| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
|---|
|
The current code doesn't do proper accounting for credits
in SMB1 case: it adds one credit per response only if we get
a complete response while it needs to return it unconditionally.
Fix this and also include malformed responses for SMB2+ into
accounting for credits because such responses have Credit
Granted field, thus nothing prevents to get a proper credit
value from them.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
|
|
We do need to account for credits received in error responses
to read requests on encrypted sessions.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
|
|
Currently we mark MID as malformed if we get an error from server
in a read response. This leads to not properly processing credits
in the readv callback. Fix this by marking such a response as
normal received response and process it appropriately.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
|
|
When executing add_credits() we currently call cifs_reconnect()
if the number of credits is zero and there are no requests in
flight. In this case we may call cifs_reconnect() recursively
twice and cause memory corruption given the following sequence
of functions:
mid1.callback() -> add_credits() -> cifs_reconnect() ->
-> mid2.callback() -> add_credits() -> cifs_reconnect().
Fix this by avoiding to call cifs_reconnect() in add_credits()
and checking for zero credits in the demultiplex thread.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
|
|
Precise and non-ambiguous license information is important. The recently
added aegis header file has a SPDX license identifier, which is nice, but
at the same time it has a contradictionary license boiler plate text.
SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
versus
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
Oh well.
Assuming that the SPDX identifier is correct and according to x86/hyper-v
contributions from Microsoft GPL V2 only is the usual license.
Remove the boiler plate as it is wrong and even if correct it is redundant.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
|
|
When doing MTU i/o we need to leave some credits for
possible reopen requests and other operations happening
in parallel. Currently we leave 1 credit which is not
enough even for reopen only: we need at least 2 credits
if durable handle reconnect fails. Also there may be
other operations at the same time including compounding
ones which require 3 credits at a time each. Fix this
by leaving 8 credits which is big enough to cover most
scenarios.
Was able to reproduce this when server was configured
to give out fewer credits than usual.
The proper fix would be to reconnect a file handle first
and then obtain credits for an MTU request but this leads
to bigger code changes and should happen in other patches.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
|
|
The call to SMB2_queary_acl can allocate memory to pntsd and also
return a failure via a call to SMB2_query_acl (and then query_info).
This occurs when query_info allocates the structure and then in
query_info the call to smb2_validate_and_copy_iov fails. Currently the
failure just returns without kfree'ing pntsd hence causing a memory
leak.
Currently, *data is allocated if it's not already pointing to a buffer,
so it needs to be kfree'd only if was allocated in query_info, so the
fix adds an allocated flag to track this. Also set *dlen to zero on
an error just to be safe since *data is kfree'd.
Also set errno to -ENOMEM if the allocation of *data fails.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpener <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
|
|
This reverts commit 574823bfab82d9d8fa47f422778043fbb4b4f50e.
It turns out that my hope that we could just remove the code that
exposes the cache residency status from mincore() was too optimistic.
There are various random users that want it, and one example would be
the Netflix database cluster maintenance. To quote Josh Snyder:
"For Netflix, losing accurate information from the mincore syscall
would lengthen database cluster maintenance operations from days to
months. We rely on cross-process mincore to migrate the contents of a
page cache from machine to machine, and across reboots.
To do this, I wrote and maintain happycache [1], a page cache
dumper/loader tool. It is quite similar in architecture to pgfincore,
except that it is agnostic to workload. The gist of happycache's
operation is "produce a dump of residence status for each page, do
some operation, then reload exactly the same pages which were present
before." happycache is entirely dependent on accurate reporting of the
in-core status of file-backed pages, as accessed by another process.
We primarily use happycache with Cassandra, which (like Postgres +
pgfincore) relies heavily on OS page cache to reduce disk accesses.
Because our workloads never experience a cold page cache, we are able
to provision hardware for a peak utilization level that is far lower
than the hypothetical "every query is a cache miss" peak.
A database warmed by happycache can be ready for service in seconds
(bounded only by the performance of the drives and the I/O subsystem),
with no period of in-service degradation. By contrast, putting a
database in service without a page cache entails a potentially
unbounded period of degradation (at Netflix, the time to populate a
single node's cache via natural cache misses varies by workload from
hours to weeks). If a single node upgrade were to take weeks, then
upgrading an entire cluster would take months. Since we want to apply
security upgrades (and other things) on a somewhat tighter schedule,
we would have to develop more complex solutions to provide the same
functionality already provided by mincore.
At the bottom line, happycache is designed to benignly exploit the
same information leak documented in the paper [2]. I think it makes
perfect sense to remove cross-process mincore functionality from
unprivileged users, but not to remove it entirely"
We do have an alternate approach that limits the cache residency
reporting only to processes that have write permissions to the file, so
we can fix the original information leak issue that way. It involves
_adding_ code rather than removing it, which is sad, but hey, at least
we haven't found any users that would find the restrictions
unacceptable.
So revert the optimistic first approach to make room for that alternate
fix instead.
Reported-by: Josh Snyder <joshs@netflix.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Kevin Easton <kevin@guarana.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Cyril Hrubis <chrubis@suse.cz>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Daniel Gruss <daniel@gruss.cc>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The IPMI driver was recently modified to use SRCU, but it turns out
this uses a chunk of percpu memory, even if IPMI is never used.
So modify thing to on initialize on the first use. There was already
code to sort of handle this for handling init races, so piggy back
on top of that, and simplify it in the process.
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Reported-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
|
|
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
|
|
Some IPMI modules (e.g. ibmpex_msg_handler()) will have ipmi_usr_hdlr
handlers that call ipmi_free_recv_msg() directly. This will essentially
kfree(msg), leading to use-after-free.
This does not happen in the ipmi_devintf module, which will queue the
message and run ipmi_free_recv_msg() later.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in deliver_response+0x12f/0x1b0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888a7bf20018 by task ksoftirqd/3/27
CPU: 3 PID: 27 Comm: ksoftirqd/3 Tainted: G O 4.19.11-amd64-ani99-debug #12.0.1.601133+pv
Hardware name: AppNeta r1000/X11SPW-TF, BIOS 2.1a-AP 09/17/2018
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x92/0xeb
print_address_description+0x73/0x290
kasan_report+0x258/0x380
deliver_response+0x12f/0x1b0
? ipmi_free_recv_msg+0x50/0x50
deliver_local_response+0xe/0x50
handle_one_recv_msg+0x37a/0x21d0
handle_new_recv_msgs+0x1ce/0x440
...
Allocated by task 9885:
kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x116/0x290
ipmi_alloc_recv_msg+0x28/0x70
i_ipmi_request+0xb4a/0x1640
ipmi_request_settime+0x1b8/0x1e0
...
Freed by task 27:
__kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x180
kfree+0xe9/0x280
deliver_response+0x122/0x1b0
deliver_local_response+0xe/0x50
handle_one_recv_msg+0x37a/0x21d0
handle_new_recv_msgs+0x1ce/0x440
tasklet_action_common.isra.19+0xc4/0x250
__do_softirq+0x11f/0x51f
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Fred Klassen <fklassen@appneta.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
|
|
channel and addr->channel are indirectly controlled by user-space,
hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1
vulnerability.
These issues were detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1381 ipmi_set_my_address() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [w] (local cap)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1401 ipmi_get_my_address() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [r] (local cap)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1421 ipmi_set_my_LUN() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [w] (local cap)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1441 ipmi_get_my_LUN() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [r] (local cap)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:2260 check_addr() warn: potential spectre issue 'intf->addrinfo' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing channel and addr->channel before using them to
index user->intf->addrinfo and intf->addrinfo, correspondingly.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
|
|
The block number was not being compared right, it was off by one
when checking the response.
Some statistics wouldn't be incremented properly in some cases.
Check to see if that middle-part messages always have 31 bytes of
data.
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4
|
|
Fixes: ec7d9c9ce8 ("ide: replace ->proc_fops with ->proc_show")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
|
|
Yue Hu noticed that when parsing device tree the allocated platform data
was never freed. Since it's not used beyond the function scope, this
switches to using a stack variable instead.
Reported-by: Yue Hu <huyue2@yulong.com>
Fixes: 35da60941e44 ("pstore/ram: add Device Tree bindings")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
|
GCC 9 reworks the way the references to the stack canary are
emitted, to prevent the value from being spilled to the stack
before the final comparison in the epilogue, defeating the
purpose, given that the spill slot is under control of the
attacker that we are protecting ourselves from.
Since our canary value address is obtained without accessing
memory (as opposed to pre-v7 code that will obtain it from a
literal pool), it is unlikely (although not guaranteed) that
the compiler will spill the canary value in the same way, so
let's just disable this improvement when building with GCC9+.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
|
The ARM per-task stack protector GCC plugin hits an assert in
the compiler in some case, due to the fact the the SP mask
expression is not sign-extended as it should be. So fix that.
Suggested-by: Kugan Vivekanandarajah <kugan.vivekanandarajah@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
|
If an input number x for int_sqrt64() has the highest bit set, then
fls64(x) is 64. (1UL << 64) is an overflow and breaks the algorithm.
Subtracting 1 is a better guess for the initial value of m anyway and
that's what also done in int_sqrt() implicitly [*].
[*] Note how int_sqrt() uses __fls() with two underscores, which already
returns the proper raw bit number.
In contrast, int_sqrt64() used fls64(), and that returns bit numbers
illogically starting at 1, because of error handling for the "no
bits set" case. Will points out that he bug probably is due to a
copy-and-paste error from the regular int_sqrt() case.
Signed-off-by: Florian La Roche <Florian.LaRoche@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Commit 594cc251fdd0 ("make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'")
makes the access_ok() check part of the user_access_begin() preceding a
series of 'unsafe' accesses. This has the desirable effect of ensuring
that all 'unsafe' accesses have been range-checked, without having to
pick through all of the callsites to verify whether the appropriate
checking has been made.
However, the consolidated range check does not inhibit speculation, so
it is still up to the caller to ensure that they are not susceptible to
any speculative side-channel attacks for user addresses that ultimately
fail the access_ok() check.
This is an oversight, so use __uaccess_begin_nospec() to ensure that
speculation is inhibited until the access_ok() check has passed.
Reported-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Syzkaller was able to construct a packet of negative length by
redirecting from bpf_prog_test_run_skb with BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:345 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in skb_copy_from_linear_data include/linux/skbuff.h:3421 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __pskb_copy_fclone+0x2dd/0xeb0 net/core/skbuff.c:1395
Read of size 4294967282 at addr ffff8801d798009c by task syz-executor2/12942
kasan_report.cold.9+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x13e/0x1b0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
memcpy+0x23/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:302
memcpy include/linux/string.h:345 [inline]
skb_copy_from_linear_data include/linux/skbuff.h:3421 [inline]
__pskb_copy_fclone+0x2dd/0xeb0 net/core/skbuff.c:1395
__pskb_copy include/linux/skbuff.h:1053 [inline]
pskb_copy include/linux/skbuff.h:2904 [inline]
skb_realloc_headroom+0xe7/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:1539
ipip6_tunnel_xmit net/ipv6/sit.c:965 [inline]
sit_tunnel_xmit+0xe1b/0x30d0 net/ipv6/sit.c:1029
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4325 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4334 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3219 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x295/0xc90 net/core/dev.c:3235
__dev_queue_xmit+0x2f0d/0x3950 net/core/dev.c:3805
dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3838
__bpf_tx_skb net/core/filter.c:2016 [inline]
__bpf_redirect_common net/core/filter.c:2054 [inline]
__bpf_redirect+0x5cf/0xb20 net/core/filter.c:2061
____bpf_clone_redirect net/core/filter.c:2094 [inline]
bpf_clone_redirect+0x2f6/0x490 net/core/filter.c:2066
bpf_prog_41f2bcae09cd4ac3+0xb25/0x1000
The generated test constructs a packet with mac header, network
header, skb->data pointing to network header and skb->len 0.
Redirecting to a sit0 through __bpf_redirect_no_mac pulls the
mac length, even though skb->data already is at skb->network_header.
bpf_prog_test_run_skb has already pulled it as LWT_XMIT !is_l2.
Update the offset calculation to pull only if skb->data differs
from skb->network_header, which is not true in this case.
The test itself can be run only from commit 1cf1cae963c2 ("bpf:
introduce BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN command"), but the same type of packets
with skb at network header could already be built from lwt xmit hooks,
so this fix is more relevant to that commit.
Also set the mac header on redirect from LWT_XMIT, as even after this
change to __bpf_redirect_no_mac that field is expected to be set, but
is not yet in ip_finish_output2.
Fixes: 3a0af8fd61f9 ("bpf: BPF for lightweight tunnel infrastructure")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
Use napi_consume_skb() to get bulk free. Note that napi_consume_skb is
safe to call in a non-napi context as long as the napi_budget flag is
correct.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Re-run the shell fragment that generated the original list. In particular
this adds the missing xarray related functions.
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
|
|
Since phy driver features became a link_mode bitmap, phy drivers that
don't have a list of features configured will cause the kernel to crash
when probed.
Prevent the phy driver from registering if the features field is missing.
Fixes: 719655a14971 ("net: phy: Replace phy driver features u32 with link_mode bitmap")
Reported-by: Scott Wood <oss@buserror.net>
Signed-off-by: Camelia Groza <camelia.groza@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
A recent commit in Clang expanded the -Wstring-plus-int warning, showing
some odd behavior in this file.
drivers/isdn/hardware/avm/b1.c:426:30: warning: adding 'int' to a string does not append to the string [-Wstring-plus-int]
cinfo->version[j] = "\0\0" + 1;
~~~~~~~^~~
drivers/isdn/hardware/avm/b1.c:426:30: note: use array indexing to silence this warning
cinfo->version[j] = "\0\0" + 1;
^
& [ ]
1 warning generated.
This is equivalent to just "\0". Nick pointed out that it is smarter to
use "" instead of "\0" because "" is used elsewhere in the kernel and
can be deduplicated at the linking stage.
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/309
Suggested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Commit 8ce5f8415753 ("of: Remove struct device_node.type pointer")
removed struct device_node.type pointer, but the conversion to use
of_node_is_type() accessor was missed in chrp_init_IRQ().
Fixes: 8ce5f8415753 ("of: Remove struct device_node.type pointer")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
|
|
Previously the identifier used for indirect block callback registry
and for block rule cb registry (when done via indirect blocks) was the
pointer to the tunnel netdev we were interested in receiving updates on.
This worked fine if a single PF existed that registered one callback for
the tunnel netdev of interest. However, if multiple PFs are in place then
the 2nd PF tries to register with the same tunnel netdev identifier. This
leads to EEXIST errors and/or incorrect cb deletions.
Prevent this conflict by using the rpriv pointer as the identifier for
netdev indirect block cb registry, allowing each PF to register a unique
callback per tunnel netdev. For block cb registry, the same PF may
register multiple cbs to the same block if using TC shared blocks.
Instead of the rpriv, use the pointer to the allocated indr_priv data as
the identifier here. This means that there can be a unique block callback
for each PF/tunnel netdev combo.
Fixes: f5bc2c5de101 ("net/mlx5e: Support TC indirect block notifications
for eswitch uplink reprs")
Signed-off-by: Eli Britstein <elibr@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Oz Shlomo <ozsh@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
|
|
For representors, the TX dropped counter is not folded from the
per-ring counters. Fix it.
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
|
|
Advertised and configured FEC query failure resulted in printing
wrong error code.
Fixes: 6cfa94605091 ("net/mlx5e: Ethtool driver callback for query/set FEC policy")
Signed-off-by: Shay Agroskin <shayag@mellanox.com>
Reported-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
|
|
When an ethernet frame is padded to meet the minimum ethernet frame
size, the padding octets are not covered by the hardware checksum.
Fortunately the padding octets are usually zero's, which don't affect
checksum. However, we have a switch which pads non-zero octets, this
causes kernel hardware checksum fault repeatedly.
Prior to:
commit '88078d98d1bb ("net: pskb_trim_rcsum() and CHECKSUM_COMPLETE ...")'
skb checksum was forced to be CHECKSUM_NONE when padding is detected.
After it, we need to keep skb->csum updated, like what we do for RXFCS.
However, fixing up CHECKSUM_COMPLETE requires to verify and parse IP
headers, it is not worthy the effort as the packets are so small that
CHECKSUM_COMPLETE can't save anything.
Fixes: 88078d98d1bb ("net: pskb_trim_rcsum() and CHECKSUM_COMPLETE are friends"),
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
Cc: Nikola Ciprich <nikola.ciprich@linuxbox.cz>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
|
|
Precise and non-ambiguous license information is important. The recent
relicensing of the bpftools introduced a license conflict.
The files have now:
SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0-only OR BSD-2-Clause
and
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version
Amazingly about 20 people acked that change and neither they nor the
committer noticed. Oh well.
Digging deeper: The files were imported from the iproute2 repository with
the GPL V2 or later boiler plate text in commit b66e907cfee2 ("tools:
bpftool: copy JSON writer from iproute2 repository")
Looking at the iproute2 repository at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/iproute2/iproute2.git
the following commit is the equivivalent:
commit d9d8c839 ("json_writer: add SPDX Identifier (GPL-2/BSD-2)")
That commit explicitly removes the boiler plate and relicenses the code
uner GPL-2.0-only and BSD-2-Clause. As Steven wrote the original code and
also the relicensing commit, it's assumed that the relicensing was intended
to do exaclty that. Just the kernel side update failed to remove the boiler
plate. Do so now.
Fixes: 907b22365115 ("tools: bpftool: dual license all files")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Cc: Sean Young <sean@mess.org>
Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Cc: David Calavera <david.calavera@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Cc: Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Petar Penkov <ppenkov@stanford.edu>
Cc: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Prashant Bhole <bhole_prashant_q7@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: Taeung Song <treeze.taeung@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Quentin Monnet <quentin.monnet@netronome.com>
CC: okash.khawaja@gmail.com
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
During review I noticed that inner meta map setup for map in
map is buggy in that it does not propagate all needed data
from the reference map which the verifier is later accessing.
In particular one such case is index masking to prevent out of
bounds access under speculative execution due to missing the
map's unpriv_array/index_mask field propagation. Fix this such
that the verifier is generating the correct code for inlined
lookups in case of unpriviledged use.
Before patch (test_verifier's 'map in map access' dump):
# bpftool prog dump xla id 3
0: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = 0
1: (bf) r2 = r10
2: (07) r2 += -4
3: (18) r1 = map[id:4]
5: (07) r1 += 272 |
6: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) |
7: (35) if r0 >= 0x1 goto pc+6 | Inlined map in map lookup
8: (54) (u32) r0 &= (u32) 0 | with index masking for
9: (67) r0 <<= 3 | map->unpriv_array.
10: (0f) r0 += r1 |
11: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) |
12: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 |
13: (05) goto pc+1 |
14: (b7) r0 = 0 |
15: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11
16: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = 0
17: (bf) r2 = r10
18: (07) r2 += -4
19: (bf) r1 = r0
20: (07) r1 += 272 |
21: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) | Index masking missing (!)
22: (35) if r0 >= 0x1 goto pc+3 | for inner map despite
23: (67) r0 <<= 3 | map->unpriv_array set.
24: (0f) r0 += r1 |
25: (05) goto pc+1 |
26: (b7) r0 = 0 |
27: (b7) r0 = 0
28: (95) exit
After patch:
# bpftool prog dump xla id 1
0: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = 0
1: (bf) r2 = r10
2: (07) r2 += -4
3: (18) r1 = map[id:2]
5: (07) r1 += 272 |
6: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) |
7: (35) if r0 >= 0x1 goto pc+6 | Same inlined map in map lookup
8: (54) (u32) r0 &= (u32) 0 | with index masking due to
9: (67) r0 <<= 3 | map->unpriv_array.
10: (0f) r0 += r1 |
11: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) |
12: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 |
13: (05) goto pc+1 |
14: (b7) r0 = 0 |
15: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+12
16: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = 0
17: (bf) r2 = r10
18: (07) r2 += -4
19: (bf) r1 = r0
20: (07) r1 += 272 |
21: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) |
22: (35) if r0 >= 0x1 goto pc+4 | Now fixed inlined inner map
23: (54) (u32) r0 &= (u32) 0 | lookup with proper index masking
24: (67) r0 <<= 3 | for map->unpriv_array.
25: (0f) r0 += r1 |
26: (05) goto pc+1 |
27: (b7) r0 = 0 |
28: (b7) r0 = 0
29: (95) exit
Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
Pavel Shilovsky
Thomas Gleixner
Colin Ian King
Linus Torvalds
Corey Minyard
Yang Yingliang
Fred Klassen
Gustavo A. R. Silva
Christoph Hellwig
Kees Cook
Ard Biesheuvel
Florian La Roche
Will Deacon
Willem de Bruijn
Michael S. Tsirkin
Jason Gunthorpe
Camelia Groza
Nathan Chancellor
Rob Herring
Eli Britstein
Tariq Toukan
Shay Agroskin
Cong Wang
Daniel Borkmann