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2010-04-21ima: handle multiple rules per writeEric Paris1-1/+1
Currently IMA will only accept one rule per write(). This patch allows IMA to accept writes which contain multiple rules but only processes one rule per write. \n is used as the delimiter between rules. IMA will return a short write indicating that it only accepted up to the first \n. This allows simple userspace utilities like cat to be used to load an IMA policy instead of needing a special userspace utility that understood 'one write per rule' Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-02-07ima: rename PATH_CHECK to FILE_CHECKMimi Zohar1-1/+1
With the movement of the ima hooks functions were renamed from *path* to *file* since they always deal with struct file. This patch renames some of the ima internal flags to make them consistent with the rest of the code. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-02-07ima: initialize ima before inodes can be allocatedEric Paris1-1/+0
ima wants to create an inode information struct (iint) when inodes are allocated. This means that at least the part of ima which does this allocation (the allocation is filled with information later) should before any inodes are created. To accomplish this we split the ima initialization routine placing the kmem cache allocator inside a security_initcall() function. Since this makes use of radix trees we also need to make sure that is initialized before security_initcall(). Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-12-16ima: call ima_inode_free ima_inode_freeEric Paris1-1/+0
ima_inode_free() has some funky #define just to confuse the crap out of me. void ima_iint_delete(struct inode *inode) and then things actually call ima_inode_free() and nothing calls ima_iint_delete(). Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-12-16IMA: clean up the IMA counts updating codeEric Paris1-1/+0
We currently have a lot of duplicated code around ima file counts. Clean that all up. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-12-16ima: only insert at inode creation timeEric Paris1-1/+0
iints are supposed to be allocated when an inode is allocated (during security_inode_alloc()) But we have code which will attempt to allocate an iint during measurement calls. If we couldn't allocate the iint and we cared, we should have died during security_inode_alloc(). Not make the code more complex and less efficient. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-02-12integrity: audit updateMimi Zohar1-1/+1
Based on discussions on linux-audit, as per Steve Grubb's request http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/2/6/269, the following changes were made: - forced audit result to be either 0 or 1. - made template names const - Added new stand-alone message type: AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-06Integrity: IMA file free imbalanceMimi Zohar1-0/+2
The number of calls to ima_path_check()/ima_file_free() should be balanced. An extra call to fput(), indicates the file could have been accessed without first being measured. Although f_count is incremented/decremented in places other than fget/fput, like fget_light/fput_light and get_file, the current task must already hold a file refcnt. The call to __fput() is delayed until the refcnt becomes 0, resulting in ima_file_free() flagging any changes. - add hook to increment opencount for IPC shared memory(SYSV), shmat files, and /dev/zero - moved NULL iint test in opencount_get() Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-06integrity: IMA policyMimi Zohar1-0/+24
Support for a user loadable policy through securityfs with support for LSM specific policy data. - free invalid rule in ima_parse_add_rule() Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-06integrity: IMA displayMimi Zohar1-0/+5
Make the measurement lists available through securityfs. - removed test for NULL return code from securityfs_create_file/dir Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-06integrity: IMA as an integrity service providerMimi Zohar1-0/+135
IMA provides hardware (TPM) based measurement and attestation for file measurements. As the Trusted Computing (TPM) model requires, IMA measures all files before they are accessed in any way (on the integrity_bprm_check, integrity_path_check and integrity_file_mmap hooks), and commits the measurements to the TPM. Once added to the TPM, measurements can not be removed. In addition, IMA maintains a list of these file measurements, which can be used to validate the aggregate value stored in the TPM. The TPM can sign these measurements, and thus the system can prove, to itself and to a third party, the system's integrity in a way that cannot be circumvented by malicious or compromised software. - alloc ima_template_entry before calling ima_store_template() - log ima_add_boot_aggregate() failure - removed unused IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN - replaced hard coded string length with #define name Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>