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Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files. Several
applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and
then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs.
Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause
a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems.
Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by
adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and
enforce that flag.
Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user
visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the
execute bit is cleared.
The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any
executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects.
This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for
adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify
existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will
not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs.
Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we
are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the
implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables
on proc. Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create
a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of
some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions).
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Add a new function proc_create_mount_point that when used to creates a
directory that can not be added to.
Add a new function is_empty_pde to test if a function is a mount
point.
Update the code to use make_empty_dir_inode when reporting
a permanently empty directory to the vfs.
Update the code to not allow adding to permanently empty directories.
Update /proc/openprom and /proc/fs/nfsd to be permanently empty directories.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Fresh mounts of proc and sysfs are a very special case that works very
much like a bind mount. Unfortunately the current structure can not
preserve the MNT_LOCK... mount flags. Therefore refactor the logic
into a form that can be modified to preserve those lock bits.
Add a new filesystem flag FS_USERNS_VISIBLE that requires some mount
of the filesystem be fully visible in the current mount namespace,
before the filesystem may be mounted.
Move the logic for calling fs_fully_visible from proc and sysfs into
fs/namespace.c where it has greater access to mount namespace state.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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that's the bulk of filesystem drivers dealing with inodes of their own
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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When a lot of netdevices are created, one of the bottleneck is the
creation of proc entries. This serie aims to accelerate this part.
The current implementation for the directories in /proc is using a single
linked list. This is slow when handling directories with large numbers of
entries (eg netdevice-related entries when lots of tunnels are opened).
This patch replaces this linked list by a red-black tree.
Here are some numbers:
dummy30000.batch contains 30 000 times 'link add type dummy'.
Before the patch:
$ time ip -b dummy30000.batch
real 2m31.950s
user 0m0.440s
sys 2m21.440s
$ time rmmod dummy
real 1m35.764s
user 0m0.000s
sys 1m24.088s
After the patch:
$ time ip -b dummy30000.batch
real 2m0.874s
user 0m0.448s
sys 1m49.720s
$ time rmmod dummy
real 1m13.988s
user 0m0.000s
sys 1m1.008s
The idea of improving this part was suggested by Thierry Herbelot.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: initialise proc_root.subdir at compile time]
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Thierry Herbelot <thierry.herbelot@6wind.com>.
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This reverts commits 344470cac42e and e81324407269.
It turns out that the exact path in the symlink matters, if for somewhat
unfortunate reasons: some apparmor configurations don't allow dhclient
access to the per-thread /proc files. As reported by Jörg Otte:
audit: type=1400 audit(1407684227.003:28): apparmor="DENIED"
operation="open" profile="/sbin/dhclient"
name="/proc/1540/task/1540/net/dev" pid=1540 comm="dhclient"
requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=0 ouid=0
so we had better revert this for now. We might be able to work around
this in practice by only using the per-thread symlinks if the thread
isn't the thread group leader, and if the namespaces differ between
threads (which basically never happens).
We'll see. In the meantime, the revert was made to be intentionally easy.
Reported-by: Jörg Otte <jrg.otte@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"This is a bunch of small changes built against 3.16-rc6. The most
significant change for users is the first patch which makes setns
drmatically faster by removing unneded rcu handling.
The next chunk of changes are so that "mount -o remount,.." will not
allow the user namespace root to drop flags on a mount set by the
system wide root. Aks this forces read-only mounts to stay read-only,
no-dev mounts to stay no-dev, no-suid mounts to stay no-suid, no-exec
mounts to stay no exec and it prevents unprivileged users from messing
with a mounts atime settings. I have included my test case as the
last patch in this series so people performing backports can verify
this change works correctly.
The next change fixes a bug in NFS that was discovered while auditing
nsproxy users for the first optimization. Today you can oops the
kernel by reading /proc/fs/nfsfs/{servers,volumes} if you are clever
with pid namespaces. I rebased and fixed the build of the
!CONFIG_NFS_FS case yesterday when a build bot caught my typo. Given
that no one to my knowledge bases anything on my tree fixing the typo
in place seems more responsible that requiring a typo-fix to be
backported as well.
The last change is a small semantic cleanup introducing
/proc/thread-self and pointing /proc/mounts and /proc/net at it. This
prevents several kinds of problemantic corner cases. It is a
user-visible change so it has a minute chance of causing regressions
so the change to /proc/mounts and /proc/net are individual one line
commits that can be trivially reverted. Unfortunately I lost and
could not find the email of the original reporter so he is not
credited. From at least one perspective this change to /proc/net is a
refgression fix to allow pthread /proc/net uses that were broken by
the introduction of the network namespace"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
proc: Point /proc/mounts at /proc/thread-self/mounts instead of /proc/self/mounts
proc: Point /proc/net at /proc/thread-self/net instead of /proc/self/net
proc: Implement /proc/thread-self to point at the directory of the current thread
proc: Have net show up under /proc/<tgid>/task/<tid>
NFS: Fix /proc/fs/nfsfs/servers and /proc/fs/nfsfs/volumes
mnt: Add tests for unprivileged remount cases that have found to be faulty
mnt: Change the default remount atime from relatime to the existing value
mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
mnt: Move the test for MNT_LOCK_READONLY from change_mount_flags into do_remount
mnt: Only change user settable mount flags in remount
namespaces: Use task_lock and not rcu to protect nsproxy
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Currently lookup for /proc/$PID first goes through spinlock and whole list
of misc /proc entries only to confirm that, yes, /proc/42 can not possibly
match random proc entry.
List is is several dozens entries long (52 entries on my setup).
None of this is necessary.
Try to convert dentry name to integer first.
If it works, it must be /proc/$PID.
If it doesn't, it must be random proc entry.
Based on patch from Al Viro.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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In oddball cases where the thread has a different mount namespace than
the thread group leader or more likely in cases where the thread
remains and the thread group leader has exited this ensures that
/proc/mounts continues to work.
This should not cause any problems but if it does this patch can just
be reverted.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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/proc/thread-self is derived from /proc/self. /proc/thread-self
points to the directory in proc containing information about the
current thread.
This funtionality has been missing for a long time, and is tricky to
implement in userspace as gettid() is not exported by glibc. More
importantly this allows fixing defects in /proc/mounts and /proc/net
where in a threaded application today they wind up being empty files
when only the initial pthread has exited, causing problems for other
threads.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Pull ext4 updates from Ted Ts'o:
"Major changes for 3.14 include support for the newly added ZERO_RANGE
and COLLAPSE_RANGE fallocate operations, and scalability improvements
in the jbd2 layer and in xattr handling when the extended attributes
spill over into an external block.
Other than that, the usual clean ups and minor bug fixes"
* tag 'ext4_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4: (42 commits)
ext4: fix premature freeing of partial clusters split across leaf blocks
ext4: remove unneeded test of ret variable
ext4: fix comment typo
ext4: make ext4_block_zero_page_range static
ext4: atomically set inode->i_flags in ext4_set_inode_flags()
ext4: optimize Hurd tests when reading/writing inodes
ext4: kill i_version support for Hurd-castrated file systems
ext4: each filesystem creates and uses its own mb_cache
fs/mbcache.c: doucple the locking of local from global data
fs/mbcache.c: change block and index hash chain to hlist_bl_node
ext4: Introduce FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE flag for fallocate
ext4: refactor ext4_fallocate code
ext4: Update inode i_size after the preallocation
ext4: fix partial cluster handling for bigalloc file systems
ext4: delete path dealloc code in ext4_ext_handle_uninitialized_extents
ext4: only call sync_filesystm() when remounting read-only
fs: push sync_filesystem() down to the file system's remount_fs()
jbd2: improve error messages for inconsistent journal heads
jbd2: minimize region locked by j_list_lock in jbd2_journal_forget()
jbd2: minimize region locked by j_list_lock in journal_get_create_access()
...
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Previously, the no-op "mount -o mount /dev/xxx" operation when the
file system is already mounted read-write causes an implied,
unconditional syncfs(). This seems pretty stupid, and it's certainly
documented or guaraunteed to do this, nor is it particularly useful,
except in the case where the file system was mounted rw and is getting
remounted read-only.
However, it's possible that there might be some file systems that are
actually depending on this behavior. In most file systems, it's
probably fine to only call sync_filesystem() when transitioning from
read-write to read-only, and there are some file systems where this is
not needed at all (for example, for a pseudo-filesystem or something
like romfs).
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Evgeniy Dushistov <dushistov@mail.ru>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Cc: Anders Larsen <al@alarsen.net>
Cc: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mikulas@artax.karlin.mff.cuni.cz>
Cc: Petr Vandrovec <petr@vandrovec.name>
Cc: xfs@oss.sgi.com
Cc: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: samba-technical@lists.samba.org
Cc: codalist@coda.cs.cmu.edu
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: cluster-devel@redhat.com
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Cc: jfs-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-nilfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-ntfs-dev@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: ocfs2-devel@oss.oracle.com
Cc: reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org
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The same data is now available in sysfs, so we can remove the code
that exports it in /proc and replace it with a symlink to the sysfs
version.
Tested on versatile qemu model and mpc5200 eval board. More testing
would be appreciated.
v5: Fixed up conflicts with mainline changes
Signed-off-by: Grant Likely <grant.likely@secretlab.ca>
Cc: Rob Herring <rob.herring@calxeda.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Nathan Fontenot <nfont@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Pantelis Antoniou <panto@antoniou-consulting.com>
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Pull namespace changes from Eric Biederman:
"This is an assorted mishmash of small cleanups, enhancements and bug
fixes.
The major theme is user namespace mount restrictions. nsown_capable
is killed as it encourages not thinking about details that need to be
considered. A very hard to hit pid namespace exiting bug was finally
tracked and fixed. A couple of cleanups to the basic namespace
infrastructure.
Finally there is an enhancement that makes per user namespace
capabilities usable as capabilities, and an enhancement that allows
the per userns root to nice other processes in the user namespace"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
userns: Kill nsown_capable it makes the wrong thing easy
capabilities: allow nice if we are privileged
pidns: Don't have unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) imply CLONE_THREAD
userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace.
namespaces: Simplify copy_namespaces so it is clear what is going on.
pidns: Fix hang in zap_pid_ns_processes by sending a potentially extra wakeup
sysfs: Restrict mounting sysfs
userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted
vfs: Don't copy mount bind mounts of /proc/<pid>/ns/mnt between namespaces
kernel/nsproxy.c: Improving a snippet of code.
proc: Restrict mounting the proc filesystem
vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users
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Rely on the fact that another flavor of the filesystem is already
mounted and do not rely on state in the user namespace.
Verify that the mounted filesystem is not covered in any significant
way. I would love to verify that the previously mounted filesystem
has no mounts on top but there are at least the directories
/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc and /sys/fs/cgroup/ that exist explicitly
for other filesystems to mount on top of.
Refactor the test into a function named fs_fully_visible and call that
function from the mount routines of proc and sysfs. This makes this
test local to the filesystems involved and the results current of when
the mounts take place, removing a weird threading of the user
namespace, the mount namespace and the filesystems themselves.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Don't allow mounting the proc filesystem unless the caller has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN rights over the pid namespace. The principle here is if
you create or have capabilities over it you can mount it, otherwise
you get to live with what other people have mounted.
Andy pointed out that this is needed to prevent users in a user
namespace from remounting proc and specifying different hidepid and gid
options on already existing proc mounts.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Commit f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs") introduced a bug on the
listing of the proc file-system. The return value of proc_readdir()
isn't tested anymore in the proc_root_readdir function.
This lead to an "interesting" behaviour when we are using the getdents()
system call with a buffer too small: instead of failing, it returns the
first entries of /proc (enough to fill the given buffer), plus the PID
directories.
This is not triggered on glibc (as getdents is called with a 32KB
buffer), but on uclibc, the buffer size is only 1KB, thus some proc
entries are missing.
See https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/8/12/288 for more background.
Signed-off-by: Richard Genoud <richard.genoud@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Pull VFS updates from Al Viro,
Misc cleanups all over the place, mainly wrt /proc interfaces (switch
create_proc_entry to proc_create(), get rid of the deprecated
create_proc_read_entry() in favor of using proc_create_data() and
seq_file etc).
7kloc removed.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (204 commits)
don't bother with deferred freeing of fdtables
proc: Move non-public stuff from linux/proc_fs.h to fs/proc/internal.h
proc: Make the PROC_I() and PDE() macros internal to procfs
proc: Supply a function to remove a proc entry by PDE
take cgroup_open() and cpuset_open() to fs/proc/base.c
ppc: Clean up scanlog
ppc: Clean up rtas_flash driver somewhat
hostap: proc: Use remove_proc_subtree()
drm: proc: Use remove_proc_subtree()
drm: proc: Use minor->index to label things, not PDE->name
drm: Constify drm_proc_list[]
zoran: Don't print proc_dir_entry data in debug
reiserfs: Don't access the proc_dir_entry in r_open(), r_start() r_show()
proc: Supply an accessor for getting the data from a PDE's parent
airo: Use remove_proc_subtree()
rtl8192u: Don't need to save device proc dir PDE
rtl8187se: Use a dir under /proc/net/r8180/
proc: Add proc_mkdir_data()
proc: Move some bits from linux/proc_fs.h to linux/{of.h,signal.h,tty.h}
proc: Move PDE_NET() to fs/proc/proc_net.c
...
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Just have it pinned in dcache all along and let procfs ->kill_sb()
drop it before kill_anon_super().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Only allow unprivileged mounts of proc and sysfs if they are already
mounted when the user namespace is created.
proc and sysfs are interesting because they have content that is
per namespace, and so fresh mounts are needed when new namespaces
are created while at the same time proc and sysfs have content that
is shared between every instance.
Respect the policy of who may see the shared content of proc and sysfs
by only allowing new mounts if there was an existing mount at the time
the user namespace was created.
In practice there are only two interesting cases: proc and sysfs are
mounted at their usual places, proc and sysfs are not mounted at all
(some form of mount namespace jail).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- The context in which proc and sysfs are mounted have no
effect on the the uid/gid of their files so no conversion is
needed except allowing the mount.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Track the number of pids in the proc hash table. When the number of
pids goes to 0 schedule work to unmount the kernel mount of proc.
Move the mount of proc into alloc_pid when we allocate the pid for
init.
Remove the surprising calls of pid_ns_release proc in fork and
proc_flush_task. Those code paths really shouldn't know about proc
namespace implementation details and people have demonstrated several
times that finding and understanding those code paths is difficult and
non-obvious.
Because of the call path detach pid is alwasy called with the
rtnl_lock held free_pid is not allowed to sleep, so the work to
unmounting proc is moved to a work queue. This has the side benefit
of not blocking the entire world waiting for the unnecessary
rcu_barrier in deactivate_locked_super.
In the process of making the code clear and obvious this fixes a bug
reported by Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> where we would leak a
mount of proc during clone(CLONE_NEWPID|CLONE_NEWNET) if copy_pid_ns
succeeded and copy_net_ns failed.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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The expressions tsk->nsproxy->pid_ns and task_active_pid_ns
aka ns_of_pid(task_pid(tsk)) should have the same number of
cache line misses with the practical difference that
ns_of_pid(task_pid(tsk)) is released later in a processes life.
Furthermore by using task_active_pid_ns it becomes trivial
to write an unshare implementation for the the pid namespace.
So I have used task_active_pid_ns everywhere I can.
In fork since the pid has not yet been attached to the
process I use ns_of_pid, to achieve the same effect.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Now that we have s_fs_info pointing to our pid namespace
the original reason for the proc root inode having a struct
pid is gone.
Caching a pid in the root inode has led to some complicated
code. Now that we don't need the struct pid, just remove it.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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I had visions at one point of splitting proc into two filesystems. If
that had happened proc/self being the the part of proc that actually deals
with pids would have been a nice cleanup. As it is proc/self requires
a lot of unnecessary infrastructure for a single file.
The only user visible change is that a mounted /proc for a pid namespace
that is dead now shows a broken proc symlink, instead of being completely
invisible. I don't think anyone will notice or care.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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This cleanup also fixes the following sparse warning:
fs/proc/root.c:64:45: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
Signed-off-by: Sachin Kamat <sachin.kamat@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Pass mount flags to sget() so that it can use them in initialising a new
superblock before the set function is called. They could also be passed to the
compare function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Just the flags; only NFS cares even about that, but there are
legitimate uses for such argument. And getting rid of that
completely would require splitting ->lookup() into a couple
of methods (at least), so let's leave that alone for now...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman:
"This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can
reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete
implementation.
Highlights:
- Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and
code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe.
- Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the
config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable
user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission
checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe.
- All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial
user namespace before they are processed. Removing the need to add
an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared
uids remains the same.
- With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or
better than it is today.
- For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or
operationally with the user namespace enabled.
- The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1
billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code
enabled. This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to
164ns per stat operation).
- (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value.
Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially
anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause
entertaining failures in userspace.
- If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails.
I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I
could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and
handle the case where setuid fails.
- If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which
we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid. The LFS
experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be
better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I
can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we
can't map.
- Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it
safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities.
My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core
kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1."
Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits)
userns: Silence silly gcc warning.
cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock
userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq
userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq
userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate
userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids.
userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate.
userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe
userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns
userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces.
userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.
userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids
userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid
userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs
...
|
|
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
The proc_parse_options() call from proc_mount() runs only once at boot
time. So on any later mount attempt, any mount options are ignored
because ->s_root is already initialized.
As a consequence, "mount -o <options>" will ignore the options. The
only way to change mount options is "mount -o remount,<options>".
To fix this, parse the mount options unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Reported-by: Arkadiusz Miskiewicz <a.miskiewicz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Arkadiusz Miskiewicz <a.miskiewicz@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Add support for mount options to restrict access to /proc/PID/
directories. The default backward-compatible "relaxed" behaviour is left
untouched.
The first mount option is called "hidepid" and its value defines how much
info about processes we want to be available for non-owners:
hidepid=0 (default) means the old behavior - anybody may read all
world-readable /proc/PID/* files.
hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc/<pid>/ directories, but
their own. Sensitive files like cmdline, sched*, status are now protected
against other users. As permission checking done in proc_pid_permission()
and files' permissions are left untouched, programs expecting specific
files' modes are not confused.
hidepid=2 means hidepid=1 plus all /proc/PID/ will be invisible to other
users. It doesn't mean that it hides whether a process exists (it can be
learned by other means, e.g. by kill -0 $PID), but it hides process' euid
and egid. It compicates intruder's task of gathering info about running
processes, whether some daemon runs with elevated privileges, whether
another user runs some sensitive program, whether other users run any
program at all, etc.
gid=XXX defines a group that will be able to gather all processes' info
(as in hidepid=0 mode). This group should be used instead of putting
nonroot user in sudoers file or something. However, untrusted users (like
daemons, etc.) which are not supposed to monitor the tasks in the whole
system should not be added to the group.
hidepid=1 or higher is designed to restrict access to procfs files, which
might reveal some sensitive private information like precise keystrokes
timings:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/11/05/3
hidepid=1/2 doesn't break monitoring userspace tools. ps, top, pgrep, and
conky gracefully handle EPERM/ENOENT and behave as if the current user is
the only user running processes. pstree shows the process subtree which
contains "pstree" process.
Note: the patch doesn't deal with setuid/setgid issues of keeping
preopened descriptors of procfs files (like
https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/7/368). We rely on that the leaked
information like the scheduling counters of setuid apps doesn't threaten
anybody's privacy - only the user started the setuid program may read the
counters.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@MIT.EDU>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Add support for procfs mount options. Actual mount options are coming in
the next patches.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@MIT.EDU>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
kern_mount() doesn't pair with plain mntput()...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Since __proc_create() appends the name it is given to the end of the PDE
structure that it allocates, there isn't a need to store a name pointer.
Instead we can just replace the name pointer with a terminal char array of
_unspecified_ length. The compiler will simply append the string to statically
defined variables of PDE type overlapping any hole at the end of the structure
and, unlike specifying an explicitly _zero_ length array, won't give a warning
if you try to statically initialise it with a string of more than zero length.
Also, whilst we're at it:
(1) Move namelen to end just prior to name and reduce it to a single byte
(name shouldn't be longer than NAME_MAX).
(2) Move pde_unload_lock two places further on so that if it's four bytes in
size on a 64-bit machine, it won't cause an unused hole in the PDE struct.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
set_anon_super() can fail...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
After the previous cleanup in proc_get_sb() the global proc_mnt has no
reasons to exists, kill it.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Reorganize proc_get_sb() so it can be called before the struct pid of the
first process is allocated.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
take that to kern_mount_data()-using callers
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
All file_operations should get a .llseek operation so we can make
nonseekable_open the default for future file operations without a
.llseek pointer.
The three cases that we can automatically detect are no_llseek, seq_lseek
and default_llseek. For cases where we can we can automatically prove that
the file offset is always ignored, we use noop_llseek, which maintains
the current behavior of not returning an error from a seek.
New drivers should normally not use noop_llseek but instead use no_llseek
and call nonseekable_open at open time. Existing drivers can be converted
to do the same when the maintainer knows for certain that no user code
relies on calling seek on the device file.
The generated code is often incorrectly indented and right now contains
comments that clarify for each added line why a specific variant was
chosen. In the version that gets submitted upstream, the comments will
be gone and I will manually fix the indentation, because there does not
seem to be a way to do that using coccinelle.
Some amount of new code is currently sitting in linux-next that should get
the same modifications, which I will do at the end of the merge window.
Many thanks to Julia Lawall for helping me learn to write a semantic
patch that does all this.
===== begin semantic patch =====
// This adds an llseek= method to all file operations,
// as a preparation for making no_llseek the default.
//
// The rules are
// - use no_llseek explicitly if we do nonseekable_open
// - use seq_lseek for sequential files
// - use default_llseek if we know we access f_pos
// - use noop_llseek if we know we don't access f_pos,
// but we still want to allow users to call lseek
//
@ open1 exists @
identifier nested_open;
@@
nested_open(...)
{
<+...
nonseekable_open(...)
...+>
}
@ open exists@
identifier open_f;
identifier i, f;
identifier open1.nested_open;
@@
int open_f(struct inode *i, struct file *f)
{
<+...
(
nonseekable_open(...)
|
nested_open(...)
)
...+>
}
@ read disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
*off = E
|
*off += E
|
func(..., off, ...)
|
E = *off
)
...+>
}
@ read_no_fpos disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}
@ write @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
*off = E
|
*off += E
|
func(..., off, ...)
|
E = *off
)
...+>
}
@ write_no_fpos @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}
@ fops0 @
identifier fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
};
@ has_llseek depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier llseek_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.llseek = llseek_f,
...
};
@ has_read depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.read = read_f,
...
};
@ has_write depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.write = write_f,
...
};
@ has_open depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.open = open_f,
...
};
// use no_llseek if we call nonseekable_open
////////////////////////////////////////////
@ nonseekable1 depends on !has_llseek && has_open @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier nso ~= "nonseekable_open";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .open = nso, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* nonseekable */
};
@ nonseekable2 depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open.open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .open = open_f, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* open uses nonseekable */
};
// use seq_lseek for sequential files
/////////////////////////////////////
@ seq depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier sr ~= "seq_read";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = sr, ...
+.llseek = seq_lseek, /* we have seq_read */
};
// use default_llseek if there is a readdir
///////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops1 depends on !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier readdir_e;
@@
// any other fop is used that changes pos
struct file_operations fops = {
... .readdir = readdir_e, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* readdir is present */
};
// use default_llseek if at least one of read/write touches f_pos
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops2 depends on !fops1 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read.read_f;
@@
// read fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* read accesses f_pos */
};
@ fops3 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+ .llseek = default_llseek, /* write accesses f_pos */
};
// Use noop_llseek if neither read nor write accesses f_pos
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops4 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !fops3 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.write = write_f,
.read = read_f,
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read and write both use no f_pos */
};
@ depends on has_write && !has_read && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* write uses no f_pos */
};
@ depends on has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read uses no f_pos */
};
@ depends on !has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* no read or write fn */
};
===== End semantic patch =====
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
|
|
I removed 3 unused assignments. The first two get reset on the first
statement of their functions. For "err" in root.c we don't return an
error and we don't use the variable again.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_symlink);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_mkdir);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(create_proc_entry);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_create_data);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(remove_proc_entry);
Those EXPORT_SYMBOL shouldn't be in fs/proc/root.c,
should be in fs/proc/generic.c.
Signed-off-by: Helight.Xu <helight.xu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
simple_set_mnt() is defined as returning 'int' but always returns 0.
Callers assume simple_set_mnt() never fails and don't properly cleanup if
it were to _ever_ fail. For instance, get_sb_single() and get_sb_nodev()
should:
up_write(sb->s_unmount);
deactivate_super(sb);
if simple_set_mnt() fails.
Since simple_set_mnt() never fails, would be cleaner if it did not
return anything.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
There are four BKL users in proc: de_put(), proc_lookup_de(),
proc_readdir_de(), proc_root_readdir(),
1) de_put()
-----------
de_put() is classic atomic_dec_and_test() refcount wrapper -- no BKL
needed. BKL doesn't matter to possible refcount leak as well.
2) proc_lookup_de()
-------------------
Walking PDE list is protected by proc_subdir_lock(), proc_get_inode() is
potentially blocking, all callers of proc_lookup_de() eventually end up
from ->lookup hooks which is protected by directory's ->i_mutex -- BKL
doesn't protect anything.
3) proc_readdir_de()
--------------------
"." and ".." part doesn't need BKL, walking PDE list is under
proc_subdir_lock, calling filldir callback is potentially blocking
because it writes to luserspace. All proc_readdir_de() callers
eventually come from ->readdir hook which is under directory's
->i_mutex -- BKL doesn't protect anything.
4) proc_root_readdir_de()
-------------------------
proc_root_readdir_de is ->readdir hook, see (3).
Since readdir hooks doesn't use BKL anymore, switch to
generic_file_llseek, since it also takes directory's i_mutex.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
|
|
Now that everything was moved to their more or less expected places,
apply rm(1).
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
|
|
kmem_cache creation code will panic, don't return anything.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
|
|
This set of patches fixes an proc ->open'less usage due to ->proc_fops flip in
the most part of the kernel code. The original OOPS is described in the
commit 2d3a4e3666325a9709cc8ea2e88151394e8f20fc:
Typical PDE creation code looks like:
pde = create_proc_entry("foo", 0, NULL);
if (pde)
pde->proc_fops = &foo_proc_fops;
Notice that PDE is first created, only then ->proc_fops is set up to
final value. This is a problem because right after creation
a) PDE is fully visible in /proc , and
b) ->proc_fops are proc_file_operations which do not have ->open callback. So, it's
possible to ->read without ->open (see one class of oopses below).
The fix is new API called proc_create() which makes sure ->proc_fops are
set up before gluing PDE to main tree. Typical new code looks like:
pde = proc_create("foo", 0, NULL, &foo_proc_fops);
if (!pde)
return -ENOMEM;
Fix most networking users for a start.
In the long run, create_proc_entry() for regular files will go.
In addition to this, proc_create_data is introduced to fix reading from
proc without PDE->data. The race is basically the same as above.
create_proc_entries is replaced in the entire kernel code as new method
is also simply better.
This patch:
The problem is the same as for de->proc_fops. Right now PDE becomes visible
without data set. So, the entry could be looked up without data. This, in
most cases, will simply OOPS.
proc_create_data call is created to address this issue. proc_create now
becomes a wrapper around it.
Signed-off-by: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Alessandro Zummo <a.zummo@towertech.it>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <bzolnier@gmail.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bjorn.helgaas@hp.com>
Cc: Chris Mason <chris.mason@oracle.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@mail.ru>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Grant Grundler <grundler@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@atmel.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@suse.cz>
Cc: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@pobox.com>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Cc: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <matthew@wil.cx>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org>
Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com>
Cc: Nadia Derbey <Nadia.Derbey@bull.net>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Osterlund <petero2@telia.com>
Cc: Pierre Peiffer <peifferp@gmail.com>
Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Eric W. Biederman
David Howells
Nicolas Dichtel
Linus Torvalds
Alexey Dobriyan
Theodore Ts'o
Grant Likely
Richard Genoud
Al Viro
Sachin Kamat
Vasiliy Kulikov
Vasiliy Kulikov
Oleg Nesterov
Arnd Bergmann
Dan Carpenter
Helight.Xu
Sukadev Bhattiprolu
Denis V. Lunev