aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/fs/f2fs/verity.c (follow)
AgeCommit message (Collapse)AuthorFilesLines
2021-05-04Merge tag 'f2fs-for-5.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fsLinus Torvalds1-21/+54
Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim: "In this round, we added a new mount option, "checkpoint_merge", which introduces a kernel thread dealing with the f2fs checkpoints. Once we start to manage the IO priority along with blk-cgroup, the checkpoint operation can be processed in a lower priority under the process context. Since the checkpoint holds all the filesystem operations, we give a higher priority to the checkpoint thread all the time. Enhancements: - introduce gc_merge mount option to introduce a checkpoint thread - improve to run discard thread efficiently - allow modular compression algorithms - expose # of overprivision segments to sysfs - expose runtime compression stat to sysfs Bug fixes: - fix OOB memory access by the node id lookup - avoid touching checkpointed data in the checkpoint-disabled mode - fix the resizing flow to avoid kernel panic and race conditions - fix block allocation issues on pinned files - address some swapfile issues - fix hugtask problem and kernel panic during atomic write operations - don't start checkpoint thread in RO And, we've cleaned up some kernel coding style and build warnings. In addition, we fixed some minor race conditions and error handling routines" * tag 'f2fs-for-5.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (48 commits) f2fs: drop inplace IO if fs status is abnormal f2fs: compress: remove unneed check condition f2fs: clean up left deprecated IO trace codes f2fs: avoid using native allocate_segment_by_default() f2fs: remove unnecessary struct declaration f2fs: fix to avoid NULL pointer dereference f2fs: avoid duplicated codes for cleanup f2fs: document: add description about compressed space handling f2fs: clean up build warnings f2fs: fix the periodic wakeups of discard thread f2fs: fix to avoid accessing invalid fio in f2fs_allocate_data_block() f2fs: fix to avoid GC/mmap race with f2fs_truncate() f2fs: set checkpoint_merge by default f2fs: Fix a hungtask problem in atomic write f2fs: fix to restrict mount condition on readonly block device f2fs: introduce gc_merge mount option f2fs: fix to cover __allocate_new_section() with curseg_lock f2fs: fix wrong alloc_type in f2fs_do_replace_block f2fs: delete empty compress.h f2fs: fix a typo in inode.c ...
2021-04-23mm/filemap: Pass the file_ra_state in the ractlMatthew Wilcox (Oracle)1-1/+1
For readahead_expand(), we need to modify the file ra_state, so pass it down by adding it to the ractl. We have to do this because it's not always the same as f_ra in the struct file that is already being passed. Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Tested-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com> Tested-By: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210407201857.3582797-2-willy@infradead.org/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161789067431.6155.8063840447229665720.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v6
2021-03-12f2fs: fix error handling in f2fs_end_enable_verity()Eric Biggers1-21/+54
f2fs didn't properly clean up if verity failed to be enabled on a file: - It left verity metadata (pages past EOF) in the page cache, which would be exposed to userspace if the file was later extended. - It didn't truncate the verity metadata at all (either from cache or from disk) if an error occurred while setting the verity bit. Fix these bugs by adding a call to truncate_inode_pages() and ensuring that we truncate the verity metadata (both from cache and from disk) in all error paths. Also rework the code to cleanly separate the success path from the error paths, which makes it much easier to understand. Finally, log a message if f2fs_truncate() fails, since it might otherwise fail silently. Reported-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@hihonor.com> Fixes: 95ae251fe828 ("f2fs: add fs-verity support") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.4+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
2020-10-16mm/readahead: make page_cache_ra_unbounded take a readahead_controlMatthew Wilcox (Oracle)1-2/+2
Define it in the callers instead of in page_cache_ra_unbounded(). Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200903140844.14194-4-willy@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-03f2fs: use macro instead of f2fs verity versionJack Qiu1-2/+4
Because fsverity_descriptor_location.version is constant, so use macro for better reading. Signed-off-by: Jack Qiu <jack.qiu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
2020-06-02mm: add page_cache_readahead_unboundedMatthew Wilcox (Oracle)1-33/+2
ext4 and f2fs have duplicated the guts of the readahead code so they can read past i_size. Instead, separate out the guts of the readahead code so they can call it directly. Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Cc: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Cc: Gao Xiang <gaoxiang25@huawei.com> Cc: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com> Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200414150233.24495-14-willy@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-01-14fs-verity: implement readahead of Merkle tree pagesEric Biggers1-2/+45
When fs-verity verifies data pages, currently it reads each Merkle tree page synchronously using read_mapping_page(). Therefore, when the Merkle tree pages aren't already cached, fs-verity causes an extra 4 KiB I/O request for every 512 KiB of data (assuming that the Merkle tree uses SHA-256 and 4 KiB blocks). This results in more I/O requests and performance loss than is strictly necessary. Therefore, implement readahead of the Merkle tree pages. For simplicity, we take advantage of the fact that the kernel already does readahead of the file's *data*, just like it does for any other file. Due to this, we don't really need a separate readahead state (struct file_ra_state) just for the Merkle tree, but rather we just need to piggy-back on the existing data readahead requests. We also only really need to bother with the first level of the Merkle tree, since the usual fan-out factor is 128, so normally over 99% of Merkle tree I/O requests are for the first level. Therefore, make fsverity_verify_bio() enable readahead of the first Merkle tree level, for up to 1/4 the number of pages in the bio, when it sees that the REQ_RAHEAD flag is set on the bio. The readahead size is then passed down to ->read_merkle_tree_page() for the filesystem to (optionally) implement if it sees that the requested page is uncached. While we're at it, also make build_merkle_tree_level() set the Merkle tree readahead size, since it's easy to do there. However, for now don't set the readahead size in fsverity_verify_page(), since currently it's only used to verify holes on ext4 and f2fs, and it would need parameters added to know how much to read ahead. This patch significantly improves fs-verity sequential read performance. Some quick benchmarks with 'cat'-ing a 250MB file after dropping caches: On an ARM64 phone (using sha256-ce): Before: 217 MB/s After: 263 MB/s (compare to sha256sum of non-verity file: 357 MB/s) In an x86_64 VM (using sha256-avx2): Before: 173 MB/s After: 215 MB/s (compare to sha256sum of non-verity file: 223 MB/s) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200106205533.137005-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-12f2fs: add fs-verity supportEric Biggers1-0/+247
Add fs-verity support to f2fs. fs-verity is a filesystem feature that enables transparent integrity protection and authentication of read-only files. It uses a dm-verity like mechanism at the file level: a Merkle tree is used to verify any block in the file in log(filesize) time. It is implemented mainly by helper functions in fs/verity/. See Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the full documentation. The f2fs support for fs-verity consists of: - Adding a filesystem feature flag and an inode flag for fs-verity. - Implementing the fsverity_operations to support enabling verity on an inode and reading/writing the verity metadata. - Updating ->readpages() to verify data as it's read from verity files and to support reading verity metadata pages. - Updating ->write_begin(), ->write_end(), and ->writepages() to support writing verity metadata pages. - Calling the fs-verity hooks for ->open(), ->setattr(), and ->ioctl(). Like ext4, f2fs stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor) past the end of the file, starting at the first 64K boundary beyond i_size. This approach works because (a) verity files are readonly, and (b) pages fully beyond i_size aren't visible to userspace but can be read/written internally by f2fs with only some relatively small changes to f2fs. Extended attributes cannot be used because (a) f2fs limits the total size of an inode's xattr entries to 4096 bytes, which wouldn't be enough for even a single Merkle tree block, and (b) f2fs encryption doesn't encrypt xattrs, yet the verity metadata *must* be encrypted when the file is because it contains hashes of the plaintext data. Acked-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>