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Pull smack updates from James Morris:
"From Casey: three patches for Smack for 4.20. Two clean up warnings
and one is a rarely encountered ptrace capability check"
* 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
Smack: Mark expected switch fall-through
Smack: ptrace capability use fixes
Smack: remove set but not used variable 'root_inode'
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Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"In this patchset, there are a couple of minor updates, as well as some
reworking of the LSM initialization code from Kees Cook (these prepare
the way for ordered stackable LSMs, but are a valuable cleanup on
their own)"
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures
LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure
LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info
LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM()
vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA
LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info
LSM: Remove initcall tracing
LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info
vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section
LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization
security: fix LSM description location
keys: Fix the use of the C++ keyword "private" in uapi/linux/keyctl.h
seccomp: remove unnecessary unlikely()
security: tomoyo: Fix obsolete function
security/capabilities: remove check for -EINVAL
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In preparation for making LSM selections outside of the LSMs, include
the name of LSMs in struct lsm_info.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Instead of using argument-based initializers, switch to defining the
contents of struct lsm_info on a per-LSM basis. This also drops
the final use of the now inaccurate "initcall" naming.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Linus recently observed that if we did not worry about the padding
member in struct siginfo it is only about 48 bytes, and 48 bytes is
much nicer than 128 bytes for allocating on the stack and copying
around in the kernel.
The obvious thing of only adding the padding when userspace is
including siginfo.h won't work as there are sigframe definitions in
the kernel that embed struct siginfo.
So split siginfo in two; kernel_siginfo and siginfo. Keeping the
traditional name for the userspace definition. While the version that
is used internally to the kernel and ultimately will not be padded to
128 bytes is called kernel_siginfo.
The definition of struct kernel_siginfo I have put in include/signal_types.h
A set of buildtime checks has been added to verify the two structures have
the same field offsets.
To make it easy to verify the change kernel_siginfo retains the same
size as siginfo. The reduction in size comes in a following change.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch cases
where we are expecting to fall through.
Notice that in this particular case, I replaced "No break" with a
proper "Fall through" annotation, which is what GCC is expecting
to find.
Warning level 2 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=2
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 115051 ("Missing break in switch")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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This fixes a pair of problems in the Smack ptrace checks
related to checking capabilities. In both cases, as reported
by Lukasz Pawelczyk, the raw capability calls are used rather
than the Smack wrapper that check addition restrictions.
In one case, as reported by Jann Horn, the wrong task is being
checked for capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
security/smack/smackfs.c: In function 'smk_fill_super':
security/smack/smackfs.c:2856:16: warning:
variable 'root_inode' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Pull smack updates from James Morris:
"Minor fixes from Piotr Sawicki"
* 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
Smack: Inform peer that IPv6 traffic has been blocked
Smack: Check UDP-Lite and DCCP protocols during IPv6 handling
Smack: Fix handling of IPv4 traffic received by PF_INET6 sockets
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Pull vfs open-related updates from Al Viro:
- "do we need fput() or put_filp()" rules are gone - it's always fput()
now. We keep track of that state where it belongs - in ->f_mode.
- int *opened mess killed - in finish_open(), in ->atomic_open()
instances and in fs/namei.c code around do_last()/lookup_open()/atomic_open().
- alloc_file() wrappers with saner calling conventions are introduced
(alloc_file_clone() and alloc_file_pseudo()); callers converted, with
much simplification.
- while we are at it, saner calling conventions for path_init() and
link_path_walk(), simplifying things inside fs/namei.c (both on
open-related paths and elsewhere).
* 'work.open3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (40 commits)
few more cleanups of link_path_walk() callers
allow link_path_walk() to take ERR_PTR()
make path_init() unconditionally paired with terminate_walk()
document alloc_file() changes
make alloc_file() static
do_shmat(): grab shp->shm_file earlier, switch to alloc_file_clone()
new helper: alloc_file_clone()
create_pipe_files(): switch the first allocation to alloc_file_pseudo()
anon_inode_getfile(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo()
hugetlb_file_setup(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo()
ocxlflash_getfile(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo()
cxl_getfile(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo()
... and switch shmem_file_setup() to alloc_file_pseudo()
__shmem_file_setup(): reorder allocations
new wrapper: alloc_file_pseudo()
kill FILE_{CREATED,OPENED}
switch atomic_open() and lookup_open() to returning 0 in all success cases
document ->atomic_open() changes
->atomic_open(): return 0 in all success cases
get rid of 'opened' in path_openat() and the helpers downstream
...
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In this patch we're sending an ICMPv6 message to a peer to
immediately inform it that making a connection is not possible.
In case of TCP connections, without this change, the peer
will be waiting until a connection timeout is exceeded.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sawicki <p.sawicki2@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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The smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb() function is checking smack labels
only for UDP and TCP frames carried in IPv6 packets. From now on,
it is able also to handle UDP-Lite and DCCP protocols.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sawicki <p.sawicki2@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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A socket which has sk_family set to PF_INET6 is able to receive not
only IPv6 but also IPv4 traffic (IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses).
Prior to this patch, the smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6() could have been
called for socket buffers containing IPv4 packets, in result such
traffic was allowed.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sawicki <p.sawicki2@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Smack: Mark inode instant in smack_task_to_inode
/proc clean-up in commit 1bbc55131e59bd099fdc568d3aa0b42634dbd188
resulted in smack_task_to_inode() being called before smack_d_instantiate.
This resulted in the smk_inode value being ignored, even while present
for files in /proc/self. Marking the inode as instant here fixes that.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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"one simple patch that fixes a memory leak in kernfs and labeled NFS"
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Fix memory leak in smack_inode_getsecctx
The implementation of smack_inode_getsecctx() made
incorrect assumptions about how Smack presents a security
context. Smack does not need to allocate memory to support
security contexts, so "releasing" a Smack context is a no-op.
The code made an unnecessary copy and returned that as a
context, which was never freed. The revised implementation
returns the context correctly.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-by: CHANDAN VN <chandan.vn@samsung.com>
Tested-by: CHANDAN VN <chandan.vn@samsung.com>
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Make sure to implement the new socketpair callback so the SO_PEERSEC
call on socketpair(2)s will return correct information.
Signed-off-by: Tom Gundersen <teg@jklm.no>
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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There is a permission discrepancy when consulting msq ipc object
metadata between /proc/sysvipc/msg (0444) and the MSG_STAT shmctl
command. The later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO.
As such there can be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the
info is displayed anyways in the procfs files.
While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the msq metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing
all the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an
overlook - so we are stuck with it. Furthermore, modifying either the
syscall or the procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie
ipcs). Some applications require getting the procfs info (without root
privileges) and can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to
500x in some reported cases for shm.
This patch introduces a new MSG_STAT_ANY command such that the msq ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead. In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-4-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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There is a permission discrepancy when consulting shm ipc object
metadata between /proc/sysvipc/sem (0444) and the SEM_STAT semctl
command. The later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO.
As such there can be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the
info is displayed anyways in the procfs files.
While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the sma metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing
all the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an
overlook - so we are stuck with it. Furthermore, modifying either the
syscall or the procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie
ipcs). Some applications require getting the procfs info (without root
privileges) and can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to
500x in some reported cases for shm.
This patch introduces a new SEM_STAT_ANY command such that the sem ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead. In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-3-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "sysvipc: introduce STAT_ANY commands", v2.
The following patches adds the discussed (see [1]) new command for shm
as well as for sems and msq as they are subject to the same
discrepancies for ipc object permission checks between the syscall and
via procfs. These new commands are justified in that (1) we are stuck
with this semantics as changing syscall and procfs can break userland;
and (2) some users can benefit from performance (for large amounts of
shm segments, for example) from not having to parse the procfs
interface.
Once merged, I will submit the necesary manpage updates. But I'm thinking
something like:
: diff --git a/man2/shmctl.2 b/man2/shmctl.2
: index 7bb503999941..bb00bbe21a57 100644
: --- a/man2/shmctl.2
: +++ b/man2/shmctl.2
: @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
: .\" 2005-04-25, mtk -- noted aberrant Linux behavior w.r.t. new
: .\" attaches to a segment that has already been marked for deletion.
: .\" 2005-08-02, mtk: Added IPC_INFO, SHM_INFO, SHM_STAT descriptions.
: +.\" 2018-02-13, dbueso: Added SHM_STAT_ANY description.
: .\"
: .TH SHMCTL 2 2017-09-15 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual"
: .SH NAME
: @@ -242,6 +243,18 @@ However, the
: argument is not a segment identifier, but instead an index into
: the kernel's internal array that maintains information about
: all shared memory segments on the system.
: +.TP
: +.BR SHM_STAT_ANY " (Linux-specific)"
: +Return a
: +.I shmid_ds
: +structure as for
: +.BR SHM_STAT .
: +However, the
: +.I shm_perm.mode
: +is not checked for read access for
: +.IR shmid ,
: +resembing the behaviour of
: +/proc/sysvipc/shm.
: .PP
: The caller can prevent or allow swapping of a shared
: memory segment with the following \fIcmd\fP values:
: @@ -287,7 +300,7 @@ operation returns the index of the highest used entry in the
: kernel's internal array recording information about all
: shared memory segments.
: (This information can be used with repeated
: -.B SHM_STAT
: +.B SHM_STAT/SHM_STAT_ANY
: operations to obtain information about all shared memory segments
: on the system.)
: A successful
: @@ -328,7 +341,7 @@ isn't accessible.
: \fIshmid\fP is not a valid identifier, or \fIcmd\fP
: is not a valid command.
: Or: for a
: -.B SHM_STAT
: +.B SHM_STAT/SHM_STAT_ANY
: operation, the index value specified in
: .I shmid
: referred to an array slot that is currently unused.
This patch (of 3):
There is a permission discrepancy when consulting shm ipc object metadata
between /proc/sysvipc/shm (0444) and the SHM_STAT shmctl command. The
later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO. As such there can
be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the info is displayed
anyways in the procfs files.
While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the shm metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing all
the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an overlook - so
we are stuck with it. Furthermore, modifying either the syscall or the
procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie ipcs). Some
applications require getting the procfs info (without root privileges) and
can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to 500x in some
reported cases.
This patch introduces a new SHM_STAT_ANY command such that the shm ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead. In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/12/19/220
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-2-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"A mixture of bug fixes, code cleanup, and continues to close
IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal, and IMA-audit gaps.
Also note the addition of a new cred_getsecid LSM hook by Matthew
Garrett:
For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid
in the bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a
cred_getsecid hook that makes this possible.
which is used by a new CREDS_CHECK target in IMA:
In ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process
credentials and the credentials that will be committed when the new
process is started. This will not change behaviour unless the
system policy is extended to include CREDS_CHECK targets -
BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same credentials that it did
previously"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithm
ima: Add smackfs to the default appraise/measure list
evm: check for remount ro in progress before writing
ima: Improvements in ima_appraise_measurement()
ima: Simplify ima_eventsig_init()
integrity: Remove unused macro IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS
ima: drop vla in ima_audit_measurement()
ima: Fix Kconfig to select TPM 2.0 CRB interface
evm: Constify *integrity_status_msg[]
evm: Move evm_hmac and evm_hash from evm_main.c to evm_crypto.c
fuse: define the filesystem as untrusted
ima: fail signature verification based on policy
ima: clear IMA_HASH
ima: re-evaluate files on privileged mounted filesystems
ima: fail file signature verification on non-init mounted filesystems
IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy
security: Add a cred_getsecid hook
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Pull smack update from James Morris:
"One small change for Automotive Grade Linux"
* 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
Smack: Handle CGROUP2 in the same way that CGROUP
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Pull general security layer updates from James Morris:
- Convert security hooks from list to hlist, a nice cleanup, saving
about 50% of space, from Sargun Dhillon.
- Only pass the cred, not the secid, to kill_pid_info_as_cred and
security_task_kill (as the secid can be determined from the cred),
from Stephen Smalley.
- Close a potential race in kernel_read_file(), by making the file
unwritable before calling the LSM check (vs after), from Kees Cook.
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: convert security hooks to use hlist
exec: Set file unwritable before LSM check
usb, signal, security: only pass the cred, not the secid, to kill_pid_info_as_cred and security_task_kill
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Rename the variables shp, sma, msq to isp. As that is how the code already
refers to those variables.
Collapse smack_of_shm, smack_of_sem, and smack_of_msq into smack_of_ipc,
as the three functions had become completely identical.
Collapse smack_shm_alloc_security, smack_sem_alloc_security and
smack_msg_queue_alloc_security into smack_ipc_alloc_security as the three
functions had become identical.
Collapse smack_shm_free_security, smack_sem_free_security and
smack_msg_queue_free_security into smack_ipc_free_security as the
three functions had become identical.
Requested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Pull request from Casey.
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For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid in the
bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a cred_getsecid
hook that makes this possible.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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All of the implementations of security hooks that take msg_queue only
access q_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the
dependencies of the msg_queue security hooks can be simplified by
passing the kern_ipc_perm member of msg_queue.
Making this change will allow struct msg_queue to become private to
ipc/msg.c.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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All of the implementations of security hooks that take shmid_kernel only
access shm_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the
dependencies of the shm security hooks can be simplified by passing
the kern_ipc_perm member of shmid_kernel..
Making this change will allow struct shmid_kernel to become private to ipc/shm.c.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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All of the implementations of security hooks that take sem_array only
access sem_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the
dependencies of the sem security hooks can be simplified by passing
the kern_ipc_perm member of sem_array.
Making this change will allow struct sem and struct sem_array
to become private to ipc/sem.c.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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commit d178bc3a708f39cbfefc3fab37032d3f2511b4ec ("user namespace: usb:
make usb urbs user namespace aware (v2)") changed kill_pid_info_as_uid
to kill_pid_info_as_cred, saving and passing a cred structure instead of
uids. Since the secid can be obtained from the cred, drop the secid fields
from the usb_dev_state and async structures, and drop the secid argument to
kill_pid_info_as_cred. Replace the secid argument to security_task_kill
with the cred. Update SELinux, Smack, and AppArmor to use the cred, which
avoids the need for Smack and AppArmor to use a secid at all in this hook.
Further changes to Smack might still be required to take full advantage of
this change, since it should now be possible to perform capability
checking based on the supplied cred. The changes to Smack and AppArmor
have only been compile-tested.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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The new file system CGROUP2 isn't actually handled
by smack. This changes makes Smack treat equally
CGROUP and CGROUP2 items.
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@iot.bzh>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Smack: Privilege check on key operations
Operations on key objects are subjected to Smack policy
even if the process is privileged. This is inconsistent
with the general behavior of Smack and may cause issues
with authentication by privileged daemons. This patch
allows processes with CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE to access keys
even if the Smack rules indicate otherwise.
Reported-by: Jose Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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This patch fixes the warning reported by smatch:
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:2872 smack_socket_connect() warn:
variable dereferenced before check 'sock->sk' (see line 2869)
Signed-off-by: Vasyl Gomonovych <gomonovych@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Pull general security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"TPM (from Jarkko):
- essential clean up for tpm_crb so that ARM64 and x86 versions do
not distract each other as much as before
- /dev/tpm0 rejects now too short writes (shorter buffer than
specified in the command header
- use DMA-safe buffer in tpm_tis_spi
- otherwise mostly minor fixes.
Smack:
- base support for overlafs
Capabilities:
- BPRM_FCAPS fixes, from Richard Guy Briggs:
The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing
setuid application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected
as it was supposed to be limited to when the file system actually
had capabilities in an extended attribute. It lists all
capabilities making the event really ugly to parse what is
happening. The PATH record correctly records the setuid bit and
owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on set*id.
TOMOYO:
- Y2038 timestamping fixes"
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (28 commits)
MAINTAINERS: update the IMA, EVM, trusted-keys, encrypted-keys entries
Smack: Base support for overlayfs
MAINTAINERS: remove David Safford as maintainer for encrypted+trusted keys
tomoyo: fix timestamping for y2038
capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions
capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root
capabilities: invert logic for clarity
capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic
capabilities: move audit log decision to function
capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes
capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic
capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap
capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status
capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root
tpm, tpm_tis: use ARRAY_SIZE() to define TPM_HID_USR_IDX
tpm: fix duplicate inline declaration specifier
tpm: fix type of a local variables in tpm_tis_spi.c
tpm: fix type of a local variable in tpm2_map_command()
tpm: fix type of a local variable in tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl()
tpm-dev-common: Reject too short writes
...
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Supply the Smack module hooks in support of overlayfs.
Ensure that the Smack label of new files gets the correct
value when a directory is transmuting. Original implementation
by Romanini Daniele, with a few tweaks added.
Signed-off-by: Romanini Daniele <daniele.romanini@aalto.fi>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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security_inode_getsecurity() provides the text string value
of a security attribute. It does not provide a "secctx".
The code in xattr_getsecurity() that calls security_inode_getsecurity()
and then calls security_release_secctx() happened to work because
SElinux and Smack treat the attribute and the secctx the same way.
It fails for cap_inode_getsecurity(), because that module has no
secctx that ever needs releasing. It turns out that Smack is the
one that's doing things wrong by not allocating memory when instructed
to do so by the "alloc" parameter.
The fix is simple enough. Change the security_release_secctx() to
kfree() because it isn't a secctx being returned by
security_inode_getsecurity(). Change Smack to allocate the string when
told to do so.
Note: this also fixes memory leaks for LSMs which implement
inode_getsecurity but not release_secctx, such as capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Pull secureexec update from Kees Cook:
"This series has the ultimate goal of providing a sane stack rlimit
when running set*id processes.
To do this, the bprm_secureexec LSM hook is collapsed into the
bprm_set_creds hook so the secureexec-ness of an exec can be
determined early enough to make decisions about rlimits and the
resulting memory layouts. Other logic acting on the secureexec-ness of
an exec is similarly consolidated. Capabilities needed some special
handling, but the refactoring removed other special handling, so that
was a wash"
* tag 'secureexec-v4.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing
exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec
exec: Consolidate dumpability logic
smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing
exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal
exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability
LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hook
commoncap: Move cap_elevated calculation into bprm_set_creds
commoncap: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
smack: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
selinux: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
binfmt: Introduce secureexec flag
exec: Correct comments about "point of no return"
exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_creds
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This removes the redundant pdeath_signal clearing in Smack: the check in
smack_bprm_committing_creds() matches the check in smack_bprm_set_creds()
(which used to be in the now-removed smack_bprm_securexec() hook) and
since secureexec is now being checked for clearing pdeath_signal, this
is redundant to the common exec code.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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The Smack bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds
hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details
are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via
prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored
via bprm->called_set_creds).
Here, the test can just happen at the end of the bprm_set_creds hook,
and the bprm_secureexec hook can be dropped.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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The cred_prepared bprm flag has a misleading name. It has nothing to do
with the bprm_prepare_cred hook, and actually tracks if bprm_set_creds has
been called. Rename this flag and improve its comment.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
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We no longer place these on a list so they can be const.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Use cap_capable() rather than capable() in the Smack privilege
check as the former does not invoke other security module
privilege check, while the later does. This becomes important
when stacking. It may be a problem even with minor modules.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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The check of S_ISSOCK() in smack_file_receive() is not
appropriate if the passed descriptor is a socket.
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tyco.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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It will allow us to remove the old netfilter hook api in the near future.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
"Assorted bits and pieces from various people. No common topic in this
pile, sorry"
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fs/affs: add rename exchange
fs/affs: add rename2 to prepare multiple methods
Make stat/lstat/fstatat pass AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT to vfs_statx()
fs: don't set *REFERENCED on single use objects
fs: compat: Remove warning from COMPATIBLE_IOCTL
remove pointless extern of atime_need_update_rcu()
fs: completely ignore unknown open flags
fs: add a VALID_OPEN_FLAGS
fs: remove _submit_bh()
fs: constify tree_descr arrays passed to simple_fill_super()
fs: drop duplicate header percpu-rwsem.h
fs/affs: bugfix: Write files greater than page size on OFS
fs/affs: bugfix: enable writes on OFS disks
fs/affs: remove node generation check
fs/affs: import amigaffs.h
fs/affs: bugfix: make symbolic links work again
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simple_fill_super() is passed an array of tree_descr structures which
describe the files to create in the filesystem's root directory. Since
these arrays are never modified intentionally, they should be 'const' so
that they are placed in .rodata and benefit from memory protection.
This patch updates the function signature and all users, and also
constifies tree_descr.name.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Since all callers of smk_netlbl_mls() are GFP_KERNEL context
(smk_set_cipso() calls memdup_user_nul(), init_smk_fs() calls
__kernfs_new_node(), smk_import_entry() calls kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL)),
it is safe to use GFP_KERNEL from netlbl_catmap_setbit().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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smack_parse_opts_str() calls kfree(opts->mnt_opts) when kcalloc() for
opts->mnt_opts_flags failed. But it should not have called it because
security_free_mnt_opts() will call kfree(opts->mnt_opts).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
fixes: 3bf2789cad9e6573 ("smack: allow mount opts setting over filesystems with binary mount data")
Cc: Vivek Trivedi <t.vivek@samsung.com>
Cc: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Mark all of the registration hooks as __ro_after_init (via the
__lsm_ro_after_init macro).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Linus Torvalds
Kees Cook
Eric W. Biederman
Gustavo A. R. Silva
Casey Schaufler
YueHaibing
Piotr Sawicki
Al Viro
Casey Schaufler
James Morris
Tom Gundersen
Davidlohr Bueso
Matthew Garrett
Stephen Smalley
José Bollo
Vasyl Gomonovych
Florian Westphal
Eric Biggers
Tetsuo Handa
James Morris