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By looking up the master keys in a filesystem-level keyring rather than
in the calling processes' key hierarchy, it becomes possible for a user
to set an encryption policy which refers to some key they don't actually
know, then encrypt their files using that key. Cryptographically this
isn't much of a problem, but the semantics of this would be a bit weird.
Thus, enforce that a v2 encryption policy can only be set if the user
has previously added the key, or has capable(CAP_FOWNER).
We tolerate that this problem will continue to exist for v1 encryption
policies, however; there is no way around that.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Allow the FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY and FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY
ioctls to be used by non-root users to add and remove encryption keys
from the filesystem-level crypto keyrings, subject to limitations.
Motivation: while privileged fscrypt key management is sufficient for
some users (e.g. Android and Chromium OS, where a privileged process
manages all keys), the old API by design also allows non-root users to
set up and use encrypted directories, and we don't want to regress on
that. Especially, we don't want to force users to continue using the
old API, running into the visibility mismatch between files and keyrings
and being unable to "lock" encrypted directories.
Intuitively, the ioctls have to be privileged since they manipulate
filesystem-level state. However, it's actually safe to make them
unprivileged if we very carefully enforce some specific limitations.
First, each key must be identified by a cryptographic hash so that a
user can't add the wrong key for another user's files. For v2
encryption policies, we use the key_identifier for this. v1 policies
don't have this, so managing keys for them remains privileged.
Second, each key a user adds is charged to their quota for the keyrings
service. Thus, a user can't exhaust memory by adding a huge number of
keys. By default each non-root user is allowed up to 200 keys; this can
be changed using the existing sysctl 'kernel.keys.maxkeys'.
Third, if multiple users add the same key, we keep track of those users
of the key (of which there remains a single copy), and won't really
remove the key, i.e. "lock" the encrypted files, until all those users
have removed it. This prevents denial of service attacks that would be
possible under simpler schemes, such allowing the first user who added a
key to remove it -- since that could be a malicious user who has
compromised the key. Of course, encryption keys should be kept secret,
but the idea is that using encryption should never be *less* secure than
not using encryption, even if your key was compromised.
We tolerate that a user will be unable to really remove a key, i.e.
unable to "lock" their encrypted files, if another user has added the
same key. But in a sense, this is actually a good thing because it will
avoid providing a false notion of security where a key appears to have
been removed when actually it's still in memory, available to any
attacker who compromises the operating system kernel.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes
from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*):
- Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as
input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and
it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF.
Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined:
- Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF.
- Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY
flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly.
These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when
support for it is added.
- Key identifiers (see below).
- Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier,
which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents
users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or
directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which
identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor.
- The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a
process-subscribed keyring.
The following UAPI additions are made:
- The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a
fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated
from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix.
- A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows
getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or
directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not
be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which
policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so
it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions.
- The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2
encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys
for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather
than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when
adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway.
This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the
same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys:
capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take
advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow
non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full
replacement for v1 policies.
(*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk
fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense
to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the
numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk.
Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Add an implementation of HKDF (RFC 5869) to fscrypt, for the purpose of
deriving additional key material from the fscrypt master keys for v2
encryption policies. HKDF is a key derivation function built on top of
HMAC. We choose SHA-512 for the underlying unkeyed hash, and use an
"hmac(sha512)" transform allocated from the crypto API.
We'll be using this to replace the AES-ECB based KDF currently used to
derive the per-file encryption keys. While the AES-ECB based KDF is
believed to meet the original security requirements, it is nonstandard
and has problems that don't exist in modern KDFs such as HKDF:
1. It's reversible. Given a derived key and nonce, an attacker can
easily compute the master key. This is okay if the master key and
derived keys are equally hard to compromise, but now we'd like to be
more robust against threats such as a derived key being compromised
through a timing attack, or a derived key for an in-use file being
compromised after the master key has already been removed.
2. It doesn't evenly distribute the entropy from the master key; each 16
input bytes only affects the corresponding 16 output bytes.
3. It isn't easily extensible to deriving other values or keys, such as
a public hash for securely identifying the key, or per-mode keys.
Per-mode keys will be immediately useful for Adiantum encryption, for
which fscrypt currently uses the master key directly, introducing
unnecessary usage constraints. Per-mode keys will also be useful for
hardware inline encryption, which is currently being worked on.
HKDF solves all the above problems.
Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl
removes an encryption key that was added by FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY.
It wipes the secret key itself, then "locks" the encrypted files and
directories that had been unlocked using that key -- implemented by
evicting the relevant dentries and inodes from the VFS caches.
The problem this solves is that many fscrypt users want the ability to
remove encryption keys, causing the corresponding encrypted directories
to appear "locked" (presented in ciphertext form) again. Moreover,
users want removing an encryption key to *really* remove it, in the
sense that the removed keys cannot be recovered even if kernel memory is
compromised, e.g. by the exploit of a kernel security vulnerability or
by a physical attack. This is desirable after a user logs out of the
system, for example. In many cases users even already assume this to be
the case and are surprised to hear when it's not.
It is not sufficient to simply unlink the master key from the keyring
(or to revoke or invalidate it), since the actual encryption transform
objects are still pinned in memory by their inodes. Therefore, to
really remove a key we must also evict the relevant inodes.
Currently one workaround is to run 'sync && echo 2 >
/proc/sys/vm/drop_caches'. But, that evicts all unused inodes in the
system rather than just the inodes associated with the key being
removed, causing severe performance problems. Moreover, it requires
root privileges, so regular users can't "lock" their encrypted files.
Another workaround, used in Chromium OS kernels, is to add a new
VFS-level ioctl FS_IOC_DROP_CACHE which is a more restricted version of
drop_caches that operates on a single super_block. It does:
shrink_dcache_sb(sb);
invalidate_inodes(sb, false);
But it's still a hack. Yet, the major users of filesystem encryption
want this feature badly enough that they are actually using these hacks.
To properly solve the problem, start maintaining a list of the inodes
which have been "unlocked" using each master key. Originally this
wasn't possible because the kernel didn't keep track of in-use master
keys at all. But, with the ->s_master_keys keyring it is now possible.
Then, add an ioctl FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It finds the specified
master key in ->s_master_keys, then wipes the secret key itself, which
prevents any additional inodes from being unlocked with the key. Then,
it syncs the filesystem and evicts the inodes in the key's list. The
normal inode eviction code will free and wipe the per-file keys (in
->i_crypt_info). Note that freeing ->i_crypt_info without evicting the
inodes was also considered, but would have been racy.
Some inodes may still be in use when a master key is removed, and we
can't simply revoke random file descriptors, mmap's, etc. Thus, the
ioctl simply skips in-use inodes, and returns -EBUSY to indicate that
some inodes weren't evicted. The master key *secret* is still removed,
but the fscrypt_master_key struct remains to keep track of the remaining
inodes. Userspace can then retry the ioctl to evict the remaining
inodes. Alternatively, if userspace adds the key again, the refreshed
secret will be associated with the existing list of inodes so they
remain correctly tracked for future key removals.
The ioctl doesn't wipe pagecache pages. Thus, we tolerate that after a
kernel compromise some portions of plaintext file contents may still be
recoverable from memory. This can be solved by enabling page poisoning
system-wide, which security conscious users may choose to do. But it's
very difficult to solve otherwise, e.g. note that plaintext file
contents may have been read in other places than pagecache pages.
Like FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is
initially restricted to privileged users only. This is sufficient for
some use cases, but not all. A later patch will relax this restriction,
but it will require introducing key hashes, among other changes.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl adds an
encryption key to the filesystem's fscrypt keyring ->s_master_keys,
making any files encrypted with that key appear "unlocked".
Why we need this
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The main problem is that the "locked/unlocked" (ciphertext/plaintext)
status of encrypted files is global, but the fscrypt keys are not.
fscrypt only looks for keys in the keyring(s) the process accessing the
filesystem is subscribed to: the thread keyring, process keyring, and
session keyring, where the session keyring may contain the user keyring.
Therefore, userspace has to put fscrypt keys in the keyrings for
individual users or sessions. But this means that when a process with a
different keyring tries to access encrypted files, whether they appear
"unlocked" or not is nondeterministic. This is because it depends on
whether the files are currently present in the inode cache.
Fixing this by consistently providing each process its own view of the
filesystem depending on whether it has the key or not isn't feasible due
to how the VFS caches work. Furthermore, while sometimes users expect
this behavior, it is misguided for two reasons. First, it would be an
OS-level access control mechanism largely redundant with existing access
control mechanisms such as UNIX file permissions, ACLs, LSMs, etc.
Encryption is actually for protecting the data at rest.
Second, almost all users of fscrypt actually do need the keys to be
global. The largest users of fscrypt, Android and Chromium OS, achieve
this by having PID 1 create a "session keyring" that is inherited by
every process. This works, but it isn't scalable because it prevents
session keyrings from being used for any other purpose.
On general-purpose Linux distros, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool [1] can't
similarly abuse the session keyring, so to make 'sudo' work on all
systems it has to link all the user keyrings into root's user keyring
[2]. This is ugly and raises security concerns. Moreover it can't make
the keys available to system services, such as sshd trying to access the
user's '~/.ssh' directory (see [3], [4]) or NetworkManager trying to
read certificates from the user's home directory (see [5]); or to Docker
containers (see [6], [7]).
By having an API to add a key to the *filesystem* we'll be able to fix
the above bugs, remove userspace workarounds, and clearly express the
intended semantics: the locked/unlocked status of an encrypted directory
is global, and encryption is orthogonal to OS-level access control.
Why not use the add_key() syscall
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
We use an ioctl for this API rather than the existing add_key() system
call because the ioctl gives us the flexibility needed to implement
fscrypt-specific semantics that will be introduced in later patches:
- Supporting key removal with the semantics such that the secret is
removed immediately and any unused inodes using the key are evicted;
also, the eviction of any in-use inodes can be retried.
- Calculating a key-dependent cryptographic identifier and returning it
to userspace.
- Allowing keys to be added and removed by non-root users, but only keys
for v2 encryption policies; and to prevent denial-of-service attacks,
users can only remove keys they themselves have added, and a key is
only really removed after all users who added it have removed it.
Trying to shoehorn these semantics into the keyrings syscalls would be
very difficult, whereas the ioctls make things much easier.
However, to reuse code the implementation still uses the keyrings
service internally. Thus we get lockless RCU-mode key lookups without
having to re-implement it, and the keys automatically show up in
/proc/keys for debugging purposes.
References:
[1] https://github.com/google/fscrypt
[2] https://goo.gl/55cCrI#heading=h.vf09isp98isb
[3] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/111#issuecomment-444347939
[4] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/116
[5] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/fscrypt/+bug/1770715
[6] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/128
[7] https://askubuntu.com/questions/1130306/cannot-run-docker-on-an-encrypted-filesystem
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Rename keyinfo.c to keysetup.c since this better describes what the file
does (sets up the key), and it matches the new file keysetup_v1.c.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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In preparation for introducing v2 encryption policies which will find
and derive encryption keys differently from the current v1 encryption
policies, move the v1 policy-specific key setup code from keyinfo.c into
keysetup_v1.c.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Do some more refactoring of the key setup code, in preparation for
introducing a filesystem-level keyring and v2 encryption policies:
- Now that ci_inode exists, don't pass around the inode unnecessarily.
- Define a function setup_file_encryption_key() which handles the crypto
key setup given an under-construction fscrypt_info. Don't pass the
fscrypt_context, since everything is in the fscrypt_info.
[This will be extended for v2 policies and the fs-level keyring.]
- Define a function fscrypt_set_derived_key() which sets the per-file
key, without depending on anything specific to v1 policies.
[This will also be used for v2 policies.]
- Define a function fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key() which takes the raw
master key, thus separating finding the key from using it.
[This will also be used if the key is found in the fs-level keyring.]
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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In preparation for introducing a filesystem-level keyring which will
contain fscrypt master keys, rename the existing 'struct
fscrypt_master_key' to 'struct fscrypt_direct_key'. This is the
structure in the existing table of master keys that's maintained to
deduplicate the crypto transforms for v1 DIRECT_KEY policies.
I've chosen to keep this table as-is rather than make it automagically
add/remove the keys to/from the filesystem-level keyring, since that
would add a lot of extra complexity to the filesystem-level keyring.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Add an inode back-pointer to 'struct fscrypt_info', such that
inode->i_crypt_info->ci_inode == inode.
This will be useful for:
1. Evicting the inodes when a fscrypt key is removed, since we'll track
the inodes using a given key by linking their fscrypt_infos together,
rather than the inodes directly. This avoids bloating 'struct inode'
with a new list_head.
2. Simplifying the per-file key setup, since the inode pointer won't
have to be passed around everywhere just in case something goes wrong
and it's needed for fscrypt_warn().
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Update fs/crypto/ to use the new names for the UAPI constants rather
than the old names, then make the old definitions conditional on
!__KERNEL__.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Most of the warning and error messages in fs/crypto/ are for situations
related to a specific inode, not merely to a super_block. So to make
things easier, make fscrypt_msg() take an inode rather than a
super_block, and make it print the inode number.
Note: This is the same approach I'm taking for fsverity_msg().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Since commit 643fa9612bf1 ("fscrypt: remove filesystem specific build
config option"), fs/crypto/ can no longer be built as a loadable module.
Thus it no longer needs a module_exit function, nor a MODULE_LICENSE.
So remove them, and change module_init to late_initcall.
Reviewed-by: Chandan Rajendra <chandan@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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fscrypt_do_page_crypto() only does a single encryption or decryption
operation, with a single logical block number (single IV). So it
actually operates on a filesystem block, not a "page" per se. To
reflect this, rename it to fscrypt_crypt_block().
Reviewed-by: Chandan Rajendra <chandan@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Currently, bounce page handling for writes to encrypted files is
unnecessarily complicated. A fscrypt_ctx is allocated along with each
bounce page, page_private(bounce_page) points to this fscrypt_ctx, and
fscrypt_ctx::w::control_page points to the original pagecache page.
However, because writes don't use the fscrypt_ctx for anything else,
there's no reason why page_private(bounce_page) can't just point to the
original pagecache page directly.
Therefore, this patch makes this change. In the process, it also cleans
up the API exposed to filesystems that allows testing whether a page is
a bounce page, getting the pagecache page from a bounce page, and
freeing a bounce page.
Reviewed-by: Chandan Rajendra <chandan@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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In order to have a common code base for fscrypt "post read" processing
for all filesystems which support encryption, this commit removes
filesystem specific build config option (e.g. CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION)
and replaces it with a build option (i.e. CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) whose
value affects all the filesystems making use of fscrypt.
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Rajendra <chandan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a
tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably
reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound.
It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper
"Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors"
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see
commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support").
On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and
the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors
without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to
enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES
instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7,
on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than
AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster.
In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and
names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in
a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their
encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information.
Adiantum does not have this problem.
Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the
master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving
per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs
and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This
configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt
policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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These are unused, undesired, and have never actually been used by
anybody. The original authors of this code have changed their mind about
its inclusion. While originally proposed for disk encryption on low-end
devices, the idea was discarded [1] in favor of something else before
that could really get going. Therefore, this patch removes Speck.
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=153359499015659
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim:
"In this round, we've mainly focused on discard, aka unmap, control
along with fstrim for Android-specific usage model. In addition, we've
fixed writepage flow which returned EAGAIN previously resulting in EIO
of fsync(2) due to mapping's error state. In order to avoid old MM bug
[1], we decided not to use __GFP_ZERO for the mapping for node and
meta page caches. As always, we've cleaned up many places for future
fsverity and symbol conflicts.
Enhancements:
- do discard/fstrim in lower priority considering fs utilization
- split large discard commands into smaller ones for better responsiveness
- add more sanity checks to address syzbot reports
- add a mount option, fsync_mode=nobarrier, which can reduce # of cache flushes
- clean up symbol namespace with modified function names
- be strict on block allocation and IO control in corner cases
Bug fixes:
- don't use __GFP_ZERO for mappings
- fix error reports in writepage to avoid fsync() failure
- avoid selinux denial on CAP_RESOURCE on resgid/resuid
- fix some subtle race conditions in GC/atomic writes/shutdown
- fix overflow bugs in sanity_check_raw_super
- fix missing bits on get_flags
Clean-ups:
- prepare the generic flow for future fsverity integration
- fix some broken coding standard"
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/4/8/661
* tag 'f2fs-for-4.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (79 commits)
f2fs: fix to clear FI_VOLATILE_FILE correctly
f2fs: let sync node IO interrupt async one
f2fs: don't change wbc->sync_mode
f2fs: fix to update mtime correctly
fs: f2fs: insert space around that ':' and ', '
fs: f2fs: add missing blank lines after declarations
fs: f2fs: changed variable type of offset "unsigned" to "loff_t"
f2fs: clean up symbol namespace
f2fs: make set_de_type() static
f2fs: make __f2fs_write_data_pages() static
f2fs: fix to avoid accessing cross the boundary
f2fs: fix to let caller retry allocating block address
disable loading f2fs module on PAGE_SIZE > 4KB
f2fs: fix error path of move_data_page
f2fs: don't drop dentry pages after fs shutdown
f2fs: fix to avoid race during access gc_thread pointer
f2fs: clean up with clear_radix_tree_dirty_tag
f2fs: fix to don't trigger writeback during recovery
f2fs: clear discard_wake earlier
f2fs: let discard thread wait a little longer if dev is busy
...
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fscrypt currently only supports AES encryption. However, many low-end
mobile devices have older CPUs that don't have AES instructions, e.g.
the ARMv8 Cryptography Extensions. Currently, user data on such devices
is not encrypted at rest because AES is too slow, even when the NEON
bit-sliced implementation of AES is used. Unfortunately, it is
infeasible to encrypt these devices at all when AES is the only option.
Therefore, this patch updates fscrypt to support the Speck block cipher,
which was recently added to the crypto API. The C implementation of
Speck is not especially fast, but Speck can be implemented very
efficiently with general-purpose vector instructions, e.g. ARM NEON.
For example, on an ARMv7 processor, we measured the NEON-accelerated
Speck128/256-XTS at 69 MB/s for both encryption and decryption, while
AES-256-XTS with the NEON bit-sliced implementation was only 22 MB/s
encryption and 19 MB/s decryption.
There are multiple variants of Speck. This patch only adds support for
Speck128/256, which is the variant with a 128-bit block size and 256-bit
key size -- the same as AES-256. This is believed to be the most secure
variant of Speck, and it's only about 6% slower than Speck128/128.
Speck64/128 would be at least 20% faster because it has 20% rounds, and
it can be even faster on CPUs that can't efficiently do the 64-bit
operations needed for Speck128. However, Speck64's 64-bit block size is
not preferred security-wise. ARM NEON also supports the needed 64-bit
operations even on 32-bit CPUs, resulting in Speck128 being fast enough
for our targeted use cases so far.
The chosen modes of operation are XTS for contents and CTS-CBC for
filenames. These are the same modes of operation that fscrypt defaults
to for AES. Note that as with the other fscrypt modes, Speck will not
be used unless userspace chooses to use it. Nor are any of the existing
modes (which are all AES-based) being removed, of course.
We intentionally don't make CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION select
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK, so people will have to enable Speck support
themselves if they need it. This is because we shouldn't bloat the
FS_ENCRYPTION dependencies with every new cipher, especially ones that
aren't recommended for most users. Moreover, CRYPTO_SPECK is just the
generic implementation, which won't be fast enough for many users; in
practice, they'll need to enable CRYPTO_SPECK_NEON to get acceptable
performance.
More details about our choice of Speck can be found in our patches that
added Speck to the crypto API, and the follow-on discussion threads.
We're planning a publication that explains the choice in more detail.
But briefly, we can't use ChaCha20 as we previously proposed, since it
would be insecure to use a stream cipher in this context, with potential
IV reuse during writes on f2fs and/or on wear-leveling flash storage.
We also evaluated many other lightweight and/or ARX-based block ciphers
such as Chaskey-LTS, RC5, LEA, CHAM, Threefish, RC6, NOEKEON, SPARX, and
XTEA. However, all had disadvantages vs. Speck, such as insufficient
performance with NEON, much less published cryptanalysis, or an
insufficient security level. Various design choices in Speck make it
perform better with NEON than competing ciphers while still having a
security margin similar to AES, and in the case of Speck128 also the
same available security levels. Unfortunately, Speck does have some
political baggage attached -- it's an NSA designed cipher, and was
rejected from an ISO standard (though for context, as far as I know none
of the above-mentioned alternatives are ISO standards either).
Nevertheless, we believe it is a good solution to the problem from a
technical perspective.
Certain algorithms constructed from ChaCha or the ChaCha permutation,
such as MEM (Masked Even-Mansour) or HPolyC, may also meet our
performance requirements. However, these are new constructions that
need more time to receive the cryptographic review and acceptance needed
to be confident in their security. HPolyC hasn't been published yet,
and we are concerned that MEM makes stronger assumptions about the
underlying permutation than the ChaCha stream cipher does. In contrast,
the XTS mode of operation is relatively well accepted, and Speck has
over 70 cryptanalysis papers. Of course, these ChaCha-based algorithms
can still be added later if they become ready.
The best known attack on Speck128/256 is a differential cryptanalysis
attack on 25 of 34 rounds with 2^253 time complexity and 2^125 chosen
plaintexts, i.e. only marginally faster than brute force. There is no
known attack on the full 34 rounds.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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|
Use a common function for fscrypt warning and error messages so that all
the messages are consistently ratelimited, include the "fscrypt:"
prefix, and include the filesystem name if applicable.
Also fix up a few of the log messages to be more descriptive.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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|
With one exception, the internal key size constants such as
FS_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE are only used for the 'available_modes' array,
where they really only serve to obfuscate what the values are. Also
some of the constants are unused, and the key sizes tend to be in the
names of the algorithms anyway. In the past these values were also
misused, e.g. we used to have FS_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE in places that
technically should have been FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE.
The exception is that FS_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE is used for key
derivation. But it's more appropriate to use
FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE for that instead.
Thus, just put the sizes directly in the 'available_modes' array.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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|
Now that all filesystems have been converted to use
fscrypt_prepare_lookup(), we can remove the fscrypt_set_d_op() and
fscrypt_set_encrypted_dentry() functions as well as un-export
fscrypt_d_ops.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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|
Currently, fscrypt provides fscrypt_decrypt_bio_pages() which decrypts a
bio's pages asynchronously, then unlocks them afterwards. But, this
assumes that decryption is the last "postprocessing step" for the bio,
so it's incompatible with additional postprocessing steps such as
authenticity verification after decryption.
Therefore, rename the existing fscrypt_decrypt_bio_pages() to
fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_bio(). Then, add fscrypt_decrypt_bio() which
decrypts the pages in the bio synchronously without unlocking the pages,
nor setting them Uptodate; and add fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work(), which
enqueues work on the fscrypt_read_workqueue. The new functions will be
used by filesystems that support both fscrypt and fs-verity.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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Filesystems don't need fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size() anymore, so
unexport it and move it to fscrypt_private.h.
We also never calculate the encrypted size of a filename without having
the fscrypt_info present since it is needed to know the amount of
NUL-padding which is determined by the encryption policy, and also we
will always truncate the NUL-padding to the maximum filename length.
Therefore, also make fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size() assume that the
fscrypt_info is present, and make it truncate the returned length to the
specified max_len.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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|
Currently, when encrypting a filename (either a real filename or a
symlink target) we calculate the amount of NUL-padding twice: once
before encryption and once during encryption in fname_encrypt(). It is
needed before encryption to allocate the needed buffer size as well as
calculate the size the symlink target will take up on-disk before
creating the symlink inode. Calculating the size during encryption as
well is redundant.
Remove this redundancy by always calculating the exact size beforehand,
and making fname_encrypt() just add as much NUL padding as is needed to
fill the output buffer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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|
Now that all filesystems have been converted to use the symlink helper
functions, they no longer need the declaration of 'struct
fscrypt_symlink_data'. Move it from fscrypt.h to fscrypt_private.h.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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|
Currently, filesystems supporting fscrypt need to implement some tricky
logic when creating encrypted symlinks, including handling a peculiar
on-disk format (struct fscrypt_symlink_data) and correctly calculating
the size of the encrypted symlink. Introduce helper functions to make
things a bit easier:
- fscrypt_prepare_symlink() computes and validates the size the symlink
target will require on-disk.
- fscrypt_encrypt_symlink() creates the encrypted target if needed.
The new helpers actually fix some subtle bugs. First, when checking
whether the symlink target was too long, filesystems didn't account for
the fact that the NUL padding is meant to be truncated if it would cause
the maximum length to be exceeded, as is done for filenames in
directories. Consequently users would receive ENAMETOOLONG when
creating symlinks close to what is supposed to be the maximum length.
For example, with EXT4 with a 4K block size, the maximum symlink target
length in an encrypted directory is supposed to be 4093 bytes (in
comparison to 4095 in an unencrypted directory), but in
FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32-mode only up to 4064 bytes were accepted.
Second, symlink targets of "." and ".." were not being encrypted, even
though they should be, as these names are special in *directory entries*
but not in symlink targets. Fortunately, we can fix this simply by
starting to encrypt them, as old kernels already accept them in
encrypted form.
Third, the output string length the filesystems were providing when
doing the actual encryption was incorrect, as it was forgotten to
exclude 'sizeof(struct fscrypt_symlink_data)'. Fortunately though, this
bug didn't make a difference.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
|
The encryption modes are validated by fs/crypto/, not by individual
filesystems. Therefore, move fscrypt_valid_enc_modes() from fscrypt.h
to fscrypt_private.h.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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|
The fscrypt_info kmem_cache is internal to fscrypt; filesystems don't
need to access it. So move its declaration into fscrypt_private.h.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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|
Pull fscrypt updates from Ted Ts'o:
"Lots of cleanups, mostly courtesy by Eric Biggers"
* tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/fscrypt:
fscrypt: lock mutex before checking for bounce page pool
fscrypt: add a documentation file for filesystem-level encryption
ext4: switch to fscrypt_prepare_setattr()
ext4: switch to fscrypt_prepare_lookup()
ext4: switch to fscrypt_prepare_rename()
ext4: switch to fscrypt_prepare_link()
ext4: switch to fscrypt_file_open()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_setattr()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_lookup()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_rename()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_link()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_file_open()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_require_key()
fscrypt: remove unneeded empty fscrypt_operations structs
fscrypt: remove ->is_encrypted()
fscrypt: switch from ->is_encrypted() to IS_ENCRYPTED()
fs, fscrypt: add an S_ENCRYPTED inode flag
fscrypt: clean up include file mess
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Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"Here is the crypto update for 4.15:
API:
- Disambiguate EBUSY when queueing crypto request by adding ENOSPC.
This change touches code outside the crypto API.
- Reset settings when empty string is written to rng_current.
Algorithms:
- Add OSCCA SM3 secure hash.
Drivers:
- Remove old mv_cesa driver (replaced by marvell/cesa).
- Enable rfc3686/ecb/cfb/ofb AES in crypto4xx.
- Add ccm/gcm AES in crypto4xx.
- Add support for BCM7278 in iproc-rng200.
- Add hash support on Exynos in s5p-sss.
- Fix fallback-induced error in vmx.
- Fix output IV in atmel-aes.
- Fix empty GCM hash in mediatek.
Others:
- Fix DoS potential in lib/mpi.
- Fix potential out-of-order issues with padata"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (162 commits)
lib/mpi: call cond_resched() from mpi_powm() loop
crypto: stm32/hash - Fix return issue on update
crypto: dh - Remove pointless checks for NULL 'p' and 'g'
crypto: qat - Clean up error handling in qat_dh_set_secret()
crypto: dh - Don't permit 'key' or 'g' size longer than 'p'
crypto: dh - Don't permit 'p' to be 0
crypto: dh - Fix double free of ctx->p
hwrng: iproc-rng200 - Add support for BCM7278
dt-bindings: rng: Document BCM7278 RNG200 compatible
crypto: chcr - Replace _manual_ swap with swap macro
crypto: marvell - Add a NULL entry at the end of mv_cesa_plat_id_table[]
hwrng: virtio - Virtio RNG devices need to be re-registered after suspend/resume
crypto: atmel - remove empty functions
crypto: ecdh - remove empty exit()
MAINTAINERS: update maintainer for qat
crypto: caam - remove unused param of ctx_map_to_sec4_sg()
crypto: caam - remove unneeded edesc zeroization
crypto: atmel-aes - Reset the controller before each use
crypto: atmel-aes - properly set IV after {en,de}crypt
hwrng: core - Reset user selected rng by writing "" to rng_current
...
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fscrypt starts several async. crypto ops and waiting for them to
complete. Move it over to generic code doing the same.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Filesystems have to include different header files based on whether they
are compiled with encryption support or not. That's nasty and messy.
Instead, rationalise the headers so we have a single include fscrypt.h
and let it decide what internal implementation to include based on the
__FS_HAS_ENCRYPTION define. Filesystems set __FS_HAS_ENCRYPTION to 1
before including linux/fscrypt.h if they are built with encryption
support. Otherwise, they must set __FS_HAS_ENCRYPTION to 0.
Add guards to prevent fscrypt_supp.h and fscrypt_notsupp.h from being
directly included by filesystems.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
[EB: use 1 and 0 rather than defined/undefined]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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|
fscrypt provides facilities to use different encryption algorithms which
are selectable by userspace when setting the encryption policy. Currently,
only AES-256-XTS for file contents and AES-256-CBC-CTS for file names are
implemented. This is a clear case of kernel offers the mechanism and
userspace selects a policy. Similar to what dm-crypt and ecryptfs have.
This patch adds support for using AES-128-CBC for file contents and
AES-128-CBC-CTS for file name encryption. To mitigate watermarking
attacks, IVs are generated using the ESSIV algorithm. While AES-CBC is
actually slightly less secure than AES-XTS from a security point of view,
there is more widespread hardware support. Using AES-CBC gives us the
acceptable performance while still providing a moderate level of security
for persistent storage.
Especially low-powered embedded devices with crypto accelerators such as
CAAM or CESA often only support AES-CBC. Since using AES-CBC over AES-XTS
is basically thought of a last resort, we use AES-128-CBC over AES-256-CBC
since it has less encryption rounds and yields noticeable better
performance starting from a file size of just a few kB.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Walter <dwalter@sigma-star.at>
[david@sigma-star.at: addressed review comments]
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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|
Introduce a helper function fscrypt_match_name() which tests whether a
fscrypt_name matches a directory entry. Also clean up the magic numbers
and document things properly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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|
This commit exposes the necessary constants and structures for a
userspace program to pass filesystem encryption keys into the keyring.
The fscrypt_key structure was already part of the kernel ABI, this
change just makes it so programs no longer have to redeclare these
structures (like e4crypt in e2fsprogs currently does).
Note that we do not expose the other FS_*_KEY_SIZE constants as they are
not necessary. Only XTS is supported for contents_encryption_mode, so
currently FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE bytes of key material must always be passed to
the kernel.
This commit also removes __packed from fscrypt_key as it does not
contain any implicit padding and does not refer to an on-disk structure.
Signed-off-by: Joe Richey <joerichey@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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|
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
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|
When a completion is declared on-stack we have to use
COMPLETION_INITIALIZER_ONSTACK().
Fixes: 0b81d07790726 ("fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs
tree to fs/crypto")
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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|
Previously, each filesystem configured without encryption support would
define all the public fscrypt functions to their notsupp_* stubs. This
list of #defines had to be updated in every filesystem whenever a change
was made to the public fscrypt functions. To make things more
maintainable now that we have three filesystems using fscrypt, split the
old header fscrypto.h into several new headers. fscrypt_supp.h contains
the real declarations and is included by filesystems when configured
with encryption support, whereas fscrypt_notsupp.h contains the inline
stubs and is included by filesystems when configured without encryption
support. fscrypt_common.h contains common declarations needed by both.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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That way we can get rid of the direct dependency on CONFIG_BLOCK.
Fixes: d475a507457b ("ubifs: Add skeleton for fscrypto")
Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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... to better explain its purpose after introducing in-place encryption
without bounce buffer.
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Since fscrypt users can now indicated if fscrypt_encrypt_page() should
use a bounce page, we can delay the bounce page pool initialization util
it is really needed. That is until fscrypt_operations has no
FS_CFLG_OWN_PAGES flag set.
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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|
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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The fscrypt_initalize() function isn't used outside fs/crypto, so
there's no point making it be an exported symbol.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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To avoid namespace collisions, rename get_crypt_info() to
fscrypt_get_crypt_info(). The function is only used inside the
fs/crypto directory, so declare it in the new header file,
fscrypt_private.h.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Eric Biggers
Chandan Rajendra
Jason A. Donenfeld
Linus Torvalds
Gilad Ben-Yossef
Greg Kroah-Hartman
Dave Chinner
Daniel Walter
Joe Richey
Richard Weinberger
David Gstir
Theodore Ts'o