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Don't use iov_iter::type directly, but rather use the new accessor
functions that have been added. This allows the .type field to be split
and rearranged without the need to update the filesystems.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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Fix two places where we need to adjust down the max response size for
ioctl when it is used together with compounding.
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
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Combine the initial SMB2_Open and the first SMB2_Query_Directory in a compound.
This shaves one round-trip of each directory listing, changing it from 4 to 3
for small directories.
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
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Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
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Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
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Fixes coccicheck warning:
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:4622:3-22: WARNING: Assignment of 0/1 to bool variable
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:4756:3-22: WARNING: Assignment of 0/1 to bool variable
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: zhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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Fixes coccicheck warning:
fs/cifs/smb2ops.c:807:2-36: WARNING: Assignment of 0/1 to bool variable
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: zhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe:
"Fix for two regressions in this cycle, both reported by the postgresql
use case.
One removes the added restriction on who can submit IO, making it
possible for rings shared across forks to do so. The other fixes an
issue for the same kind of use case, where one exiting process would
cancel all IO"
* tag 'io_uring-5.5-2020-01-26' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
io_uring: don't cancel all work on process exit
Revert "io_uring: only allow submit from owning task"
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Pull vfs fix from Al Viro:
"Fix a use-after-free in do_last() handling of sysctl_protected_...
checks.
The use-after-free normally doesn't happen there, but race with
rename() and it becomes possible"
* 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
do_last(): fetch directory ->i_mode and ->i_uid before it's too late
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If we're sharing the ring across forks, then one process exiting means
that we cancel ALL work and prevent future work. This is overly
restrictive. As long as we cancel the work associated with the files
from the current task, it's safe to let others persist. Normal fd close
on exit will still wait (and cancel) pending work.
Fixes: fcb323cc53e2 ("io_uring: io_uring: add support for async work inheriting files")
Reported-by: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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This ends up being too restrictive for tasks that willingly fork and
share the ring between forks. Andres reports that this breaks his
postgresql work. Since we're close to 5.5 release, revert this change
for now.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 44d282796f81 ("io_uring: only allow submit from owning task")
Reported-by: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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The afs filesystem needs to prohibit certain characters from cell names,
such as '/', as these are used to form filenames in procfs, leading to
the following warning being generated:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3489 at fs/proc/generic.c:178
Fix afs_alloc_cell() to disallow nonprintable characters, '/', '@' and
names that begin with a dot.
Remove the check for "@cell" as that is then redundant.
This can be tested by running:
echo add foo/.bar 1.2.3.4 >/proc/fs/afs/cells
Note that we will also need to deal with:
- Names ending in ".invalid" shouldn't be passed to the DNS.
- Names that contain non-valid domainname chars shouldn't be passed to
the DNS.
- DNS replies that say "your-dns-needs-immediate-attention.<gTLD>" and
replies containing A records that say 127.0.53.53 should be
considered invalid.
[https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/name-collision-mitigation-01aug14-en.pdf]
but these need to be dealt with by the kafs-client DNS program rather
than the kernel.
Reported-by: syzbot+b904ba7c947a37b4b291@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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may_create_in_sticky() call is done when we already have dropped the
reference to dir.
Fixes: 30aba6656f61e (namei: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Pull btrfs fix from David Sterba:
"Here's a last minute fix for a regression introduced in this
development cycle.
There's a small chance of a silent corruption when device replace and
NOCOW data writes happen at the same time in one block group. Metadata
or COW data writes are unaffected.
The extra fixup patch is there to silence an unnecessary warning"
* tag 'for-5.5-rc8-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
btrfs: dev-replace: remove warning for unknown return codes when finished
btrfs: scrub: Require mandatory block group RO for dev-replace
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This code accidentally returns success, but it should return the
-EIO error code from adfs_fplus_validate_header().
Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Fixes: d79288b4f61b ("fs/adfs: bigdir: calculate and validate directory checkbyte")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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The fstests btrfs/011 triggered a warning at the end of device replace,
[ 1891.998975] BTRFS warning (device vdd): failed setting block group ro: -28
[ 1892.038338] BTRFS error (device vdd): btrfs_scrub_dev(/dev/vdd, 1, /dev/vdb) failed -28
[ 1892.059993] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 1892.063032] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2244 at fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c:506 btrfs_dev_replace_start.cold+0xf9/0x140 [btrfs]
[ 1892.074346] CPU: 2 PID: 2244 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.5.0-rc7-default+ #942
[ 1892.079956] RIP: 0010:btrfs_dev_replace_start.cold+0xf9/0x140 [btrfs]
[ 1892.096576] RSP: 0018:ffffbb58c7b3fd10 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 1892.098311] RAX: 00000000ffffffe4 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 8888888888888889
[ 1892.100342] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff9e889645f5d8 RDI: ffffffff92821080
[ 1892.102291] RBP: ffff9e889645c000 R08: 000001b8878fe1f6 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1892.104239] R10: ffffbb58c7b3fd08 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9e88a0017000
[ 1892.106434] R13: ffff9e889645f608 R14: ffff9e88794e1000 R15: ffff9e88a07b5200
[ 1892.108642] FS: 00007fcaed3f18c0(0000) GS:ffff9e88bda00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1892.111558] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1892.113492] CR2: 00007f52509ff420 CR3: 00000000603dd002 CR4: 0000000000160ee0
[ 1892.115814] Call Trace:
[ 1892.116896] btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl+0x35/0x60 [btrfs]
[ 1892.118962] btrfs_ioctl+0x1d62/0x2550 [btrfs]
caused by the previous patch ("btrfs: scrub: Require mandatory block
group RO for dev-replace"). Hitting ENOSPC is possible and could happen
when the block group is set read-only, preventing NOCOW writes to the
area that's being accessed by dev-replace.
This has happend with scratch devices of size 12G but not with 5G and
20G, so this is depends on timing and other activity on the filesystem.
The whole replace operation is restartable, the space state should be
examined by the user in any case.
The error code is propagated back to the ioctl caller so the kernel
warning is causing false alerts.
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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The allocation mask is no longer used by on_each_cpu_cond() and
on_each_cpu_cond_mask() and can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200117090137.1205765-4-bigeasy@linutronix.de
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[BUG]
For dev-replace test cases with fsstress, like btrfs/06[45] btrfs/071,
looped runs can lead to random failure, where scrub finds csum error.
The possibility is not high, around 1/20 to 1/100, but it's causing data
corruption.
The bug is observable after commit b12de52896c0 ("btrfs: scrub: Don't
check free space before marking a block group RO")
[CAUSE]
Dev-replace has two source of writes:
- Write duplication
All writes to source device will also be duplicated to target device.
Content: Not yet persisted data/meta
- Scrub copy
Dev-replace reused scrub code to iterate through existing extents, and
copy the verified data to target device.
Content: Previously persisted data and metadata
The difference in contents makes the following race possible:
Regular Writer | Dev-replace
-----------------------------------------------------------------
^ |
| Preallocate one data extent |
| at bytenr X, len 1M |
v |
^ Commit transaction |
| Now extent [X, X+1M) is in |
v commit root |
================== Dev replace starts =========================
| ^
| | Scrub extent [X, X+1M)
| | Read [X, X+1M)
| | (The content are mostly garbage
| | since it's preallocated)
^ | v
| Write back happens for |
| extent [X, X+512K) |
| New data writes to both |
| source and target dev. |
v |
| ^
| | Scrub writes back extent [X, X+1M)
| | to target device.
| | This will over write the new data in
| | [X, X+512K)
| v
This race can only happen for nocow writes. Thus metadata and data cow
writes are safe, as COW will never overwrite extents of previous
transaction (in commit root).
This behavior can be confirmed by disabling all fallocate related calls
in fsstress (*), then all related tests can pass a 2000 run loop.
*: FSSTRESS_AVOID="-f fallocate=0 -f allocsp=0 -f zero=0 -f insert=0 \
-f collapse=0 -f punch=0 -f resvsp=0"
I didn't expect resvsp ioctl will fallback to fallocate in VFS...
[FIX]
Make dev-replace to require mandatory block group RO, and wait for current
nocow writes before calling scrub_chunk().
This patch will mostly revert commit 76a8efa171bf ("btrfs: Continue replace
when set_block_ro failed") for dev-replace path.
The side effect is, dev-replace can be more strict on avaialble space, but
definitely worth to avoid data corruption.
Reported-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Fixes: 76a8efa171bf ("btrfs: Continue replace when set_block_ro failed")
Fixes: b12de52896c0 ("btrfs: scrub: Don't check free space before marking a block group RO")
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Pull ceph fix from Ilya Dryomov:
"A fix for a potential use-after-free from Jeff, marked for stable"
* tag 'ceph-for-5.5-rc8' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client:
ceph: hold extra reference to r_parent over life of request
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In commit 9f79b78ef744 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to
unsafe_put_user()") I changed filldir to not do individual __put_user()
accesses, but instead use unsafe_put_user() surrounded by the proper
user_access_begin/end() pair.
That make them enormously faster on modern x86, where the STAC/CLAC
games make individual user accesses fairly heavy-weight.
However, the user_access_begin() range was not really the exact right
one, since filldir() has the unfortunate problem that it needs to not
only fill out the new directory entry, it also needs to fix up the
previous one to contain the proper file offset.
It's unfortunate, but the "d_off" field in "struct dirent" is _not_ the
file offset of the directory entry itself - it's the offset of the next
one. So we end up backfilling the offset in the previous entry as we
walk along.
But since x86 didn't really care about the exact range, and used to be
the only architecture that did anything fancy in user_access_begin() to
begin with, the filldir[64]() changes did something lazy, and even
commented on it:
/*
* Note! This range-checks 'previous' (which may be NULL).
* The real range was checked in getdents
*/
if (!user_access_begin(dirent, sizeof(*dirent)))
goto efault;
and it all worked fine.
But now 32-bit ppc is starting to also implement user_access_begin(),
and the fact that we faked the range to only be the (possibly not even
valid) previous directory entry becomes a problem, because ppc32 will
actually be using the range that is passed in for more than just "check
that it's user space".
This is a complete rewrite of Christophe's original patch.
By saving off the record length of the previous entry instead of a
pointer to it in the filldir data structures, we can simplify the range
check and the writing of the previous entry d_off field. No need for
any conditionals in the user accesses themselves, although we retain the
conditional EINTR checking for the "was this the first directory entry"
signal handling latency logic.
Fixes: 9f79b78ef744 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/a02d3426f93f7eb04960a4d9140902d278cab0bb.1579697910.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/408c90c4068b00ea8f1c41cca45b84ec23d4946b.1579783936.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr/
Reported-and-tested-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Commit 8a23eb804ca4 ("Make filldir[64]() verify the directory entry
filename is valid") added some minimal validity checks on the directory
entries passed to filldir[64](). But they really were pretty minimal.
This fleshes out at least the name length check: we used to disallow
zero-length names, but really, negative lengths or oevr-long names
aren't ok either. Both could happen if there is some filesystem
corruption going on.
Now, most filesystems tend to use just an "unsigned char" or similar for
the length of a directory entry name, so even with a corrupt filesystem
you should never see anything odd like that. But since we then use the
name length to create the directory entry record length, let's make sure
it actually is half-way sensible.
Note how POSIX states that the size of a path component is limited by
NAME_MAX, but we actually use PATH_MAX for the check here. That's
because while NAME_MAX is generally the correct maximum name length
(it's 255, for the same old "name length is usually just a byte on
disk"), there's nothing in the VFS layer that really cares.
So the real limitation at a VFS layer is the total pathname length you
can pass as a filename: PATH_MAX.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Since btrfs was migrated to use the generic VFS helpers for clone and
deduplication, it stopped allowing for the last block of a file to be
deduplicated when the source file size is not sector size aligned (when
eof is somewhere in the middle of the last block). There are two reasons
for that:
1) The generic code always rounds down, to a multiple of the block size,
the range's length for deduplications. This means we end up never
deduplicating the last block when the eof is not block size aligned,
even for the safe case where the destination range's end offset matches
the destination file's size. That rounding down operation is done at
generic_remap_check_len();
2) Because of that, the btrfs specific code does not expect anymore any
non-aligned range length's for deduplication and therefore does not
work if such nona-aligned length is given.
This patch addresses that second part, and it depends on a patch that
fixes generic_remap_check_len(), in the VFS, which was submitted ealier
and has the following subject:
"fs: allow deduplication of eof block into the end of the destination file"
These two patches address reports from users that started seeing lower
deduplication rates due to the last block never being deduplicated when
the file size is not aligned to the filesystem's block size.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/2019-1576167349.500456@svIo.N5dq.dFFD/
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.1+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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We always round down, to a multiple of the filesystem's block size, the
length to deduplicate at generic_remap_check_len(). However this is only
needed if an attempt to deduplicate the last block into the middle of the
destination file is requested, since that leads into a corruption if the
length of the source file is not block size aligned. When an attempt to
deduplicate the last block into the end of the destination file is
requested, we should allow it because it is safe to do it - there's no
stale data exposure and we are prepared to compare the data ranges for
a length not aligned to the block (or page) size - in fact we even do
the data compare before adjusting the deduplication length.
After btrfs was updated to use the generic helpers from VFS (by commit
34a28e3d77535e ("Btrfs: use generic_remap_file_range_prep() for cloning
and deduplication")) we started to have user reports of deduplication
not reflinking the last block anymore, and whence users getting lower
deduplication scores. The main use case is deduplication of entire
files that have a size not aligned to the block size of the filesystem.
We already allow cloning the last block to the end (and beyond) of the
destination file, so allow for deduplication as well.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/2019-1576167349.500456@svIo.N5dq.dFFD/
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.1+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Sometimes when running generic/475 we would trip the
WARN_ON(cache->reserved) check when free'ing the block groups on umount.
This is because sometimes we don't commit the transaction because of IO
errors and thus do not cleanup the tree logs until at umount time.
These blocks are still reserved until they are cleaned up, but they
aren't cleaned up until _after_ we do the free block groups work. Fix
this by moving the free after free'ing the fs roots, that way all of the
tree logs are cleaned up and we have a properly cleaned fs. A bunch of
loops of generic/475 confirmed this fixes the problem.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Current code doesn't correctly handle the situation which arises when
a file system that has METADATA_UUID_INCOMPAT flag set and has its FSID
changed to the one in metadata uuid. This causes the incompat flag to
disappear.
In case of a power failure we could end up in a situation where part of
the disks in a multi-disk filesystem are correctly reverted to
METADATA_UUID_INCOMPAT flag unset state, while others have
METADATA_UUID_INCOMPAT set and CHANGING_FSID_V2_IN_PROGRESS.
This patch corrects the behavior required to handle the case where a
disk of the second type is scanned first, creating the necessary
btrfs_fs_devices. Subsequently, when a disk which has already completed
the transition is scanned it should overwrite the data in
btrfs_fs_devices.
Reported-by: Su Yue <Damenly_Su@gmx.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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There is one more cases which isn't handled by the original metadata
uuid work. Namely, when a filesystem has METADATA_UUID incompat bit and
the user decides to change the FSID to the original one e.g. have
metadata_uuid and fsid match. In case of power failure while this
operation is in progress we could end up in a situation where some of
the disks have the incompat bit removed and the other half have both
METADATA_UUID_INCOMPAT and FSID_CHANGING_IN_PROGRESS flags.
This patch handles the case where a disk that has successfully changed
its FSID such that it equals METADATA_UUID is scanned first.
Subsequently when a disk with both
METADATA_UUID_INCOMPAT/FSID_CHANGING_IN_PROGRESS flags is scanned
find_fsid_changed won't be able to find an appropriate btrfs_fs_devices.
This is done by extending find_fsid_changed to correctly find
btrfs_fs_devices whose metadata_uuid/fsid are the same and they match
the metadata_uuid of the currently scanned device.
Fixes: cc5de4e70256 ("btrfs: Handle final split-brain possibility during fsid change")
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reported-by: Su Yue <Damenly_Su@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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find_fsid became rather hairy with the introduction of metadata uuid
changing feature. Alleviate this by factoring out the metadata uuid
specific code in a dedicated function which deals with finding
correct fsid for a device with changed uuid.
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Su Yue <Damenly_Su@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Since find_fsid_inprogress should also handle the case in which an fs
didn't change its FSID make it call find_fsid directly. This makes the
code in device_list_add simpler by eliminating a conditional call of
find_fsid. No functional changes.
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Su Yue <Damenly_Su@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Recently fsstress (from fstests) sporadically started to trigger an
infinite loop during fsync operations. This turned out to be because
support for the rename exchange and whiteout operations was added to
fsstress in fstests. These operations, unlike any others in fsstress,
cause file names to be reused, whence triggering this issue. However
it's not necessary to use rename exchange and rename whiteout operations
trigger this issue, simple rename operations and file creations are
enough to trigger the issue.
The issue boils down to when we are logging inodes that conflict (that
had the name of any inode we need to log during the fsync operation), we
keep logging them even if they were already logged before, and after
that we check if there's any other inode that conflicts with them and
then add it again to the list of inodes to log. Skipping already logged
inodes fixes the issue.
Consider the following example:
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb
$ mount /dev/sdb /mnt
$ mkdir /mnt/testdir # inode 257
$ touch /mnt/testdir/zz # inode 258
$ ln /mnt/testdir/zz /mnt/testdir/zz_link
$ touch /mnt/testdir/a # inode 259
$ sync
# The following 3 renames achieve the same result as a rename exchange
# operation (<rename_exchange> /mnt/testdir/zz_link to /mnt/testdir/a).
$ mv /mnt/testdir/a /mnt/testdir/a/tmp
$ mv /mnt/testdir/zz_link /mnt/testdir/a
$ mv /mnt/testdir/a/tmp /mnt/testdir/zz_link
# The following rename and file creation give the same result as a
# rename whiteout operation (<rename_whiteout> zz to a2).
$ mv /mnt/testdir/zz /mnt/testdir/a2
$ touch /mnt/testdir/zz # inode 260
$ xfs_io -c fsync /mnt/testdir/zz
--> results in the infinite loop
The following steps happen:
1) When logging inode 260, we find that its reference named "zz" was
used by inode 258 in the previous transaction (through the commit
root), so inode 258 is added to the list of conflicting indoes that
need to be logged;
2) After logging inode 258, we find that its reference named "a" was
used by inode 259 in the previous transaction, and therefore we add
inode 259 to the list of conflicting inodes to be logged;
3) After logging inode 259, we find that its reference named "zz_link"
was used by inode 258 in the previous transaction - we add inode 258
to the list of conflicting inodes to log, again - we had already
logged it before at step 3. After logging it again, we find again
that inode 259 conflicts with him, and we add again 259 to the list,
etc - we end up repeating all the previous steps.
So fix this by skipping logging of conflicting inodes that were already
logged.
Fixes: 6b5fc433a7ad67 ("Btrfs: fix fsync after succession of renames of different files")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.1+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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If we abort a transaction we have the following sequence
if (!trans->dirty && list_empty(&trans->new_bgs))
return;
WRITE_ONCE(trans->transaction->aborted, err);
The idea being if we didn't modify anything with our trans handle then
we don't really need to abort the whole transaction, maybe the other
trans handles are fine and we can carry on.
However in the case of create_snapshot we add a pending_snapshot object
to our transaction and then commit the transaction. We don't actually
modify anything. sync() behaves the same way, attach to an existing
transaction and commit it. This means that if we have an IO error in
the right places we could abort the committing transaction with our
trans->dirty being not set and thus not set transaction->aborted.
This is a problem because in the create_snapshot() case we depend on
pending->error being set to something, or btrfs_commit_transaction
returning an error.
If we are not the trans handle that gets to commit the transaction, and
we're waiting on the commit to happen we get our return value from
cur_trans->aborted. If this was not set to anything because sync() hit
an error in the transaction commit before it could modify anything then
cur_trans->aborted would be 0. Thus we'd return 0 from
btrfs_commit_transaction() in create_snapshot.
This is a problem because we then try to do things with
pending_snapshot->snap, which will be NULL because we didn't create the
snapshot, and then we'll get a NULL pointer dereference like the
following
"BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000001f0"
RIP: 0010:btrfs_orphan_cleanup+0x2d/0x330
Call Trace:
? btrfs_mksubvol.isra.31+0x3f2/0x510
btrfs_mksubvol.isra.31+0x4bc/0x510
? __sb_start_write+0xfa/0x200
? mnt_want_write_file+0x24/0x50
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x16c/0x1a0
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x11e/0x1a0
btrfs_ioctl+0x1534/0x2c10
? free_debug_processing+0x262/0x2a3
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa6/0x6b0
? do_sys_open+0x188/0x220
? syscall_trace_enter+0x1f8/0x330
ksys_ioctl+0x60/0x90
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x1b0
In order to fix this we need to make sure anybody who calls
commit_transaction has trans->dirty set so that they properly set the
trans->transaction->aborted value properly so any waiters know bad
things happened.
This was found while I was running generic/475 with my modified
fsstress, it reproduced within a few runs. I ran with this patch all
night and didn't see the problem again.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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If we fsync on a subvolume and create a log root for that volume, and
then later delete that subvolume we'll never clean up its log root. Fix
this by making switch_commit_roots free the log for any dropped roots we
encounter. The extra churn is because we need a btrfs_trans_handle, not
the btrfs_transaction.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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New sysfs attributes that track the filesystem status of devices, stored
in the per-filesystem directory in /sys/fs/btrfs/FSID/devinfo . There's
a directory for each device, with name corresponding to the numerical
device id.
in_fs_metadata - device is in the list of fs metadata
missing - device is missing (no device node or block device)
replace_target - device is target of replace
writeable - writes from fs are allowed
These attributes reflect the state of the device::dev_state and created
at mount time.
Sample output:
$ pwd
/sys/fs/btrfs/6e1961f1-5918-4ecc-a22f-948897b409f7/devinfo/1/
$ ls
in_fs_metadata missing replace_target writeable
$ cat missing
0
The output from these attributes are 0 or 1. 0 indicates unset and 1
indicates set. These attributes are readonly.
It is observed that the device delete thread and sysfs read thread will
not race because the delete thread calls sysfs kobject_put() which in
turn waits for existing sysfs read to complete.
Note for device replace devid swap:
During the replace the target device temporarily assumes devid 0 before
assigning the devid of the soruce device.
In btrfs_dev_replace_finishing() we remove source sysfs devid using the
function btrfs_sysfs_remove_devices_attr(), so after that call
kobject_rename() to update the devid in the sysfs. This adds and calls
btrfs_sysfs_update_devid() helper function to update the device id.
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ update changelog ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Move variables to appropriate scope. Remove last BUG_ON in the function
and rework error handling accordingly. Make the duplicate detection code
more straightforward. Use in_range macro. And give variables more
descriptive name by explicitly distinguishing between IO stripe size
(size recorded in the chunk item) and data stripe size (the size of
an actual stripe, constituting a logical chunk/block group).
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
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Add RAID1 and single testcases to verify that data stripes are excluded
from super block locations and that the address mapping is valid.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ update changelog ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Add basic infrastructure to create and link dummy btrfs_devices. This
will be used in the pending btrfs_rmap_block test which deals with
the block groups.
Calling btrfs_alloc_dummy_device will link the newly created device to
the passed fs_info and the test framework will free them once the test
is finished.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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It's used only during initial block group reading to map physical
address of super block to a list of logical ones. Make it private to
block-group.c, add proper kernel doc and ensure it's exported only for
tests.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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There's a report where objtool detects unreachable instructions, eg.:
fs/btrfs/ctree.o: warning: objtool: btrfs_search_slot()+0x2d4: unreachable instruction
This seems to be a false positive due to compiler version. The cause is
in the ASSERT macro implementation that does the conditional check as
IS_DEFINED(CONFIG_BTRFS_ASSERT) and not an #ifdef.
To avoid that, use the ifdefs directly.
There are still 2 reports that aren't fixed:
fs/btrfs/extent_io.o: warning: objtool: __set_extent_bit()+0x71f: unreachable instruction
fs/btrfs/relocation.o: warning: objtool: find_data_references()+0x4e0: unreachable instruction
Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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When an encrypted directory is listed without the key, the filesystem
must show "no-key names" that uniquely identify directory entries, are
at most 255 (NAME_MAX) bytes long, and don't contain '/' or '\0'.
Currently, for short names the no-key name is the base64 encoding of the
ciphertext filename, while for long names it's the base64 encoding of
the ciphertext filename's dirhash and second-to-last 16-byte block.
This format has the following problems:
- Since it doesn't always include the dirhash, it's incompatible with
directories that will use a secret-keyed dirhash over the plaintext
filenames. In this case, the dirhash won't be computable from the
ciphertext name without the key, so it instead must be retrieved from
the directory entry and always included in the no-key name.
Casefolded encrypted directories will use this type of dirhash.
- It's ambiguous: it's possible to craft two filenames that map to the
same no-key name, since the method used to abbreviate long filenames
doesn't use a proper cryptographic hash function.
Solve both these problems by switching to a new no-key name format that
is the base64 encoding of a variable-length structure that contains the
dirhash, up to 149 bytes of the ciphertext filename, and (if any bytes
remain) the SHA-256 of the remaining bytes of the ciphertext filename.
This ensures that each no-key name contains everything needed to find
the directory entry again, contains only legal characters, doesn't
exceed NAME_MAX, is unambiguous unless there's a SHA-256 collision, and
that we only take the performance hit of SHA-256 on very long filenames.
Note: this change does *not* address the existing issue where users can
modify the 'dirhash' part of a no-key name and the filesystem may still
accept the name.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
[EB: improved comments and commit message, fixed checking return value
of base64_decode(), check for SHA-256 error, continue to set disk_name
for short names to keep matching simpler, and many other cleanups]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120223201.241390-7-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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In order to support a new dirhash method that is a secret-keyed hash
over the plaintext filenames (which will be used by encrypted+casefolded
directories on ext4 and f2fs), fscrypt will be switching to a new no-key
name format that always encodes the dirhash in the name.
UBIFS isn't happy with this because it has assertions that verify that
either the hash or the disk name is provided, not both.
Change it to use the disk name if one is provided, even if a hash is
available too; else use the hash.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120223201.241390-6-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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If userspace provides an invalid fscrypt no-key filename which encodes a
hash value with any of the UBIFS node type bits set (i.e. the high 3
bits), gracefully report ENOENT rather than triggering ubifs_assert().
Test case with kvm-xfstests shell:
. fs/ubifs/config
. ~/xfstests/common/encrypt
dev=$(__blkdev_to_ubi_volume /dev/vdc)
ubiupdatevol $dev -t
mount $dev /mnt -t ubifs
mkdir /mnt/edir
xfs_io -c set_encpolicy /mnt/edir
rm /mnt/edir/_,,,,,DAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
With the bug, the following assertion fails on the 'rm' command:
[ 19.066048] UBIFS error (ubi0:0 pid 379): ubifs_assert_failed: UBIFS assert failed: !(hash & ~UBIFS_S_KEY_HASH_MASK), in fs/ubifs/key.h:170
Fixes: f4f61d2cc6d8 ("ubifs: Implement encrypted filenames")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120223201.241390-5-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Now that there's sometimes a second type of per-file key (the dirhash
key), clarify some function names, macros, and documentation that
specifically deal with per-file *encryption* keys.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120223201.241390-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
|
When we allow indexed directories to use both encryption and
casefolding, for the dirhash we can't just hash the ciphertext filenames
that are stored on-disk (as is done currently) because the dirhash must
be case insensitive, but the stored names are case-preserving. Nor can
we hash the plaintext names with an unkeyed hash (or a hash keyed with a
value stored on-disk like ext4's s_hash_seed), since that would leak
information about the names that encryption is meant to protect.
Instead, if we can accept a dirhash that's only computable when the
fscrypt key is available, we can hash the plaintext names with a keyed
hash using a secret key derived from the directory's fscrypt master key.
We'll use SipHash-2-4 for this purpose.
Prepare for this by deriving a SipHash key for each casefolded encrypted
directory. Make sure to handle deriving the key not only when setting
up the directory's fscrypt_info, but also in the case where the casefold
flag is enabled after the fscrypt_info was already set up. (We could
just always derive the key regardless of casefolding, but that would
introduce unnecessary overhead for people not using casefolding.)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
[EB: improved commit message, updated fscrypt.rst, squashed with change
that avoids unnecessarily deriving the key, and many other cleanups]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120223201.241390-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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|
Casefolded encrypted directories will use a new dirhash method that
requires a secret key. If the directory uses a v2 encryption policy,
it's easy to derive this key from the master key using HKDF. However,
v1 encryption policies don't provide a way to derive additional keys.
Therefore, don't allow casefolding on directories that use a v1 policy.
Specifically, make it so that trying to enable casefolding on a
directory that has a v1 policy fails, trying to set a v1 policy on a
casefolded directory fails, and trying to open a casefolded directory
that has a v1 policy (if one somehow exists on-disk) fails.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
[EB: improved commit message, updated fscrypt.rst, and other cleanups]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120223201.241390-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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fname_encrypt() is a global function, due to being used in both fname.c
and hooks.c. So it should be prefixed with "fscrypt_", like all the
other global functions in fs/crypto/.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120071736.45915-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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When an encryption key can't be fully removed due to file(s) protected
by it still being in-use, we shouldn't really print the path to one of
these files to the kernel log, since parts of this path are likely to be
encrypted on-disk, and (depending on how the system is set up) the
confidentiality of this path might be lost by printing it to the log.
This is a trade-off: a single file path often doesn't matter at all,
especially if it's a directory; the kernel log might still be protected
in some way; and I had originally hoped that any "inode(s) still busy"
bugs (which are security weaknesses in their own right) would be quickly
fixed and that to do so it would be super helpful to always know the
file path and not have to run 'find dir -inum $inum' after the fact.
But in practice, these bugs can be hard to fix (e.g. due to asynchronous
process killing that is difficult to eliminate, for performance
reasons), and also not tied to specific files, so knowing a file path
doesn't necessarily help.
So to be safe, for now let's just show the inode number, not the path.
If someone really wants to know a path they can use 'find -inum'.
Fixes: b1c0ec3599f4 ("fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.4+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120060732.390362-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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REQ_F_FORCE_ASYNC is checked only for the head of a link. Fix it.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Whenever IOSQE_ASYNC is set, requests will be punted to async without
getting into io_issue_req() and without proper preparation done (e.g.
io_req_defer_prep()). Hence they will be left uninitialised.
Prepare them before punting.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Pull io_uring fix from Jens Axboe:
"This was supposed to have gone in last week, but due to a brain fart
on my part, I forgot that we made this struct addition in the 5.5
cycle. So here it is for 5.5, to prevent having a 32 vs 64-bit
compatability issue with the files_update command"
* tag 'io_uring-5.5-2020-01-22' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
io_uring: fix compat for IORING_REGISTER_FILES_UPDATE
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Currently, we just assume that it will stick around by virtue of the
submitter's reference, but later patches will allow the syscall to
return early and we can't rely on that reference at that point.
While I'm not aware of any reports of it, Xiubo pointed out that this
may fix a use-after-free. If the wait for a reply times out or is
canceled via signal, and then the reply comes in after the syscall
returns, the client can end up trying to access r_parent without a
reference.
Take an extra reference to the inode when setting r_parent and release
it when releasing the request.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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A label and extra variables will be eliminated,
which is more cleaner.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200121064819.139469-1-gaoxiang25@huawei.com
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <gaoxiang25@huawei.com>
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