| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
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phy_speed_down_core provides most of the functionality for
phy_speed_down. It makes use of new helper phy_resolve_min_speed that is
based on the sorting of the settings[] array. In certain cases it may be
helpful to be able to exclude legacy half duplex modes, therefore
prepare phy_resolve_min_speed() for it.
v2:
- rename __phy_speed_down to phy_speed_down_core
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
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Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.
There is a small merge conflict in libbpf (Cc Andrii so he's in the loop
as well):
for (i = 1; i <= btf__get_nr_types(btf); i++) {
t = (struct btf_type *)btf__type_by_id(btf, i);
if (!has_datasec && btf_is_var(t)) {
/* replace VAR with INT */
t->info = BTF_INFO_ENC(BTF_KIND_INT, 0, 0);
<<<<<<< HEAD
/*
* using size = 1 is the safest choice, 4 will be too
* big and cause kernel BTF validation failure if
* original variable took less than 4 bytes
*/
t->size = 1;
*(int *)(t+1) = BTF_INT_ENC(0, 0, 8);
} else if (!has_datasec && kind == BTF_KIND_DATASEC) {
=======
t->size = sizeof(int);
*(int *)(t + 1) = BTF_INT_ENC(0, 0, 32);
} else if (!has_datasec && btf_is_datasec(t)) {
>>>>>>> 72ef80b5ee131e96172f19e74b4f98fa3404efe8
/* replace DATASEC with STRUCT */
Conflict is between the two commits 1d4126c4e119 ("libbpf: sanitize VAR to
conservative 1-byte INT") and b03bc6853c0e ("libbpf: convert libbpf code to
use new btf helpers"), so we need to pick the sanitation fixup as well as
use the new btf_is_datasec() helper and the whitespace cleanup. Looks like
the following:
[...]
if (!has_datasec && btf_is_var(t)) {
/* replace VAR with INT */
t->info = BTF_INFO_ENC(BTF_KIND_INT, 0, 0);
/*
* using size = 1 is the safest choice, 4 will be too
* big and cause kernel BTF validation failure if
* original variable took less than 4 bytes
*/
t->size = 1;
*(int *)(t + 1) = BTF_INT_ENC(0, 0, 8);
} else if (!has_datasec && btf_is_datasec(t)) {
/* replace DATASEC with STRUCT */
[...]
The main changes are:
1) Addition of core parts of compile once - run everywhere (co-re) effort,
that is, relocation of fields offsets in libbpf as well as exposure of
kernel's own BTF via sysfs and loading through libbpf, from Andrii.
More info on co-re: http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-2
and http://vger.kernel.org/lpc-bpf2018.html#session-2
2) Enable passing input flags to the BPF flow dissector to customize parsing
and allowing it to stop early similar to the C based one, from Stanislav.
3) Add a BPF helper function that allows generating SYN cookies from XDP and
tc BPF, from Petar.
4) Add devmap hash-based map type for more flexibility in device lookup for
redirects, from Toke.
5) Improvements to XDP forwarding sample code now utilizing recently enabled
devmap lookups, from Jesper.
6) Add support for reporting the effective cgroup progs in bpftool, from Jakub
and Takshak.
7) Fix reading kernel config from bpftool via /proc/config.gz, from Peter.
8) Fix AF_XDP umem pages mapping for 32 bit architectures, from Ivan.
9) Follow-up to add two more BPF loop tests for the selftest suite, from Alexei.
10) Add perf event output helper also for other skb-based program types, from Allan.
11) Fix a co-re related compilation error in selftests, from Yonghong.
====================
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
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This reverts commit 2f0799a0ffc033b ("mm, thp: restore node-local
hugepage allocations").
commit 2f0799a0ffc033b was rightfully applied to avoid the risk of a
severe regression that was reported by the kernel test robot at the end
of the merge window. Now we understood the regression was a false
positive and was caused by a significant increase in fairness during a
swap trashing benchmark. So it's safe to re-apply the fix and continue
improving the code from there. The benchmark that reported the
regression is very useful, but it provides a meaningful result only when
there is no significant alteration in fairness during the workload. The
removal of __GFP_THISNODE increased fairness.
__GFP_THISNODE cannot be used in the generic page faults path for new
memory allocations under the MPOL_DEFAULT mempolicy, or the allocation
behavior significantly deviates from what the MPOL_DEFAULT semantics are
supposed to be for THP and 4k allocations alike.
Setting THP defrag to "always" or using MADV_HUGEPAGE (with THP defrag
set to "madvise") has never meant to provide an implicit MPOL_BIND on
the "current" node the task is running on, causing swap storms and
providing a much more aggressive behavior than even zone_reclaim_node =
3.
Any workload who could have benefited from __GFP_THISNODE has now to
enable zone_reclaim_mode=1||2||3. __GFP_THISNODE implicitly provided
the zone_reclaim_mode behavior, but it only did so if THP was enabled:
if THP was disabled, there would have been no chance to get any 4k page
from the current node if the current node was full of pagecache, which
further shows how this __GFP_THISNODE was misplaced in MADV_HUGEPAGE.
MADV_HUGEPAGE has never been intended to provide any zone_reclaim_mode
semantics, in fact the two are orthogonal, zone_reclaim_mode = 1|2|3
must work exactly the same with MADV_HUGEPAGE set or not.
The performance characteristic of memory depends on the hardware
details. The numbers below are obtained on Naples/EPYC architecture and
the N/A projection extends them to show what we should aim for in the
future as a good THP NUMA locality default. The benchmark used
exercises random memory seeks (note: the cost of the page faults is not
part of the measurement).
D0 THP | D0 4k | D1 THP | D1 4k | D2 THP | D2 4k | D3 THP | D3 4k | ...
0% | +43% | +45% | +106% | +131% | +224% | N/A | N/A
D0 means distance zero (i.e. local memory), D1 means distance one (i.e.
intra socket memory), D2 means distance two (i.e. inter socket memory),
etc...
For the guest physical memory allocated by qemu and for guest mode
kernel the performance characteristic of RAM is more complex and an
ideal default could be:
D0 THP | D1 THP | D0 4k | D2 THP | D1 4k | D3 THP | D2 4k | D3 4k | ...
0% | +58% | +101% | N/A | +222% | N/A | N/A | N/A
NOTE: the N/A are projections and haven't been measured yet, the
measurement in this case is done on a 1950x with only two NUMA nodes.
The THP case here means THP was used both in the host and in the guest.
After applying this commit the THP NUMA locality order that we'll get
out of MADV_HUGEPAGE is this:
D0 THP | D1 THP | D2 THP | D3 THP | ... | D0 4k | D1 4k | D2 4k | D3 4k | ...
Before this commit it was:
D0 THP | D0 4k | D1 4k | D2 4k | D3 4k | ...
Even if we ignore the breakage of large workloads that can't fit in a
single node that the __GFP_THISNODE implicit "current node" mbind
caused, the THP NUMA locality order provided by __GFP_THISNODE was still
not the one we shall aim for in the long term (i.e. the first one at
the top).
After this commit is applied, we can introduce a new allocator multi
order API and to replace those two alloc_pages_vmas calls in the page
fault path, with a single multi order call:
unsigned int order = (1 << HPAGE_PMD_ORDER) | (1 << 0);
page = alloc_pages_multi_order(..., &order);
if (!page)
goto out;
if (!(order & (1 << 0))) {
VM_WARN_ON(order != 1 << HPAGE_PMD_ORDER);
/* THP fault */
} else {
VM_WARN_ON(order != 1 << 0);
/* 4k fallback */
}
The page allocator logic has to be altered so that when it fails on any
zone with order 9, it has to try again with a order 0 before falling
back to the next zone in the zonelist.
After that we need to do more measurements and evaluate if adding an
opt-in feature for guest mode is worth it, to swap "DN 4k | DN+1 THP"
with "DN+1 THP | DN 4k" at every NUMA distance crossing.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190503223146.2312-3-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Zi Yan <zi.yan@cs.rutgers.edu>
Cc: Stefan Priebe - Profihost AG <s.priebe@profihost.ag>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "reapply: relax __GFP_THISNODE for MADV_HUGEPAGE mappings".
The fixes for what was originally reported as "pathological THP
behavior" we rightfully reverted to be sure not to introduced
regressions at end of a merge window after a severe regression report
from the kernel bot. We can safely re-apply them now that we had time
to analyze the problem.
The mm process worked fine, because the good fixes were eventually
committed upstream without excessive delay.
The regression reported by the kernel bot however forced us to revert
the good fixes to be sure not to introduce regressions and to give us
the time to analyze the issue further. The silver lining is that this
extra time allowed to think more at this issue and also plan for a
future direction to improve things further in terms of THP NUMA
locality.
This patch (of 2):
This reverts commit 356ff8a9a78fb35d ("Revert "mm, thp: consolidate THP
gfp handling into alloc_hugepage_direct_gfpmask"). So it reapplies
89c83fb539f954 ("mm, thp: consolidate THP gfp handling into
alloc_hugepage_direct_gfpmask").
Consolidation of the THP allocation flags at the same place was meant to
be a clean up to easier handle otherwise scattered code which is
imposing a maintenance burden. There were no real problems observed
with the gfp mask consolidation but the reversion was rushed through
without a larger consensus regardless.
This patch brings the consolidation back because this should make the
long term maintainability easier as well as it should allow future
changes to be less error prone.
[mhocko@kernel.org: changelog additions]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190503223146.2312-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Zi Yan <zi.yan@cs.rutgers.edu>
Cc: Stefan Priebe - Profihost AG <s.priebe@profihost.ag>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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A compiler throws a warning on an arm64 system since commit 9849a5697d3d
("arch, mm: convert all architectures to use 5level-fixup.h"),
mm/kasan/init.c: In function 'kasan_free_p4d':
mm/kasan/init.c:344:9: warning: variable 'p4d' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
p4d_t *p4d;
^~~
because p4d_none() in "5level-fixup.h" is compiled away while it is a
static inline function in "pgtable-nopud.h".
However, if converted p4d_none() to a static inline there, powerpc would
be unhappy as it reads those in assembler language in
"arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h", so it needs to skip
assembly include for the static inline C function.
While at it, converted a few similar functions to be consistent with the
ones in "pgtable-nopud.h".
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190806232917.881-1-cai@lca.pw
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Memcg counters for shadow nodes are broken because the memcg pointer is
obtained in a wrong way. The following approach is used:
virt_to_page(xa_node)->mem_cgroup
Since commit 4d96ba353075 ("mm: memcg/slab: stop setting
page->mem_cgroup pointer for slab pages") page->mem_cgroup pointer isn't
set for slab pages, so memcg_from_slab_page() should be used instead.
Also I doubt that it ever worked correctly: virt_to_head_page() should
be used instead of virt_to_page(). Otherwise objects residing on tail
pages are not accounted, because only the head page contains a valid
mem_cgroup pointer. That was a case since the introduction of these
counters by the commit 68d48e6a2df5 ("mm: workingset: add vmstat counter
for shadow nodes").
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190801233532.138743-1-guro@fb.com
Fixes: 4d96ba353075 ("mm: memcg/slab: stop setting page->mem_cgroup pointer for slab pages")
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "mm/hmm: fixes for device private page migration", v3.
Testing the latest linux git tree turned up a few bugs with page
migration to and from ZONE_DEVICE private and anonymous pages.
Hopefully it clarifies how ZONE_DEVICE private struct page uses the same
mapping and index fields from the source anonymous page mapping.
This patch (of 3):
Struct page for ZONE_DEVICE private pages uses the page->mapping and and
page->index fields while the source anonymous pages are migrated to
device private memory. This is so rmap_walk() can find the page when
migrating the ZONE_DEVICE private page back to system memory.
ZONE_DEVICE pmem backed fsdax pages also use the page->mapping and
page->index fields when files are mapped into a process address space.
Add comments to struct page and remove the unused "_zd_pad_1" field to
make this more clear.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190724232700.23327-2-rcampbell@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Ralph Campbell <rcampbell@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Upcoming ->nocb_lock contention-reduction work requires that the
rcu_segcblist structure's ->len field be concurrently manipulated,
but only if there are no-CBs CPUs in the kernel. This commit
therefore makes this ->len field be an atomic_long_t, but only
in CONFIG_RCU_NOCB_CPU=y kernels.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
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Currently the RCU callbacks for no-CBs CPUs are queued on a series of
ad-hoc linked lists, which means that these callbacks cannot benefit
from "drive-by" grace periods, thus suffering needless delays prior
to invocation. In addition, the no-CBs grace-period kthreads first
wait for callbacks to appear and later wait for a new grace period,
which means that callbacks appearing during a grace-period wait can
be delayed. These delays increase memory footprint, and could even
result in an out-of-memory condition.
This commit therefore enqueues RCU callbacks from no-CBs CPUs on the
rcu_segcblist structure that is already used by non-no-CBs CPUs. It also
restructures the no-CBs grace-period kthread to be checking for incoming
callbacks while waiting for grace periods. Also, instead of waiting
for a new grace period, it waits for the closest grace period that will
cause some of the callbacks to be safe to invoke. All of these changes
reduce callback latency and thus the number of outstanding callbacks,
in turn reducing the probability of an out-of-memory condition.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
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RCU callback processing currently uses rcu_is_nocb_cpu() to determine
whether or not the current CPU's callbacks are to be offloaded.
This works, but it is not so good for cache locality. Plus use of
->cblist for offloaded callbacks will greatly increase the frequency
of these checks. This commit therefore adds a ->offloaded flag to the
rcu_segcblist structure to provide a more flexible and cache-friendly
means of checking for callback offloading.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
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NULLing the RCU_NEXT_TAIL pointer was a clever way to save a byte, but
forward-progress considerations would require that this pointer be both
NULL and non-NULL, which, absent a quantum-computer port of the Linux
kernel, simply won't happen. This commit therefore creates as separate
->enabled flag to replace the current NULL checks.
[ paulmck: Add include files per 0day test robot and -next. ]
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
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The nocb_cb_wait() function traces a "FollowerSleep" trace_rcu_nocb_wake()
event, which never was documented and is now misleading. This commit
therefore changes "FollowerSleep" to "CBSleep", documents this, and
updates the documentation for "Sleep" as well.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
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The Qualcomm QCS404 platform has several buses that could be controlled
and tuned according to the bandwidth demand.
Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Georgi Djakov <georgi.djakov@linaro.org>
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Introduce an optional callback in interconnect provider drivers. It can be
used for implementing actions, that need to be executed before the actual
aggregation of the bandwidth requests has started.
The benefit of this for now is that it will significantly simplify the code
in provider drivers.
Suggested-by: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Georgi Djakov <georgi.djakov@linaro.org>
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Consumers may have use cases with different bandwidth requirements based
on the system or driver state. The consumer driver can append a specific
tag to the path and pass this information to the interconnect platform
driver to do the aggregation based on this state.
Introduce icc_set_tag() function that will allow the consumers to append
an optional tag to each path. The aggregation of these tagged paths is
platform specific.
Reviewed-by: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Georgi Djakov <georgi.djakov@linaro.org>
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Add two events that were defined in the device specification but were
not exposed in the driver list.
Post this patch those events can be read over the DEVX events interface
once be reported by the firmware.
Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Edward Srouji <edwards@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190808084358.29517-4-leon@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
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This patch changes the driver/user shared (mmapped) CQ notification
flags field from unsigned 64-bits size to unsigned 32-bits size. This
enables building siw on 32-bit architectures.
This patch changes the siw-abi, but as siw was only just merged in
this merge window cycle, there are no released kernels with the prior
abi. We are making no attempt to be binary compatible with siw user
space libraries prior to the merge of siw into the upstream kernel,
only moving forward with upstream kernels and upstream rdma-core
provided siw libraries are we guaranteeing compatibility.
Signed-off-by: Bernard Metzler <bmt@zurich.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190809151816.13018-1-bmt@zurich.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
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Merging tip of mlx5-next in order to get changes related to adding
XRQ support to the DEVX interface needed prior to the following two
patches.
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
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Update the build scripts and the version magic to reflect when
CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT is enabled in the same way as CONFIG_PREEMPT is treated.
The resulting version strings:
Linux m 5.3.0-rc1+ #100 SMP Fri Jul 26 ...
Linux m 5.3.0-rc1+ #101 SMP PREEMPT Fri Jul 26 ...
Linux m 5.3.0-rc1+ #102 SMP PREEMPT_RT Fri Jul 26 ...
The module vermagic:
5.3.0-rc1+ SMP mod_unload modversions
5.3.0-rc1+ SMP preempt mod_unload modversions
5.3.0-rc1+ SMP preempt_rt mod_unload modversions
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
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This patch fixes some documentation typos in struct can_bittiming_const.
Signed-off-by: Andre Hartmann <aha_1980@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
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Introduce CAN FD support which needs an extension of the netlink API to
pass CAN FD type content to the kernel which has a different size to
Classic CAN. Additionally the struct canfd_frame has a new 'flags' element
that can now be modified with can-gw.
The new CGW_FLAGS_CAN_FD option flag defines whether the routing job
handles Classic CAN or CAN FD frames. This setting is very strict at
reception time and enables the new possibilities, e.g. CGW_FDMOD_* and
modifying the flags element of struct canfd_frame, only when
CGW_FLAGS_CAN_FD is set.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
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To prepare the CAN FD support this patch implements the first adaptions in
data structures for CAN FD without changing the current functionality.
Additionally some code at the end of this patch is moved or indented to
simplify the review of the next implementation step.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
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Add #defines only for the Data Link Feature and Physical Layer 16.0 GT/s
features as defined in PCIe spec r4.0, sec 7.7.4 for Data Link Feature and
sec 7.7.5 for Physical Layer 16.0 GT/s.
Signed-off-by: Vidya Sagar <vidyas@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
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A few fields in various structures is missing the corresponding
kerneldoc comments. Add them. Also, fixed the comment for sidlemodes.
Signed-off-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com>
Acked-by: Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
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Use the appropriate SPDX license identifier in the TI sysc
interconnect target driver source files and drop the previous
boilerplate license text. Also, add the the SPDX license
identifier in the associated ti-sysc header files.
Signed-off-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com>
Acked-by: Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
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Add the appropriate SPDX license identifier to the common
TI sysc bindings header file.
Signed-off-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com>
Acked-by: Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
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All the blacklisted NF headers can now be compiled stand-alone, so
removed them from the blacklist.
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Sowden <jeremy@azazel.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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A number of non-UAPI Netfilter header-files contained superfluous
"#ifdef __KERNEL__" guards. Removed them.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Sowden <jeremy@azazel.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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linux/netfilter.h defines a number of struct and inline function
definitions which are only available is CONFIG_NETFILTER is enabled.
These structs and functions are used in declarations and definitions in
other header-files. Added preprocessor checks to make sure these
headers will compile if CONFIG_NETFILTER is disabled.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Sowden <jeremy@azazel.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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struct nf_conn contains a "struct nf_conntrack ct_general" member and
struct net contains a "struct netns_ct ct" member which are both only
defined in CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK is enabled. These members are used in a
number of inline functions defined in other header-files. Added
preprocessor checks to make sure the headers will compile if
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK is disabled.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Sowden <jeremy@azazel.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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nf_tables.h defines an API comprising several inline functions and
macros that depend on the nft member of struct net. However, this is
only defined is CONFIG_NF_TABLES is enabled. Added preprocessor checks
to ensure that nf_tables.h will compile if CONFIG_NF_TABLES is disabled.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Sowden <jeremy@azazel.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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br_netfilter.h defines inline functions that use an enum constant and
struct member that are only defined if CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER is
enabled. Added preprocessor checks to ensure br_netfilter.h will
compile if CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER is disabled.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Sowden <jeremy@azazel.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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A number of netfilter header-files used declarations and definitions
from other headers without including them. Added include directives to
make those declarations and definitions available.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Sowden <jeremy@azazel.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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linux/netfilter/ipset/ip_set.h included four other header files:
include/linux/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_comment.h
include/linux/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_counter.h
include/linux/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_skbinfo.h
include/linux/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_timeout.h
Of these the first three were not included anywhere else. The last,
ip_set_timeout.h, was included in a couple of other places, but defined
inline functions which call other inline functions defined in ip_set.h,
so ip_set.h had to be included before it.
Inlined all four into ip_set.h, and updated the other files that
included ip_set_timeout.h.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Sowden <jeremy@azazel.net>
Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Store immediate data into offload context register. This allows follow
up instructions to take it from the corresponding source register.
This patch is required to support for payload mangling, although other
instructions that take data from source register will benefit from this
too.
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Add XRQ legacy commands opcodes, will be used via the DEVX interface.
Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
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Be more consistent with the naming of the other DMA-buf objects.
Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/323401/
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The only remaining use for this is to protect against setting a new exclusive
fence while we grab both exclusive and shared. That can also be archived by
looking if the exclusive fence has changed or not after completing the
operation.
v2: switch setting excl fence to rcu_assign_pointer
Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/322380/
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Add a function to unregister a logical PIO range.
Logical PIO space can still be leaked when unregistering certain
LOGIC_PIO_CPU_MMIO regions, but this acceptable for now since there are no
callers to unregister LOGIC_PIO_CPU_MMIO regions, and the logical PIO
region allocation scheme would need significant work to improve this.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Xu <xuwei5@hisilicon.com>
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Add SHA-512 support to fs-verity. This is primarily a demonstration of
the trivial changes needed to support a new hash algorithm in fs-verity;
most users will still use SHA-256, due to the smaller space required to
store the hashes. But some users may prefer SHA-512.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Add a function for filesystems to call to implement the
FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl. This ioctl retrieves the file measurement
that fs-verity calculated for the given file and is enforcing for reads;
i.e., reads that don't match this hash will fail. This ioctl can be
used for authentication or logging of file measurements in userspace.
See the "FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY" section of
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the documentation.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
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Add a function for filesystems to call to implement the
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl. This ioctl enables fs-verity on a file.
See the "FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY" section of
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the documentation.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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When CONFIG_UAPI_HEADER_TEST=y, exported headers are compile-tested to make
sure they can be included from user-space.
Currently, scsi_bsg_fc.h, scsi_netlink.h, and scsi_netlink_fc.h are
excluded from the test coverage. To make them join the compile-test, we
need to fix the build errors attached below.
For a case like this, we decided to use __u{8,16,32,64} variable types in
this discussion:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/6/5/18
Build log:
CC usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink_fc.h.s
CC usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink.h.s
CC usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h.s
In file included from ./usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink_fc.h:10:0,
from <command-line>:32:
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink.h:29:2: error: unknown type name uint8_t
uint8_t version;
^~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink.h:30:2: error: unknown type name uint8_t
uint8_t transport;
^~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink.h:31:2: error: unknown type name uint16_t
uint16_t magic;
^~~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink.h:32:2: error: unknown type name uint16_t
uint16_t msgtype;
^~~~~~~~
CC usr/include/rdma/vmw_pvrdma-abi.h.s
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink.h:33:2: error: unknown type name uint16_t
uint16_t msglen;
^~~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink.h:34:33: error: uint64_t undeclared here (not in a function); did you mean __uint128_t ?
} __attribute__((aligned(sizeof(uint64_t))));
^~~~~~~~
__uint128_t
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink.h:78:2: error: expected specifier-qualifier-list before uint64_t
uint64_t vendor_id;
^~~~~~~~
In file included from <command-line>:32:0:
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink_fc.h:46:2: error: expected specifier-qualifier-list before uint64_t
uint64_t seconds;
^~~~~~~~
make[2]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build;302: usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink_fc.h.s] Error 1
make[2]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
In file included from <command-line>:32:0:
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink.h:29:2: error: unknown type name uint8_t
uint8_t version;
^~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink.h:30:2: error: unknown type name uint8_t
uint8_t transport;
^~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink.h:31:2: error: unknown type name uint16_t
uint16_t magic;
^~~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink.h:32:2: error: unknown type name uint16_t
uint16_t msgtype;
^~~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink.h:33:2: error: unknown type name uint16_t
uint16_t msglen;
^~~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink.h:34:33: error: uint64_t undeclared here (not in a function); did you mean __uint128_t ?
} __attribute__((aligned(sizeof(uint64_t))));
^~~~~~~~
__uint128_t
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink.h:78:2: error: expected specifier-qualifier-list before uint64_t
uint64_t vendor_id;
^~~~~~~~
make[2]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build;302: usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink.h.s] Error 1
In file included from <command-line>:32:0:
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:69:2: error: unknown type name uint8_t
uint8_t reserved;
^~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:72:2: error: unknown type name uint8_t
uint8_t port_id[3];
^~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:90:2: error: unknown type name uint8_t
uint8_t reserved;
^~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:93:2: error: unknown type name uint8_t
uint8_t port_id[3];
^~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:114:2: error: unknown type name uint8_t
uint8_t command_code;
^~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:117:2: error: unknown type name uint8_t
uint8_t port_id[3];
^~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:154:2: error: unknown type name uint32_t
uint32_t status; /* See FC_CTELS_STATUS_xxx */
^~~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:158:3: error: unknown type name uint8_t
uint8_t action; /* fragment_id for CT REJECT */
^~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:159:3: error: unknown type name uint8_t
uint8_t reason_code;
^~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:160:3: error: unknown type name uint8_t
uint8_t reason_explanation;
^~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:161:3: error: unknown type name uint8_t
uint8_t vendor_unique;
^~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:177:2: error: unknown type name uint8_t
uint8_t reserved;
^~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:180:2: error: unknown type name uint8_t
uint8_t port_id[3];
^~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:185:2: error: unknown type name uint32_t
uint32_t preamble_word0; /* revision & IN_ID */
^~~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:186:2: error: unknown type name uint32_t
uint32_t preamble_word1; /* GS_Type, GS_SubType, Options, Rsvd */
^~~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:187:2: error: unknown type name uint32_t
uint32_t preamble_word2; /* Cmd Code, Max Size */
^~~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:207:2: error: unknown type name uint64_t
uint64_t vendor_id;
^~~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:210:2: error: unknown type name uint32_t
uint32_t vendor_cmd[0];
^~~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:217:2: error: unknown type name uint32_t
uint32_t vendor_rsp[0];
^~~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:236:2: error: unknown type name uint8_t
uint8_t els_code;
^~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:254:2: error: unknown type name uint32_t
uint32_t preamble_word0; /* revision & IN_ID */
^~~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:255:2: error: unknown type name uint32_t
uint32_t preamble_word1; /* GS_Type, GS_SubType, Options, Rsvd */
^~~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:256:2: error: unknown type name uint32_t
uint32_t preamble_word2; /* Cmd Code, Max Size */
^~~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:268:2: error: unknown type name uint32_t
uint32_t msgcode;
^~~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:292:2: error: unknown type name uint32_t
uint32_t result;
^~~~~~~~
./usr/include/scsi/scsi_bsg_fc.h:295:2: error: unknown type name uint32_t
uint32_t reply_payload_rcv_len;
^~~~~~~~
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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Add a root-only variant of the FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl which
removes all users' claims of the key, not just the current user's claim.
I.e., it always removes the key itself, no matter how many users have
added it.
This is useful for forcing a directory to be locked, without having to
figure out which user ID(s) the key was added under. This is planned to
be used by a command like 'sudo fscrypt lock DIR --all-users' in the
fscrypt userspace tool (http://github.com/google/fscrypt).
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
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Allow the FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY and FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY
ioctls to be used by non-root users to add and remove encryption keys
from the filesystem-level crypto keyrings, subject to limitations.
Motivation: while privileged fscrypt key management is sufficient for
some users (e.g. Android and Chromium OS, where a privileged process
manages all keys), the old API by design also allows non-root users to
set up and use encrypted directories, and we don't want to regress on
that. Especially, we don't want to force users to continue using the
old API, running into the visibility mismatch between files and keyrings
and being unable to "lock" encrypted directories.
Intuitively, the ioctls have to be privileged since they manipulate
filesystem-level state. However, it's actually safe to make them
unprivileged if we very carefully enforce some specific limitations.
First, each key must be identified by a cryptographic hash so that a
user can't add the wrong key for another user's files. For v2
encryption policies, we use the key_identifier for this. v1 policies
don't have this, so managing keys for them remains privileged.
Second, each key a user adds is charged to their quota for the keyrings
service. Thus, a user can't exhaust memory by adding a huge number of
keys. By default each non-root user is allowed up to 200 keys; this can
be changed using the existing sysctl 'kernel.keys.maxkeys'.
Third, if multiple users add the same key, we keep track of those users
of the key (of which there remains a single copy), and won't really
remove the key, i.e. "lock" the encrypted files, until all those users
have removed it. This prevents denial of service attacks that would be
possible under simpler schemes, such allowing the first user who added a
key to remove it -- since that could be a malicious user who has
compromised the key. Of course, encryption keys should be kept secret,
but the idea is that using encryption should never be *less* secure than
not using encryption, even if your key was compromised.
We tolerate that a user will be unable to really remove a key, i.e.
unable to "lock" their encrypted files, if another user has added the
same key. But in a sense, this is actually a good thing because it will
avoid providing a false notion of security where a key appears to have
been removed when actually it's still in memory, available to any
attacker who compromises the operating system kernel.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
|
Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes
from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*):
- Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as
input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and
it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF.
Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined:
- Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF.
- Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY
flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly.
These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when
support for it is added.
- Key identifiers (see below).
- Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier,
which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents
users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or
directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which
identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor.
- The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a
process-subscribed keyring.
The following UAPI additions are made:
- The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a
fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated
from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix.
- A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows
getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or
directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not
be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which
policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so
it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions.
- The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2
encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys
for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather
than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when
adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway.
This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the
same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys:
capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take
advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow
non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full
replacement for v1 policies.
(*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk
fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense
to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the
numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk.
Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
|
Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS. Given a key
specified by 'struct fscrypt_key_specifier' (the same way a key is
specified for the other fscrypt key management ioctls), it returns
status information in a 'struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg'.
The main motivation for this is that applications need to be able to
check whether an encrypted directory is "unlocked" or not, so that they
can add the key if it is not, and avoid adding the key (which may
involve prompting the user for a passphrase) if it already is.
It's possible to use some workarounds such as checking whether opening a
regular file fails with ENOKEY, or checking whether the filenames "look
like gibberish" or not. However, no workaround is usable in all cases.
Like the other key management ioctls, the keyrings syscalls may seem at
first to be a good fit for this. Unfortunately, they are not. Even if
we exposed the keyring ID of the ->s_master_keys keyring and gave
everyone Search permission on it (note: currently the keyrings
permission system would also allow everyone to "invalidate" the keyring
too), the fscrypt keys have an additional state that doesn't map cleanly
to the keyrings API: the secret can be removed, but we can be still
tracking the files that were using the key, and the removal can be
re-attempted or the secret added again.
After later patches, some applications will also need a way to determine
whether a key was added by the current user vs. by some other user.
Reserved fields are included in fscrypt_get_key_status_arg for this and
other future extensions.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
|
Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl
removes an encryption key that was added by FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY.
It wipes the secret key itself, then "locks" the encrypted files and
directories that had been unlocked using that key -- implemented by
evicting the relevant dentries and inodes from the VFS caches.
The problem this solves is that many fscrypt users want the ability to
remove encryption keys, causing the corresponding encrypted directories
to appear "locked" (presented in ciphertext form) again. Moreover,
users want removing an encryption key to *really* remove it, in the
sense that the removed keys cannot be recovered even if kernel memory is
compromised, e.g. by the exploit of a kernel security vulnerability or
by a physical attack. This is desirable after a user logs out of the
system, for example. In many cases users even already assume this to be
the case and are surprised to hear when it's not.
It is not sufficient to simply unlink the master key from the keyring
(or to revoke or invalidate it), since the actual encryption transform
objects are still pinned in memory by their inodes. Therefore, to
really remove a key we must also evict the relevant inodes.
Currently one workaround is to run 'sync && echo 2 >
/proc/sys/vm/drop_caches'. But, that evicts all unused inodes in the
system rather than just the inodes associated with the key being
removed, causing severe performance problems. Moreover, it requires
root privileges, so regular users can't "lock" their encrypted files.
Another workaround, used in Chromium OS kernels, is to add a new
VFS-level ioctl FS_IOC_DROP_CACHE which is a more restricted version of
drop_caches that operates on a single super_block. It does:
shrink_dcache_sb(sb);
invalidate_inodes(sb, false);
But it's still a hack. Yet, the major users of filesystem encryption
want this feature badly enough that they are actually using these hacks.
To properly solve the problem, start maintaining a list of the inodes
which have been "unlocked" using each master key. Originally this
wasn't possible because the kernel didn't keep track of in-use master
keys at all. But, with the ->s_master_keys keyring it is now possible.
Then, add an ioctl FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It finds the specified
master key in ->s_master_keys, then wipes the secret key itself, which
prevents any additional inodes from being unlocked with the key. Then,
it syncs the filesystem and evicts the inodes in the key's list. The
normal inode eviction code will free and wipe the per-file keys (in
->i_crypt_info). Note that freeing ->i_crypt_info without evicting the
inodes was also considered, but would have been racy.
Some inodes may still be in use when a master key is removed, and we
can't simply revoke random file descriptors, mmap's, etc. Thus, the
ioctl simply skips in-use inodes, and returns -EBUSY to indicate that
some inodes weren't evicted. The master key *secret* is still removed,
but the fscrypt_master_key struct remains to keep track of the remaining
inodes. Userspace can then retry the ioctl to evict the remaining
inodes. Alternatively, if userspace adds the key again, the refreshed
secret will be associated with the existing list of inodes so they
remain correctly tracked for future key removals.
The ioctl doesn't wipe pagecache pages. Thus, we tolerate that after a
kernel compromise some portions of plaintext file contents may still be
recoverable from memory. This can be solved by enabling page poisoning
system-wide, which security conscious users may choose to do. But it's
very difficult to solve otherwise, e.g. note that plaintext file
contents may have been read in other places than pagecache pages.
Like FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is
initially restricted to privileged users only. This is sufficient for
some use cases, but not all. A later patch will relax this restriction,
but it will require introducing key hashes, among other changes.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
|
Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl adds an
encryption key to the filesystem's fscrypt keyring ->s_master_keys,
making any files encrypted with that key appear "unlocked".
Why we need this
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The main problem is that the "locked/unlocked" (ciphertext/plaintext)
status of encrypted files is global, but the fscrypt keys are not.
fscrypt only looks for keys in the keyring(s) the process accessing the
filesystem is subscribed to: the thread keyring, process keyring, and
session keyring, where the session keyring may contain the user keyring.
Therefore, userspace has to put fscrypt keys in the keyrings for
individual users or sessions. But this means that when a process with a
different keyring tries to access encrypted files, whether they appear
"unlocked" or not is nondeterministic. This is because it depends on
whether the files are currently present in the inode cache.
Fixing this by consistently providing each process its own view of the
filesystem depending on whether it has the key or not isn't feasible due
to how the VFS caches work. Furthermore, while sometimes users expect
this behavior, it is misguided for two reasons. First, it would be an
OS-level access control mechanism largely redundant with existing access
control mechanisms such as UNIX file permissions, ACLs, LSMs, etc.
Encryption is actually for protecting the data at rest.
Second, almost all users of fscrypt actually do need the keys to be
global. The largest users of fscrypt, Android and Chromium OS, achieve
this by having PID 1 create a "session keyring" that is inherited by
every process. This works, but it isn't scalable because it prevents
session keyrings from being used for any other purpose.
On general-purpose Linux distros, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool [1] can't
similarly abuse the session keyring, so to make 'sudo' work on all
systems it has to link all the user keyrings into root's user keyring
[2]. This is ugly and raises security concerns. Moreover it can't make
the keys available to system services, such as sshd trying to access the
user's '~/.ssh' directory (see [3], [4]) or NetworkManager trying to
read certificates from the user's home directory (see [5]); or to Docker
containers (see [6], [7]).
By having an API to add a key to the *filesystem* we'll be able to fix
the above bugs, remove userspace workarounds, and clearly express the
intended semantics: the locked/unlocked status of an encrypted directory
is global, and encryption is orthogonal to OS-level access control.
Why not use the add_key() syscall
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
We use an ioctl for this API rather than the existing add_key() system
call because the ioctl gives us the flexibility needed to implement
fscrypt-specific semantics that will be introduced in later patches:
- Supporting key removal with the semantics such that the secret is
removed immediately and any unused inodes using the key are evicted;
also, the eviction of any in-use inodes can be retried.
- Calculating a key-dependent cryptographic identifier and returning it
to userspace.
- Allowing keys to be added and removed by non-root users, but only keys
for v2 encryption policies; and to prevent denial-of-service attacks,
users can only remove keys they themselves have added, and a key is
only really removed after all users who added it have removed it.
Trying to shoehorn these semantics into the keyrings syscalls would be
very difficult, whereas the ioctls make things much easier.
However, to reuse code the implementation still uses the keyrings
service internally. Thus we get lockless RCU-mode key lookups without
having to re-implement it, and the keys automatically show up in
/proc/keys for debugging purposes.
References:
[1] https://github.com/google/fscrypt
[2] https://goo.gl/55cCrI#heading=h.vf09isp98isb
[3] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/111#issuecomment-444347939
[4] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/116
[5] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/fscrypt/+bug/1770715
[6] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/128
[7] https://askubuntu.com/questions/1130306/cannot-run-docker-on-an-encrypted-filesystem
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
|
Rename keyinfo.c to keysetup.c since this better describes what the file
does (sets up the key), and it matches the new file keysetup_v1.c.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
Heiner Kallweit
Jakub Kicinski
Andrea Arcangeli
Qian Cai
Roman Gushchin
Ralph Campbell
Paul E. McKenney
Georgi Djakov
Yishai Hadas
Bernard Metzler
Doug Ledford
Thomas Gleixner
Andre Hartmann
Oliver Hartkopp
Vidya Sagar
Suman Anna
Jeremy Sowden
Pablo Neira Ayuso
Christian König
John Garry
Eric Biggers
Masahiro Yamada