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According to SUSv3:
[EACCES] Permission denied. An attempt was made to access a file in a way
forbidden by its file access permissions.
[EPERM] Operation not permitted. An attempt was made to perform an operation
limited to processes with appropriate privileges or to the owner of a file
or other resource.
So -EPERM should be returned if capability checks fails.
Strictly speaking this is an API change since the error code user sees is
altered.
Signed-off-by: Zhao Hongjiang <zhaohongjiang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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* calling conventions change - ERR_PTR() is returned on ->d_hash() errors;
NULL is just for dcache miss now.
* exported, open-coded instances in ncpfs and cifs converted.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Removed vmtruncate
Signed-off-by: Marco Stornelli <marco.stornelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Pull user namespace changes from Eric Biederman:
"While small this set of changes is very significant with respect to
containers in general and user namespaces in particular. The user
space interface is now complete.
This set of changes adds support for unprivileged users to create user
namespaces and as a user namespace root to create other namespaces.
The tyranny of supporting suid root preventing unprivileged users from
using cool new kernel features is broken.
This set of changes completes the work on setns, adding support for
the pid, user, mount namespaces.
This set of changes includes a bunch of basic pid namespace
cleanups/simplifications. Of particular significance is the rework of
the pid namespace cleanup so it no longer requires sending out
tendrils into all kinds of unexpected cleanup paths for operation. At
least one case of broken error handling is fixed by this cleanup.
The files under /proc/<pid>/ns/ have been converted from regular files
to magic symlinks which prevents incorrect caching by the VFS,
ensuring the files always refer to the namespace the process is
currently using and ensuring that the ptrace_mayaccess permission
checks are always applied.
The files under /proc/<pid>/ns/ have been given stable inode numbers
so it is now possible to see if different processes share the same
namespaces.
Through the David Miller's net tree are changes to relax many of the
permission checks in the networking stack to allowing the user
namespace root to usefully use the networking stack. Similar changes
for the mount namespace and the pid namespace are coming through my
tree.
Two small changes to add user namespace support were commited here adn
in David Miller's -net tree so that I could complete the work on the
/proc/<pid>/ns/ files in this tree.
Work remains to make it safe to build user namespaces and 9p, afs,
ceph, cifs, coda, gfs2, ncpfs, nfs, nfsd, ocfs2, and xfs so the
Kconfig guard remains in place preventing that user namespaces from
being built when any of those filesystems are enabled.
Future design work remains to allow root users outside of the initial
user namespace to mount more than just /proc and /sys."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (38 commits)
proc: Usable inode numbers for the namespace file descriptors.
proc: Fix the namespace inode permission checks.
proc: Generalize proc inode allocation
userns: Allow unprivilged mounts of proc and sysfs
userns: For /proc/self/{uid,gid}_map derive the lower userns from the struct file
procfs: Print task uids and gids in the userns that opened the proc file
userns: Implement unshare of the user namespace
userns: Implent proc namespace operations
userns: Kill task_user_ns
userns: Make create_new_namespaces take a user_ns parameter
userns: Allow unprivileged use of setns.
userns: Allow unprivileged users to create new namespaces
userns: Allow setting a userns mapping to your current uid.
userns: Allow chown and setgid preservation
userns: Allow unprivileged users to create user namespaces.
userns: Ignore suid and sgid on binaries if the uid or gid can not be mapped
userns: fix return value on mntns_install() failure
vfs: Allow unprivileged manipulation of the mount namespace.
vfs: Only support slave subtrees across different user namespaces
vfs: Add a user namespace reference from struct mnt_namespace
...
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The maximum oom_score_adj is 1000 and the minimum oom_score_adj is -1000,
so this range can be represented by the signed short type with no
functional change. The extra space this frees up in struct signal_struct
will be used for per-thread oom kill flags in the next patch.
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Anton Vorontsov <anton.vorontsov@linaro.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Commit 7b540d0646ce ("proc_map_files_readdir(): don't bother with
grabbing files") switched proc_map_files_readdir() to use @f_mode
directly instead of grabbing @file reference, but same time the test for
@vm_file presence was lost leading to nil dereference. The patch brings
the test back.
The all proc_map_files feature is CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE wrapped
(which is set to 'n' by default) so the bug doesn't affect regular
kernels.
The regression is 3.7-rc1 only as far as I can tell.
[gorcunov@openvz.org: provided changelog]
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Track the number of pids in the proc hash table. When the number of
pids goes to 0 schedule work to unmount the kernel mount of proc.
Move the mount of proc into alloc_pid when we allocate the pid for
init.
Remove the surprising calls of pid_ns_release proc in fork and
proc_flush_task. Those code paths really shouldn't know about proc
namespace implementation details and people have demonstrated several
times that finding and understanding those code paths is difficult and
non-obvious.
Because of the call path detach pid is alwasy called with the
rtnl_lock held free_pid is not allowed to sleep, so the work to
unmounting proc is moved to a work queue. This has the side benefit
of not blocking the entire world waiting for the unnecessary
rcu_barrier in deactivate_locked_super.
In the process of making the code clear and obvious this fixes a bug
reported by Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> where we would leak a
mount of proc during clone(CLONE_NEWPID|CLONE_NEWNET) if copy_pid_ns
succeeded and copy_net_ns failed.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Now that we have s_fs_info pointing to our pid namespace
the original reason for the proc root inode having a struct
pid is gone.
Caching a pid in the root inode has led to some complicated
code. Now that we don't need the struct pid, just remove it.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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I had visions at one point of splitting proc into two filesystems. If
that had happened proc/self being the the part of proc that actually deals
with pids would have been a nice cleanup. As it is proc/self requires
a lot of unnecessary infrastructure for a single file.
The only user visible change is that a mounted /proc for a pid namespace
that is dead now shows a broken proc symlink, instead of being completely
invisible. I don't think anyone will notice or care.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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This is mostly a revert of 01dc52ebdf47 ("oom: remove deprecated oom_adj")
from Davidlohr Bueso.
It reintroduces /proc/pid/oom_adj for backwards compatibility with earlier
kernels. It simply scales the value linearly when /proc/pid/oom_score_adj
is written.
The major difference is that its scheduled removal is no longer included
in Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt. We do warn users with a
single printk, though, to suggest the more powerful and supported
/proc/pid/oom_score_adj interface.
Reported-by: Artem S. Tashkinov <t.artem@lycos.com>
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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The deprecated /proc/<pid>/oom_adj is scheduled for removal this month.
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@gnu.org>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Pull vfs update from Al Viro:
- big one - consolidation of descriptor-related logics; almost all of
that is moved to fs/file.c
(BTW, I'm seriously tempted to rename the result to fd.c. As it is,
we have a situation when file_table.c is about handling of struct
file and file.c is about handling of descriptor tables; the reasons
are historical - file_table.c used to be about a static array of
struct file we used to have way back).
A lot of stray ends got cleaned up and converted to saner primitives,
disgusting mess in android/binder.c is still disgusting, but at least
doesn't poke so much in descriptor table guts anymore. A bunch of
relatively minor races got fixed in process, plus an ext4 struct file
leak.
- related thing - fget_light() partially unuglified; see fdget() in
there (and yes, it generates the code as good as we used to have).
- also related - bits of Cyrill's procfs stuff that got entangled into
that work; _not_ all of it, just the initial move to fs/proc/fd.c and
switch of fdinfo to seq_file.
- Alex's fs/coredump.c spiltoff - the same story, had been easier to
take that commit than mess with conflicts. The rest is a separate
pile, this was just a mechanical code movement.
- a few misc patches all over the place. Not all for this cycle,
there'll be more (and quite a few currently sit in akpm's tree)."
Fix up trivial conflicts in the android binder driver, and some fairly
simple conflicts due to two different changes to the sock_alloc_file()
interface ("take descriptor handling from sock_alloc_file() to callers"
vs "net: Providing protocol type via system.sockprotoname xattr of
/proc/PID/fd entries" adding a dentry name to the socket)
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (72 commits)
MAX_LFS_FILESIZE should be a loff_t
compat: fs: Generic compat_sys_sendfile implementation
fs: push rcu_barrier() from deactivate_locked_super() to filesystems
btrfs: reada_extent doesn't need kref for refcount
coredump: move core dump functionality into its own file
coredump: prevent double-free on an error path in core dumper
usb/gadget: fix misannotations
fcntl: fix misannotations
ceph: don't abuse d_delete() on failure exits
hypfs: ->d_parent is never NULL or negative
vfs: delete surplus inode NULL check
switch simple cases of fget_light to fdget
new helpers: fdget()/fdput()
switch o2hb_region_dev_write() to fget_light()
proc_map_files_readdir(): don't bother with grabbing files
make get_file() return its argument
vhost_set_vring(): turn pollstart/pollstop into bool
switch prctl_set_mm_exe_file() to fget_light()
switch xfs_find_handle() to fget_light()
switch xfs_swapext() to fget_light()
...
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all we need is their ->f_mode, so just collect _that_
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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simplifies a bunch of callers...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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This patch prepares the ground for further extension of
/proc/pid/fd[info] handling code by moving fdinfo handling
code into fs/proc/fd.c.
I think such move makes both fs/proc/base.c and fs/proc/fd.c
easier to read.
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
CC: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
CC: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
CC: James Bottomley <jbottomley@parallels.com>
CC: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CC: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
CC: Matthew Helsley <matt.helsley@gmail.com>
CC: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
CC: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Implement kprojid_t a cousin of the kuid_t and kgid_t.
The per user namespace mapping of project id values can be set with
/proc/<pid>/projid_map.
A full compliment of helpers is provided: make_kprojid, from_kprojid,
from_kprojid_munged, kporjid_has_mapping, projid_valid, projid_eq,
projid_eq, projid_lt.
Project identifiers are part of the generic disk quota interface,
although it appears only xfs implements project identifiers currently.
The xfs code allows anyone who has permission to set the project
identifier on a file to use any project identifier so when
setting up the user namespace project identifier mappings I do
not require a capability.
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Always store audit loginuids in type kuid_t.
Print loginuids by converting them into uids in the appropriate user
namespace, and then printing the resulting uid.
Modify audit_get_loginuid to return a kuid_t.
Modify audit_set_loginuid to take a kuid_t.
Modify /proc/<pid>/loginuid on read to convert the loginuid into the
user namespace of the opener of the file.
Modify /proc/<pid>/loginud on write to convert the loginuid
rom the user namespace of the opener of the file.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> ?
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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__mem_open() which is called by both /proc/<pid>/environ and
/proc/<pid>/mem ->open() handlers will allow the use of negative offsets.
/proc/<pid>/mem has negative offsets but not /proc/<pid>/environ.
Clean this by moving the 'force FMODE_UNSIGNED_OFFSET flag' to mem_open()
to allow negative offsets only on /proc/<pid>/mem.
Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Currently the following offset and environment address range check in
environ_read() of /proc/<pid>/environ is buggy:
int this_len = mm->env_end - (mm->env_start + src);
if (this_len <= 0)
break;
Large or negative offsets on /proc/<pid>/environ converted to 'unsigned
long' may pass this check since '(mm->env_start + src)' can overflow and
'this_len' will be positive.
This can turn /proc/<pid>/environ to act like /proc/<pid>/mem since
(mm->env_start + src) will point and read from another VMA.
There are two fixes here plus some code cleaning:
1) Fix the overflow by checking if the offset that was converted to
unsigned long will always point to the [mm->env_start, mm->env_end]
address range.
2) Remove the truncation that was made to the result of the check,
storing the result in 'int this_len' will alter its value and we can
not depend on it.
For kernels that have commit b409e578d ("proc: clean up
/proc/<pid>/environ handling") which adds the appropriate ptrace check and
saves the 'mm' at ->open() time, this is not a security issue.
This patch is taken from the grsecurity patch since it was just made
available.
Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Add a helper that abstracts out the jump to an already parsed struct path
from ->follow_link operation from procfs. Not only does this clean up
the code by moving the two sides of this game into a single helper, but
it also prepares for making struct nameidata private to namei.c
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Currently the non-nd_set_link based versions of ->follow_link are expected
to do a path_put(&nd->path) on failure. This calling convention is unexpected,
undocumented and doesn't match what the nd_set_link-based instances do.
Move the path_put out of the only non-nd_set_link based ->follow_link
instance into the caller.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Just the flags; only NFS cares even about that, but there are
legitimate uses for such argument. And getting rid of that
completely would require splitting ->lookup() into a couple
of methods (at least), so let's leave that alone for now...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Just the lookup flags. Die, bastard, die...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Cyrill Gorcunov reports that I broke the fdinfo files with commit
30a08bf2d31d ("proc: move fd symlink i_mode calculations into
tid_fd_revalidate()"), and he's quite right.
The tid_fd_revalidate() function is not just used for the <tid>/fd
symlinks, it's also used for the <tid>/fdinfo/<fd> files, and the
permission model for those are different.
So do the dynamic symlink permission handling just for symlinks, making
the fdinfo files once more appear as the proper regular files they are.
Of course, Al Viro argued (probably correctly) that we shouldn't do the
symlink permission games at all, and make the symlinks always just be
the normal 'lrwxrwxrwx'. That would have avoided this issue too, but
since somebody noticed that the permissions had changed (which was the
reason for that original commit 30a08bf2d31d in the first place), people
do apparently use this feature.
[ Basically, you can use the symlink permission data as a cheap "fdinfo"
replacement, since you see whether the file is open for reading and/or
writing by just looking at st_mode of the symlink. So the feature
does make sense, even if the pain it has caused means we probably
shouldn't have done it to begin with. ]
Reported-and-tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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When we do checkpoint of a task we need to know the list of children the
task, has but there is no easy and fast way to generate reverse
parent->children chain from arbitrary <pid> (while a parent pid is
provided in "PPid" field of /proc/<pid>/status).
So instead of walking over all pids in the system (creating one big
process tree in memory, just to figure out which children a task has) --
we add explicit /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children entry, because the kernel
already has this kind of information but it is not yet exported.
This is a first level children, not the whole process tree.
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Pass "fd" directly, not via pointer -- one less memory read.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() is nop for TINY_RCU, but is not a nop
for, say, PREEMPT_RCU.
proc_fill_cache() is called without RCU lock, there is no need to
lock/unlock on error path, simply jump out of the loop.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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mm_access() handles this much better, and avoids some race conditions.
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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mm_for_maps() is a simple wrapper for mm_access(), and the name is
misleading, so just remove it and use mm_access() directly.
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Similar to e268337dfe26 ("proc: clean up and fix /proc/<pid>/mem
handling"), move the check of permission to open(), this will simplify
read() code.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The oom_score_adj scale ranges from -1000 to 1000 and represents the
proportion of memory available to the process at allocation time. This
means an oom_score_adj value of 300, for example, will bias a process as
though it was using an extra 30.0% of available memory and a value of
-350 will discount 35.0% of available memory from its usage.
The oom killer badness heuristic also uses this scale to report the oom
score for each eligible process in determining the "best" process to
kill. Thus, it can only differentiate each process's memory usage by
0.1% of system RAM.
On large systems, this can end up being a large amount of memory: 256MB
on 256GB systems, for example.
This can be fixed by having the badness heuristic to use the actual
memory usage in scoring threads and then normalizing it to the
oom_score_adj scale for userspace. This results in better comparison
between eligible threads for kill and no change from the userspace
perspective.
Suggested-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Tested-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman:
"This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can
reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete
implementation.
Highlights:
- Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and
code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe.
- Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the
config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable
user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission
checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe.
- All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial
user namespace before they are processed. Removing the need to add
an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared
uids remains the same.
- With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or
better than it is today.
- For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or
operationally with the user namespace enabled.
- The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1
billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code
enabled. This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to
164ns per stat operation).
- (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value.
Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially
anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause
entertaining failures in userspace.
- If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails.
I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I
could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and
handle the case where setuid fails.
- If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which
we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid. The LFS
experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be
better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I
can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we
can't map.
- Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it
safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities.
My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core
kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1."
Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits)
userns: Silence silly gcc warning.
cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock
userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq
userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq
userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate
userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids.
userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate.
userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe
userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns
userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces.
userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.
userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids
userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid
userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs
...
|
|
Merge misc fixes from Andrew Morton.
* emailed from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (4 patches)
frv: delete incorrect task prototypes causing compile fail
slub: missing test for partial pages flush work in flush_all()
fs, proc: fix ABBA deadlock in case of execution attempt of map_files/ entries
drivers/rtc/rtc-pl031.c: configure correct wday for 2000-01-01
|
|
Instead of doing the i_mode calculations at proc_fd_instantiate() time,
move them into tid_fd_revalidate(), which is where the other inode state
(notably uid/gid information) is updated too.
Otherwise we'll end up with stale i_mode information if an fd is re-used
while the dentry still hangs around. Not that anything really *cares*
(symlink permissions don't really matter), but Tetsuo Handa noticed that
the owner read/write bits don't always match the state of the
readability of the file descriptor, and we _used_ to get this right a
long time ago in a galaxy far, far away.
Besides, aside from fixing an ugly detail (that has apparently been this
way since commit 61a28784028e: "proc: Remove the hard coded inode
numbers" in 2006), this removes more lines of code than it adds. And it
just makes sense to update i_mode in the same place we update i_uid/gid.
Al Viro correctly points out that we could just do the inode fill in the
inode iops ->getattr() function instead. However, that does require
somewhat slightly more invasive changes, and adds yet *another* lookup
of the file descriptor. We need to do the revalidate() for other
reasons anyway, and have the file descriptor handy, so we might as well
fill in the information at this point.
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
map_files/ entries are never supposed to be executed, still curious
minds might try to run them, which leads to the following deadlock
======================================================
[ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
3.4.0-rc4-24406-g841e6a6 #121 Not tainted
-------------------------------------------------------
bash/1556 is trying to acquire lock:
(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){+.+.+.}, at: do_lookup+0x267/0x2b1
but task is already holding lock:
(&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: prepare_bprm_creds+0x2d/0x69
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}:
validate_chain+0x444/0x4f4
__lock_acquire+0x387/0x3f8
lock_acquire+0x12b/0x158
__mutex_lock_common+0x56/0x3a9
mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x40/0x45
lock_trace+0x24/0x59
proc_map_files_lookup+0x5a/0x165
__lookup_hash+0x52/0x73
do_lookup+0x276/0x2b1
walk_component+0x3d/0x114
do_last+0xfc/0x540
path_openat+0xd3/0x306
do_filp_open+0x3d/0x89
do_sys_open+0x74/0x106
sys_open+0x21/0x23
tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
-> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){+.+.+.}:
check_prev_add+0x6a/0x1ef
validate_chain+0x444/0x4f4
__lock_acquire+0x387/0x3f8
lock_acquire+0x12b/0x158
__mutex_lock_common+0x56/0x3a9
mutex_lock_nested+0x40/0x45
do_lookup+0x267/0x2b1
walk_component+0x3d/0x114
link_path_walk+0x1f9/0x48f
path_openat+0xb6/0x306
do_filp_open+0x3d/0x89
open_exec+0x25/0xa0
do_execve_common+0xea/0x2f9
do_execve+0x43/0x45
sys_execve+0x43/0x5a
stub_execve+0x6c/0xc0
This is because prepare_bprm_creds grabs task->signal->cred_guard_mutex
and when do_lookup happens we try to grab task->signal->cred_guard_mutex
again in lock_trace.
Fix it using plain ptrace_may_access() helper in proc_map_files_lookup()
and in proc_map_files_readdir() instead of lock_trace(), the caller must
be CAP_SYS_ADMIN granted anyway.
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
- Convert the old uid mapping functions into compatibility wrappers
- Add a uid/gid mapping layer from user space uid and gids to kernel
internal uids and gids that is extent based for simplicty and speed.
* Working with number space after mapping uids/gids into their kernel
internal version adds only mapping complexity over what we have today,
leaving the kernel code easy to understand and test.
- Add proc files /proc/self/uid_map /proc/self/gid_map
These files display the mapping and allow a mapping to be added
if a mapping does not exist.
- Allow entering the user namespace without a uid or gid mapping.
Since we are starting with an existing user our uids and gids
still have global mappings so are still valid and useful they just don't
have local mappings. The requirement for things to work are global uid
and gid so it is odd but perfectly fine not to have a local uid
and gid mapping.
Not requiring global uid and gid mappings greatly simplifies
the logic of setting up the uid and gid mappings by allowing
the mappings to be set after the namespace is created which makes the
slight weirdness worth it.
- Make the mappings in the initial user namespace to the global
uid/gid space explicit. Today it is an identity mapping
but in the future we may want to twist this for debugging, similar
to what we do with jiffies.
- Document the memory ordering requirements of setting the uid and
gid mappings. We only allow the mappings to be set once
and there are no pointers involved so the requirments are
trivial but a little atypical.
Performance:
In this scheme for the permission checks the performance is expected to
stay the same as the actuall machine instructions should remain the same.
The worst case I could think of is ls -l on a large directory where
all of the stat results need to be translated with from kuids and
kgids to uids and gids. So I benchmarked that case on my laptop
with a dual core hyperthread Intel i5-2520M cpu with 3M of cpu cache.
My benchmark consisted of going to single user mode where nothing else
was running. On an ext4 filesystem opening 1,000,000 files and looping
through all of the files 1000 times and calling fstat on the
individuals files. This was to ensure I was benchmarking stat times
where the inodes were in the kernels cache, but the inode values were
not in the processors cache. My results:
v3.4-rc1: ~= 156ns (unmodified v3.4-rc1 with user namespace support disabled)
v3.4-rc1-userns-: ~= 155ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support disabled)
v3.4-rc1-userns+: ~= 164ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support enabled)
All of the configurations ran in roughly 120ns when I performed tests
that ran in the cpu cache.
So in summary the performance impact is:
1ns improvement in the worst case with user namespace support compiled out.
8ns aka 5% slowdown in the worst case with user namespace support compiled in.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
Pull x32 support for x86-64 from Ingo Molnar:
"This tree introduces the X32 binary format and execution mode for x86:
32-bit data space binaries using 64-bit instructions and 64-bit kernel
syscalls.
This allows applications whose working set fits into a 32 bits address
space to make use of 64-bit instructions while using a 32-bit address
space with shorter pointers, more compressed data structures, etc."
Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/{Kconfig,vdso/vma.c}
* 'x86-x32-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (71 commits)
x32: Fix alignment fail in struct compat_siginfo
x32: Fix stupid ia32/x32 inversion in the siginfo format
x32: Add ptrace for x32
x32: Switch to a 64-bit clock_t
x32: Provide separate is_ia32_task() and is_x32_task() predicates
x86, mtrr: Use explicit sizing and padding for the 64-bit ioctls
x86/x32: Fix the binutils auto-detect
x32: Warn and disable rather than error if binutils too old
x32: Only clear TIF_X32 flag once
x32: Make sure TS_COMPAT is cleared for x32 tasks
fs: Remove missed ->fds_bits from cessation use of fd_set structs internally
fs: Fix close_on_exec pointer in alloc_fdtable
x32: Drop non-__vdso weak symbols from the x32 VDSO
x32: Fix coding style violations in the x32 VDSO code
x32: Add x32 VDSO support
x32: Allow x32 to be configured
x32: If configured, add x32 system calls to system call tables
x32: Handle process creation
x32: Signal-related system calls
x86: Add #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT to <asm/sys_ia32.h>
...
|
|
Stack for a new thread is mapped by userspace code and passed via
sys_clone. This memory is currently seen as anonymous in
/proc/<pid>/maps, which makes it difficult to ascertain which mappings
are being used for thread stacks. This patch uses the individual task
stack pointers to determine which vmas are actually thread stacks.
For a multithreaded program like the following:
#include <pthread.h>
void *thread_main(void *foo)
{
while(1);
}
int main()
{
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, thread_main, NULL);
pthread_join(t, NULL);
}
proc/PID/maps looks like the following:
00400000-00401000 r-xp 00000000 fd:0a 3671804 /home/siddhesh/a.out
00600000-00601000 rw-p 00000000 fd:0a 3671804 /home/siddhesh/a.out
019ef000-01a10000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap]
7f8a44491000-7f8a44492000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f8a44c92000-7f8a44e3d000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
7f8a44e3d000-7f8a4503d000 ---p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
7f8a4503d000-7f8a45041000 r--p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
7f8a45041000-7f8a45043000 rw-p 001af000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
7f8a45043000-7f8a45048000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f8a45048000-7f8a4505f000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
7f8a4505f000-7f8a4525e000 ---p 00017000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
7f8a4525e000-7f8a4525f000 r--p 00016000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
7f8a4525f000-7f8a45260000 rw-p 00017000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
7f8a45260000-7f8a45264000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f8a45264000-7f8a45286000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097348 /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
7f8a45457000-7f8a4545a000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f8a45484000-7f8a45485000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f8a45485000-7f8a45486000 r--p 00021000 fd:00 2097348 /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
7f8a45486000-7f8a45487000 rw-p 00022000 fd:00 2097348 /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
7f8a45487000-7f8a45488000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7fff627ff000-7fff62800000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso]
ffffffffff600000-ffffffffff601000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vsyscall]
Here, one could guess that 7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 is a stack since
the earlier vma that has no permissions (7f8a44e3d000-7f8a4503d000) but
that is not always a reliable way to find out which vma is a thread
stack. Also, /proc/PID/maps and /proc/PID/task/TID/maps has the same
content.
With this patch in place, /proc/PID/task/TID/maps are treated as 'maps
as the task would see it' and hence, only the vma that that task uses as
stack is marked as [stack]. All other 'stack' vmas are marked as
anonymous memory. /proc/PID/maps acts as a thread group level view,
where all thread stack vmas are marked as [stack:TID] where TID is the
process ID of the task that uses that vma as stack, while the process
stack is marked as [stack].
So /proc/PID/maps will look like this:
00400000-00401000 r-xp 00000000 fd:0a 3671804 /home/siddhesh/a.out
00600000-00601000 rw-p 00000000 fd:0a 3671804 /home/siddhesh/a.out
019ef000-01a10000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap]
7f8a44491000-7f8a44492000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack:1442]
7f8a44c92000-7f8a44e3d000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
7f8a44e3d000-7f8a4503d000 ---p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
7f8a4503d000-7f8a45041000 r--p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
7f8a45041000-7f8a45043000 rw-p 001af000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
7f8a45043000-7f8a45048000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f8a45048000-7f8a4505f000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
7f8a4505f000-7f8a4525e000 ---p 00017000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
7f8a4525e000-7f8a4525f000 r--p 00016000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
7f8a4525f000-7f8a45260000 rw-p 00017000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
7f8a45260000-7f8a45264000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f8a45264000-7f8a45286000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097348 /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
7f8a45457000-7f8a4545a000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f8a45484000-7f8a45485000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f8a45485000-7f8a45486000 r--p 00021000 fd:00 2097348 /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
7f8a45486000-7f8a45487000 rw-p 00022000 fd:00 2097348 /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
7f8a45487000-7f8a45488000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7fff627ff000-7fff62800000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso]
ffffffffff600000-ffffffffff601000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vsyscall]
Thus marking all vmas that are used as stacks by the threads in the
thread group along with the process stack. The task level maps will
however like this:
00400000-00401000 r-xp 00000000 fd:0a 3671804 /home/siddhesh/a.out
00600000-00601000 rw-p 00000000 fd:0a 3671804 /home/siddhesh/a.out
019ef000-01a10000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap]
7f8a44491000-7f8a44492000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7f8a44c92000-7f8a44e3d000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
7f8a44e3d000-7f8a4503d000 ---p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
7f8a4503d000-7f8a45041000 r--p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
7f8a45041000-7f8a45043000 rw-p 001af000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
7f8a45043000-7f8a45048000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f8a45048000-7f8a4505f000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
7f8a4505f000-7f8a4525e000 ---p 00017000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
7f8a4525e000-7f8a4525f000 r--p 00016000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
7f8a4525f000-7f8a45260000 rw-p 00017000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
7f8a45260000-7f8a45264000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f8a45264000-7f8a45286000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097348 /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
7f8a45457000-7f8a4545a000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f8a45484000-7f8a45485000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f8a45485000-7f8a45486000 r--p 00021000 fd:00 2097348 /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
7f8a45486000-7f8a45487000 rw-p 00022000 fd:00 2097348 /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
7f8a45487000-7f8a45488000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7fff627ff000-7fff62800000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso]
ffffffffff600000-ffffffffff601000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vsyscall]
where only the vma that is being used as a stack by *that* task is
marked as [stack].
Analogous changes have been made to /proc/PID/smaps,
/proc/PID/numa_maps, /proc/PID/task/TID/smaps and
/proc/PID/task/TID/numa_maps. Relevant snippets from smaps and
numa_maps:
[siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ pgrep a.out
1441
[siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/smaps | grep "\[stack"
7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack:1442]
7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
[siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/task/1442/smaps | grep "\[stack"
7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
[siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/task/1441/smaps | grep "\[stack"
7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
[siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/numa_maps | grep "stack"
7f8a44492000 default stack:1442 anon=2 dirty=2 N0=2
7fff6273a000 default stack anon=3 dirty=3 N0=3
[siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/task/1442/numa_maps | grep "stack"
7f8a44492000 default stack anon=2 dirty=2 N0=2
[siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/task/1441/numa_maps | grep "stack"
7fff6273a000 default stack anon=3 dirty=3 N0=3
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
Signed-off-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh.poyarekar@gmail.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Pass nice as a value to proc_sched_autogroup_set_nice().
No side effect is expected, and the variable err will be overwritten with
the return value.
Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4F45FBB7.5090607@ct.jp.nec.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
|
Wrap accesses to the fd_sets in struct fdtable (for recording open files and
close-on-exec flags) so that we can move away from using fd_sets since we
abuse the fd_set structs by not allocating the full-sized structure under
normal circumstances and by non-core code looking at the internals of the
fd_sets.
The first abuse means that use of FD_ZERO() on these fd_sets is not permitted,
since that cannot be told about their abnormal lengths.
This introduces six wrapper functions for setting, clearing and testing
close-on-exec flags and fd-is-open flags:
void __set_close_on_exec(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
void __clear_close_on_exec(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
bool close_on_exec(int fd, const struct fdtable *fdt);
void __set_open_fd(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
void __clear_open_fd(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
bool fd_is_open(int fd, const struct fdtable *fdt);
Note that I've prepended '__' to the names of the set/clear functions because
they require the caller to hold a lock to use them.
Note also that I haven't added wrappers for looking behind the scenes at the
the array. Possibly that should exist too.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120216174942.23314.1364.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
This fixes the race in process_vm_core found by Oleg (see
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/1235667/
for details).
This has been updated since I last sent it as the creation of the new
mm_access() function did almost exactly the same thing as parts of the
previous version of this patch did.
In order to use mm_access() even when /proc isn't enabled, we move it to
kernel/fork.c where other related process mm access functions already
are.
Signed-off-by: Chris Yeoh <yeohc@au1.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Once /proc/pid/mem is opened, the memory can't be released until
mem_release() even if its owner exits.
Change mem_open() to do atomic_inc(mm_count) + mmput(), this only
pins mm_struct. Change mem_rw() to do atomic_inc_not_zero(mm_count)
before access_remote_vm(), this verifies that this mm is still alive.
I am not sure what should mem_rw() return if atomic_inc_not_zero()
fails. With this patch it returns zero to match the "mm == NULL" case,
may be it should return -EINVAL like it did before e268337d.
Perhaps it makes sense to add the additional fatal_signal_pending()
check into the main loop, to ensure we do not hold this memory if
the target task was oom-killed.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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No functional changes, cleanup and preparation.
mem_read() and mem_write() are very similar. Move this code into the
new common helper, mem_rw(), which takes the additional "int write"
argument.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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mem_release() can hit mm == NULL, add the necessary check.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit: (29 commits)
audit: no leading space in audit_log_d_path prefix
audit: treat s_id as an untrusted string
audit: fix signedness bug in audit_log_execve_info()
audit: comparison on interprocess fields
audit: implement all object interfield comparisons
audit: allow interfield comparison between gid and ogid
audit: complex interfield comparison helper
audit: allow interfield comparison in audit rules
Kernel: Audit Support For The ARM Platform
audit: do not call audit_getname on error
audit: only allow tasks to set their loginuid if it is -1
audit: remove task argument to audit_set_loginuid
audit: allow audit matching on inode gid
audit: allow matching on obj_uid
audit: remove audit_finish_fork as it can't be called
audit: reject entry,always rules
audit: inline audit_free to simplify the look of generic code
audit: drop audit_set_macxattr as it doesn't do anything
audit: inline checks for not needing to collect aux records
audit: drop some potentially inadvisable likely notations
...
Use evil merge to fix up grammar mistakes in Kconfig file.
Bad speling and horrible grammar (and copious swearing) is to be
expected, but let's keep it to commit messages and comments, rather than
expose it to users in config help texts or printouts.
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Jüri Aedla reported that the /proc/<pid>/mem handling really isn't very
robust, and it also doesn't match the permission checking of any of the
other related files.
This changes it to do the permission checks at open time, and instead of
tracking the process, it tracks the VM at the time of the open. That
simplifies the code a lot, but does mean that if you hold the file
descriptor open over an execve(), you'll continue to read from the _old_
VM.
That is different from our previous behavior, but much simpler. If
somebody actually finds a load where this matters, we'll need to revert
this commit.
I suspect that nobody will ever notice - because the process mapping
addresses will also have changed as part of the execve. So you cannot
actually usefully access the fd across a VM change simply because all
the offsets for IO would have changed too.
Reported-by: Jüri Aedla <asd@ut.ee>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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At the moment we allow tasks to set their loginuid if they have
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. In reality we want tasks to set the loginuid when they
log in and it be impossible to ever reset. We had to make it mutable even
after it was once set (with the CAP) because on update and admin might have
to restart sshd. Now sshd would get his loginuid and the next user which
logged in using ssh would not be able to set his loginuid.
Systemd has changed how userspace works and allowed us to make the kernel
work the way it should. With systemd users (even admins) are not supposed
to restart services directly. The system will restart the service for
them. Thus since systemd is going to loginuid==-1, sshd would get -1, and
sshd would be allowed to set a new loginuid without special permissions.
If an admin in this system were to manually start an sshd he is inserting
himself into the system chain of trust and thus, logically, it's his
loginuid that should be used! Since we have old systems I make this a
Kconfig option.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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Zhao Hongjiang
Al Viro
Marco Stornelli
Linus Torvalds
David Rientjes
Stanislav Kinsbursky
Eric W. Biederman
Jeff Layton
Davidlohr Bueso
Cyrill Gorcunov
Djalal Harouni
Christoph Hellwig
Alexey Dobriyan
Cong Wang
Siddhesh Poyarekar
Hiroshi Shimamoto
David Howells
Christopher Yeoh
Oleg Nesterov
Eric Paris