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The ability to mark files for direct i/o access when opened
normally is both unused and pointless, so this patch removes
support for that feature.
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
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This patch removes the "recent list" which is used during allocation
and replaces it with the (already existing) mru list used during
deletion. The "recent list" was not a true mru list leading to a number
of inefficiencies including a "next" function which made scanning the
list an order N^2 operation wrt to the number of list elements.
This should increase allocation performance with large numbers of rgrps.
Its also a useful preparation and cleanup before some further changes
which are planned in this area.
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
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We already allow local SH locks while we hold a cached EX glock, so here
we allow DF locks as well. This works only because we rely on the VFS's
invalidation for locally cached data, and because if we hold an EX lock,
then we know that no other node can be caching data relating to this
file.
It dramatically speeds up initial writes to O_DIRECT files since we fall
back to buffered I/O for this and would otherwise bounce between DF and
EX modes on each and every write call. The lessons to be learned from
that are to ensure that (for the time being anyway) O_DIRECT files are
preallocated and that they are written to using reasonably large I/O
sizes. Even so this change fixes that corner case nicely
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
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There is a race in the delayed demote code where it does the wrong thing
if a demotion to UN has occurred for other reasons before the delay has
expired. This patch adds an assert to catch that condition as well as
fixing the root cause by adding an additional check for the UN state.
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
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GFS2 calls permission() to verify permissions after locks on the files
have been taken.
For this it's sufficient to call gfs2_permission() instead. This
results in the following changes:
- IS_RDONLY() check is not performed
- IS_IMMUTABLE() check is not performed
- devcgroup_inode_permission() is not called
- security_inode_permission() is not called
IS_RDONLY() should be unnecessary anyway, as the per-mount read-only
flag should provide protection against read-only remounts during
operations. do_gfs2_set_flags() has been fixed to perform
mnt_want_write()/mnt_drop_write() to protect against remounting
read-only.
IS_IMMUTABLE has been added to gfs2_permission()
Repeating the security checks seems to be pointless, as they don't
normally change, and if they do, it's independent of the filesystem
state.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
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Two lines missed from the previous patch.
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
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