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Export Xen symbols to dom0 via /proc/xen/xensyms (similar to
/proc/kallsyms).
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
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Convert printks to pr_<level> (excludes printk(KERN_DEBUG...)
to be more consistent throughout the xen subsystem.
Add pr_fmt with KBUILD_MODNAME or "xen:" KBUILD_MODNAME
Coalesce formats and add missing word spaces
Add missing newlines
Align arguments and reflow to 80 columns
Remove DRV_NAME from formats as pr_fmt adds the same content
This does change some of the prefixes of these messages
but it also does make them more consistent.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
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Modify the request_module to prefix the file system type with "fs-"
and add aliases to all of the filesystems that can be built as modules
to match.
A common practice is to build all of the kernel code and leave code
that is not commonly needed as modules, with the result that many
users are exposed to any bug anywhere in the kernel.
Looking for filesystems with a fs- prefix limits the pool of possible
modules that can be loaded by mount to just filesystems trivially
making things safer with no real cost.
Using aliases means user space can control the policy of which
filesystem modules are auto-loaded by editing /etc/modprobe.d/*.conf
with blacklist and alias directives. Allowing simple, safe,
well understood work-arounds to known problematic software.
This also addresses a rare but unfortunate problem where the filesystem
name is not the same as it's module name and module auto-loading
would not work. While writing this patch I saw a handful of such
cases. The most significant being autofs that lives in the module
autofs4.
This is relevant to user namespaces because we can reach the request
module in get_fs_type() without having any special permissions, and
people get uncomfortable when a user specified string (in this case
the filesystem type) goes all of the way to request_module.
After having looked at this issue I don't think there is any
particular reason to perform any filtering or permission checks beyond
making it clear in the module request that we want a filesystem
module. The common pattern in the kernel is to call request_module()
without regards to the users permissions. In general all a filesystem
module does once loaded is call register_filesystem() and go to sleep.
Which means there is not much attack surface exposed by loading a
filesytem module unless the filesystem is mounted. In a user
namespace filesystems are not mounted unless .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
which most filesystems do not set today.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Access to xenbus is currently handled via xenfs. This adds a device
driver for xenbus and makes xenfs use this code.
Signed-off-by: Bastian Blank <waldi@debian.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
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Access to arbitrary hypercalls is currently provided via xenfs. This
adds a standard character device to handle this. The support in xenfs
remains for backward compatibility and uses the device driver code.
Signed-off-by: Bastian Blank <waldi@debian.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
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This reverts commit 24a89b5be4cf2b7f1b49b56b6cb4a7b71fccf241.
We should no longer need an address space now that we're correctly
setting VM_PFNMAP on our vmas.
Conflicts:
drivers/xen/xenfs/super.c
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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.mount now returns a struct dentry *.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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* 'upstream/xenfs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeremy/xen:
xen/privcmd: make privcmd visible in domU
xen/privcmd: move remap_domain_mfn_range() to core xen code and export.
privcmd: MMAPBATCH: Fix error handling/reporting
xenbus: export xen_store_interface for xenfs
xen/privcmd: make sure vma is ours before doing anything to it
xen/privcmd: print SIGBUS faults
xen/xenfs: set_page_dirty is supposed to return true if it dirties
xen/privcmd: create address space to allow writable mmaps
xen: add privcmd driver
xen: add variable hypercall caller
xen: add xen_set_domain_pte()
xen: add /proc/xen/xsd_{kva,port} to xenfs
* 'upstream/core' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeremy/xen: (29 commits)
xen: include xen/xen.h for definition of xen_initial_domain()
xen: use host E820 map for dom0
xen: correctly rebuild mfn list list after migration.
xen: improvements to VIRQ_DEBUG output
xen: set up IRQ before binding virq to evtchn
xen: ensure that all event channels start off bound to VCPU 0
xen/hvc: only notify if we actually sent something
xen: don't add extra_pages for RAM after mem_end
xen: add support for PAT
xen: make sure xen_max_p2m_pfn is up to date
xen: limit extra memory to a certain ratio of base
xen: add extra pages for E820 RAM regions, even if beyond mem_end
xen: make sure xen_extra_mem_start is beyond all non-RAM e820
xen: implement "extra" memory to reserve space for pages not present at boot
xen: Use host-provided E820 map
xen: don't map missing memory
xen: defer building p2m mfn structures until kernel is mapped
xen: add return value to set_phys_to_machine()
xen: convert p2m to a 3 level tree
xen: make install_p2mtop_page() static
...
Fix up trivial conflict in arch/x86/xen/mmu.c, and fix the use of
'reserve_early()' - in the new memblock world order it is now
'memblock_x86_reserve_range()' instead. Pointed out by Jeremy.
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It has its uses in a domU as well as dom0. Xen will prevent an
unprivileged domain from doing anything untoward.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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I don't think it matters at all in this case (there's only one caller
which checks the return value), but may as well be strictly correct.
[ Impact: cleanup ]
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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These are necessary to allow writeable mmap of the privcmd node to
succeed without being marked read-only for writenotify purposes. Which
in turn is necessary to allow mappings of foreign guest pages
[ Impact: bugfix: allow writable mappings ]
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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The privcmd interface in xenfs allows the tool stack in the privileged
domain to get fairly direct access to the hypervisor in order to do
various management things such as domain construction.
[ Impact: new xenfs interface for privileged operations ]
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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These are used by the userspace xenstore daemon, which runs in dom0.
Xenstored is what's behind the xenfs "xenbus" filesystem.
[ Impact: provide mapping and port to usermode for xenstore ]
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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All file_operations should get a .llseek operation so we can make
nonseekable_open the default for future file operations without a
.llseek pointer.
The three cases that we can automatically detect are no_llseek, seq_lseek
and default_llseek. For cases where we can we can automatically prove that
the file offset is always ignored, we use noop_llseek, which maintains
the current behavior of not returning an error from a seek.
New drivers should normally not use noop_llseek but instead use no_llseek
and call nonseekable_open at open time. Existing drivers can be converted
to do the same when the maintainer knows for certain that no user code
relies on calling seek on the device file.
The generated code is often incorrectly indented and right now contains
comments that clarify for each added line why a specific variant was
chosen. In the version that gets submitted upstream, the comments will
be gone and I will manually fix the indentation, because there does not
seem to be a way to do that using coccinelle.
Some amount of new code is currently sitting in linux-next that should get
the same modifications, which I will do at the end of the merge window.
Many thanks to Julia Lawall for helping me learn to write a semantic
patch that does all this.
===== begin semantic patch =====
// This adds an llseek= method to all file operations,
// as a preparation for making no_llseek the default.
//
// The rules are
// - use no_llseek explicitly if we do nonseekable_open
// - use seq_lseek for sequential files
// - use default_llseek if we know we access f_pos
// - use noop_llseek if we know we don't access f_pos,
// but we still want to allow users to call lseek
//
@ open1 exists @
identifier nested_open;
@@
nested_open(...)
{
<+...
nonseekable_open(...)
...+>
}
@ open exists@
identifier open_f;
identifier i, f;
identifier open1.nested_open;
@@
int open_f(struct inode *i, struct file *f)
{
<+...
(
nonseekable_open(...)
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nested_open(...)
)
...+>
}
@ read disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
*off = E
|
*off += E
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func(..., off, ...)
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E = *off
)
...+>
}
@ read_no_fpos disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}
@ write @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
*off = E
|
*off += E
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func(..., off, ...)
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E = *off
)
...+>
}
@ write_no_fpos @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}
@ fops0 @
identifier fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
};
@ has_llseek depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier llseek_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.llseek = llseek_f,
...
};
@ has_read depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.read = read_f,
...
};
@ has_write depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.write = write_f,
...
};
@ has_open depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.open = open_f,
...
};
// use no_llseek if we call nonseekable_open
////////////////////////////////////////////
@ nonseekable1 depends on !has_llseek && has_open @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier nso ~= "nonseekable_open";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .open = nso, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* nonseekable */
};
@ nonseekable2 depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open.open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .open = open_f, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* open uses nonseekable */
};
// use seq_lseek for sequential files
/////////////////////////////////////
@ seq depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier sr ~= "seq_read";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = sr, ...
+.llseek = seq_lseek, /* we have seq_read */
};
// use default_llseek if there is a readdir
///////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops1 depends on !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier readdir_e;
@@
// any other fop is used that changes pos
struct file_operations fops = {
... .readdir = readdir_e, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* readdir is present */
};
// use default_llseek if at least one of read/write touches f_pos
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops2 depends on !fops1 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read.read_f;
@@
// read fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* read accesses f_pos */
};
@ fops3 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+ .llseek = default_llseek, /* write accesses f_pos */
};
// Use noop_llseek if neither read nor write accesses f_pos
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops4 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !fops3 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.write = write_f,
.read = read_f,
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read and write both use no f_pos */
};
@ depends on has_write && !has_read && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* write uses no f_pos */
};
@ depends on has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read uses no f_pos */
};
@ depends on !has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* no read or write fn */
};
===== End semantic patch =====
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
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Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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Move xen_domain and related tests out of asm-x86 to xen/xen.h so they
can be included whenever they are necessary.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
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The xenfs capabilities file allows usermode to determine what
capabilities the domain has. The only one at present is "control_d"
in a privileged domain.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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The xenfs filesystem exports various interfaces to usermode. Initially
this exports a file to allow usermode to interact with xenbus/xenstore.
Traditionally this appeared in /proc/xen. Rather than extending procfs,
this patch adds a backward-compat mountpoint on /proc/xen, and provides
a xenfs filesystem which can be mounted there.
Signed-off-by: Alex Zeffertt <alex.zeffertt@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Boris Ostrovsky
Joe Perches
Eric W. Biederman
Al Viro
Bastian Blank
Jeremy Fitzhardinge
Linus Torvalds
Jeremy Fitzhardinge
Ian Campbell
Arnd Bergmann
Alex Zeffertt