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When fsl,erratum-a011043 is set, adjust for erratum A011043:
MDIO reads to internal PCS registers may result in having
the MDIO_CFG[MDIO_RD_ER] bit set, even when there is no
error and read data (MDIO_DATA[MDIO_DATA]) is correct.
Software may get false read error when reading internal
PCS registers through MDIO. As a workaround, all internal
MDIO accesses should ignore the MDIO_CFG[MDIO_RD_ER] bit.
Signed-off-by: Madalin Bucur <madalin.bucur@oss.nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Add fsl,erratum-a011043 to internal MDIO buses.
Software may get false read error when reading internal
PCS registers through MDIO. As a workaround, all internal
MDIO accesses should ignore the MDIO_CFG[MDIO_RD_ER] bit.
Signed-off-by: Madalin Bucur <madalin.bucur@oss.nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Add an entry for erratum A011043: the MDIO_CFG[MDIO_RD_ER]
bit may be falsely set when reading internal PCS registers.
MDIO reads to internal PCS registers may result in having
the MDIO_CFG[MDIO_RD_ER] bit set, even when there is no
error and read data (MDIO_DATA[MDIO_DATA]) is correct.
Software may get false read error when reading internal
PCS registers through MDIO. As a workaround, all internal
MDIO accesses should ignore the MDIO_CFG[MDIO_RD_ER] bit.
Signed-off-by: Madalin Bucur <madalin.bucur@oss.nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Driver while collecting firmware dump takes longer time to
collect/process some of the firmware dump entries/memories.
Bigger capture masks makes it worse as it results in larger
amount of data being collected and results in CPU soft lockup.
Place cond_resched() in some of the driver flows that are
expectedly time consuming to relinquish the CPU to avoid CPU
soft lockup panic.
Signed-off-by: Shahed Shaikh <shshaikh@marvell.com>
Tested-by: Yonggen Xu <Yonggen.Xu@dell.com>
Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In commit 9f79b78ef744 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to
unsafe_put_user()") I changed filldir to not do individual __put_user()
accesses, but instead use unsafe_put_user() surrounded by the proper
user_access_begin/end() pair.
That make them enormously faster on modern x86, where the STAC/CLAC
games make individual user accesses fairly heavy-weight.
However, the user_access_begin() range was not really the exact right
one, since filldir() has the unfortunate problem that it needs to not
only fill out the new directory entry, it also needs to fix up the
previous one to contain the proper file offset.
It's unfortunate, but the "d_off" field in "struct dirent" is _not_ the
file offset of the directory entry itself - it's the offset of the next
one. So we end up backfilling the offset in the previous entry as we
walk along.
But since x86 didn't really care about the exact range, and used to be
the only architecture that did anything fancy in user_access_begin() to
begin with, the filldir[64]() changes did something lazy, and even
commented on it:
/*
* Note! This range-checks 'previous' (which may be NULL).
* The real range was checked in getdents
*/
if (!user_access_begin(dirent, sizeof(*dirent)))
goto efault;
and it all worked fine.
But now 32-bit ppc is starting to also implement user_access_begin(),
and the fact that we faked the range to only be the (possibly not even
valid) previous directory entry becomes a problem, because ppc32 will
actually be using the range that is passed in for more than just "check
that it's user space".
This is a complete rewrite of Christophe's original patch.
By saving off the record length of the previous entry instead of a
pointer to it in the filldir data structures, we can simplify the range
check and the writing of the previous entry d_off field. No need for
any conditionals in the user accesses themselves, although we retain the
conditional EINTR checking for the "was this the first directory entry"
signal handling latency logic.
Fixes: 9f79b78ef744 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/a02d3426f93f7eb04960a4d9140902d278cab0bb.1579697910.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/408c90c4068b00ea8f1c41cca45b84ec23d4946b.1579783936.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr/
Reported-and-tested-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Commit 8a23eb804ca4 ("Make filldir[64]() verify the directory entry
filename is valid") added some minimal validity checks on the directory
entries passed to filldir[64](). But they really were pretty minimal.
This fleshes out at least the name length check: we used to disallow
zero-length names, but really, negative lengths or oevr-long names
aren't ok either. Both could happen if there is some filesystem
corruption going on.
Now, most filesystems tend to use just an "unsigned char" or similar for
the length of a directory entry name, so even with a corrupt filesystem
you should never see anything odd like that. But since we then use the
name length to create the directory entry record length, let's make sure
it actually is half-way sensible.
Note how POSIX states that the size of a path component is limited by
NAME_MAX, but we actually use PATH_MAX for the check here. That's
because while NAME_MAX is generally the correct maximum name length
(it's 255, for the same old "name length is usually just a byte on
disk"), there's nothing in the VFS layer that really cares.
So the real limitation at a VFS layer is the total pathname length you
can pass as a filename: PATH_MAX.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Should work properly with the latest sbios on 5.5 and newer
kernels.
Reviewed-by: Hawking Zhang <Hawking.Zhang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
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Set d0 and d1 pin directions for spi0 and spi1 as per their pinmux.
Signed-off-by: Raag Jadav <raagjadav@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
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When submitting v2 of "fou: Support binding FoU socket" (1713cb37bf67),
I accidentally sent the wrong version of the patch and one fix was
missing. In the initial version of the patch, as well as the version 2
that I submitted, I incorrectly used ".type" for the two V6-attributes.
The correct is to use ".len".
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Fixes: 1713cb37bf67 ("fou: Support binding FoU socket")
Signed-off-by: Kristian Evensen <kristian.evensen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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If both IFF_NAPI_FRAGS mode and XDP are enabled, and the XDP program
consumes the skb, we need to clear the napi.skb (or risk
a use-after-free) and release the mutex (or risk a deadlock)
WARNING: lock held when returning to user space!
5.5.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.0/455 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
1 lock held by syz-executor.0/455:
#0: ffff888098f6e748 (&tfile->napi_mutex){+.+.}, at: tun_get_user+0x1604/0x3fc0 drivers/net/tun.c:1835
Fixes: 90e33d459407 ("tun: enable napi_gro_frags() for TUN/TAP driver")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Petar Penkov <ppenkov@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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During reload (or module unload), the router block is de-initialized.
Among other things, this results in the removal of a default multicast
route from each active virtual router (VRF). These default routes are
configured during initialization to trap packets to the CPU. In
Spectrum-2, unlike Spectrum-1, multicast routes are implemented using
ACL rules.
Since the router block is de-initialized before the ACL block, it is
possible that the ACL rules corresponding to the default routes are
deleted while being accessed by the ACL delayed work that queries rules'
activity from the device. This can result in a rare use-after-free [1].
Fix this by protecting the rules list accessed by the delayed work with
a lock. We cannot use a spinlock as the activity read operation is
blocking.
[1]
[ 123.331662] ==================================================================
[ 123.339920] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_activity_update_work+0x330/0x3b0
[ 123.349381] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881f3bb4520 by task kworker/0:2/78
[ 123.357080]
[ 123.358773] CPU: 0 PID: 78 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc5-custom-33108-gf5df95d3ef41 #2209
[ 123.368898] Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN3700C/VMOD0008, BIOS 5.11 10/10/2018
[ 123.378456] Workqueue: mlxsw_core mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_activity_update_work
[ 123.385970] Call Trace:
[ 123.388734] dump_stack+0xc6/0x11e
[ 123.392568] print_address_description.constprop.4+0x21/0x340
[ 123.403236] __kasan_report.cold.8+0x76/0xb1
[ 123.414884] kasan_report+0xe/0x20
[ 123.418716] mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_activity_update_work+0x330/0x3b0
[ 123.444034] process_one_work+0xb06/0x19a0
[ 123.453731] worker_thread+0x91/0xe90
[ 123.467348] kthread+0x348/0x410
[ 123.476847] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
[ 123.480863]
[ 123.482545] Allocated by task 73:
[ 123.486273] save_stack+0x19/0x80
[ 123.490000] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.6+0xc1/0xd0
[ 123.495379] mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_create+0xa7/0x230
[ 123.500566] mlxsw_sp2_mr_tcam_route_create+0xf6/0x3e0
[ 123.506334] mlxsw_sp_mr_tcam_route_create+0x5b4/0x820
[ 123.512102] mlxsw_sp_mr_table_create+0x3b5/0x690
[ 123.517389] mlxsw_sp_vr_get+0x289/0x4d0
[ 123.521797] mlxsw_sp_fib_node_get+0xa2/0x990
[ 123.526692] mlxsw_sp_router_fib4_event_work+0x54c/0x2d60
[ 123.532752] process_one_work+0xb06/0x19a0
[ 123.537352] worker_thread+0x91/0xe90
[ 123.541471] kthread+0x348/0x410
[ 123.545103] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
[ 123.549113]
[ 123.550795] Freed by task 518:
[ 123.554231] save_stack+0x19/0x80
[ 123.557958] __kasan_slab_free+0x125/0x170
[ 123.562556] kfree+0xd7/0x3a0
[ 123.565895] mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_destroy+0x63/0xd0
[ 123.571081] mlxsw_sp2_mr_tcam_route_destroy+0xd5/0x130
[ 123.576946] mlxsw_sp_mr_tcam_route_destroy+0xba/0x260
[ 123.582714] mlxsw_sp_mr_table_destroy+0x1ab/0x290
[ 123.588091] mlxsw_sp_vr_put+0x1db/0x350
[ 123.592496] mlxsw_sp_fib_node_put+0x298/0x4c0
[ 123.597486] mlxsw_sp_vr_fib_flush+0x15b/0x360
[ 123.602476] mlxsw_sp_router_fib_flush+0xba/0x470
[ 123.607756] mlxsw_sp_vrs_fini+0xaa/0x120
[ 123.612260] mlxsw_sp_router_fini+0x137/0x384
[ 123.617152] mlxsw_sp_fini+0x30a/0x4a0
[ 123.621374] mlxsw_core_bus_device_unregister+0x159/0x600
[ 123.627435] mlxsw_devlink_core_bus_device_reload_down+0x7e/0xb0
[ 123.634176] devlink_reload+0xb4/0x380
[ 123.638391] devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0x610/0x700
[ 123.643382] genl_rcv_msg+0x6a8/0xdc0
[ 123.647497] netlink_rcv_skb+0x134/0x3a0
[ 123.651904] genl_rcv+0x29/0x40
[ 123.655436] netlink_unicast+0x4d4/0x700
[ 123.659843] netlink_sendmsg+0x7c0/0xc70
[ 123.664251] __sys_sendto+0x265/0x3c0
[ 123.668367] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe2/0x1b0
[ 123.672773] do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x530
[ 123.676892] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 123.682552]
[ 123.684238] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881f3bb4500
[ 123.684238] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
[ 123.698261] The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of
[ 123.698261] 128-byte region [ffff8881f3bb4500, ffff8881f3bb4580)
[ 123.711303] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 123.716682] page:ffffea0007ceed00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff888236403500 index:0x0
[ 123.725958] raw: 0200000000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888236403500
[ 123.734646] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 123.743315] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 123.749562]
[ 123.751241] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 123.756620] ffff8881f3bb4400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 123.764716] ffff8881f3bb4480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 123.772812] >ffff8881f3bb4500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 123.780904] ^
[ 123.785697] ffff8881f3bb4580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 123.793793] ffff8881f3bb4600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 123.801883] ==================================================================
Fixes: cf7221a4f5a5 ("mlxsw: spectrum_router: Add Multicast routing support for Spectrum-2")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Commit 0034d395f89d ("powerpc/mm/hash64: Map all the kernel regions in
the same 0xc range") has a bug in the definition of MIN_USER_CONTEXT.
The result is that the context id used for the vmemmap and the lowest
context id handed out to userspace are the same. The context id is
essentially the process identifier as far as the first stage of the
MMU translation is concerned.
This can result in multiple SLB entries with the same VSID (Virtual
Segment ID), accessible to the kernel and some random userspace
process that happens to get the overlapping id, which is not expected
eg:
07 c00c000008000000 40066bdea7000500 1T ESID= c00c00 VSID= 66bdea7 LLP:100
12 0002000008000000 40066bdea7000d80 1T ESID= 200 VSID= 66bdea7 LLP:100
Even though the user process and the kernel use the same VSID, the
permissions in the hash page table prevent the user process from
reading or writing to any kernel mappings.
It can also lead to SLB entries with different base page size
encodings (LLP), eg:
05 c00c000008000000 00006bde0053b500 256M ESID=c00c00000 VSID= 6bde0053b LLP:100
09 0000000008000000 00006bde0053bc80 256M ESID= 0 VSID= 6bde0053b LLP: 0
Such SLB entries can result in machine checks, eg. as seen on a G5:
Oops: Machine check, sig: 7 [#1]
BE PAGE SIZE=64K MU-Hash SMP NR_CPUS=4 NUMA Power Mac
NIP: c00000000026f248 LR: c000000000295e58 CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c0000000erfd3d70 TRAP: 0200 Tainted: G M (5.5.0-rcl-gcc-8.2.0-00010-g228b667d8ea1)
MSR: 9000000000109032 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 24282048 XER: 00000000
DAR: c00c000000612c80 DSISR: 00000400 IRQMASK: 0
...
NIP [c00000000026f248] .kmem_cache_free+0x58/0x140
LR [c088000008295e58] .putname 8x88/0xa
Call Trace:
.putname+0xB8/0xa
.filename_lookup.part.76+0xbe/0x160
.do_faccessat+0xe0/0x380
system_call+0x5c/ex68
This happens with 256MB segments and 64K pages, as the duplicate VSID
is hit with the first vmemmap segment and the first user segment, and
older 32-bit userspace maps things in the first user segment.
On other CPUs a machine check is not seen. Instead the userspace
process can get stuck continuously faulting, with the fault never
properly serviced, due to the kernel not understanding that there is
already a HPTE for the address but with inaccessible permissions.
On machines with 1T segments we've not seen the bug hit other than by
deliberately exercising it. That seems to be just a matter of luck
though, due to the typical layout of the user virtual address space
and the ranges of vmemmap that are typically populated.
To fix it we add 2 to MIN_USER_CONTEXT. This ensures the lowest
context given to userspace doesn't overlap with the VMEMMAP context,
or with the context for INVALID_REGION_ID.
Fixes: 0034d395f89d ("powerpc/mm/hash64: Map all the kernel regions in the same 0xc range")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.2+
Reported-by: Christian Marillat <marillat@debian.org>
Reported-by: Romain Dolbeau <romain@dolbeau.org>
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
[mpe: Account for INVALID_REGION_ID, mostly rewrite change log]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200123102547.11623-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
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When enabling this, the device would wait an internal signal which
wouldn't be triggered. Then, the device couldn't enter P3 mode, so
the power consumption is increased.
Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Avoid the MCU to clear the lanwake after suspending. It may cause the
WOL fail. Disable LANWAKE_CLR_EN before suspending. Besides,enable it
and reset the lanwake status when resuming or initializing.
Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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For certain platforms, it causes USB reset periodically.
Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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For RTL8153B with QFN32, disable test IO. Otherwise, it may cause
abnormal behavior for the device randomly.
Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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PLA MCU clock speed down could only be enabled when tx/rx are disabled.
Otherwise, the packet loss may occur.
Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Enable U2P3 may miss zero packet for bulk-in.
Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Initailization would reset runtime suspend by tp->saved_wolopts, so
the tp->saved_wolopts should be set before initializing.
Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When linking ON, the patch of flow control has to be reset. This
makes sure the patch works normally.
Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Fix the runtime resume doesn't work normally for linking change.
1. Reset the settings and status of runtime suspend.
2. Sync the linking status.
3. Poll the linking change.
Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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A malicious user could use RAW sockets and fool
GTP using them as standard SOCK_DGRAM UDP sockets.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in udp_tunnel_encap_enable include/net/udp_tunnel.h:174 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x45e/0x6f0 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c:85
CPU: 0 PID: 11262 Comm: syz-executor613 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1c9/0x220 lib/dump_stack.c:118
kmsan_report+0xf7/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:118
__msan_warning+0x58/0xa0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:215
udp_tunnel_encap_enable include/net/udp_tunnel.h:174 [inline]
setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x45e/0x6f0 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c:85
gtp_encap_enable_socket+0x37f/0x5a0 drivers/net/gtp.c:827
gtp_encap_enable drivers/net/gtp.c:844 [inline]
gtp_newlink+0xfb/0x1e50 drivers/net/gtp.c:666
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3305 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x2973/0x3920 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3363
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1153/0x1570 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5424
netlink_rcv_skb+0x451/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5442
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xf9e/0x1100 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
netlink_sendmsg+0x1248/0x14d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:639 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:659 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x12b6/0x1350 net/socket.c:2330
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2384 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x451/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2417
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2426 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x97/0xb0 net/socket.c:2424
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2424
do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x441359
Code: e8 ac e8 ff ff 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 eb 08 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fff1cd0ac28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000441359
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006cb018 R08: 00000000004002c8 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 00000000004002c8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004020d0
R13: 0000000000402160 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags+0x3c/0x90 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:144
kmsan_internal_alloc_meta_for_pages mm/kmsan/kmsan_shadow.c:307 [inline]
kmsan_alloc_page+0x12a/0x310 mm/kmsan/kmsan_shadow.c:336
__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x57f2/0x5f60 mm/page_alloc.c:4800
alloc_pages_current+0x67d/0x990 mm/mempolicy.c:2207
alloc_pages include/linux/gfp.h:534 [inline]
alloc_slab_page+0x111/0x12f0 mm/slub.c:1511
allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1656 [inline]
new_slab+0x2bc/0x1130 mm/slub.c:1722
new_slab_objects mm/slub.c:2473 [inline]
___slab_alloc+0x1533/0x1f30 mm/slub.c:2624
__slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2664 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2738 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2783 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0xb23/0xd70 mm/slub.c:2788
sk_prot_alloc+0xf2/0x620 net/core/sock.c:1597
sk_alloc+0xf0/0xbe0 net/core/sock.c:1657
inet_create+0x7c7/0x1370 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:321
__sock_create+0x8eb/0xf00 net/socket.c:1420
sock_create net/socket.c:1471 [inline]
__sys_socket+0x1a1/0x600 net/socket.c:1513
__do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1522 [inline]
__se_sys_socket+0x8d/0xb0 net/socket.c:1520
__x64_sys_socket+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:1520
do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: 459aa660eb1d ("gtp: add initial driver for datapath of GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP-U)")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira <pablo@netfilter.org>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
rtnl_create_link() needs to apply dev->min_mtu and dev->max_mtu
checks that we apply in do_setlink()
Otherwise malicious users can crash the kernel, for example after
an integer overflow :
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memset include/linux/string.h:365 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __alloc_skb+0x37b/0x5e0 net/core/skbuff.c:238
Write of size 32 at addr ffff88819f20b9c0 by task swapper/0/0
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
__kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x41 mm/kasan/report.c:506
kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x134/0x1a0 mm/kasan/generic.c:192
memset+0x24/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:108
memset include/linux/string.h:365 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x37b/0x5e0 net/core/skbuff.c:238
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1049 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0x93/0x590 net/core/skbuff.c:5664
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x7ad/0x920 net/core/sock.c:2242
sock_alloc_send_skb+0x32/0x40 net/core/sock.c:2259
mld_newpack+0x1d7/0x7f0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1609
add_grhead.isra.0+0x299/0x370 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1713
add_grec+0x7db/0x10b0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1844
mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:1970 [inline]
mld_ifc_timer_expire+0x3d3/0x950 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2477
call_timer_fn+0x1ac/0x780 kernel/time/timer.c:1404
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1449 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1773 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1740 [inline]
run_timer_softirq+0x6c3/0x1790 kernel/time/timer.c:1786
__do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:373 [inline]
irq_exit+0x19b/0x1e0 kernel/softirq.c:413
exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline]
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a3/0x610 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1137
apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:829
</IRQ>
RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:61
Code: 98 6b ea f9 eb 8a cc cc cc cc cc cc e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 44 1c 60 00 f4 c3 66 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 34 1c 60 00 fb f4 <c3> cc 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 e8 4e 5d 9a f9 e8 79
RSP: 0018:ffffffff89807ce8 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
RAX: 1ffffffff13266ae RBX: ffffffff8987a1c0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: ffffffff8987aa54
RBP: ffffffff89807d18 R08: ffffffff8987a1c0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffffffff8a799980 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
arch_cpu_idle+0xa/0x10 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:690
default_idle_call+0x84/0xb0 kernel/sched/idle.c:94
cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:154 [inline]
do_idle+0x3c8/0x6e0 kernel/sched/idle.c:269
cpu_startup_entry+0x1b/0x20 kernel/sched/idle.c:361
rest_init+0x23b/0x371 init/main.c:451
arch_call_rest_init+0xe/0x1b
start_kernel+0x904/0x943 init/main.c:784
x86_64_start_reservations+0x29/0x2b arch/x86/kernel/head64.c:490
x86_64_start_kernel+0x77/0x7b arch/x86/kernel/head64.c:471
secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:242
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00067c82c0 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
raw: 057ffe0000000000 ffffea00067c82c8 ffffea00067c82c8 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88819f20b880: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff88819f20b900: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>ffff88819f20b980: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
^
ffff88819f20ba00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff88819f20ba80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
Fixes: 61e84623ace3 ("net: centralize net_device min/max MTU checking")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
The driver for Cisco Aironet 4500 and 4800 series cards (airo.c),
implements AIROOLDIOCTL/SIOCDEVPRIVATE in airo_ioctl().
The ioctl handler copies an aironet_ioctl struct from userspace, which
includes a command. Some of the commands are handled in readrids(),
where the user controlled command is converted into a driver-internal
value called "ridcode".
There are two command values, AIROGWEPKTMP and AIROGWEPKNV, which
correspond to ridcode values of RID_WEP_TEMP and RID_WEP_PERM
respectively. These commands both have checks that the user has
CAP_NET_ADMIN, with the comment that "Only super-user can read WEP
keys", otherwise they return -EPERM.
However there is another command value, AIRORRID, that lets the user
specify the ridcode value directly, with no other checks. This means
the user can bypass the CAP_NET_ADMIN check on AIROGWEPKTMP and
AIROGWEPKNV.
Fix it by moving the CAP_NET_ADMIN check out of the command handling
and instead do it later based on the ridcode. That way regardless of
whether the ridcode is set via AIROGWEPKTMP or AIROGWEPKNV, or passed
in using AIRORID, we always do the CAP_NET_ADMIN check.
Found by Ilja by code inspection, not tested as I don't have the
required hardware.
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
The driver for Cisco Aironet 4500 and 4800 series cards (airo.c),
implements AIROOLDIOCTL/SIOCDEVPRIVATE in airo_ioctl().
The ioctl handler copies an aironet_ioctl struct from userspace, which
includes a command and a length. Some of the commands are handled in
readrids(), which kmalloc()'s a buffer of RIDSIZE (2048) bytes.
That buffer is then passed to PC4500_readrid(), which has two cases.
The else case does some setup and then reads up to RIDSIZE bytes from
the hardware into the kmalloc()'ed buffer.
Here len == RIDSIZE, pBuf is the kmalloc()'ed buffer:
// read the rid length field
bap_read(ai, pBuf, 2, BAP1);
// length for remaining part of rid
len = min(len, (int)le16_to_cpu(*(__le16*)pBuf)) - 2;
...
// read remainder of the rid
rc = bap_read(ai, ((__le16*)pBuf)+1, len, BAP1);
PC4500_readrid() then returns to readrids() which does:
len = comp->len;
if (copy_to_user(comp->data, iobuf, min(len, (int)RIDSIZE))) {
Where comp->len is the user controlled length field.
So if the "rid length field" returned by the hardware is < 2048, and
the user requests 2048 bytes in comp->len, we will leak the previous
contents of the kmalloc()'ed buffer to userspace.
Fix it by kzalloc()'ing the buffer.
Found by Ilja by code inspection, not tested as I don't have the
required hardware.
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
The optee driver uses specific page table types to verify if a memory
region is normal. These types are not defined in nommu systems. Trying
to compile the driver in these systems results in a build error:
linux/drivers/tee/optee/call.c: In function ‘is_normal_memory’:
linux/drivers/tee/optee/call.c:533:26: error: ‘L_PTE_MT_MASK’ undeclared
(first use in this function); did you mean ‘PREEMPT_MASK’?
return (pgprot_val(p) & L_PTE_MT_MASK) == L_PTE_MT_WRITEALLOC;
^~~~~~~~~~~~~
PREEMPT_MASK
linux/drivers/tee/optee/call.c:533:26: note: each undeclared identifier is
reported only once for each function it appears in
linux/drivers/tee/optee/call.c:533:44: error: ‘L_PTE_MT_WRITEALLOC’ undeclared
(first use in this function)
return (pgprot_val(p) & L_PTE_MT_MASK) == L_PTE_MT_WRITEALLOC;
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Make the optee driver depend on MMU to fix the compilation issue.
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
[jw: update commit title]
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
|
|
phylink and phylib are interconnected. It makes sense for phylib and
phy driver patches to be also reviewed by the phylink maintainer.
So add Russell King as a designed reviewer of phylib.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
in the same manner as commit d0f418516022 ("net, ip_tunnel: fix
namespaces move"), fix namespace moving as it was broken since commit
8d79266bc48c ("ip6_tunnel: add collect_md mode to IPv6 tunnel"), but for
ipv6 this time; there is no reason to keep it for ip6_tunnel.
Fixes: 8d79266bc48c ("ip6_tunnel: add collect_md mode to IPv6 tunnel")
Signed-off-by: William Dauchy <w.dauchy@criteo.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
sysbot found another issue in tc_new_tfilter().
We probably should use @name which contains the sanitized
version of TCA_KIND.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in string_nocheck lib/vsprintf.c:608 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in string+0x522/0x690 lib/vsprintf.c:689
CPU: 1 PID: 10753 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1c9/0x220 lib/dump_stack.c:118
kmsan_report+0xf7/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:118
__msan_warning+0x58/0xa0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:215
string_nocheck lib/vsprintf.c:608 [inline]
string+0x522/0x690 lib/vsprintf.c:689
vsnprintf+0x207d/0x31b0 lib/vsprintf.c:2574
__request_module+0x2ad/0x11c0 kernel/kmod.c:143
tcf_proto_lookup_ops+0x241/0x720 net/sched/cls_api.c:139
tcf_proto_create net/sched/cls_api.c:262 [inline]
tc_new_tfilter+0x2a4e/0x5010 net/sched/cls_api.c:2058
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xcb7/0x1570 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5415
netlink_rcv_skb+0x451/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5442
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xf9e/0x1100 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
netlink_sendmsg+0x1248/0x14d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:639 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:659 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x12b6/0x1350 net/socket.c:2330
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2384 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x451/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2417
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2426 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x97/0xb0 net/socket.c:2424
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2424
do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x45b349
Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f88b3948c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f88b39496d4 RCX: 000000000045b349
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000075bfc8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 000000000000099f R14: 00000000004cb163 R15: 000000000075bfd4
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:144 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x66/0xd0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:127
kmsan_slab_alloc+0x8a/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:82
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2774 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb40/0x1200 mm/slub.c:4382
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:141 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x2fd/0xac0 net/core/skbuff.c:209
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1049 [inline]
netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1174 [inline]
netlink_sendmsg+0x7d3/0x14d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:639 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:659 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x12b6/0x1350 net/socket.c:2330
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2384 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x451/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2417
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2426 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x97/0xb0 net/socket.c:2424
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2424
do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: 6f96c3c6904c ("net_sched: fix backward compatibility for TCA_KIND")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
This reverts commit 0d4a6608f68c7532dcbfec2ea1150c9761767d03.
Williem reported that after commit 0d4a6608f68c ("udp: do rmem bulk
free even if the rx sk queue is empty") the memory allocated by
an almost idle system with many UDP sockets can grow a lot.
For stable kernel keep the solution as simple as possible and revert
the offending commit.
Reported-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
Diagnosed-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Fixes: 0d4a6608f68c ("udp: do rmem bulk free even if the rx sk queue is empty")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Add pointer to datasheet and fix typo in printk message.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
|
|
Trivial cleanup removing empty line at wrong place.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
|
|
Apparently it is quite easy to forget ">" in quoting of email
address. This fixes it.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
|
|
We need the of_match table if we want to use the compatible string in
the pmic's child node and get the led driver loaded automatically.
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bgolaszewski@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
|
|
If a node is ignored, do not get a reference to it. Fix the bug by moving
fwnode_handle_get() where a reference to an fwnode is saved for clarity.
Reported-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
|
|
When switching to using generic LED name composition mechanism via
devm_led_classdev_register_ext() API the part of code initializing
struct gpio_led's template name property was removed alongside.
It was however overlooked that the property was also passed to
devm_fwnode_get_gpiod_from_child() in place of "label" parameter,
which when set to NULL, results in gpio label being initialized to '?'.
It could be observed in debugfs and failed to properly identify
gpio association with LED consumer.
Fix this shortcoming by updating the GPIO label after the LED is
registered and its final name is known.
Fixes: d7235f5feaa0 ("leds: gpio: Use generic support for composing LED names")
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jacek Anaszewski <jacek.anaszewski@gmail.com>
[fixed comment]
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
|
|
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
Commit 323ebb61e32b ("net: use listified RX for handling GRO_NORMAL
skbs") introduces batching of GRO_NORMAL packets in napi_frags_finish,
and commit 6570bc79c0df ("net: core: use listified Rx for GRO_NORMAL in
napi_gro_receive()") adds the same to napi_skb_finish. However,
dev_gro_receive (that is called just before napi_{frags,skb}_finish) can
also pass skbs to the networking stack: e.g., when the GRO session is
flushed, napi_gro_complete is called, which passes pp directly to
netif_receive_skb_internal, skipping napi->rx_list. It means that the
packet stored in pp will be handled by the stack earlier than the
packets that arrived before, but are still waiting in napi->rx_list. It
leads to TCP reorderings that can be observed in the TCPOFOQueue counter
in netstat.
This commit fixes the reordering issue by making napi_gro_complete also
use napi->rx_list, so that all packets going through GRO will keep their
order. In order to keep napi_gro_flush working properly, gro_normal_list
calls are moved after the flush to clear napi->rx_list.
iwlwifi calls napi_gro_flush directly and does the same thing that is
done by gro_normal_list, so the same change is applied there:
napi_gro_flush is moved to be before the flush of napi->rx_list.
A few other drivers also use napi_gro_flush (brocade/bna/bnad.c,
cortina/gemini.c, hisilicon/hns3/hns3_enet.c). The first two also use
napi_complete_done afterwards, which performs the gro_normal_list flush,
so they are fine. The latter calls napi_gro_receive right after
napi_gro_flush, so it can end up with non-empty napi->rx_list anyway.
Fixes: 323ebb61e32b ("net: use listified RX for handling GRO_NORMAL skbs")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@mellanox.com>
Cc: Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@dlink.ru>
Cc: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@dlink.ru>
Acked-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
write_wakeup can happen in parallel with close/hangup where tty->disc_data
is set to NULL and the netdevice is freed thus also freeing
disc_data. write_wakeup accesses disc_data so we must prevent close from
freeing the netdev while write_wakeup has a non-NULL view of
tty->disc_data.
We also need to make sure that accesses to disc_data are atomic. Which can
all be done with RCU.
This problem was found by Syzkaller on SLCAN, but the same issue is
reproducible with the SLIP line discipline using an LTP test based on the
Syzkaller reproducer.
A fix which didn't use RCU was posted by Hillf Danton.
Fixes: 661f7fda21b1 ("slip: Fix deadlock in write_wakeup")
Fixes: a8e83b17536a ("slcan: Port write_wakeup deadlock fix from slip")
Reported-by: syzbot+017e491ae13c0068598a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <rpalethorpe@suse.com>
Cc: Wolfgang Grandegger <wg@grandegger.com>
Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Tyler Hall <tylerwhall@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-can@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: syzkaller@googlegroups.com
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
As John Fastabend reports [0], psock state tear-down can happen on receive
path *after* unlocking the socket, if the only other psock user, that is
sockmap or sockhash, releases its psock reference before tcp_bpf_recvmsg
does so:
tcp_bpf_recvmsg()
psock = sk_psock_get(sk) <- refcnt 2
lock_sock(sk);
...
sock_map_free() <- refcnt 1
release_sock(sk)
sk_psock_put() <- refcnt 0
Remove the lockdep check for socket lock in psock tear-down that got
introduced in 7e81a3530206 ("bpf: Sockmap, ensure sock lock held during
tear down").
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/5e25dc995d7d_74082aaee6e465b441@john-XPS-13-9370.notmuch/
Fixes: 7e81a3530206 ("bpf: Sockmap, ensure sock lock held during tear down")
Reported-by: syzbot+d73682fcf7fee6982fe3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Updates to the Generic Timer architecture allow ID_PFR1.GenTimer to
have values other than 0 or 1 while still preserving backward
compatibility. At the moment, Linux is quite strict in the way it
handles this field at early boot and will not configure arch timer if
it doesn't find the value 1.
Since here use ubfx for arch timer version extraction (hyb-stub build
with -march=armv7-a, so it is safe)
To help backports (even though the code was correct at the time of writing)
Fixes: 8ec58be9f3ff ("ARM: virt: arch_timers: enable access to physical timers")
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
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The purpose of this was to keep all the queues updated with
the Rx sequence numbers because unlikely yet possible
situations where queues can't understand if a specific
packet needs to be dropped or not.
Unfortunately, it was reported that this caused issues in
our DMA engine. We don't fully understand how this is related,
but this is being currently debugged. For now, just don't send
this notification to the Rx queues. This de-facto reverts my
commit 3c514bf831ac12356b695ff054bef641b9e99593:
iwlwifi: mvm: add a loose synchronization of the NSSN across Rx queues
This issue was reported here:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204873
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205001
and others maybe.
Fixes: 3c514bf831ac ("iwlwifi: mvm: add a loose synchronization of the NSSN across Rx queues")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.3+
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
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Commit 99c9a923e97a ("tracing/uprobe: Fix double perf_event
linking on multiprobe uprobe") moved trace_uprobe_filter on
trace_probe_event. However, since it introduced a flexible
data structure with char array and type casting, the
alignment of trace_uprobe_filter can be broken.
This changes the type of the array to trace_uprobe_filter
data strucure to fix it.
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120124022.GA14897@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/157966340499.5107.10978352478952144902.stgit@devnote2
Fixes: 99c9a923e97a ("tracing/uprobe: Fix double perf_event linking on multiprobe uprobe")
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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A load on an ESB page returning all 1's means that the underlying
device has invalidated the access to the PQ state of the interrupt
through mmio. It may happen, for example when querying a PHB interrupt
while the PHB is in an error state.
In that case, we should consider the interrupt to be invalid when
checking its state in the irq_get_irqchip_state() handler.
Fixes: da15c03b047d ("powerpc/xive: Implement get_irqchip_state method for XIVE to fix shutdown race")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.4+
Signed-off-by: Frederic Barrat <fbarrat@linux.ibm.com>
[clg: wrote a commit log, introduced XIVE_ESB_INVALID ]
Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200113130118.27969-1-clg@kaod.org
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Let PPC_UV depend only on DEVICE_PRIVATE which in turn
will satisfy all the other required dependencies
Fixes: 013a53f2d25a ("powerpc: Ultravisor: Add PPC_UV config option")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200109092047.24043-1-bharata@linux.ibm.com
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Currently, we just assume that it will stick around by virtue of the
submitter's reference, but later patches will allow the syscall to
return early and we can't rely on that reference at that point.
While I'm not aware of any reports of it, Xiubo pointed out that this
may fix a use-after-free. If the wait for a reply times out or is
canceled via signal, and then the reply comes in after the syscall
returns, the client can end up trying to access r_parent without a
reference.
Take an extra reference to the inode when setting r_parent and release
it when releasing the request.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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With the introduction of per-FD address space, the same BO can be mapped
in different address space if the BO is globally visible (GEM_FLINK)
and opened in different context or if the dmabuf is self-imported. The
current implementation does not take case into account, and attaches the
mapping directly to the panfrost_gem_object.
Let's create a panfrost_gem_mapping struct and allow multiple mappings
per BO.
The mappings are refcounted which helps solve another problem where
mappings were torn down (GEM handle closed by userspace) while GPU
jobs accessing those BOs were still in-flight. Jobs now keep a
reference on the mappings they use.
v2 (robh):
- Minor review comment clean-ups from Steven
- Use list_is_singular helper
- Just WARN if we add a mapping when madvise state is not WILLNEED.
With that, drop the use of object_name_lock.
v3 (robh):
- Revert returning list iterator in panfrost_gem_mapping_get()
Fixes: a5efb4c9a562 ("drm/panfrost: Restructure the GEM object creation")
Fixes: 7282f7645d06 ("drm/panfrost: Implement per FD address spaces")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200116021554.15090-1-robh@kernel.org
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in the same manner as commit 690afc165bb3 ("net: ip6_gre: fix moving
ip6gre between namespaces"), fix namespace moving as it was broken since
commit 2e15ea390e6f ("ip_gre: Add support to collect tunnel metadata.").
Indeed, the ip6_gre commit removed the local flag for collect_md
condition, so there is no reason to keep it for ip_gre/ip_tunnel.
this patch will fix both ip_tunnel and ip_gre modules.
Fixes: 2e15ea390e6f ("ip_gre: Add support to collect tunnel metadata.")
Signed-off-by: William Dauchy <w.dauchy@criteo.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Not sure how this got in here. git blame says the second assignment was
added in 3a9a57f6, but that commit also removed the first assignment.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Dubois <tblodt@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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As reported by Eric Dumazet, there are still some outstanding
cases where the driver does not handle TSO correctly when skb's
are over a certain size. Most cases have been fixed, this patch
should ensure that forwarded SKB's that are greater than
MAX_SINGLE_PACKET_SIZE - TX_OVERHEAD are software segmented
and handled correctly.
Signed-off-by: James Hughes <james.hughes@raspberrypi.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Madalin Bucur
Manish Chopra
Linus Torvalds
Alex Deucher
Raag Jadav
Kristian Evensen
Eric Dumazet
Ido Schimmel
Aneesh Kumar K.V
Hayes Wang
Michael Ellerman
Vincenzo Frascino
Andrew Lunn
William Dauchy
Paolo Abeni
Pavel
Bartosz Golaszewski
Sakari Ailus
Jacek Anaszewski
David S. Miller
Maxim Mikityanskiy
Richard Palethorpe
Jakub Sitnicki
Vladimir Murzin
Emmanuel Grumbach
Masami Hiramatsu
Frederic Barrat
Bharata B Rao
Jeff Layton
Boris Brezillon
Theodore Dubois
James Hughes