linux-dev - Linux kernel development work

Age	Commit message (Collapse)	Author	Files	Lines
2019-06-29	net: sched: em_ipt: add support for addrtype matching	Nikolay Aleksandrov	1	-0/+14
	Allow em_ipt to use addrtype for matching. Restrict the use only to revision 1 which has IPv6 support. Since it's a NFPROTO_UNSPEC xt match we use the user-specified nfproto for matching, in case it's unspecified both v4/v6 will be matched by the rule. v2: no changes, was patch 5 in v1 Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-29	net: sched: em_ipt: keep the user-specified nfproto and dump it	Nikolay Aleksandrov	1	-1/+13
	If we dump NFPROTO_UNSPEC as nfproto user-space libxtables can't handle it and would exit with an error like: "libxtables: unhandled NFPROTO in xtables_set_nfproto" In order to avoid the error return the user-specified nfproto. If we don't record it then the match family is used which can be NFPROTO_UNSPEC. Even if we add support to mask NFPROTO_UNSPEC in iproute2 we have to be compatible with older versions which would be also be allowed to add NFPROTO_UNSPEC matches (e.g. addrtype after the last patch). v3: don't use the user nfproto for matching, only for dumping the rule, also don't allow the nfproto to be unspecified (explained above) v2: adjust changes to missing patch, was patch 04 in v1 Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-29	net: sched: em_ipt: set the family based on the packet if it's unspecified	Nikolay Aleksandrov	1	-1/+6
	Set the family based on the packet if it's unspecified otherwise protocol-neutral matches will have wrong information (e.g. NFPROTO_UNSPEC). In preparation for using NFPROTO_UNSPEC xt matches. v2: set the nfproto only when unspecified Suggested-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-29	net: sched: em_ipt: match only on ip/ipv6 traffic	Nikolay Aleksandrov	1	-0/+13
	Restrict matching only to ip/ipv6 traffic and make sure we can use the headers, otherwise matches will be attempted on any protocol which can be unexpected by the xt matches. Currently policy supports only ipv4/6. Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-05-30	treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 152	Thomas Gleixner	1	-5/+1
	Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-04-27	netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness	Johannes Berg	1	-2/+2
	We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be everything. The current _strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to _parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-21	net: sched: add em_ipt ematch for calling xtables matches	Eyal Birger	1	-0/+257
	The commit a new tc ematch for using netfilter xtable matches. This allows early classification as well as mirroning/redirecting traffic based on logic implemented in netfilter extensions. Current supported use case is classification based on the incoming IPSec state used during decpsulation using the 'policy' iptables extension (xt_policy). The module dynamically fetches the netfilter match module and calls it using a fake xt_action_param structure based on validated userspace provided parameters. As the xt_policy match does not access skb->data, no skb modifications are needed on match. Signed-off-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>