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Instead of allowing public keys, with certificates signed by any
key on the system trusted keyring, to be added to a trusted keyring,
this patch further restricts the certificates to those signed only by
builtin keys on the system keyring.
This patch defines a new option 'builtin' for the kernel parameter
'keys_ownerid' to allow trust validation using builtin keys.
Simplified Mimi's "KEYS: define an owner trusted keyring" patch
Changelog v7:
- rename builtin_keys to use_builtin_keys
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Apart from data-type specific alignment constraints, there are also
architecture-specific alignment requirements.
For example, on s390 symbols must be on even addresses implying a 2-byte
alignment. If the system_certificate_list_end symbol is on an odd address
and if this address is loaded, the least-significant bit is ignored. As a
result, the load_system_certificate_list() fails to load the certificates
because of a wrong certificate length calculation.
To be safe, align system_certificate_list on an 8-byte boundary. Also improve
the length calculation of the system_certificate_list content. Introduce a
system_certificate_list_size (8-byte aligned because of unsigned long) variable
that stores the length. Let the linker calculate this size by introducing
a start and end label for the certificate content.
Signed-off-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Give the root user the ability to read the system keyring and put read
permission on the trusted keys added during boot. The latter is actually more
theoretical than real for the moment as asymmetric keys do not currently
provide a read operation.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Add KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED to indicate that a key either comes from a trusted source
or had a cryptographic signature chain that led back to a trusted key the
kernel already possessed.
Add KEY_FLAGS_TRUSTED_ONLY to indicate that a keyring will only accept links to
keys marked with KEY_FLAGS_TRUSTED.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing so that it
can be used by code other than the module-signing code.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Dmitry Kasatkin
Hendrik Brueckner
Mimi Zohar
David Howells