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MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE is missing in spi phy in case CONFIG_OF is not set.
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Ricard <christophe-h.ricard@st.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
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In case the driver is configured to use irq, we are not waiting the answer
for a duration period to see the DATA_AVAIL status bit to raise but at
maximum timeout_c. This may result in critical failure as we will
not wait long enough for the command completion.
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jason.gunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Ricard <christophe-h.ricard@st.com>
Fixes: bf38b8710892 ("tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Split tpm_i2c_tpm_st33 in 2
layers (core + phy)")
Reviewed-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
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In commit 00f84f3f2e9d088f06722f4351d67f5f577abe22 ("Smack: Make the
syslog control configurable") this mutex was added, but the rest of
the final commit never actually made use of it, resulting in:
In file included from include/linux/mutex.h:29:0,
from include/linux/notifier.h:13,
from include/linux/memory_hotplug.h:6,
from include/linux/mmzone.h:821,
from include/linux/gfp.h:5,
from include/linux/slab.h:14,
from include/linux/security.h:27,
from security/smack/smackfs.c:21:
security/smack/smackfs.c:63:21: warning: ‘smack_syslog_lock’ defined but not used [-Wunused-variable]
static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_syslog_lock);
^
A git grep shows no other instances/references to smack_syslog_lock.
Delete it, assuming that the mutex addition was just a leftover from
an earlier work in progress version of the change.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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I have vehemently opposed adding a "permissive" mode to Smack
for the simple reasons that it would be subject to massive abuse
and that developers refuse to turn it off come product release.
I still believe that this is true, and still refuse to add a
general "permissive mode". So don't ask again.
Bumjin Im suggested an approach that addresses most of the concerns,
and I have implemented it here. I still believe that we'd be better
off without this sort of thing, but it looks like this minimizes the
abuse potential.
Firstly, you have to configure Smack Bringup Mode. That allows
for "release" software to be ammune from abuse. Second, only one
label gets to be "permissive" at a time. You can use it for
debugging, but that's about it.
A label written to smackfs/unconfined is treated specially.
If either the subject or object label of an access check
matches the "unconfined" label, and the access would not
have been allowed otherwise an audit record and a console
message are generated. The audit record "request" string is
marked with either "(US)" or "(UO)", to indicate that the
request was granted because of an unconfined label. The
fact that an inode was accessed by an unconfined label is
remembered, and subsequent accesses to that "impure"
object are noted in the log. The impurity is not stored in
the filesystem, so a file mislabled as a side effect of
using an unconfined label may still cause concern after
a reboot.
So, it's there, it's dangerous, but so many application
developers seem incapable of living without it I have
given in. I've tried to make it as safe as I can, but
in the end it's still a chain saw.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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With this commit, the LSM Smack implements the LSM
side part of the system call keyctl with the action
code KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY.
It is now possible to get the context of, for example,
the user session key using the command "keyctl security @s".
The original patch has been modified for merge.
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@open.eurogiciel.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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This change fixes the bug associated with sockets owned by kernel threads. These
sockets, created usually by network devices' drivers tasks, received smk_in
label from the task that created them - the "floor" label in the most cases. The
result was that they were not able to receive data packets because of missing
smack rules. The main reason of the access deny is that the socket smk_in label
is placed as the object during smk check, kernel thread's capabilities are
omitted.
Signed-off-by: Marcin Lis <m.lis@samsung.com>
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Make the tpm_infineon driver define its PM callbacks through
a struct dev_pm_ops object rather than by using legacy PM hooks
in struct pnp_driver.
This allows the driver to use tpm_pm_suspend() as its suspend
callback directly, so we can remove the duplicated savestate code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
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Jason does an excellent job reviewing the TPM stuff, so we add him to
the designated reviewer list (with his consent :)
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
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I got a lot of requests lately about whether the new TPM2.0 support
includes the FIFO interface for TPM2.0 as well.
The FIFO interface is handled by tpm_tis since FIFO=TIS (more or less).
-> Update the helptext and headline
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
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