is necessary to process 16 bytes IV. Fixes: b189817cf789 ("crypto: caam/qi - add ablkcipher and authenc algorithms") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+ Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-10-02crypto: caam/jr - add fallback for XTS with more than 8B IVAndrei Botila2-7/+66
A hardware limitation exists for CAAM until Era 9 which restricts the accelerator to IVs with only 8 bytes. When CAAM has a lower era a fallback is necessary to process 16 bytes IV. Fixes: c6415a6016bf ("crypto: caam - add support for acipher xts(aes)") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.4+ Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-09-25crypto: caam - Convert to DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTEQinglang Miao1-21/+2
Use DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE macro to simplify the code. Signed-off-by: Qinglang Miao <miaoqinglang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-09-18crypto: caam - Simplify with dev_err_probe()Krzysztof Kozlowski1-2/+1
Common pattern of handling deferred probe can be simplified with dev_err_probe(). Less code and the error value gets printed. Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-09-18crypto: caam - Fix kerneldocKrzysztof Kozlowski4-8/+11
Fix kerneldoc warnings like: drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c:73: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'struct caam_ctx' drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c:2962: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'struct caam_hash_ctx' drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c:449: warning: Function parameter or member 'ctrl' not described in 'caam_get_era' Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-09-11crypto: caam - use traditional error check patternAndy Shevchenko1-4/+3
Use traditional error check pattern ret = ...; if (ret) return ret; ... instead of checking error code to be 0. Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-08-21crypto: caam - Move debugfs fops into standalone fileHoria Geantă6-102/+136
Currently the debugfs fops are defined in caam/intern.h. This causes problems because it creates identical static functions and variables in multiple files. It also creates warnings when those files don't use the fops. This patch moves them into a standalone file, debugfs.c. It also removes unnecessary uses of ifdefs on CONFIG_DEBUG_FS. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> [Moved most of debugfs-related operations into debugfs.c.] Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-08-07mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()Waiman Long1-14/+14
As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-07-31crypto: caam/qi2 - add module aliasHoria Geantă1-0/+1
Add a module alias, to enable udev-based module autoloading: $ modinfo -F alias drivers/crypto/caam/dpaa2_caam.ko fsl-mc:v00001957ddpseci Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-07-31crypto: caam - add more RNG hw error codesHoria Geantă1-0/+3
In some cases, e.g. when TRNG is not properly configured, the RNG module could issue a "Hardware error" at runtime. "Continuos check" error is emitted when some of the BISTs fail. Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-07-31crypto: caam/jr - remove incorrect reference to caam_jr_register()Dan Douglass1-2/+1
caam_jr_register() function is no longer part of the driver since commit 6dad41158db6 ("crypto: caam - Remove unused functions from Job Ring") This patch removes a comment referencing the function. Signed-off-by: Dan Douglass <dan.douglass@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-07-31crypto: caam - silence .setkey in case of bad key lengthHoria Geantă3-3/+3
In case of bad key length, driver emits "key size mismatch" messages, but only for xts(aes) algorithms. Reduce verbosity by making them visible only when debugging. This way crypto fuzz testing log cleans up a bit. Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-07-31crypto: caam/qi2 - create ahash shared descriptors only onceHoria Geantă1-1/+5
For keyed hash algorithms, shared descriptors are currently generated twice: -at tfm initialization time, in cra_init() callback -in setkey() callback Since it's mandatory to call setkey() for keyed algorithms, drop the generation in cra_init(). This is similar to the change in caamhash (caam/jr top-level library) commit 9a2537d0ebc9 ("crypto: caam - create ahash shared descriptors only once") Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-07-31crypto: caam/qi2 - fix error reporting for caam_hash_allocHoria Geantă1-1/+1
Fix error reporting when preparation of an hmac algorithm for registration fails: print the hmac algorithm name, not the unkeyed hash algorithm name. Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-07-31crypto: caam - remove deadcode on 32-bit platformsFranck LENORMAND1-3/+8
When building on a platform with a 32bit DMA address, taking the upper 32 bits makes no sense. Signed-off-by: Franck LENORMAND <franck.lenormand@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-07-16crypto: drivers - set the flag CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORYMikulas Patocka4-8/+14
Set the flag CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY in the crypto drivers that allocate memory. drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-core.c: sun8i_ce_cipher drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-core.c: sun8i_ss_cipher drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-core.c: meson_cipher drivers/crypto/axis/artpec6_crypto.c: artpec6_crypto_common_init drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.c: spu_skcipher_rx_sg_create drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c: aead_edesc_alloc drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi.c: aead_edesc_alloc drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c: aead_edesc_alloc drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c: hash_digest_key drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_algs.c: process_request drivers/crypto/cavium/nitrox/nitrox_aead.c: nitrox_process_se_request drivers/crypto/cavium/nitrox/nitrox_skcipher.c: nitrox_process_se_request drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-aes-cmac.c: ccp_do_cmac_update drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-aes-galois.c: ccp_crypto_enqueue_request drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-aes-xts.c: ccp_crypto_enqueue_request drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-aes.c: ccp_crypto_enqueue_request drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-des3.c: ccp_crypto_enqueue_request drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-sha.c: ccp_crypto_enqueue_request drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c: create_cipher_wr drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec/sec_algs.c: sec_alloc_and_fill_hw_sgl drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c: sec_alloc_req_id drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c: safexcel_queue_req drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c: safexcel_ahash_enqueue drivers/crypto/ixp4xx_crypto.c: ablk_perform drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa/cipher.c: mv_cesa_skcipher_dma_req_init drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa/hash.c: mv_cesa_ahash_dma_req_init drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_algs.c: create_ctx_hdr drivers/crypto/n2_core.c: n2_compute_chunks drivers/crypto/picoxcell_crypto.c: spacc_sg_to_ddt drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c: qat_alg_skcipher_encrypt drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c: qce_skcipher_async_req_handle drivers/crypto/talitos.c : talitos_edesc_alloc drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c: __virtio_crypto_skcipher_do_req drivers/crypto/xilinx/zynqmp-aes-gcm.c: zynqmp_aes_aead_cipher Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> [EB: avoid overly-long lines] Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-07-16crypto: caam - Remove broken arc4 supportHerbert Xu2-30/+0
The arc4 algorithm requires storing state in the request context in order to allow more than one encrypt/decrypt operation. As this driver does not seem to do that, it means that using it for more than one operation is broken. Fixes: eaed71a44ad9 ("crypto: caam - add ecb(*) support") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/CAMj1kXGvMe_A_iQ43Pmygg9xaAM-RLy=_M=v+eg--8xNmv9P+w@mail.gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20200702101947.682-1-ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-06-26crypto: caam/qi2 - fix return code in ahash_finup_no_ctx()Horia Geantă1-4/+6
ahash_finup_no_ctx() returns -ENOMEM in most error cases, and this is fine for almost all of them. However, the return code provided by dpaa2_caam_enqueue() (e.g. -EIO or -EBUSY) shouldn't be overridden by -ENOMEM. Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-06-18crypto: caam - Fix argument type in handle_imx6_err005766Herbert Xu1-1/+1
The function handle_imx6_err005766 needs to take an __iomem argument as otherwise sparse will generate two warnings. Fixes: 33d69455e402 ("crypto: caam - limit AXI pipeline to a...") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-06-18crypto: caam/qi2 - remove redundant assignment to retColin Ian King1-2/+0
The variable ret is being assigned a value that is never read, the error exit path via label 'unmap' returns -ENOMEM anyhow, so assigning ret with -ENOMEM is redundamt. Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-06-18crypto: caam/qi2 - add support for dpseci_reset()Andrei Botila4-0/+36
Add support for dpseci_reset() command for DPSECI objects. For DPSECI DPAA2 objects with version lower than v5.4 reset command was broken in MC f/w. Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-06-18crypto: caam - add clock info for VFxxx SoCsAndrey Smirnov1-0/+10
Add a small bit of plumbing necessary to use CAAM on VFxxx SoCs. Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com> Cc: Chris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com> Cc: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com> Cc: linux-imx@nxp.com Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-06-15crypto: caam - fix typosHeinrich Schuchardt4-13/+13
Fix CAAM related typos. Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-04-16crypto: caam - fix the address of the last entry of S/GIuliana Prodan1-1/+1
For skcipher algorithms, the input, output HW S/G tables look like this: [IV, src][dst, IV] Now, we can have 2 conditions here: - there is no IV; - src and dst are equal (in-place encryption) and scattered and the error is an "off-by-one" in the HW S/G table. This issue was seen with KASAN: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in skcipher_edesc_alloc+0x95c/0x1018 Read of size 4 at addr ffff000022a02958 by task cryptomgr_test/321 CPU: 2 PID: 321 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 5.6.0-rc1-00165-ge4ef8383-dirty #4 Hardware name: LS1046A RDB Board (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x260 show_stack+0x14/0x20 dump_stack+0xe8/0x144 print_address_description.isra.11+0x64/0x348 __kasan_report+0x11c/0x230 kasan_report+0xc/0x18 __asan_load4+0x90/0xb0 skcipher_edesc_alloc+0x95c/0x1018 skcipher_encrypt+0x84/0x150 crypto_skcipher_encrypt+0x50/0x68 test_skcipher_vec_cfg+0x4d4/0xc10 test_skcipher_vec+0x178/0x1d8 alg_test_skcipher+0xec/0x230 alg_test.part.44+0x114/0x4a0 alg_test+0x1c/0x60 cryptomgr_test+0x34/0x58 kthread+0x1b8/0x1c0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Allocated by task 321: save_stack+0x24/0xb0 __kasan_kmalloc.isra.10+0xc4/0xe0 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x18 __kmalloc+0x178/0x2b8 skcipher_edesc_alloc+0x21c/0x1018 skcipher_encrypt+0x84/0x150 crypto_skcipher_encrypt+0x50/0x68 test_skcipher_vec_cfg+0x4d4/0xc10 test_skcipher_vec+0x178/0x1d8 alg_test_skcipher+0xec/0x230 alg_test.part.44+0x114/0x4a0 alg_test+0x1c/0x60 cryptomgr_test+0x34/0x58 kthread+0x1b8/0x1c0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Freed by task 0: (stack is not available) The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff000022a02800 which belongs to the cache dma-kmalloc-512 of size 512 The buggy address is located 344 bytes inside of 512-byte region [ffff000022a02800, ffff000022a02a00) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:fffffe00006a8000 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff00093200c400 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0xffff00000010200(slab|head) raw: 0ffff00000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff00093200c400 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff000022a02800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff000022a02880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff000022a02900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff000022a02980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff000022a02a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Fixes: 334d37c9e263 ("crypto: caam - update IV using HW support") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.3+ Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-04-16crypto: caam - fix use-after-free KASAN issue for RSA algorithmsIuliana Prodan1-2/+6
Here's the KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rsa_pub_done+0x70/0xe8 Read of size 1 at addr ffff000023082014 by task swapper/0/0 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc1-00162-gfcb90d5 #60 Hardware name: LS1046A RDB Board (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x260 show_stack+0x14/0x20 dump_stack+0xe8/0x144 print_address_description.isra.11+0x64/0x348 __kasan_report+0x11c/0x230 kasan_report+0xc/0x18 __asan_load1+0x5c/0x68 rsa_pub_done+0x70/0xe8 caam_jr_dequeue+0x390/0x608 tasklet_action_common.isra.13+0x1ec/0x230 tasklet_action+0x24/0x30 efi_header_end+0x1a4/0x370 irq_exit+0x114/0x128 __handle_domain_irq+0x80/0xe0 gic_handle_irq+0x50/0xa0 el1_irq+0xb8/0x180 cpuidle_enter_state+0xa4/0x490 cpuidle_enter+0x48/0x70 call_cpuidle+0x44/0x70 do_idle+0x304/0x338 cpu_startup_entry+0x24/0x40 rest_init+0xf8/0x10c arch_call_rest_init+0xc/0x14 start_kernel+0x774/0x7b4 Allocated by task 263: save_stack+0x24/0xb0 __kasan_kmalloc.isra.10+0xc4/0xe0 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x18 __kmalloc+0x178/0x2b8 rsa_edesc_alloc+0x2cc/0xe10 caam_rsa_enc+0x9c/0x5f0 test_akcipher_one+0x78c/0x968 alg_test_akcipher+0x78/0xf8 alg_test.part.44+0x114/0x4a0 alg_test+0x1c/0x60 cryptomgr_test+0x34/0x58 kthread+0x1b8/0x1c0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Freed by task 0: save_stack+0x24/0xb0 __kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x188 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 kfree+0x7c/0x298 rsa_pub_done+0x68/0xe8 caam_jr_dequeue+0x390/0x608 tasklet_action_common.isra.13+0x1ec/0x230 tasklet_action+0x24/0x30 efi_header_end+0x1a4/0x370 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff000023082000 which belongs to the cache dma-kmalloc-256 of size 256 The buggy address is located 20 bytes inside of 256-byte region [ffff000023082000, ffff000023082100) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:fffffe00006c2080 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff00093200c200 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0xffff00000010200(slab|head) raw: 0ffff00000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff00093200c200 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff000023081f00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff000023081f80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >ffff000023082000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff000023082080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff000023082100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Fixes: bf53795025a2 ("crypto: caam - add crypto_engine support for RSA algorithms") Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-04-16crypto: caam - fix use-after-free KASAN issue for HASH algorithmsIuliana Prodan1-2/+6
Here's the KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ahash_done+0xdc/0x3b8 Read of size 1 at addr ffff00002303f010 by task swapper/0/0 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc1-00162-gfcb90d5 #59 Hardware name: LS1046A RDB Board (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x260 show_stack+0x14/0x20 dump_stack+0xe8/0x144 print_address_description.isra.11+0x64/0x348 __kasan_report+0x11c/0x230 kasan_report+0xc/0x18 __asan_load1+0x5c/0x68 ahash_done+0xdc/0x3b8 caam_jr_dequeue+0x390/0x608 tasklet_action_common.isra.13+0x1ec/0x230 tasklet_action+0x24/0x30 efi_header_end+0x1a4/0x370 irq_exit+0x114/0x128 __handle_domain_irq+0x80/0xe0 gic_handle_irq+0x50/0xa0 el1_irq+0xb8/0x180 cpuidle_enter_state+0xa4/0x490 cpuidle_enter+0x48/0x70 call_cpuidle+0x44/0x70 do_idle+0x304/0x338 cpu_startup_entry+0x24/0x40 rest_init+0xf8/0x10c arch_call_rest_init+0xc/0x14 start_kernel+0x774/0x7b4 Allocated by task 263: save_stack+0x24/0xb0 __kasan_kmalloc.isra.10+0xc4/0xe0 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x18 __kmalloc+0x178/0x2b8 ahash_edesc_alloc+0x58/0x1f8 ahash_final_no_ctx+0x94/0x6e8 ahash_final+0x24/0x30 crypto_ahash_op+0x58/0xb0 crypto_ahash_final+0x30/0x40 do_ahash_op+0x2c/0xa0 test_ahash_vec_cfg+0x894/0x9e0 test_hash_vec_cfg+0x6c/0x88 test_hash_vec+0xfc/0x1e0 __alg_test_hash+0x1ac/0x368 alg_test_hash+0xf8/0x1c8 alg_test.part.44+0x114/0x4a0 alg_test+0x1c/0x60 cryptomgr_test+0x34/0x58 kthread+0x1b8/0x1c0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Freed by task 0: save_stack+0x24/0xb0 __kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x188 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 kfree+0x7c/0x298 ahash_done+0xd4/0x3b8 caam_jr_dequeue+0x390/0x608 tasklet_action_common.isra.13+0x1ec/0x230 tasklet_action+0x24/0x30 efi_header_end+0x1a4/0x370 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff00002303f000 which belongs to the cache dma-kmalloc-128 of size 128 The buggy address is located 16 bytes inside of 128-byte region [ffff00002303f000, ffff00002303f080) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:fffffe00006c0fc0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff00093200c000 index:0x0 flags: 0xffff00000000200(slab) raw: 0ffff00000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff00093200c000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff00002303ef00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff00002303ef80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >ffff00002303f000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff00002303f080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff00002303f100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Fixes: 21b014f038d3 ("crypto: caam - add crypto_engine support for HASH algorithms") Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-04-16crypto: caam - fix use-after-free KASAN issue for AEAD algorithmsIuliana Prodan1-1/+3
Here's the KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in aead_crypt_done+0x60/0xd8 Read of size 1 at addr ffff00002303f014 by task swapper/0/0 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc1-00162-gfcb90d5 #58 Hardware name: LS1046A RDB Board (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x260 show_stack+0x14/0x20 dump_stack+0xe8/0x144 print_address_description.isra.11+0x64/0x348 __kasan_report+0x11c/0x230 kasan_report+0xc/0x18 __asan_load1+0x5c/0x68 aead_crypt_done+0x60/0xd8 caam_jr_dequeue+0x390/0x608 tasklet_action_common.isra.13+0x1ec/0x230 tasklet_action+0x24/0x30 efi_header_end+0x1a4/0x370 irq_exit+0x114/0x128 __handle_domain_irq+0x80/0xe0 gic_handle_irq+0x50/0xa0 el1_irq+0xb8/0x180 _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x78 finish_task_switch+0xa4/0x2f8 __schedule+0x3a4/0x890 schedule_idle+0x28/0x50 do_idle+0x22c/0x338 cpu_startup_entry+0x24/0x40 rest_init+0xf8/0x10c arch_call_rest_init+0xc/0x14 start_kernel+0x774/0x7b4 Allocated by task 263: save_stack+0x24/0xb0 __kasan_kmalloc.isra.10+0xc4/0xe0 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x18 __kmalloc+0x178/0x2b8 aead_edesc_alloc+0x1b4/0xbf0 ipsec_gcm_encrypt+0xd4/0x140 crypto_aead_encrypt+0x50/0x68 test_aead_vec_cfg+0x498/0xec0 test_aead_vec+0x110/0x200 alg_test_aead+0xfc/0x680 alg_test.part.44+0x114/0x4a0 alg_test+0x1c/0x60 cryptomgr_test+0x34/0x58 kthread+0x1b8/0x1c0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Freed by task 0: save_stack+0x24/0xb0 __kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x188 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 kfree+0x7c/0x298 aead_crypt_done+0x58/0xd8 caam_jr_dequeue+0x390/0x608 tasklet_action_common.isra.13+0x1ec/0x230 tasklet_action+0x24/0x30 efi_header_end+0x1a4/0x370 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff00002303f000 which belongs to the cache dma-kmalloc-128 of size 128 The buggy address is located 20 bytes inside of 128-byte region [ffff00002303f000, ffff00002303f080) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:fffffe00006c0fc0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff00093200c000 index:0x0 flags: 0xffff00000000200(slab) raw: 0ffff00000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff00093200c000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff00002303ef00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff00002303ef80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >ffff00002303f000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff00002303f080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff00002303f100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Fixes: 1c2402266713 ("crypto: caam - add crypto_engine support for AEAD algorithms") Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-04-16crypto: caam - fix use-after-free KASAN issue for SKCIPHER algorithmsIuliana Prodan1-1/+3
Here's the KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skcipher_crypt_done+0xe8/0x1a8 Read of size 1 at addr ffff00002304001c by task swapper/0/0 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc1-00162-gfcb90d5 #57 Hardware name: LS1046A RDB Board (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x260 show_stack+0x14/0x20 dump_stack+0xe8/0x144 print_address_description.isra.11+0x64/0x348 __kasan_report+0x11c/0x230 kasan_report+0xc/0x18 __asan_load1+0x5c/0x68 skcipher_crypt_done+0xe8/0x1a8 caam_jr_dequeue+0x390/0x608 tasklet_action_common.isra.13+0x1ec/0x230 tasklet_action+0x24/0x30 efi_header_end+0x1a4/0x370 irq_exit+0x114/0x128 __handle_domain_irq+0x80/0xe0 gic_handle_irq+0x50/0xa0 el1_irq+0xb8/0x180 _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x78 finish_task_switch+0xa4/0x2f8 __schedule+0x3a4/0x890 schedule_idle+0x28/0x50 do_idle+0x22c/0x338 cpu_startup_entry+0x24/0x40 rest_init+0xf8/0x10c arch_call_rest_init+0xc/0x14 start_kernel+0x774/0x7b4 Allocated by task 263: save_stack+0x24/0xb0 __kasan_kmalloc.isra.10+0xc4/0xe0 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x18 __kmalloc+0x178/0x2b8 skcipher_edesc_alloc+0x21c/0x1018 skcipher_encrypt+0x84/0x150 crypto_skcipher_encrypt+0x50/0x68 test_skcipher_vec_cfg+0x4d4/0xc10 test_skcipher_vec+0xf8/0x1d8 alg_test_skcipher+0xec/0x230 alg_test.part.44+0x114/0x4a0 alg_test+0x1c/0x60 cryptomgr_test+0x34/0x58 kthread+0x1b8/0x1c0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Freed by task 0: save_stack+0x24/0xb0 __kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x188 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 kfree+0x7c/0x298 skcipher_crypt_done+0xe0/0x1a8 caam_jr_dequeue+0x390/0x608 tasklet_action_common.isra.13+0x1ec/0x230 tasklet_action+0x24/0x30 efi_header_end+0x1a4/0x370 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff000023040000 which belongs to the cache dma-kmalloc-512 of size 512 The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of 512-byte region [ffff000023040000, ffff000023040200) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:fffffe00006c1000 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff00093200c400 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0xffff00000010200(slab|head) raw: 0ffff00000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff00093200c400 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff00002303ff00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff00002303ff80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >ffff000023040000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff000023040080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff000023040100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Fixes: ee38767f152a ("crypto: caam - support crypto_engine framework for SKCIPHER algorithms") Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-03-30crypto: caam - limit single JD RNG output to maximum of 16 bytesAndrey Smirnov1-10/+11
In order to follow recommendation in SP800-90C (section "9.4 The Oversampling-NRBG Construction") limit the output of "generate" JD submitted to CAAM. See https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/VI1PR0402MB3485EF10976A4A69F90E5B0F98580@VI1PR0402MB3485.eurprd04.prod.outlook.com/ for more details. This change should make CAAM's hwrng driver good enough to have 1024 quality rating. Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Cc: Chris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com> Cc: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de> Cc: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-imx@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-03-30crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNGAndrey Smirnov5-15/+68
Instantiate CAAM RNG with prediction resistance enabled to improve its quality (with PR on DRNG is forced to reseed from TRNG every time random data is generated). Management Complex firmware with version lower than 10.20.0 doesn't provide prediction resistance support. Consider this and only instantiate rng when mc f/w version is lower. Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@nxp.com> Cc: Chris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com> Cc: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de> Cc: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-imx@nxp.com Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-03-30crypto: caam - invalidate entropy register during RNG initializationAndrey Smirnov2-4/+10
In order to make sure that we always use non-stale entropy data, change the code to invalidate entropy register during RNG initialization. Signed-off-by: Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Vipul Kumar <vipul_kumar@mentor.com> [andrew.smirnov@gmail.com ported to upstream kernel, rewrote commit msg] Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Cc: Chris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com> Cc: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de> Cc: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-imx@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-03-30crypto: caam - check if RNG job failedAndrey Smirnov1-6/+15
We shouldn't stay silent if RNG job fails. Add appropriate code to check for that case and propagate error code up appropriately. Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Cc: Chris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com> Cc: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de> Cc: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-imx@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-03-30crypto: caam - simplify RNG implementationAndrey Smirnov1-215/+107
Rework CAAM RNG implementation as follows: - Make use of the fact that HWRNG supports partial reads and will handle such cases gracefully by removing recursion in caam_read() - Convert blocking caam_read() codepath to do a single blocking job read directly into requested buffer, bypassing any intermediary buffers - Convert async caam_read() codepath into a simple single reader/single writer FIFO use-case, thus simplifying concurrency handling and delegating buffer read/write position management to KFIFO subsystem. - Leverage the same low level RNG data extraction code for both async and blocking caam_read() scenarios, get rid of the shared job descriptor and make non-shared one as a simple as possible (just HEADER + ALGORITHM OPERATION + FIFO STORE) - Split private context from DMA related memory, so that the former could be allocated without GFP_DMA. NOTE: On its face value this commit decreased throughput numbers reported by dd if=/dev/hwrng of=/dev/null bs=1 count=100K [iflag=nonblock] by about 15%, however commits that enable prediction resistance and limit JR total size impact the performance so much and move the bottleneck such as to make this regression irrelevant. NOTE: On the bright side, this commit reduces RNG in kernel DMA buffer memory usage from 2 x RN_BUF_SIZE (~256K) to 32K. Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Cc: Chris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com> Cc: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de> Cc: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-imx@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-03-30crypto: caam - drop global context pointer and init_doneAndrey Smirnov3-43/+44
Leverage devres to get rid of code storing global context as well as init_done flag. Original code also has a circular deallocation dependency where unregister_algs() -> caam_rng_exit() -> caam_jr_free() chain would only happen if all of JRs were freed. Fix this by moving caam_rng_exit() outside of unregister_algs() and doing it specifically for JR that instantiated HWRNG. Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com> Cc: Chris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com> Cc: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de> Cc: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-imx@nxp.com Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-03-30crypto: caam - use struct hwrng's .init for initializationAndrey Smirnov1-23/+24
Make caamrng code a bit more symmetric by moving initialization code to .init hook of struct hwrng. Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Cc: Chris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com> Cc: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de> Cc: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-imx@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-03-30crypto: caam - allocate RNG instantiation descriptor with GFP_DMAAndrey Smirnov1-2/+2
Be consistent with the rest of the codebase and use GFP_DMA when allocating memory for a CAAM JR descriptor. Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Cc: Chris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com> Cc: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de> Cc: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Cc: linux-imx@nxp.com Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-03-06crypto: caam - update xts sector size for large input lengthAndrei Botila1-2/+14
Since in the software implementation of XTS-AES there is no notion of sector every input length is processed the same way. CAAM implementation has the notion of sector which causes different results between the software implementation and the one in CAAM for input lengths bigger than 512 bytes. Increase sector size to maximum value on 16 bits. Fixes: c6415a6016bf ("crypto: caam - add support for acipher xts(aes)") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+ Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-03-06crypto: caam/qi2 - fix chacha20 data size errorHoria Geantă1-4/+10
HW generates a Data Size error for chacha20 requests that are not a multiple of 64B, since algorithm state (AS) does not have the FINAL bit set. Since updating req->iv (for chaining) is not required, modify skcipher descriptors to set the FINAL bit for chacha20. [Note that for skcipher decryption we know that ctx1_iv_off is 0, which allows for an optimization by not checking algorithm type, since append_dec_op1() sets FINAL bit for all algorithms except AES.] Also drop the descriptor operations that save the IV. However, in order to keep code logic simple, things like S/G tables generation etc. are not touched. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.3+ Fixes: 334d37c9e263 ("crypto: caam - update IV using HW support") Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Tested-by: Valentin Ciocoi Radulescu <valentin.ciocoi@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-03-06crypto: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array memberGustavo A. R. Silva4-7/+7
The current codebase makes use of the zero-length array language extension to the C90 standard, but the preferred mechanism to declare variable-length types such as these ones is a flexible array member[1][2], introduced in C99: struct foo { int stuff; struct boo array[]; }; By making use of the mechanism above, we will get a compiler warning in case the flexible array does not occur last in the structure, which will help us prevent some kind of undefined behavior bugs from being inadvertently introduced[3] to the codebase from now on. Also, notice that, dynamic memory allocations won't be affected by this change: "Flexible array members have incomplete type, and so the sizeof operator may not be applied. As a quirk of the original implementation of zero-length arrays, sizeof evaluates to zero."[1] This issue was found with the help of Coccinelle. [1] https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Zero-Length.html [2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21 [3] commit 76497732932f ("cxgb3/l2t: Fix undefined behaviour") Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-02-22crypto: caam - add crypto_engine support for HASH algorithmsIuliana Prodan1-51/+123
Add crypto_engine support for HASH algorithms, to make use of the engine queue. The requests, with backlog flag, will be listed into crypto-engine queue and processed by CAAM when free. Only the backlog request are sent to crypto-engine since the others can be handled by CAAM, if free, especially since JR has up to 1024 entries (more than the 10 entries from crypto-engine). Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-02-22crypto: caam - add crypto_engine support for RSA algorithmsIuliana Prodan2-24/+114
Add crypto_engine support for RSA algorithms, to make use of the engine queue. The requests, with backlog flag, will be listed into crypto-engine queue and processed by CAAM when free. In case the queue is empty, the request is directly sent to CAAM. Only the backlog request are sent to crypto-engine since the others can be handled by CAAM, if free, especially since JR has up to 1024 entries (more than the 10 entries from crypto-engine). Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-02-22crypto: caam - add crypto_engine support for AEAD algorithmsIuliana Prodan1-30/+77
Add crypto_engine support for AEAD algorithms, to make use of the engine queue. The requests, with backlog flag, will be listed into crypto-engine queue and processed by CAAM when free. If sending just the backlog request to crypto-engine, and non-blocking directly to CAAM, the latter requests have a better chance to be executed since JR has up to 1024 entries, more than the 10 entries from crypto-engine. Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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